ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
BY JOHN F. (SKIP) COLEMAN
Things in the fire service tend to be cyclical. There are “trends” in the fire service. When I began my career in 1975, some of the new trends were hazardous materials response for firefighters, emergency medical response for fire departments, and aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF). Other things that had been tried or used and that were beginning to fall off the firefighter face of the earth at that time were Brouder life nets (too labor intensive, too many broken wrists, and the advent of taller buildings), smooth-bore nozzles (replaced by combination nozzles), and two-stage fire pumps for most middle- and small-size departments. When I started, there was no such thing as large-diameter hose, confined space, or positive-pressure ventilation. Those items hadn`t even begun their “climb.”
Things seem to rise on the horizon of the fire service. Once they are tried, they fall into the center of the firefighters` world for use and periodic review or off the face of the earth. Note that some items are again climbing back onto the horizon. Some “basic” tools discarded 10 or 20 years ago have resurfaced. Two items come to mind. The first is the smooth-bore nozzle, which is being carried as part of preconnected hoseline complements. It is used in conjunction with an offensive indirect fire attack.1 This nozzle has excellent knockdown power and reduces the chance of steam generation and thus thermal burns to firefighters.
Also making a comeback is preconnected 212-inch hose. That was the standard when my father fought fires in the `50s and `60s. It was replaced by 134-inch hose, which was touted as the cure-all for fire attacks–it was said it could provide the same flow as a 212-inch hose and had the maneuverability of 112-inch hose. However, we are finding out that we normally do not have the same flow as with the larger 212-inch line and that it is almost impossible for a single firefighter to handle the smaller 134-inch safely.
The single-stage fire pump is another example. In fact, 60 to 70 percent of the pumps installed on new apparatus are single-stage. Among the reasons for this is that it facilitates training and has fewer movable parts, reducing the need for maintenance and repairs. Also, it delivers a range of volume and pressure that meets all NFPA standards.
FIREFIGHTER SAFETY
One of today`s fire service trends is firefighter safety. NFPA 1500, Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program; NFPA 1561, Fire Department Incident Management System; and so on, have created safety goals for which most fire departments can and should strive. Some of these safety-related provisions and concerns, such as rapid intervention teams; PASS devices; “two-in, two-out”; and mandatory mask policies are indeed indisputable lifesavers for firefighters. I wholeheartedly endorse every practical safety policy that can be implemented in the fire service. Firefighters who have fought a fire alongside me or under my direction and those who have attended my classes understand my passion for safety.
As conscious as I am of firefighter safety, however, I am not a fanatic. We have a job to do. Our mission–to protect life and property from the effects of fire–cannot be disputed or destroyed. I recently heard rumors concerning a depart-ment that is considering adopting a policy of “noninterior” fire attacks when no life hazard is present. I am not sure where our mission would fall in such a policy.
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS
Section 2-6 of NFPA 1561 and Section 6-3 of NFPA 1500 address the need for establishing an accountability system. The responsibilities of the department as a whole, the on-scene incident commander, the company and/or sector officers, and the members of individual crews are covered. All will be discussed later. Note: What is discussed in this article does not meet all of what is contained in these standards, but it certainly meets the gist of the standards.
Several types of accountability systems are used throughout the country. They include the newer “bar-code” systems, in which each firefighter is assigned a specific bar code. Firefighters entering a fire structure or other hazardous area are scanned by a computer bar code scanner. Commercial “Passport” or self-closing strip systems are used in conjunction with boards placed at or near the entrances to structures and hazardous areas. As firefighters enter the structure or area, they leave a strip with their name on a board signifying that they are in the structure or area. The least expensive form of these systems is the use of daily rosters on which the names of crew members and the apparatus to which they are assigned at any particular time are recorded.
Firefighter accountability has risen to the horizon of the firefighter`s earth. However, as it exists today, I believe accountability is doomed to failure. The point of this article is that although these tags or tracking systems tell us who is on the fireground or inside a specific hazardous area, they do not really “account” for anything. Let`s look at what the goal of an accountability system should be to really account for firefighters.
GOAL OF ACCOUNTABILITY
The goal of an accountability system should be to enable us to track crew members at all times and to identify the location of any and all units inside a structure or other hazardous area.
Although it is true that most systems tell you which units, companies, and individuals are inside a structure, they do nothing to tell you where inside the structure they are. This does not fulfill the goal of an accountability system. If a general and massive structural collapse were to occur, if the fire were to become questionable, or if a specific area of the structure were to deteriorate, it would be imperative to know the following:
Are crews operating in the affected area in the structure?
If so, who are they, and how many of them are there?
Although I agree that a system for determining who is assigned to what apparatus or unit at any time is important, an effective accountability system must be able to track the location of all crews inside a structure.
COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM
To effectively track the location of all crews operating within a specific structure, we need three things. They are not expensive (in fact, they cost next to nothing). They are not complicated, nor do they require that boards be left at doors or firefighters walk around the fire scene with a computer scanner in their hands.
The first and foremost item needed to effectively account for every member at every structure fire all of the time is to hold company officers accountable for the unity of their crews (NFPA 1561, 2-6-3, and NFPA 1500, 6-3.3.3). It is imperative in this day and age that a crew enter together and stay together. I come from a large, urban Midwest fire department. We are filled with tradition. However, we accept no excuses for a crew member`s being allowed to wander off or perform unknown tasks in unknown areas.
I have no problem with two or more members being given direction from their officer and being allowed to complete a task in an area remote from the officer or their partners. Splitting a four-person squad for search is acceptable and often necessary. I also have no problem with a fire officer`s asking a “trained” (not recruit) crew member to go outside for a tool or to perform some other task [the latter would certainly depend on the amount of fire and smoke (visibility) in the area, the size of the structure, the proximity to egress, and the member`s training level and experience].
I draw the line at the point where a crew enters a structure on fire and the officer, within minutes, has no clue about where one or more of his members are–and when this situation is not rare but the norm. You know who you are, and you know if this problem exists in your department. Plain and simple, this is a “discipline” thing–not discipline as in punishment but discipline as in conviction and training. Officers must be held accountable for the crew members assigned to them. Crews should be given a task to accomplish by Command or Operations, and they should accomplish that task as a team–together. This team concept is the first piece of the accountability solution.
The next piece of the accountability puzzle involves “incident-specific” assignments given by a singular commander (NFPA 2-6.3.1 and NFPA 1500, 6-3.3.1). The IC assigns crews to specific tasks or areas to mitigate the situation. In the past (and it occurs even now in many departments across the country), crews were allowed to enter and operate inside a structure with (1) no prior assignment and (2) no system that informs anyone of where they will end up operating. They enter with a handful of tools (hopefully) and, once inside, start looking for a place to work and something to do when they get there.
Incident-specific assignments eliminate the guesswork when crews cross the doorway to enter a structure on fire. They are given a specific assignment that defines a task they are to accomplish, an area in which they will be required to handle all tasks, or a combination of a task to accomplish and a specific area within which to accomplish it. Examples of incident-specific assignments at a structure fire are the following: Attack, Search on Division (or Floor) 2, Topside Ventilation Division (or Floor) 1, and so on. The IC tracks these assignments on some type of “status” board or incident worksheet. At our bread-and-butter fires at which four or five units are assigned and working, a good chief can usually track crews in his head or on a clipboard without a formal worksheet.
However, at larger, more complex, and thus more labor-intensive incidents, it is absolutely necessary to specifically and deliberately document the assignment of crews. We now have a system in which crews are required to remain intact while operating at incidents. A specific individual (the incident commander) is required to assign crews to specific activities. This forms the basis for accountability. But we still need some “fine tuning.” We know that when the normal attack crew enters a structure that has a fire on the first floor, it will advance on the fire and knock it down. Then it will advance to other “known” areas of fire on the same floor or up to the area above the fire to check for the extension of fire. Herein lies the problem.
We need to require that our crews tell us when they have completed their assignments and are leaving a specific area to work another area. This is the final and, in some instances, hardest piece of the puzzle to pound into place. I can hear some officers now. “First this guy wants me to babysit my crew and hold their hands. Next, I have to have some chief telling me what to do at a house or apartment fire. Now, he wants me to tell him where I am in the building and when I go from floor to floor or area to area.”
Well, that`s right! I want to know where my crews are and what they are doing at all times while they are in the structure and the fire is not under control. Someone needs to be held accountable for the officers at an incident, just as the officers must be held accountable for their crew members. If this “accountability thing” rests with me, the chief on the scene, I guess that`s how it will have to be. If done well, in concert with specific “benchmarks”2 and brief communication, I, the IC, will be better able to focus on the entire incident, knowing that if a problem should arise–if the building should misbehave or the fire flare up–I will know exactly how many crews, if any, are or could be in imminent danger and then can act accordingly.
That`s accountability: Crews stay together. Assignments are given to all crews working at the incident so that the IC has specific knowledge of where all crews are. A standard method of recording and tracking all “on-scene” working or staged crews is in place, and, finally, company officers inform Command when they are moving from area to area.
SCENARIO
Let`s look at a scenario that illustrates the accountability concept.
A department is dispatched to an apartment fire at 2349 hours on a Saturday night. The battalion chief, the first to arrive, observes heavy smoke conditions coming from the first floor of a four-story, 16-unit apartment building. The chief directs the first-in engine to lay a line in and assigns Engine 1 to Division 1 Attack.
As the truck company arrives behind the engine, the chief assigns Truck 1 to Topside Ventilation. The chief takes formal command and asks for a second alarm. As more units arrive, he makes the following assignments: Engine 2: Backup on the stairs; Truck 4: Horizontal Ventilation on Division 1; Squad 7: Search on Division 1; Engine 3: assist with Search on Division 1; Engine 5: Search on Division 2; Engine 6: assist Division 1 Attack.
The command worksheet/board would look something like that above.
Command now starts to get reports from interior sectors.
“Division 1 Attack to Command: We have the fire knocked down on Division 1 and are going to check for extension on Division 2.”
Engine 1`s new assignment is Division 2 Extension (or could be Division 2 Attack). Division 1 Search gives an “All Clear on Division 1.”
Command now knows that a search has been completed on the first floor and that two crews are now searching Division 2. He needs to get someone started on a search on Divisions 3 and 4. He reassigns Squad 7 as Division 3 Search and tells Engine 3 to assist with Division 3 Search.
Topside Ventilation (Truck 1) reports, “Ventilation complete. We opened a hatch over the stairway, and we have good air movement.”
Command now reassigns Truck 1 to Division Search.
Interior Ventilation (Truck 4) has opened up Division 1 and has been assigned Salvage on Division 1.
Backup reports that heat and visibility conditions on the stairway are improving.
Command still wants to maintain a backup sector, so he simply acknowledges Backup`s transmission, “Command, OK.”
Division 2 Extension reports there is no extension on Division 2. Command tells them to come out and change bottles and then to reenter and start on Division 1 Overhaul.
At all times throughout this scenario, Command knows the general location of the crews within the structure. Note the changes on Command`s worksheet (at right), which reflects the changes in assignments. Had a collapse occurred or a crew become trapped or disoriented, Command would have been aware of the location of every on-scene crew.
This method of accountability can be taken a step further–again at no additional cost to a department. Personnel Accountability Reports or PARs can be used to account for all on-scene personnel at any time. When Command calls for a PAR, all officers quickly account for the location of all members of their crew. When all crew members are accounted for, the officer reports to Command the following information: unit name, present assignment or designation, and the fact that the crew has PAR:
“Engine 4, Division 16 Attack, has PAR.”
“Truck 9, Division 15 Salvage, has PAR.”
“Squad 1, Division 16 Search, has PAR.”
Crews in staging or rehab also check for all members and give Command PAR:
“Engine 5, in Rehab, has PAR.”
“Engine 21, Staged, has PAR.”
Some departments` SOPs call for PARs every 20 minutes on the scene until Command declares the incident under control. Dispatch gives Command a time check and reminds him to get a PAR:
“Dispatch to Command, you`re 40 minutes into this incident; you need a PAR.”
“Command: OK. Command to all units: Give me a PAR.”
Again, personnel accountability reports give Command two things:
An up-to-the-minute accounting of all on-scene crews.
An up-to-the-minute location of every crew on the scene.
This serves as a check-and-balance mechanism for Command`s board updates–enhancing the true purpose and function of accountability systems. Accountability systems are only as good as your ability to know who is inside and where inside the structure they are during a fire or other emergency.
ASSIGNMENT CYCLE
There is an “assignment cycle” that should not be broken at incidents, especially large, labor-intensive incidents, at which we seem to lose track of crews more often and more easily. The cycle “Staged – Assigned – Rehab (bottle change if no rehab is required) – Staged” calls for control units at large incidents. Crews not yet assigned must stage at Level I or Level II staging areas. Once assigned, they go to work. If the location of their work (assignment) changes or is changed, this fact is noted. Once they come out for bottle changes or to take a break, they report to Rehab. After they change bottles and take a break as per procedure, they report back to a staging area for reassignment.3 It is in this last stage of assignment–from taking a break to reassignment–where many departments lose track of their crews at large incidents. Crews go out, change bottles, take a break, and then reenter to return to their previous work area or look for something else to do. However, if the assignment cycle is enforced and maintained, your ability to track all on-scene crews will be greatly enhanced and the likelihood of losing a crew or crew member will be greatly reduced. This takes team effort and great discipline. However, the required effort and discipline can`t be measured against the potential for losing or injuring one or more firefighters because “we didn`t know where they were.”
To fully comply with NFPA standards of accountability, several other concerns–such as systems for immediately evacuating the building, developing and implementing written procedures, and so on–must be addressed. Nevertheless, if the above-mentioned steps are considered and implemented in some fashion, you will have taken great strides to ensure the accountability of all members at an emergency scene.
Endnotes
1. Coleman, John F. Incident Management for the Street-Smart Fire Officer, Fire Engineering, 1997, 161-162.
2. Coleman, 298.
3. This could call for establishing an “on-scene” staging area, located near Rehab, to which crews can report after a bottle change or rehab.
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Splitting crews at fires is acceptable, and at times effective, as long as someone knows where other crew members are at all times. (Photo by Gerry Mazur.)
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JOHN F. (SKIP) COLEMAN has been a member of the Toledo (OH) Department of Fire and Rescue Operations for 21 years and a battalion chief for the past 11 years. He has been an instructor at Owens Community College, one of Ohio`s largest community colleges, for more than 10 years. Coleman is also a contract instructor for the National Fire Academy`s Command and Control of Fire Department Operations at Multialarm Incidents course and annually conducts a course in incident command for industrial fire brigades at the Ohio State Fire School. Coleman is the author of Incident Management for the Street-Smart Fire Officer (Fire Engineering, 1997). He is a graduate of the National Fire Academy`s Executive Fire Officer Program and is working toward his bachelor`s degree at the University of Cincinnati.
