10-Day Fire Burns From Top Floors To Cellar, Destroys 11-Story Hotel
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A 91-year-old Brooklyn, N.Y., hotel was destroyed by a five-alarm fire that first took possession of the top three floors of the 11-story building and then spread down to the cellar. It was not until the evening of the 10th day that the last companies left the area.
The Hotel Margaret was completed in 1889 as a family hotel and deteriorated into a welfare hotel by the early ’70s. After being closed in 1978, the Margaret was being converted into a 43-unit cooperative apartment building at the time of the fire. About half the apartments had been finished.
The 150 X 100-foot building had brick walls and wood beams and partitions. A large central stairway shaft spiraled around the elevator. Atop the building was a steel frame penthouse used at one time as a solarium and garden.
A phone call to the Brooklyn Central Office at 3:48 a.m. last Feb. 1 told of smoke several blocks from the Hotel Margaret. The dispatchers sent a first-alarm assignment that consisted of Engines 205 and 224, Ladders 110 and 118, and the chiefs of the 31st Battalion and 10th Division. The companies began searching the area mentioned by the caller and Engine 205 located the fire four blocks away at Columbia Heights and Orange St.
The officer of Engine 205 radioed for the other units to respond to this location and requested that the box assignment be filled out. Engine 226 and Squad 1 were then dispatched.
Second alarm ordered
When the chief of the 31st Battalion arrived, he saw heavy fire in the front of the 9th and 10th floors and ordered a second alarm.
The weather was clear and the temperature was 14 degrees and dropping. North-northwest winds were gusting to 40 mph, and the wind chill factor was 30 below.
Engine 205 found that the standpipe was out of service and started to stretch a hand line up the interior stairs. Since the stretch around the elevator was difficult, the efforts of the other first-alarm companies were concentrated in placing this first line into operation and determining the exact extent of the fire.
A third alarm was transmitted by Battalion 31. Companies began to operate the interior line from the eighth floor stairs. As this line was placed into operation a second line was requested to this position. Simultaneously, search and ventilation operations were conducted on the upper floors. It was found that the Fire involved everything above the eighth floor and was extending downward through the central shaft as well as smaller shafts throughout the building.
Heavy fire was now showing out the Orange St. side of the building, and plans were made to start an exterior attack. Ladder 101 was setting up its ladder pipe in this narrow street when an extensive collapse on this side showered men, apparatus and the entire block with bricks, steel beams, and flaming debris. The reason for this early collapse was not known and the urgent “mayday” message was transmitted to all companies by walkie-talkie. It was found that the interior companies were all safe, and they were ordered out of the building at once. Positions on Orange St. were abandoned and men and apparatus were moved away from the front of the building.
A difficult attack with outside streams was the only option open. Several apparatus were damaged by the collapse, the worst being Ladder 101’s tractor-trailer aerial, which received moderate damage. It was later determined that the entire steel-frame penthouse had given way and had pulled down chimneys, roofing components, and the upper parts of the main bearing walls.
The New York Fire Department identifies the surrounding properties (exposures) of a fire building numerically, starting with exposure 1 (the front of the fire building) and proceeding clockwise. Exposure 1 was Columbia Heights. This exposure offered no safe point of attack on the fire. There were no buildings opposite the hotel, just a wall and fence overlooking Furman St. and the beginning of the promenade; a narrow walkway. Exposure 2 was an occupied five-story brick residence, 91 Columbia Heights, with a five-story apartment house occupying the remainder of the block to Cranberry St.
Exposure 3 was a three-story brick, brownstone residence, 56 Willow St. Along this building was a large open lot exposing the rear of the Margaret. After the lot, more four and five-story dwellings occupied the rest of Willow St. Across Orange St. on the exposure 4 side was a modern 11-story building that occupied the entire block between Columbia Heights and Willow St. This was 107 Columbia Heights (exposure 4-A) and was occupied by a religious organization which used some space for offices, although most of the building was made up of dormitory-type rooms for its members. All exposures were occupied.
Brands cause problem
Harbor winds whipped fiercely into the Margaret and drove a shower of flying brands in the direction of Willow St. Not only were these brands a serious problem, but the fire was rapidly extending downward and generating a tremendous amount of radiant heat.
As some companies began to search, evacuate, and examine the exposures, the remaining units were directed to place into operation the large-caliber streams that would be needed to control the fire. Tower Ladder 119 was special called and a few minutes later, the deputy chief of the 10th Division ordered a fourth alarm transmitted. All aerial apparatus was positioned as near as possible to the fire building, but not directly alongside it. This provided safety for the fire fighters while permitting the closest stream placement. As it was, the high winds and elevation to reach the fire limited the effect of the streams.
Tower Ladder 105 and Engine 226 were directed into Orange St. from Willow St. and prepared to place the tower ladder stream in operation. Due to the amount and size of the brands being driven down, this was a difficult position, but the coordinated efforts of these companies had the tower in operation quickly. This stream was vital in protecting the Willow St. dwellings and 107 Columbia Heights, and in coping with the brand problem.
Meanwhile, other master streams were being placed in operation. Ladder 118 operated its ladder pipe from in front of exposure 2 into the front and side of the fire building. Tower Ladder 119 was set up on Columbia Heights to the south and directed its stream into the front of the fire, as well as on the Orange St. side.
Guns operated on roofs
Engine 210, a second-alarm company, placed a deluge gun in operation on the roof of exposure 4-A. Engine 239, a third-alarm company, operated a deluge gun from a roof of exposure 2. After Tower Ladder 105 was in operation, Engine 226 was directed to place another deluge gun to work from the roof of 107 Columbia Heights. The other companies were used to assist in stretching and supplying these streams, and to continue interior operations in the exposures.
A fifth alarm was followed by special calls for Tower Ladders 146 and 111. The chief of the 1st Division was called and assigned to supervise operations on exposure 3. Additional engine companies were also called after the fifth alarm. Some were directed by radio to patrol the surrounding area for fires caused by brands.
Tower Ladder 146 was positioned to operate from the open area at the rear of the hotel. Wind-driven spray from the streams soon covered the apparatus, streets, and buildings with ice. Tower Ladder 111 was set up on Columbia Heights near Ladder 118 on exposure 2. Interior collapses were occurring and stream penetration into the building was limited by the many partition walls. Shortly after 5 a.m., the entire top half of the hotel was in flames.
Coverage by the large-caliber streams was now lessening the danger to exposures. Surprisingly, only two other fires were started. Brands landing on the roof of 56 Willow St. (exposure 3) started a fire which was quickly discovered and extinguished with only minor damage. A company on brand patrol discovered and extinguished a dumpster fire on Pineapple St., three blocks away. As the hazard of extension abated, the problems caused by severe icing grew worse. This was of particular concern to companies operating on the many lower rooftops around the fire. Because of this and the chilling winds, companies in exposed positions were alternated for relief.
The Super Pumper (with Engine 207) was special called. It connected on Middagh St. and stood fast. Large volumes of water were not required at the time, so it did not supply any lines. Satellite 1 (with Engine 9) responded on the second alarm and used its 4 1/2-inch lines to supply large-caliber streams.
Fire drops into cellar
As dawn came, the fire continued dropping down and by 7 a.m. it was into the first floor and cellar, Exterior streams continued to pour into the hotel, whose brick walls and fire escapes became shrouded in ice as the interior continued to burn. Smoke was carried throughout the Heights and downtown Brooklyn as the streams lessened the severity of the fire. Daylight revealed that there had been no collapse of the main bearing walls, nor did they appear to be in danger of imminent collapse. The upper parts of the hotel were consumed, and the threat to surrounding properties was over. At 7:27 a.m., the fire was declared under control. There were no civilian injuries, no serious injuries to members, and other than slight damage to 56 Willow St., no fire extension from the hotel.
The fire continued to burn for 10 days. Engine and tower ladder companies from every borough were called to perform watch line service. Cold weather continued and arrangements were made for these companies to he relieved after three hours of duty.
Demolition crews were called in when building inspectors determined that the exterior walls were a hazard and must come down. Adjoining buildings remained evacuated, and the nearby streets and both levels of the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway were closed during the earlier phases of demolition. Working carefully, the wrecking crews avoided damage to the exposures.
On the evening of Feb. 10, after almost continued application of exterior streams, it was obvious that the fire was out. Department units were ordered to take up after 10 days of continuous operation, leaving the hotel and surrounding area encrusted in tons of ice.
