BY MIKE NASTA
At 2014 hours on July 26, 2009, Newark (NJ) Fire Department dispatch transmitted an alarm for a fire at 282 Sherman Avenue. At 2017 hours, Battalion Chief 4 Pete Spann transmitted an “all hands” signal. Dispatch advised all responding units that it was receiving multiple calls for a commercial structure fire. Spann established command on arrival, setting up the command post at the building’s A/B corner. His initial size-up reported heavy fire through the roof of a large one-story commercial building of ordinary construction. This building housed an auto repair vocational training program. Recognizing that this building featured a heavy timber truss roof, Spann ordered a defensive operation because of the building’s construction and the heavy volume of fire (photo 1).
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| (1) Aerial view of the fire and exposure buildings. The circle marks the skylight through which the battalion chief fell. |
New Jersey law requires placarding of all buildings that feature floor or roof truss construction, which enables the incident commanders (ICs) to choose the proper firefighting mode and protect the rest of the operating forces (photo 2). This law was enacted after the July 1, 1988, Hackensack Ford tragedy that took the lives of five Hackensack firefighters.
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| (2) (2-6) Photos by Frank Bellina. |
Command was transferred to Deputy Chief 1 James Smith, who confirmed the “all hands” dispatch and the defensive fireground operations. Smith established collapse/exclusionary zones, which all chief officers, including Battalion Chief Kevin Killeen, the incident safety officer (ISO), defined and continuously monitored.
Master streams were placed in service on all four sides of the fire building. Second, third, and fourth alarms were struck, followed by several special calls. Personnel used additional master streams and large-caliber handlines on the fire building and operated handlines from the roof of the L-shaped exposure building, which faced two sides of the fire building. The 22½-foot-high exposure building housed a heavy truck repair business; its side walls and roof were constructed of corrugated steel panels.
After Ladder 5 forced entry into the exposure building, the captain noticed the roof included skylights (photo 3). Units used Ladder 4’s aerial to stretch hoselines on the roof of the exposure building. Members immediately verbally warned each other about the presence of these skylights as each member climbed off the ladder onto the roof. The multiple 3- × 10-foot corrugated fiberglass skylight panels were set flush with the roof surface with no surrounding lip, mounted on a steel I-beam frame with the I-beams spaced five feet on center. These particular skylights were thin panels and did not have any load-bearing characteristics. One firefighter actually put his foot through one of the skylights, but, fortunately, did not fall completely through it (photo 4).
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| (3) |
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| (4) |
Approximately 45 minutes into the operation, when the fire was still not under control, Killeen, as ISO, was performing a perimeter safety check as directed by the IC. He ascended a ground ladder (originally set up as a secondary means of egress from the exposure building) to check on operating units on the exposure’s roof. Killeen began to walk across the roof, unaware of the presence of the skylights. Since the skylights had no lip around them and blended into the corrugated steel roofing, they were nearly impossible to see, especially in dark and smoky conditions. Killeen walked past the first row of skylights but stepped into a skylight in the second row, falling 22½ feet, landing on the concrete floor below on his SCBA (photo 5). Because of the skylight’s dimensions and lack of a surrounding lip, the chief had nothing to grab onto as he fell through.
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| (5) |
Members operating within the building immediately located the severely injured battalion chief. Several units operating in the area witnessed the fall and immediately went to assist Killeen. EMS personnel immobilized him and quickly packaged and transported him to the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey for evaluation and treatment. Killeen suffered a badly broken pelvis and shoulder and damage to his lower spine; he underwent multiple surgeries to repair the damage.
Immediately following Killeen’s accident, personnel made several emergency radio transmissions concerning the incident. However, units stepped on each other, diminishing their transmissions’ effectiveness.
Except for this unfortunate accident, the incident ran smoothly and there were no other injuries to civilians or firefighters (photo 6).
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| (6) |
Lessons Learned
• On August 3, 2009, the Newark Fire Department issued a safety bulletin that identified the exposure building and one other that also featured corrugated metal roofs with thin fiberglass skylights. The bulletin stated the following:
[These roofs] “are to be considered unsafe for firefighting operations …. In order to prevent further injuries, members are directed not to conduct roof operations on these buildings until further notice.
“All members should be alert to the possibility that the thin plastic light-transmitting panels may be encountered on other roofs, especially those constructed with corrugated metal roof panels. The plastic panels will likely be placed over an opening in the metal panels without any supports or identifying features. They will not be readily apparent to the unwary firefighter.
“Extreme caution must be exercised when operating on any roof; and if the possibility exists that the thin light-transmitting panels are present, roof operations are to be abandoned immediately.”
• Response district preplanning is essential to firefighter safety. The presence of fiberglass skylights was discovered only when firefighters entered the exposure building. Companies must be thoroughly familiar with and preplan their first-due response district, especially noting building features that impact firefighter safety. Computer-aided design software is a useful tool for compiling building preplans based on inspection data. Dispatch must relay this information to responding units and make them aware of any possible dangers.
• Construction codes must promote firefighter safety. Although this building’s skylights met the applicable construction codes when it was built, these panels are extremely difficult to spot at night and in smoky conditions. The code did not require any raised lip or frame around the skylight. A raised frame was required only if the roof contained any mechanical equipment that would have required a worker to enter the roof for routine maintenance. Firefighters are not considered in the requirement.
• Several fireground communications issues arose in this incident. An “Urgent” construction hazard message was not transmitted to all on the fireground when the fiberglass panels were first discovered. Whenever any firefighter, regardless of rank or assignment, discovers a potential fireground safety issue, that member should transmit an “Urgent” warning message to all on the fireground. Although the Newark Fire Department had trained on New Jersey’s state guidelines for Urgent and Mayday transmissions, they were not followed at this incident. Firefighters only verbally warned other members about the skylights as they stepped onto the exposure building roof. Chief Killeen did not receive that warning.
Emergency transmissions made after Killeen fell through the roof did not follow Mayday transmission procedures. Radio transmissions were stepped on because too many members were trying to talk at one time. Members must exercise radio discipline and wait for clear air before making a radio transmission. Urgent messages take priority over normal messages, and Mayday messages take priority over all transmissions.
The Newark Fire Department uses the same radio frequency for dispatch as well as fireground. Establish several fireground frequencies so different incident and dispatch frequencies do not interfere with each other.
This was a tragic accident. Hopefully, it will motivate firefighters to investigate their districts for the presence of fiberglass skylight panels. Information sharing in this profession equals safety. We are each other’s keepers; if we don’t protect each other, who will protect us?
After the 1988 Hackensack Ford tragedy, New Jersey mandated that buildings with truss roofs be placarded. This incident again reminds the fire service that we must learn from past tragedies and not repeat them. No other firefighter should fall through one of these panels.
MIKE NASTA, a 25-year veteran of the Newark (NJ) Fire Department, is deputy chief in charge of the Training Division and the department’s safety officer. He is also serving his third term as chief of the South Hackensack (NJ) Volunteer Fire Department. Nasta is a New Jersey-certified level II fire instructor and a senior fire instructor at the Bergen County (NJ) Fire Academy, a H.O.T. coordinator for FDIC, and a member of Fire Engineering’s editorial advisory board. He coauthored Fireground Officer Developmentwith Anthony Avillo and has written numerous fire service articles. He is also an adjunct instructor at Kean University and New Jersey State University, where he teaches the program he coauthored.
