By Brian Ward
Starting in rookie school, most academies teach offensive, defensive, and transitional (aka blitz) attacks. The offensive mode of attack is taught as a very aggressive, interior fire attack. There are times when the nozzle is not opened until firefighters are inside the structure and in the actual burn room. The defensive mode of attack is generally not as aggressive, known as surround and drown, and is an exterior fire attack. These are generally straightforward concepts while the transitional attack is taught as a blend of these modes and taught as being used through various stages of an incident.
Transitional or blitz attacks have been taught around the country as a mode that indicates transitioning from a defensive to an offensive mode of attack in most cases. This situation typically is taught as a defensive attack beginning on the exterior of the structure, then proceeding to an offensive interior attack. Aggressive fire crews performing this attack use a wide selection of hoselines from the 1 ¾” to a portable monitor, such as a blitz fire (capable of a quick 500 gpm on one 3” hoseline). The quick knockdown is needed for crews to make entry because they believe that there are still viable victims inside the structure. After the initial knockdown, positive observations can be made including temperature reduction, steam conversion, and fire knockdown. While I understand and agree with the concept, I do not believe that we should use the terminology transitional. Offensive and defensive modes of attack should not be based on a geographical location; however, it should be based on the intent of the tactical assignments given, regardless of interior or exterior position.
The analogy I use to associate the difference in offensive and defensive postures is from the military tactical book. In essence, what we are doing by making a quick aggressive exterior knockdown, “resetting the fire,” and then moving interior for the kill is what the military has used for centuries and is known as flanking. Desert Storm’s “left hook,” Allies in WWII, and Stonewall Jackson’s infamous flank attack at the Battle of Chancellorsville in May of 1862–these are all aggressive offensive attacks from the exterior of the battle. Firefighting uses the same concept, just a different landscape.
For firefighters and considering the mental makeup of firefighters, defensive attacks are our last option if we have any choice in the matter. This is sometimes regardless of the potential to save anything. Our tactical decision making can be clouded by the adrenaline rush and stress we often encounter. However, what if we changed the stereotype of an exterior attack being defensive to one that is an aggressive-offensive tactical decision? Would we be more apt to use it? There is research that can support this statement and allow us to change the hazards we face prior to making entry. This research also supports increasing the survivability of trapped occupants.
The International Society of Fire Service Instructors (ISFSI) in conjunction with the South Carolina Fire Academy Staff, City of Spartanburg, SC Fire Department, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed information and captured videos that demonstrate that an aggressive exterior attack, which is offensive in nature, may be the best method of attack in many situations. Furthermore, there should be a clear distinction between offensive and defensive modes of attack based on the tactical assignments. Offensive modes of attack are designed to be aggressive and rapid in nature because of preserving life and property, regardless of where the firefight starts. Preferably, this will occur in a minimum amount of time and from the safest location possible. Defensive modes of attack indicate that all attempts to preserve life and property have been exhausted. A defensive mode of attack is designed to hold a position and prevent extension.
|
Experiment Background: In these experiments, we used eight similar residential structures outfitted with “new” furnishings, windows, and all holes inside the structure were repaired with either sheetrock or plywood to ensure an airtight space typical of what is found in new residential structures. NIST used various oxygen sensors, pressure sensors, and thermal imaging devices to record the data from each experiment. Each structure was prepared and prepped to hold two experiments; this is where compartmentalizing became very important. Without it working properly, the number of experiments would have been reduced.
|
|
Large amount of fire showing on A/D corner with smoke pushing through the adjacent room windows, very black and turbulent smoke.
|
|
Firefighters aggressively attacked the main body of fire and within 30 seconds the main fire was knocked down; the turbulence and density of the smoke were noticeably different with the reduction of heat and smoke. There was no indication of fire being pushed throughout the structure and temperatures dropped immediately.
|
Fire officers and firefighters making tactical decisions on the fireground must understand the impact of their decisions on the occupants and firefighters. This information provides a science to firefighting, which has never existed before, and demonstrates numerous benefits to firefighters and the occupants of the structure. These benefits include the survivability of occupants inside the structure because of significantly decreased temperatures, improved oxygen levels, and CO levels that remain within acceptable limits. For firefighters, the drastically decreased temperatures (250 – 500 degrees F) in many cases allow firefighters to perform rescue and fire attack assignments within acceptable environments while preserving the survivability profile of the occupants. In one scenario, a 120-gpm nozzle directly applied to the room of origin reduced the temperatures from 2,000 degrees to 200 degrees within 1 minute. While increasing the survivability of all those involved, the reduction in flashover events and superheated environments can be eliminated in many cases prior to committing personnel inside the structure.
Another valuable piece of information that we were able to demonstrate in the experiments was the importance of compartmentalizing a structure. If firefighters or occupants are trapped inside of a structure, the best scenario is to close the doors inside the structure. During this scenario, side-by-side rooms with a hallway in between were measured for temperatures. The room of origin was more than 1,000 degrees while the adjacent room with the door closed did not rise above 95 degrees. If our quickest means to the fire is to apply water from the outside in a quick aggressive “offensive mode of attack” prior to making entry into a 1,000+ degree environment, then this is the attack we should use to provide firefighters and occupants with the best chance at survival. This would not be a defensive mode of attack; however, it is an offensive mode of attack from the exterior. It would increase the occupant’s chance of survival, decrease the chance of flashover, and reduce placing firefighters in superheated environments when it is not necessary. Although this is not a PPE article, truly understanding the threshold values of our turnouts should play a factor in determining our firefighting tactics as well.
|
The room on the left (point of origin) elevated to more than 1,000 degrees, while the adjacent room on the right with the door closed was only 95 degrees.
|
|
Left: Unburned side of door. Right: Burn side of door. Both pictures are from the structure fire experiment above.
|
|
1,800 degrees from floor to ceiling in room of origin. After applying a fog nozzle for 30 seconds, the temperature dropped to 500 degrees with noticeable steam conversion.
|
|
In another experiment, sensors in this particular structure reached 2,000 degrees in the room of origin (A/B corner); however, the room on the A/D corner with the door closed never reached an IDLH temperature before extinguishment and the air quality was adequate for survival.
|
These experiments, along with the NIST research, support a case for change concerning offensive and defensive modes of attack. This case for change is based on challenging the typical teachings of the fire service and using the new science to assist firefighters in making the best tactical fireground decisions, whether it is an interior or an exterior attack. Mrs. Smith never cared how we put the fire out; she just wanted us to save what we could.
Bio:
BRIAN WARD is the chief of emergency operations and training manager for Georgia Pacific – Madison (GA). He is a past training officer for Gwinnett County (GA), chairman of the Metro Atlanta Training Officers and Honeywell Advisory Council. He is an ISFSI Board of Directors – Director At Large and Lead Live Fire Credentialing Instructor. He was awarded the National Seal of Excellence from the NFFF/EGH. He has an associate’s degree in fire science and a fire safety and technology engineering bachelor’s degree from the University of Cincinnati. He is the founder of FireServiceSLT.com and Georgia Smoke Diver #741.
