DISASTER PLAN PASSES WITH FLYING COLORS
DISASTER MANAGEMENT
In October of 1989 the Upper Moreland Township (PA) Board of Commissioners unanimously passed a resolution to adopt an interagency emergency operations plan. One hundred days later, a Marine Corps A-4 Skyhawk plane crashed into a residential neighborhood in this suburban Philadelphia community. Damage to the streets, one business, eight residential structures, and four automobiles exceeded S1.5 million. The S12 million aircraft was destroyed in the crash and the tremendous fireball that followed its impact with the earth. Miraculously there were no deaths or serious injuries in this densely populated area of the township.
The following is not just a report of the firefighting operations: It’s a story of a unified and nearly flawless effort by both military and civilian agencies to restore order and provide relief to a residential/commercial neighborhood that nearly went up in flames.
THE INCIDENT UNFOLDS
The crash occurred at 10:43 a.m. on January 12, 1990, when a Marine attack aircraft was forced to abort a routine training mission after the pilot noticed what appeared to be a fuel leak. The jet began a 1 5-minute flight back to the Willow Grove Naval Air Station in Horsham, Pennsylvania. Apparently it lost power and began to tumble to the earth approximately 1.9 miles from the base. The area of impact was about 20 feet from Route 611, one of the most heavily traveled highways in the area.
Fire protection in Upper Moreland Township is provided by the Willow Grove Fire Company, a volunteer department consisting of 50 firefighters manning four engines and one tower ladder. Emergency medical services are provided by the Second Alarmers Association, whose seven ambulances responded to more than 6,000 calls in 1989. The township’s comprehensive emergency management program is administered by the Department of Emergency Services, an administrative element of the township government, and an interagency committee meets regularly to plan for emergencies and conduct disaster plan exercises.
The Willow Grove Naval Air Station Fire Department, a career department of 42 firefighters, was standing by awaiting the arrival of the troubled aircraft. The crash crew watched the jet descend and crash off base. The duty officer ordered the base closed to all other aircraft as the Navy Fire Department responded with three P19 crash trucks, a twin-agent unit (AFFF and halon), and a structural pumper.
The Montgomery County Communications Center began receiving the first of many calls reporting that a major explosion had taken place. Pennsylvania Turnpike officials also called from a toll station several miles away to report a “jetliner” crash. The fire department. Second Alarmers, and Upper Moreland police were dispatched.
First-arriving crash crews observed the jet in the middle of an intersection, fully involved in fire. In addition, there were numerous fires including fire in a commercial building, several dwellings, vehicles, trees, and aircraft parts. Many electrical wires were down and sparking, including a 34-kv line that knocked out traffic control signals for at least a mile-long stretch of Route 611, adding to the neargridlock traffic conditions.
PUN PUT INTO ACTION
The crash crews of approximately 12 firefighters approached from two separate streets and initiated a quick knockdown using turret nozzles and handlines. The Willow Grove Fire Company approached from the south and put a foam handline in service. The Horsham Fire Company, arriving on a second alarm called by the deputy chief of Willow Grove, stretched two five-inch supply lines to the crash trucks. Willow Grove stretched a four-inch line to supply its engines.
Within five minutes of the arrival of the emergency forces, a unified command post was established and the township’s emergency operations plan was activated. This plan mandates the establishment of the Incident Command System, modeled after the National Fire Academy’s system but modified by local procedures.
The Willow Grove fire chief arrived, assumed fire command, and immediately assigned a rescue group to conduct a primary search of the damaged structures and automobiles. It was determined at this time that the pilot, Captain Duane Pandorf, USMC, had ejected at less than 100 feet, rode his partially opened parachute through the fireball, and became tangled in the overhead electrical wires. The recommended ejection height is about 1,500 feet. Fortunately, he was quickly extricated and sustained only minor injuries.
Fire command established a staging area for incoming fire equipment and a manpower pool for arriving firefighters yet to be assigned. Later in the operation a refreshment area and heated school bus were set up to rehab the several dozen civilian and military responders on the scene.
The chief of police, patrol division commander, and shift supervisor assembled at the command post to coordinate police responsibilities. The police chief assigned the patrol division lieutenant to the police command function and the chief took charge of the mammoth traffic jam, working with neighboring police departments and fire police units. The shift supervisor was tasked with establishing perimeter control: First personnel and then barricades were used to keep back hundreds of civilian spectators, many of whom were trying to take pieces of the aircraft.
It was almost immediately clear that the mass casualty incident anticipated had in fact not occurred. There were no rescues to be made or injuries to triage, treat, or transport. EMS command began to release units from staging within 20 minutes.
Other responsibilities and tasks continued to be divided between public works command, township administration, the Fire Marshal’s Office, and others. As director of emergency services/fire marshal, I assumed command of overall scene management as indicated in our emergency plan.
As soon as the fires were controlled and before the secondary search was completed, ranking military officials were requested to report to the command post so that activities could be coordinated and duplication of effort minimized. A cooperative working relationship between military and public command personnel quickly formed. An expanded perimeter was agreed to and the police coordinated with the public works sector to secure barricades from five municipalities. These were delivered to a staging area and distributed.
The Fire Marshal’s Office was tasked with documenting damage to private and public’ property and, in addition, instituted a preplanned identification system for local residents returning home to the restricted neighborhood. Residents were directed to a local commercial building, logged in, identified, issued a pass, and escorted to their homes. Shelter needs were coordinated with the American Red Cross and the military.
Within a few hours the Navy and Marine Corps had established a completely self-sufficient operation that involved tasks ranging from cooking to investigation to security. The Naval Base Public Works Department moved in artificial lighting, tents, and trucks to help facilitate the accident investigation. By 5 p.m. all civilian agencies except the police department and Fire Marshal’s Office were released from the scene. The Fire Marshal’s Office and the police department remained involved for about one week, assessing damage, working with the utilities, and providing traffic and crowd control for the hundreds of daily sightseers.
Thirty hours after the crash, all parts of the aircraft had been removed. Total restoration of the neighborhood, including removal of fuelcontaminated soil, was completed this spring.
WHAT WE LEARNED
As is the case with all emergency incidents, there are lessons to be learned and reinforced. At an incident critique we identified more than 50 such lessons. Several are listed below:
- Recent tabletop exercises proved invaluable in the successful management of this incident.
- The rapid establishment of a unified command post, staging area, press area, safety sector, and specific prima-
- ry search assignments are essential to control a chaotic scene.
- Fire and police officials should consider utilizing local tactical frequencies earlier on in major incidents.
- A common command radio frequency is necessary for all senior officials. As a result of this incident the Montgomery County Office of Emergency Management has purchased a portable repeater and 10 portable radios with a dedicated frequency for command-level tactical use.
- Senior officials must not leave the command post to personally oversee operations within their area of responsibility; instead they must delegate authority.
- It is helpful to establish specific meeting times or intervals for strategy meetings, especially after the emergency phase is over and the recovery phase has begun.
- There was an immediate need for more paper, pencils, and maps. We are now developing more “command post kits” to place in emergency vehicles.
- Use of incident command vests should be initiated immediately. The delay in the use of the vests and the fact that nonuniformed township officials did not have more visible ID tags caused some confusion among military officials. We will purchase more vests and more visible ID tags.
Had it not been for the courage of the pilot and the skills of the fire and other emergency forces, this incident would have been a tragedy rather than an unusual but successful operation. Captain Fandorf was later recognized by the community for his courage in attempting to avoid a congested area until the last possible moment.
No one knows better than emergency services personnel that the next unusual incident may be far more devastating and provide a far greater challenge than this aircraft crash. The real challenge is to continue to prepare and train for that next incident.
