225 Buildings, 30,000 Acres Burned In 2 Los Angeles City, County Fires
Photo by Phil McBride
Two extensive brush fires that burned over more than 30,000 acres and destroyed or damaged more than 225 structures gave both the Los Angeles County and the Los Angeles City Fire Departments a day to remember last October 23.
The L.A. County Fire Department has fought many major brush fires, but none was more difficult than the fierce, wind-driven Kanan fire in the Santa Monica Mountains on that Monday.
Before the fire was controlled the following day, more than 200 structures were destroyed or damaged and the total property loss was estimated at nearly $24 million; the loss of 25,385 acres of watershed at $12 million.
Two other fires
At noon on the 23rd. the department was already committed to a major brush incident in the San Dimas area in the eastern part of the county with 12 engine companies, crews, patrols and two helicopters. A helicopter, a five-engine strike team, and camp crews were assisting Los Angeles City in that department’s extensive Mandeville fire.
With gusty winds blasting out of the northwest, a fire believed to be incendiary started in the Agoura area near the Ventura Freeway in the northwestern area of the county.
At 12:11 p.m., Los Angeles County Center dispatched Engines 65, 144,125, 325 and 67, Patrols 65 and 144, Water Tender 144, Tractor 5 and Battalion 5 Chief Gary Henry. No helicopters were available because of commitments elsewhere.
By the time Engine 65—stationed less than a mile from where the fire started—rolled onto Cornell Road, the unit reported “10 to 12 acres going strong—send additional equipment.”
At 12:13 p.m., a second dispatch was made for Engines 68, 72, 88, 99, 75 and 72, Patrols 68 and 72, Tractor 2 and Battalion 6. Helicopters 10 and 14 and their attack crews were recalled from their assignments.
Additional reports to the county dispatch center were that the fire was going strong north toward Westlake Village and Thousand Oaks area of Ventura County and also moving rapidly west along Kanan Road.
Full brush response
At 12:17, a full brush response was requested from the Ventura County Fire Department and five engines, a bulldozer, a helicopter, two battalion chiefs and a division chief responded. Ventura County units took the northwestern flanks of the fire. Eventually, 27 units were working the area. The fire was kept out of the populated areas of Westlake.
The county now had committed all available area equipment and personnel into the fight and quickly began moving additional units from distant areas of the county. Commanders knew that the fierce fire posed a major threat to expensive homes in the Trancas area of Malibu along the Pacific Coast Highway 10 miles away, but there were no additional resources to deploy at the time since all units were committed to the fight in Agoura along Kanan Road and to the northwestern perimeter bordering Ventura County.
Photo by Phil McBride
Los Angeles County F.D. photos
Los Angeles County F.D. photos, top and bottom; Phil McBride photo, right
Photo by Phil McBride
Under normal conditions, mutual aid assistance from L.A. City would have quickly brought units north along the Pacific Coast Highway, but the L.A. City Fire Department was involved in its own major emergency.
Deputy Chief Donald Beckman arrived to take command a« incident commander. Chief Clyde Bragdon was in Seattle at a United States Fire Administration national life safety conference.
“We had communications problems. Units could not see because of heavy smoke. Individual homes in the sparsely settled area were burning before companies could arrive, yet many structures were saved. It was chaotic,” the chief recalled.
Beckman organized the incident command structure with Chief John Kngland as suppression and rescue commander and set up three divisions. Assistant Chief George Taylor commanded the south along Pacific Coast Highway, Battalion Chief Henry the east through Kanan Road and Agoura, and Ventura County Division Chief Dick Wilson the west, where all of that county’s equipment and manpower was committed.
More brush fires
To further complicate the grave situation, a brush fire at Darling Road and Canyon Quail Trail in the Aqua Dulce area in the Newhall area was reported at 12:47 p.m. L.A. County committed four engines, four crews, three patrols, a tanker, and a dozer while the United States Forest Service dispatched four engines, four crews, a tanker, two bulldozers and three helicopters. This fire was held to 495 acres of watershed.
At 1:30 p.m., a brush fire broke out in the northeast mountain area of the city of Glendale. That city committed eight engines and two tankers, and the county sent one engine. Although potentially dangerous, only 40 acres of brush were destroyed.
At 2 p.m. in the Chatsworth area of L.A. City, another brush fire occurred. The city dispatched 13 engines and Ventura County, four engines. L.A. County normally would have responded in this area. The fire was held to 5 acres.
At 2:57 p.m., a fire broke out in the foothills of the San Gabriel Mountains in the City of Sierra Madre and posed a serious threat to portions of Pasadena. L.A. County dispatched 15 engines, five crews, a bulldozer and two patrols. The United States Forest Service, Pasadena and other agencies committed 67 engines, eight crews, two bulldozers, seven air tankers, and four helicopters. Some 1270 acres of watershed burned.
Fire moves rapidly
Beckman projected that the fire would eventually burn to the ocean because of the high winds, but he admitted that none of the veteran fire fighters expected such a fast run.
“The fire reached the coast at 2:26 p.m., 2 hours and 15 minutes after it was reported,” the chief commented.
Beckman pointed out that the undermanned fire crews attempted to hold the flanks to save individual homes and ranch buildings, but practically nothing could have blunted the blazing thrust of the main fire.
The chief also noted that lack of water and overloaded bad communications because of the terrain helped complicate the suppression and command problems.
More companies dispatched
As the extent of the disaster unfolded, additional equipment, including strike teams from municipal fire departments in other areas of the county, were organized and dispatched. These included Area C—Alhambra, two engines; Monterey Park, one; San Gabriel, one; Area D—Arcadia, one; Azusa, one; Pomona, one; Area E—Compton, one; Downey, one; Montebello, one; Santa Fe Springs, one; Vernon, one; Area G—El Segundo, one; Hawthorne, one; Inglewood, one; Palos Verdes Estates, one; Redondo Beach, one; Torrance, one. Strike teams were furnished with a county fireman for coordination and communications.
Gardena, Lynwood, Long Beach and Downey also provided units to fill in vacant county stations.
Another strike team from Santa Barbara County, City and Montecito Fire Protection District also moved in.
“We needed all of this manpower and equipment,” Beckman said. “If it had been physically possible to have had it within two hours, many homes would have been saved.”
State sends teams
In addition to the Southern California assistance, the Office of Emergency Services ordered strike teams from throughout the rest of the state. Units from as far south as Imperial County, as far east as Barstow in the Mojave Desert, north from Stockton, Solano County, and Sacramento City responded to the fight in one of the greatest movements of equipment in California fire fighting history.
Eventually, there were 125 engine companies, 35 hand crews, four bulldozers, two helicopters and three air tankers at the scene.
By Monday night, the winds began to die down and the spread of the fire was slowed. Although not controlled until the following day, the major action was over.
L.A. City fire
Northeast winds were blowing from 50 to 60 miles per hour at 9:41 a.m. that same Monday when the L.A. City Fire Department received a call reporting a brush fire on the hillside along Mulholland on the crest of the Santa Monica Mountains dividing the San Fernando Valley from Western Los Angeles.
Operations Control Division dispatched a brush assignment—five engines, a truck, three helicopters and two battalion chiefs.
Engine 109 was on the scene within three minutes from its station on Mulholland Drive. The company found a 4-acre grass and brush fire which was threatening the Miramar private school. Emgine 109 called for more companies, helped evacuate the school and attacked the fire flanks.
“The fire was moving rapidly beyond reach at more than 200 feet per minute with northeast winds blowing from 50 to 60 mph. The fire was traveling into steep terrain, generating heavy smoke, and spotting ahead of the main fire front,” an L.A.F.D. narrative prepared by Division Commanders Frank Borden and J.S. Weber reported.
Command post set up
As units moved in, a command post was established at Station 109, a helibase on Mulholland, and a staging area was located at Sepulveda and Mulholland.
As this arrived, companies were deployed to attack the north, east and west flanks and sent onto the Mission Dump Road on the south to try to blunt the head of the fire.
Field commanders knew from past experience that with existing conditions, the fire would spread south and west into the exclusive Brentwood, Mandeville and possibly Pacific Palisades areas. Brentwood and Mandeville areas suffered damage in the 1961 Bel Air fire.
Before the night was over, L.A. City deployed more men and equipment than in any other single incident in its history—157 companies, two helicopters (two were damaged in the fire and out of service), four bulldozers, and 49 chief officers. Five field divisions were set up for field command. Twenty-five structures, a church and a Boy Scout camp were destroyed. Many others were damaged. Watershed damage was beyond estimation and yet, considering the intensity of the wind-driven flames, damage was minimum—5500 acres in a 15-mile perimeter.
Fire commanders
Acting Chief D. R. Evansen (Chief Engineer Gerard was at the fire conference in Seattle) was in command. Deputy Chief Kenneth Schoebinger became incident commander.
Field Division commanders were A, Battalion Chief William Newman; B, Battalion Chief Jim Kolb; C, Assistant Chief Tom Tolman; D, Assistant Chief Jack Bennett; and E, Battalion Chief Jim Mullen.
At 6:30 p.m., the entire city was protected only by 27 light task forces (a truck and an engine manned by five men), two engines and three trucks. During some periods when other fires occurred, the available resources were down to 16 light task forces. The Santa Monica Fire Department covered Stations 63 (Venice) and 92 (Rancho Park) and Culver City 94 (Baldwin Hills). County camp crews and one strike team were available until the outbreak of the major county fire.
The fire continued its spread to the south and west and Evansen directed his units to move ahead and try to stop the western spread. The eastern flank in Sepulveda pass held.
Staging area established
A new staging area was set up at Station 19 in Brentwood for deployment of equipment into the Mandeville area. Police closed the main artery—Sunset Boulevard—causing major traffic congestion.
At 10:11 a.m., the incident became a “major emergency.” Six helicopters were actively engaged in water drops and reconnaissance, but water drops on the head of the fire were almost futile because of fire spotting up to one quarter of a mile ahead of the main fire.
Los Angeles County F t), photo.
A partial recall of off-duty fire fighters was ordered and reserve units were manned as the desperate battle to save the watershed and homes proceeded.
Strike teams were organized and sent into Mandeville, Tigertail and Kenter Canyons to save homes.
At 11:53 a.m., mutual aid was requested from the Office of Emergency Services, but none was available because of other fire activity in the region.
Numerous homes saved
With limited manpower and sometimes poor water supply, the men saved numerous homes. On many streets, eight lines were laid and men ran from house to house to put out fires.
Thirty-two recruits from the training academy were pressed into service for cold-trailing, and the fire spread was held on the north and south areas of the dump. However, the fire still burned fiercely toward the west and the expensive homes of Westridge, Mandeville and the Pacific Palisades.
The fire burned to the rear of structures in several areas and attempts to hold it on the east slopes of Mandeville failed. The fire spotted and jumped to the west slope and in the upper canyon, it moved along to the west, menacing Sullivan, Rustic Canyon and the Palisades.
Another staging area at Station 69, Pacific Palisades, was activated as units moved ahead of the fire. Flexible deployment by field commanders allowed units to move from east to west canyons as the fire danger subsided.
Scout camp lost
Strike teams moved into Rustic Canyon, but they could not reach Boy Scout Camp Josepho, which was destroyed. As the fire came down in the area, the fire fighters remained flexible and saved many homes by their hit, attack and move-to-the-next-house tactics.
In the early evening, the battle to save homes in the Palisades was fought. Again, the strike teams’ mobility often—but not always—prevailed against the fast-moving fire in which flaming brands frequently set roofs on fire.
A helibase was set up on the polo field at Will Rogers State Park and a survey was made of the Palisades Highland area to the west. It was feared that this area of new and expensive homes would be next. A fifth division, E, was established to command t he Palisades Highland front and personnel moved into the city’s most western fire station along Sunset, Station 23.
Winds subside
Shortly after 8 p.m., conditions improved as winds died down and most companies were engaged in extensive mop-up operations as the critical fire threat had passed. Perimeters were established and units were alert to new spot fires.
Chief Gerard returned immediately from Seattle to join the command at the scene.
Gerard noted that the commitment of 157 companies to the Mandeville fire reduced protection below acceptable minimums for the rest of the city.
City protection is thin.
‘We should have a minimum of 25 companies to protect the city,” Gerard explained, “and at times we were below that number. All reserve units had been manned, a partial recall was in effect, two-piece task force companies had been split, and, in effect, we had no more resources available.
“With the county overcommitted to a series of fires, the usual backup forces simply were not available.”
Gerard said studies and plans have already started to improve mutual aid.
By late night, 10 Office of Emergency Service engines arrived to give some relief to the weary city fire fighters.
