BY WILLIAM SHOULDIS
The public safety pledge of reducing responders’ risk was tested once again shortly after 0800 hours on Saturday, May 20, 2000, when the Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department received a report of a fire from a guard at the Eastern American Transport and Warehouse Co., located at 8501 Hegerman Street. As the on-duty division commander, the words announcing a first-alarm assignment for this structure were routine to me.
 It took 10 alarms and 57 apparatus to control the flames in the building. [Photo by Diane Dus] |
On arrival of the first unit, it was clear from the fire officer’s words and the tone of his voice in the initial report that this was going to be a campaign fire. Fire was burning through the roof in the center of the large warehouse (see photo 1). Heavy smoke and flames poured from the center of the 650-foot by 750-foot complex. The one-story,1 block-long warehouse was constructed with supporting columns and joists of unprotected steel and corrugated metal and glass walls (see photo 2). An attached loading dock was constructed of concrete block and unprotected steel. The offices were in the front of the building.
 The structure’s metal frame supports were unprotected. The roof collapsed quickly.[Photos by author unless otherwise indicated.] |
Fire protection equipment for the complex was limited. The building was only partially sprinklered with a dry pipe system in the loading terminal and the office areas. There were no detection systems.
The exceptionally large warehouse and loading terminal were filled with highly combustible solids and liquids. Some storage was stacked three levels high on pallets in metal racks. The fire load consisted of motor oil; wood; paper; roofing materials; and products containing alcohol, paraben wax (used to manufacture lipstick), and plastics. Responders knew they had to react quickly and decisively to this expanding emergency to contain the spread of fire and confine the chemical runoff.
CONTAINMENT STRATEGY
When I arrived on the fireground, four alarms had been requested, and the building’s partial sprinkler system was properly supplied. It was obvious that the main objectives were to prevent a major conflagration caused by flying brands (primarily roofing materials stored in the building) dropping into a neighborhood of flat-roof homes and an explosion of a propane storage tank on the premises.
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As the incident commander, my initial incident action plan (IAP) was to isolate the storage section from the offices, establish safe corridors to position heavy-caliber streams, and implement strict accountability procedures. The perimeter of the complex was divided into four geographical sectors (see Figure 1).
Elevated streams and “pipeline” (five-inch hose) companies were requested in rapid succession. An additional functional sector-a water supply group-was established to provide a relay operation. Developing a water supply group in the early phase was an essential element of the IAP because a relay system was needed to deliver a sufficient quantity of water to all sides of the burning building and maintain an adequate flow to the sprinkler system. A battalion chief and five engine companies were assigned to this critical task.
 Runoff from the warehouse is evident in this pool fire seen underneath the master stream. [Photo by T. Harrigan] |
Ground fires were ignited because of the runoff in sectors A and C (see photo 3). Foam was brought to the scene to apply to the runoff, but it was not used. The haz-mat team was instructed to contain the wax, petroleum, and contaminated runoff pouring from the building’s overhead doors. The team constructed dikes around sewer drains (see photo 4).
Later, a floating boom was placed near the entrance of a primary waterway; intake valves at a nearby water treatment plant were closed.
 Hazardous materials responders strategically placed diking materials by sewer drains to prevent chemical runoff from contaminating the city’s water supply. |
With a snorkel, a tower ladder, ladder pipes, SqurtsT, and 1,500-gpm pumpers with large-diameter hose, I felt the strategy in place was appropriate.
PLAN ADJUSTMENTS NEEDED
 After a series of explosions, the fire rapidly moved through the rest of the structure. [Photo by T. Harrigan] |
Suddenly, at around 0830 hours, a series of significant explosions occurred inside the warehouse, necessitating strategic and tactical plan adjustments. The safety zone was expanded beyond the normal range (100 percent of the height of the structure) (see photo 5).
On the south side of the facility, the ground trembled as “fireballs” ascended into the sky after each explosion. Most of the asphalt roof covering had burned away, and bursts of odd-colored flames mixed with the conventional red- and orange-colored flames.
 The 30,000 gallon propane tank was a primary exposure. Water streams were used to cool the vapor space above the liquid. |
Although we did not order the relocation of nearby residents, we encouraged it. Thirty families voluntarily evacuated to an upwind shelter established by the Red Cross at a nearby school. The warden of a prison three blocks downwind was instructed to close the prison’s air-intake system and to keep the inmates indoors. Two major East Coast transportation arteries-Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor and Interstate 95-were shut down for several hours. The railroad was forced to use shuttle buses and cabs to transfer about 400 people between the Philadelphia and the Trenton, New Jersey, stations. The closing of the highway forced many motorists unfamiliar with the area to navigate the narrow streets of the residential Holmesburg section. Additional police were ordered into the neighborhood to control traffic, provide security, and assist in moving people to the upwind shelter.
 Unstaffed streams cool the tank. |
The adjacent 30,000-gallon tank of propane, filled to 45 percent of capacity, was within 80 feet of the structure. Large-caliber streams trained on this vessel to cool the vapor space prevented a BLEVE (boiling-liquid, expanding-vapor explosion). (See photos 6, 7.) Eventually, three unstaffed portable monitors were placed in the street, and an elevated stream from a SqurtT was positioned behind a nearby “defendable” one-story building.
Inside the warehouse, 55-gallon plastic and steel barrels roasted and swelled in the heat. Many were hurtled like missiles, spraying liquids into the north side of the complex. Having pulled our firefighting forces back away from the building prevented them from injuries from the flying drums.
After nearly five hours, at 1249 hours, the fire was contained. It would remain active inside the building for the next 26 hours. Once the fire began to subside, the real challenge and time-consuming portion of the operation began.
Fire department personnel remained on the scene for eight days, engaged in wetting down hot spots; demobilizing; and assisting investigators, including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Overall, a full 10 alarms had been deployed, bringing more than 275 firefighters, paramedics, and police officers to the scene. More than 57 firefighting apparatus were positioned. After the transmission of the 10th alarm, only 16 pumpers remained to cover the city. Later, nine engine companies and one ladder company were staffed by a recall process of off-duty members.
Three firefighters were injured; two received minor chemical burns after stepping in a contaminated pool of water (both had on low-cut bunker boots). The third firefighter tripped and fell, injuring a finger tendon.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- History has demonstrated that there are very few concrete rules in the field of emergency services. Yet, to successfully mitigate a major fire, we must follow fundamental steps: size-up, call for assistance, protect critical exposures, and confine the fire/hazardous materials to the smallest area while maximizing life safety. Trying to create a comprehensive checklist of strategic considerations and safety concerns for different types of occupancies would be cumbersome and impractical in a profession where flexibility is the “password to prosperity.”
Yet, having a firefighting preplan for “super-sized” warehouses is reasonable in this legalist society where inspection procedures, initial actions, and written operating guidelines for target hazards are scrutinized, especially when the incident results in extensive damages and costs to a jurisdiction.
A comprehensive preparedness plan must include identification of hazards, fire protection characteristics, and anticipated “reflex time” required to get apparatus and staffing into crucial positions to limit fire extension and minimize environmental damage.
- The first-arriving crew has many responsibilities, and the initial person in charge needs to understand that his role will have a major impact on the outcome of a large-scale incident. Following standard operating procedures is critical; however, such officers must have the ability to be flexible and determine what resources must be called for at the very beginning of the incident and the actions that need to be taken. This paves the way for a smooth transition when an incident grows from a regular day-to-day, single-unit response to a mutual-aid/extra-alarm event with multiagency and multijurisdictional implications. How the initial incident commander chooses to gather and transfer information will determine whether there will be coordination or chaos.
Most fire service instructors agree that a key to command and control of fire department operations is the proper positioning of resources (apparatus, personnel, and equipment) from the first alarm. Frequently, a meaningful postincident analysis will reveal how actions taken in the first minutes dictated what happened in the next hours.
Additional assistance must be called immediately. Evaluations of serious warehouse fires based on insurance industry investigations and fire department critiques have shown that most require extra alarms or mutual aid because of the fire load that contributes to an intense, fast-burning fire.
Every warehouse is not a target hazard, but many warehouses can easily produce large-scale events that will overwhelm local resources, involve many support agencies, and have a detrimental effect on economic and employment conditions in the community.
In terms of firefighting, appropriate actions include cutting off vertical and horizontal fire spread while maintaining a safe area in which firefighters can operate. Size-up should include assessment of construction features that include roof assemblies, access/escape points, large (unpartitioned) floors, shafts, and breaches in fire doors or walls; the presence and working condition of fire protection systems; configuration/ type of storage; and degree of difficulty in reaching the seat of the fire all will dictate whether the attack should be offensive or defensive.
- Keep in mind that master streams and aerial ladder pipes will not penetrate partitioned or racked storage shelves deep inside a warehouse.
- Always abort aggressive interior operations if you suspect that heavy fire conditions may be present in high-piled storage.
- As in many other large-scale incidents, the need for multiple tactical radio frequencies was readily apparent. Accurate feedback from all sections and sectors provides the basis for the IC’s decisions at the command post. Therefore, avenues of communication must flow up and down the chain of command to ensure that dangerous conditions and circumstances are communicated and acknowledged.
- When considering large-scale relay operations, placing units together will assist in long hoseline stretches. Even with a “team approach,” such tasks are time-consuming. Training in this function will help speed the evolution at an actual emergency. Anticipate the need for relay operations at large-scale incidents such as this fire, for which the local municipal water supply was inadequate.
- Organize the scene by defining tasks (engine, truck, medical, logistical support) and tracking units. Tracking methods vary throughout the nation. The best procedures can trace companies and individuals from the start of a shift to dispatch routes to check-in with the staging area manager to the fireground perimeter to R&R to termination. Tracking of personnel should not prevent units from completing any duties; the intention is to keep an accurate list of units by name (for example, Engine #18) and location (for example, assigned to south side). Tactical worksheets and planning boards have become standard tools while the technology in global tracking systems is being tested.
- Anticipate that large warehouses often contain significant quantities and types of chemicals. Each substance has the potential for producing toxic effects as well as runoff to cross-jurisdictional and political boundaries. As it turned out, we did not have enough booms in our own stock to block all the areas of runoff.
- Emergency scene decision making at large-scale incidents is enhanced by using unified command and an Emergency Operations Center.
- Extended operations are likely to exceed budgets, resources, and the patience of elected officials. Effectiveness will be measured in health, legal, and environmental issues.
- The secret to success at a warehouse fire incorporates keeping a perspective on priorities such as safety, suppression efforts, haz-mat containment, evacuations, emergency notifications, and providing sufficient information to the public. Historical data on large storage sites without automatic detection and properly designed suppression systems are not encouraging. These businesses are prone to rapid fire spread and large monetary losses. The fire department’s responsibility is to create a realistic response plan to accurately assess operational obstacles and warn property owners, tenants, and city managers of potential consequences.
Today’s firefighters rely on new technology, new ideas, and new techniques at an evolving emergency. Yet, often success can be traced to the old tradition-people doing the right things at the right time. Firefighters, code enforcement agents, property owners, business operators, insurance carriers, architects, and elected officials need to be involved as a community grows and the square footage of structures increase. Each group has a vested interest in improving the record of fire loss in storage occupancies, and each has a unique role in working together to ensure that the best possible fire protection features are designed into these sprawling facilities. For fire department leaders, customer service to these industrial sites is at the forefront of risk-threshold changes. Maintaining an acceptable level of risk in a community is having the availability of resources and capability to control any type of crisis. Large distribution centers and storage buildings built or occupied without complete sprinkler coverage are real operational challenges to any size fire department.
For front-line firefighters, the importance of preincident emergency planning, company-level inspections, and realistic hands-on proficiency drills can never be overstated. These are the key components of a quality response agency-the foundation for handling an emergency event before it escalates into a disaster.
- The fire service must actively seek and enforce strong codes so that initial responders have a better chance to balance a firefighter’s oath to protect and undertaking unnecessary personal risk. Most model fire codes contain extensive requirements for high-piled stock including complete and properly designed sprinkler protection, firefighter access roads and doors, as well as many other fire protection features.
- Fires in partially sprinklered warehouses often overwhelm the sprinkler system, especially when the fire does not start in the sprinklered area. For a sprinkler system to be effective, it must be installed throughout the building.
Endnote
1The main building complex was one story but equal to four stories in height. The loading dock was one story; a garage used to repair over-the-road trucks was two stories
WILLIAM SHOULDIS is a deputy chief with the Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department, where he has served for more than 28 years. He is an adjunct instructor for the National Fire Academy’s resident and field programs, teaching courses in fireground operations, health and safety, and prevention. Shouldis has a bachelor’s degree in fire science administration and a master’s degree in public safety. He is an editorial advisory board member of Fire Engineering and a presenter at the FDIC.
