THE OLD CHICAGO SAYING “THE ACTIONS AND decisions of the first five minutes will dictate the success or failures of the next five hours” often rings true when the first-due companies arrive at a fast-spreading fire. Understanding our companies’ basic capabilities and preplanning our response district often make or break this critical first five minutes when we arrive at a quickly changing emergency. This is an incident report of first-due companies to such a fast-spreading fire with an extreme life hazard potential. Quick thinking and a good understanding of the basics brought the incident to a successful end.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
At approximately 0530 hours on a 10°F winter night, Chicago (IL) Fire Department (CFD) Engine 123 and Tower Ladder 39 responded to a fast-spreading fire in two occupied 2 1/2-story balloon-frame apartment buildings, each with two apartments. The fire had originated in the rear porch of one building and was spreading to the rear porch of the building next door (photo 1). Rear porches are exterior wood stairs that are typically used as the second means of egress from the apartments on both floors.
With a strong 25-mph wind coming from the north, the exposures on the 4/D side were in great danger of becoming fully involved. The rear porch of the building next door (the closest exposure), just four feet away and downwind of the fire building, had already started to burn. A commercial strip of mixed-use taxpayer buildings (commercial storefronts with apartments above) was located another 20 feet beyond this first exposure in the same sector. These buildings were 40 feet from the original fire building and were a mix of ordinary and balloon-frame construction.
On arrival of Engine 123 to the intersection where hydrant A was located (Figure 1), Lieutenant Don Freza could see a large body of fire at the rear of the fire buildings (photo 2). Drawing on his extensive fireground experience and thinking quickly, he ordered Engine 123 to drive past the street one block to hydrant B and do a forward supply lay through the alley to the rear of the fire buildings.
 Figure 1. Rear Porch Fire Overview |
From that final position, Engine 123 used a prepiped deck gun to knock down the fire, a critical decision for this operation’s success (photo 3). Simultaneously, an interior hoseline was laid to the front of the fire building. Because of this quick use of the deck gun to contain most of the fire to the original building, personnel from Tower Ladder 39, which had followed the engine and had positioned in front of the fire building, were able to force entry, vent, and search the main fire building for civilians while the fire was being brought under control.
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ANALYSIS
Let’s examine this decision. Generally speaking, when a fire company receives the alarm for a fire response, the size-up starts immediately. A good fire company will know things about the response district such as what it takes to get a positive source of water on one block or another. En route, they will learn additional specifics about the situation.
For example, a significant 25-mph wind was blowing from the north. You can assess the wind condition en route by looking at trees and flags prior to arrival. You must address the wind’s influence on the fire when considering the initial actions to take. In this situation, the fire was at the rear exterior exit of the fire buildings, endangering combustible exposures of mixed occupied residences and a commercial strip in sector 4/D. Complete evacuation of these buildings would be a major problem. Putting out the fire makes this problem go away.
Water supply is another significant factor in this attack. The deck gun flowing 500 gpm could be used to knock down the porches’ fire, but this stream could be maintained only for about a minute with the 500-gallon tank on the engine. Although this water is enough to knock down the outside fire, it is not enough to also supply the interior hoseline stretch that must be made into the fire building to protect the search team, so a positive source must be found quickly.
Since CFD engine companies carry a minimum of 700 feet of large-diameter hose (LDH) on the rear bed, a forward LDH supply lay could be performed from hydrant B on the next block. This supply line stretch would be about 350 feet to the engine’s final position at the rear of the fire buildings.
A water supply consideration: What if hydrant B is inoperable? In this case, the engine could drive down the alley to the rear of the fire buildings, empty the tank using the deck gun to knock down the fast-spreading fire in the rear porches, then drive to the next block and connect to hydrant A. The interior hose stretch would now be coming off the rear step of the apparatus to the fire building.
The Engine 123 officer’s decision to go to hydrant B on the next block also involved efficiently using the best tool on the fireground, the apparatus. If the engine were placed in front of the fire building, hose would have to be brought around to the rear for knockdown of the fire outside and additionally to inside the front door for an interior attack. If the engine were spotted in the rear, water could be placed on the fire quickly and a single-line hose stretch could be made from the alley to the front of the fire building. This would ease the workload on the crew.
Any time an exterior stream is used, one concern is the effect it will have on conditions inside the building. With Engine 123’s final position at the rear of the fire buildings, that stream was delivered to the fire in a flanking attack. This way, the exposures were protected and the fire was not driven into the original fire building because of the angle at which the stream from the deck gun was used.
Radio communications between the engine and the tower ladder are important here, too. The engine must notify the tower ladder of what it intends to do for two reasons. First, it will prevent the tower from automatically following the engine into the next block and trying to get through the alley. Second, if hydrant B is found to be inoperable, the tower ladder will travel on the street past the alley so the engine can still access hydrant A. Pulling an extra alarm in case the extension cannot be stopped is also a good idea. Get the cavalry coming just in case the problem escalates. This engine should also report that it is in the alley if there is a chance that other responding engines would take this position on their arrival.
In this operation, Tower Ladder 39, as the first truck, positioned in front of the main fire building for venting and primary search. Let’s examine this decision. In structure fires that start in rear porches or generally on any exterior surface, expect the fire to communicate into the building and endanger lives on all floors. Another common example of this exterior-to-interior extension would be a vehicle fire burning right up against an occupied residence.
The primary searches in the original fire building were completed effectively, because the truck members knew that the fire was being brought under control in the rear. By the time forcible entry was completed in the front of the main fire building, the interior hoseline made it to the front door for protection. If the fire had not been knocked down as quickly, possibly the primary searches would have been made in the 4/D exposure, since the original fire building occupants might have been written off (photo 4).
Understanding the capabilities of your company and coordinating with other companies on the scene will help you perform the basics more efficiently at a fast-spreading fire.
JIM MASON is a lieutenant in the Chicago (IL) Fire Department. He will present the eight-hour workshop “Strategies and Tactics for Firefighter Survival” at FDIC 2008.
