FRANCIS L. BRANNIGAN, SFPE (Fellow)
Editor’s note: Francis L. Brannigan had submitted this column, and others, before his sudden death on January 10.
A cantilever is a structure projected out from the building and supported only at the building. Think of a see-saw. When you were a kid, a bad kid would get you, a good kid, up on a see-saw and then jump off. You get on a balcony supported by wooden I-beams projecting from the building. The fire damages the I-beam, and the balcony falls-you with it. Know your buildings.
Several New Orleans (LA) firefighters died in a balcony collapse some years ago. Canopies may be cantilevered or simple beam-supported (on both ends) on the wall at the inside end and by cables or chains at the outside end. How is the chain or cable connected to the building? It could be connected by a spreader plate on the inside face of a masonry wall or, as is more usual, it could be connected to the combustible interior support structure. The failure of such a connection would convert the simple beam to an undesigned cantilever.
Canopies and Mansards
A furniture store was located in a former theater. There was a projecting canopy. The interior support connection failed. The falling canopy pulled down a long section of coping, and six Fire Department of New York firefighters died.
In a more fortunate case, District of Columbia firefighters noted that the connections of a supported canopy were loosening at the wall and cleared the area. A wrecking company placed wood columns under the outer end of the canopy and thus converted it; it is a simple beam (supported at both ends).
Such a hazard should be archived by the address, so it could be announced as a “hazard alert” with the dispatch. The finished balcony will not give a clue of its flimsy construction.
Construction jobs often have a platform extending from the building so a crane can deposit materials. The platform is secured by 4 × 4 wood posts delivering the load upward to the floor above. Should there be a fire on or near the platform, clear the area and attack the fire from another side of the building or by a master stream from well outside the collapse zone. You might need police assistance in clearing the collapse zone. I suggest you inform the police department of this possibility beforehand.
A canopy over a walkway across the front of a building was supported by trusses extending from the interior. A firefighter was on the walkway directing a small stream into an inferno. He died when the canopy collapsed. Note that big fires require big water delivered from outside the collapse zone. A collapse zone should be set up at any defensive operation. National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Report 2002-44 tells of one fatality that occurred when a false mansard that had been added to improve the appearance of a building collapsed.
The load of the mansard was delivered to the roof by a tension rod. When the connection to the roof failed, the mansard fell. The fire was under a defensive attack. In such a case, standard operating procedures should demand that all personnel stay clear of the collapse zone. All types of people seem to believe that they have a right or duty to enter the collapse zone. A collapse sector officer should be designated and given police assistance if necessary.
Most, if not all, projecting signs are supported by a tension rod(s) tied back to the roof. When surveying a building for a preplan, determine projections are secured.
Air-Conditioners
One common projection-a window air-conditioner-might seem to require no preplan survey. However, darkness or smoke might hide the air-conditioner.
Deputy Chief Billy Goldfeder of the Loveland-Symmes (OH) Fire Department, a constant proponent of firefighter safety, told of two Nashua (NH) firefighters injured when window air-conditioners fell as they were setting up a ladder to remove the air-conditioners.
This condition and any of the others cited should be archived in a file at alarm headquarters keyed to the structure’s address. Announce the information as a “hazard alert” with the dispatch. This will put all on notice that these firefighter killer hazards exist. If the alarm is dispatched without an address, the first unit on the scene should pass the address to the dispatcher. The alert should be repeated when additional units from the same department or mutual aid are summoned.
A firefighter asked for information about marking buildings. I pointed out that marking is limited and that fire suppression forces should be made aware of an infinite number of hazards. The Hazard Alert system described above will accomplish this vital safety measure. Failure to have such a system could be construed as evidence of criminal negligence in a civil or criminal action.
The firefighter said the department’s separate dispatching agency was not enthusiastic about suggestions on how to improve firefighter safety. I suggested that the fire department assemble the information in a computer file. During the working day, the office clerk could pass on the information by cell phone, if necessary, to the incident commander. At night, a retired member or a buff who monitors alarms could perform this function.
Once this “system” is in place, make the common supervisor of the fire department and of the dispatch agency aware of it. Then, ask (or the question might be raised), “Why is this makeshift system being used? Why is this function not performed at the alarm office?” This “little nudge” might result in orders coming down from on high to put in the system.
BURGLAR BARS
I go back to my younger years by monitoring FDNY alarms on the Internet while I write. A request for an additional engine and truck because of “burglar bars” got me thinking about such obstructions to firefighter egress in emergency situations. I started to write, but a nagging thought crossed my mind. I had recently read about that problem. I reviewed a few magazine copies, and I found that my longtime friend Tom Brennan had covered the subject like a blanket in Random Thoughts (Fire Engineering, February 2005). The only hazard I could add was to be sure to block any fire door you pass through, even if only light smoke is showing. A burst of fire from a void could trigger the closing of the door. Overhead doors are particularly dangerous. When inspecting, see if there is a normal door to one side of the overhead fire door that can be used as an exit. Add this information to the preplan.
Remove the blockage when all have evacuated. If enough personnel are available, place a firefighter at the door to prevent others from wandering in without your knowledge. Remember Murphy’s Law: If some dumb thing can happen, it will happen.
SHIPS AT PIERS
In 1941, I was a red-hot FDNY buff and member of the well-trained auxiliary corps. In 1942, I was a Naval firefighting officer in Panama designated as a district fire chief in the Unified Panama Security Command. Conscious of my ignorance, I started preplanning buildings, a practice unknown in the fire service of the day. I extended my preplanning to ships at our piers, particularly submarines. It took several meetings with the legendary “knows everything chief of the boat” of several boats to get a man who could combine his knowledge of the submarine. I say this as a warning about the quality of the information you might get at the scene of a fire. On a cruise around the Hawaiian Islands, the captain bragged that he had never been to firefighting school. I said, “Neither had the captain of the General Slocum.” (The General Slocum burned in the East River in New York City in 1904. The captain kept going forward into a wind that was pushing the fire the length of the ship and past a fireboat station. The ship was totally unfit to handle an emergency. More than a thousand people on a church picnic died.)
At Navy Norfolk, I commanded the seagoing mobile unit, which would be called out for ships on fire in the harbor or offshore. On any platoon, we could muster 12 members who had shipboard firefighting training or experience. All our equipment was on express wagons, combat loaded-basically not having all the eggs in one basket. As an example, we had four boxes-each containing a 2 1/2-inch nozzle; a 1 1/2-inch nozzle; a wye gate; a spanner wrench; gaskets; a double male; a double female; and a Bresnan distributor-that were not on the official Navy list of equipment. The Coast Guard had escorted the ship in and anchored it out of the way. A fire in the hold had produced a backdraft explosion violent enough to toss a steel pontoon hatch cover up and drop it back into the hold askew. A crewman, blown overboard, was recovered. They covered the hold with canvas and steamed the hold. We peeled back the canvas and started three big lines. Some flames were as high as the mast. We could not hit the fire because of the position of the hatch cover.
I had my firefighter on the tug put a distributor on the end of a line. I hauled it up and dropped it down the “booby hatch,” a ladder access to the hold. Within a minute, the smoke was all white. By sheer luck, I had hit the heart of the fire.
However, I could not do that today. Study “Maritime Code May Affect Marine Operations,” by Craig Shelley and Anthony Cole, in Fire Engineering, April 2005. It appears that the booby hatch would now be secured on the underside as part of security precautions. The IC should not be afraid to draw the line on interior operations in a ship with firefighter ventilation and escape routes locked by an ad hoc variety of security devices. Do not wait for fire. Let the shipping interests know that under the circumstances, your assistance will be limited. After all, a ship fire can almost always be licked by sinking the ship or towing it to a safe location, where it can burn out. Each of these alternatives should be discussed with the proper authorities.
When I was assigned to the Class A Navy Firefighting School at Norfolk, I was put in charge of the one-week class for personnel assigned to damage control, which consisted of intensive work in oxygen breathing apparatus and a repetition of the hose-handling techniques taught in the two-day course. Many of the students had fought fires in combat, and they wanted more advanced training.
I had started preplanning for building fires in Panama and asked Commander Jerry Crowley for permission to develop a preplanning course for ships. We didn’t tell Washington headquarters anything, because none of the bosses there had had anything to do with systematic preplanning. Since I had developed and taught about ship fires, and also had additional duty as a fire protection officer (as a civilian) at the Norfolk Group of The Atlantic Reserve Fleet (mothballed ships), Commander Charles McKeough, a senior FDNY chief who was the fire protection officer at Atlantic Reserve Fleet Headquarters, would say when an inspection party from Headquarters would find fault with the local guy in his field, “Frank Brannigan is working very hard to prevent a fire loss. If you will only do as he says, you will not have a problem.”
FRANCIS L. BRANNIGAN, SFPE (Fellow), the recipient of Fire Engineering’s first Lifetime Achievement Award, devoted more than half of his 63-year career to the safety of firefighters in building fires. He was well known as the author of Building Construction for the Fire Service, Third Edition (National Fire Protection Association, 1992) and for his lectures and videotapes. Brannigan was an editorial advisory board member of Fire Engineering.
