By Raul A. Angulo
Do your firefighters know what goes into your decision for fire attack? It’s more than just “put the wet stuff on the red stuff”—you have to have a strategy and a plan. If the fire chief came up to you at your next fire and asked “IC, what’s your strategy and your plan?” what would you say? Be honest. Up until 10 years ago, I would have frozen with a blank stare on my face. My strategy? My plan? The fact is, many times companies show up at a fire and go into action with no plan at all. Everything is shoot from the hip, everyone is playing “catch up,” and the fire ends up running the incident.
Seattle (WA) Fire Department Deputy Chief (Ret.) Stewart E. Rose, who helped develop the original National Fire Academy Managing Company Tactical Operations, expanded the concept to formulate a Quick Action Plan (QAP) that includes conducting a risk-benefit analysis, identifying problems, developing strategy and tactics to solve those problems, and assigning teams to accomplish those strategies. The QAP becomes the dynamic foundation for a workable firefighter accountability system.
No matter what type of accountability system your fire department uses, unless it can track specific firefighters performing specific assignments at specific locations, you do not have a functional accountability system. You merely have a roster of firefighters at the incident. That’s not going to help you locate a firefighter when someone calls for a Mayday.
This QAP concept is used in the decision-making process for fire attack in the Pacific Northwest and other parts of the country.
USING THE QAP AT A FIRE
Let’s look at how to apply the QAP concept at a fire I observed on a recent visit to Englewood, New Jersey.
The alarm bell. This is where size-up starts.
Time of day. It was 17:12 hours on a sunny Saturday afternoon in July. A huge downtown merchants’ sidewalk sale was taking place, and the streets were packed with people; traffic was almost gridlocked. It was tough for Englewood Fire Chief Robert Moran’s vehicle to plow through the traffic, so he knew the engines would be delayed also. The address of the fire was in an upscale part of town where the houses tend to be larger than 3,000 square feet. This is another part of size-up—size of the occupancy. Moran was already thinking of mutual aid and a second alarm, anticipating what the fire may become.
Water. As the chief approached the top of the hill, he could see the fire. The next question was, Where’s my water? There happened to be a hydrant right at the top of the driveway. This was one less thing to worry about and a critical piece of information to relay to incoming companies. There’s a lot of prefire information to think about, but the engine driver is looking for a hydrant. If you arrive before the engine company, let the chauffeur know the location of the hydrant. That will take a lot of pressure off the driver and the officer of the first-in engine.
 1. Photos by author. |
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Paint the picture for incoming companies. On arrival, smoke and flames were visible from the large center window on the second floor of a two-story, wood-frame, single-family residence that measured 50 2 60 feet. There were no immediate exposures. (See photo 1.)
Risk-benefit analysis. Whether you’re the first-in company officer or first-in chief, you have to ask three risk-benefit analysis questions before you do anything else. They are essential in developing your Quick Action Plan to determine whether your strategy will be offensive or defensive.
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(Note: Refer to photos 1 and 2. Photo 1 was taken on the chief’s arrival; photo 2 was taken on arrival of the first fire units. The time elapsed was just a matter of minutes. You can see how time is of the essence in every aspect of responding to a house fire. A good rule of thumb is to expect the fire to double in size every minute.)
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The first question concerns value. The first-in officer should ask, “Is there life value and is there property value?” If the answer to both of these questions is “no,” go defensive and don’t risk the lives of your firefighters on loser buildings. If you have visible occupants, obviously the answer is “yes.” You must use offensive tactics to effect rescues. The other consideration is possible occupant life. At this fire, there were no visible occupants trapped, but there was a swingset on the side of the house, a red sedan in the driveway, and a neighbor who stated a family of five lived in the home with a possible live-in nanny. However, the neighbor could not verify if anyone was home. These are all indicative of possible occupants in the burning structure. Again, you must employ an offensive strategy.
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Then determine if you have property value. So far, this looks like a room-and-contents fire, not a structure fire. Initiate an aggressive offensive attack with calculated risks to firefighters to protect property. Any delay in an offensive attack will allow this room-and-contents fire to progress to a structure fire.
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The second question concerns time—how much time you have to fight the fire. The answer is directly related to the fire resistive rating of the building classification. In building construction, you are most concerned with the floor, ceiling, and truss ratings because of the threat of structural failure. In this case, the house was determined to be wood-frame construction, which is rated for 20 minutes (two to five minutes for lightweight trusses). That means you have about 20 minutes of the building’s being on fire before components fail.
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Moran can calculate a 20- to 30-minute offensive attack before he has to reevaluate his strategy. The only way to buy time and slow down this clock is to put water on the fire! If he isn’t making progress at the 20-minute mark, he will have to back his crews out and go defensive or run the risk of a structural collapse.
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The third question concerns size of the fire. The answer is in gallons per minute (gpm) and your ability to deliver the required gpm. Using the National Fire Academy Fire Flow Formula (L 2 W divided by 3 for 100% involvement), the house is 50 2 60 feet = 3,000 feet divided by 3 = 1,000 gpm for 100% involvement. Working only with the second floor, this fire is approximately 25% involved; 1,000 gpm divided by 4 = 250 gpm. Moran has to be able to apply 250 gpm of water to knock down the fire. Englewood’s engines carry 750 gallons of water in their tanks. Personnel use break-apart low-pressure nozzles that deliver 200 gpm at 75 psi. With this quick calculation, he knows he has the resources and water capability to launch an offensive attack on a fire this size.
 8. |
Answering questions about value, time, and size and applying a risk-benefit analysis give a sound justification for the attack strategy—in this case, offensive.
 9. |
Identify your problems. Problems basically fall into seven categories: access, possible occupants, visible occupants, smoke, fire, exposures, and hazardous materials. If you can’t resolve these problems, anything else you do really doesn’t matter. For example, if you have trapped, visible occupants with fire showing but you have a locked chain-link fence around the property, you have an access problem that you must resolve before you can do anything else. Strategy: forcible entry. Tactic: bolt cutters. Resources needed: 1 firefighter.
These categories are listed in the order that they usually present themselves; however, they can appear in any order and may present themselves more than once during the incident. For example, after you cut through the chain-link fence, if you were to encounter locked doors in the hallways, you would have another access problem to solve. Strategy: forcible entry. Tactic: rabbit tool, ax, or halligan. Resources: 1 or 2 firefighters.
List only the problems you see. You may not have all seven problems at an incident.
Look at photos 1-4. What are your problems? Access, possible occupants, smoke, and fire. Make a tactical worksheet. This is your QAP. Develop your own personal shorthand symbols. These are basically the problems you need to solve, and you will need approximately 12 firefighters to do so. Obviously many of these tasks can be done quickly, freeing firefighters for the next assignment.
For example, at this fire the front door was kicked in and there was good visibility on the first floor. Access and primary search on this floor were done in seconds, freeing those firefighters to assist in the search and attack on the second floor. You will need a minimum of 12 firefighters to fight this fire. This number does not include all the support operations you need—RIT team, safety officer, rehab, and so on. If you don’t have 10 to 12 firefighters responding, you’ll have to call for a second alarm or mutual aid.
As fire problems are solved, cross them off your list. If new problems arise, list them, and come up with a strategy, a tactic, and how many firefighters you need to accomplish the task. The QAP is dynamic. It’s an excellent tool to quickly estimate how many firefighters you will need on-scene at an incident and whether you will need additional personnel.
Fireground accountability system. The accountability system in many fire departments is nothing more than a roster of names. A functional system has to let you know who is doing what and where they are doing it. Fire departments will face fines and lawsuits if they cannot demonstrate a working accountability system was in place at the time of a firefighter injury or fatality.
The QAP tactical worksheet lists your problems, where they are, strategy and tactic, and how many firefighters you need to assign to accomplish the task. Tying the QAP to your accountability system will give you practical and accurate firefighter accountability.
For example, if E2 was assigned to fire attack on floor 2, E3 was backup line on floor 2, E1 did forcible entry and search on floor 1, and T1 was doing ventilation and search on floor 2, by looking at the QAP, you know where everyone is and what they are doing. If you were to receive a Mayday from a member of T1, you could immediately call E3 to assist T1. Both units are on floor 2.
If you were running a roof operation and a firefighter went through the roof of this two-story house, he’s either going to end up in the attic or on the second floor. You could look at your QAP to see who is assigned to operations on the second floor. They are in the immediate vicinity to assist or rescue this downed firefighter. Depending on how sophisticated your portable radios are, you can identify the firefighter transmitting the Mayday by name. But the QAP will allow you to narrow it down to the unit, group, or team in trouble.
BACK AT THE FIRE
The chief parked his vehicle in the driveway across the street and set up command, leaving room for the engines and the truck to position. This was an excellent position for a command post. He was out of the way of apparatus and still had a clear view of the fireground.
A 360-degree survey revealed light smoke was coming from the soffits. This fire will soon enter the attic. There was no visible fire on side C (see photo 3). Win-dows on the first floor were clear enough to see the whole layout of the house and the first indication that occupants were on that floor. With the fire blowing out the front A-side window, it had a vent point, slowing interior fire spread. It was still a room-and-contents fire.
Photo 4 was shot from the A-D corner of the house. It’s a graphic reminder of how quickly fire spreads. Now it is a structure fire, and the 20-minute time clock to structural collapse has started.
With two in/two out, and anticipating the need for additional resources and crew rotation because of the afternoon heat and humidity, Moran requested a third alarm. Mutual-aid companies came from departments in Fort Lee, Tenafly, Teaneck, and Leonia, New Jersey.
The driver of the first-in engine took the hydrant at the top of the driveway (see photo 5), and the crew pulled a two-inch preconnected attack line. They laid to the front door, forced entry, and continued up the stairs to attack the fire (see photo 6). The presence of the family station wagon indicated possible occupants (see photo 7). Members laid a second line to the second floor as a backup and exposure line. They attacked from the uninvolved toward the involved part of the structure, pushing the fire toward the path of least resistance, and quickly knocked down the fire in a couple of minutes (see photo 8). Then they performed the primary search on the second floor.
Remember, when you’re short-staffed in the initial stages of a fire, as was the case here, sometimes the best tactic to accomplish life safety for visible or possible occupants is to put out the fire!
The truck company positioned the apparatus in the front driveway of the structure. This was a good move by the driver because of the deep setback from the street. (Remember to place your apparatus to maximize the reach of the aerial. You can always lay an extra 100 feet of hose, but you can’t extend the aerial an extra 100 feet.) Crew members placed the aerial to the roof as well as a 24-foot ground ladder on side C for a secondary means of egress. They also vented the windows on side C, second floor (see photo 9). Smoke was still coming from the eaves, indicating the possibility that fire extended into the attic. The ceiling would have to be pulled to check for extension.
Passport name tags were collected from all the apparatus and turned in to the command post so Moran could have his accountability system in place. A mutual-aid company later assisted in monitoring fireground accountability.
The chief was notified that there was an attic vent accessible on the B-side gabled end should lightweight trusses be encountered. He relayed this information to all companies on the fireground. This is an excellent alternative in checking for extension in the attic or fighting a fire involving lightweight trusses instead of having firefighters on the roof or under the trusses. Again, try to access from the uninvolved end of the attic. A straight stream should reach trusses involved in fire on the opposite side of the attic space.
With the fire knocked down, Moran decided not to open the roof. Instead, crews pulled ceilings vented the fire horizontally by opening windows and hydraulically flowing a 45-degree fog stream out the fire window.
Primary and secondary searches in the house and garage confirmed that the family was not home at the time of the fire.
Rehab and medical stations were set up to check the fire crews. Companies were rotated to limit the effects of the hot and humid weather.
The cause of the fire was electrical and involved a hanging light fixture in the master bedroom closet. Contents and structural property loss was estimated at $100,000. Fire damage was confined to the room of origin with extension into the hallways.
Raul A. Angulo, a 23-year veteran of the fire service, is captain of Seattle (WA) Fire Department Engine Co. 33. He is on the educational advisory boards for FDIC and FDIC WEST. Angulo is an instructor in company officer development, fire service leadership, and fireground strategy and tactics. He is president of the Fellowship of Christian Firefighters, Seattle-Puget Sound Chapter. Visit FireEngineering.com for a description of his 2003 FDIC West class and other classroom descriptions.
This house fire illustrates that a QAP can be applied to a fire in any part of the country. It’s a simple, systematic approach in the decision-making process toward fire attack. If chiefs and company officers are committed to making firefighting safer, they have to make their firefighters smarter. Learning to use and read a QAP teaches them to understand the decisions that go into fire attack. And when everyone understands how your plan works, you can be confident that your firefighters will do the right thing, the right way, at the right time, for the right reasons.
