UNUSUAL TOOLS FOR UNUSUAL RESCUE CALLS
BY LARRY COLLINS
It has been said that effective training and realistic standard operating guidelines (SOGs) provide the foundation for effective management of routine emergencies. And it is generally recognized that unusual incidents often exceed the scope of written guidelines, challenging emergency responders to rely more heavily on their experience and critical judgment. In both instances, a subtle but important part of this equation is the ability of firefighters and rescuers to make the most effective use of available resources, which sometimes are considered unorthodox. In other words, they often need to improvise.
Those who are unable to improvise during the course of an unusual emergency will be hampered in their efforts to save lives and property. History is replete with examples of unusual emergencies in which strict reliance on rules and regulations simply didn`t get the job done. Periodically, an incident comes along that compels public safety personnel to deviate from their normal repertoire of tactics, strategies, and equipment. If they find themselves unable to adapt to quickly changing conditions, they can find themselves in lethal danger–and quickly.
But adaptivity is part of the culture of the fire and rescue services, and therefore unusual emergencies represent not just serious challenges to be overcome but also ripe opportunities to devise and master new strategies, equipment, and methods (read: P-R-O-G-R-E-S-S).
Countless examples of this dynamic process can be cited from many agencies across the nation. One example of this type of incident occurred on July 19, 1997, when members of the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and the Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD) were dispatched to a rescue that required the creative use of construction equipment to extract two pipeline construction workers from a precipitous canyon deep in the rugged mountains of the Angeles National Forest following an industrial accident.
This article, intended to convey several “lessons learned” from the incident, may stir debate in some quarters about the methods used, as well as their inherent risks. There is no claim that the methods used that day are right or wrong for everyone. They are presented in the spirit that they worked in this instance for this crew and might possibly be options for others faced with similar conditions.
THE RESCUE SITE
The Pacific Pipeline is a controversial $170 million project under construction across a long swath of Los Angeles County from the northwestern mountains to the Los Angeles Harbor. The pipeline was conceived to transport oil from the Kern County oil fields to the refineries of the Los Angeles Harbor area, a distance of 132 miles. After lengthy court battles, the pipeline project was approved in part because its construction would prevent an alternative scenario–nearly 25,000 annual round trips by oil-bearing tanker trucks to carry the equivalent volume of oil to the refineries.
The pipeline`s route takes it north from the harbor area through densely populated parts of the Los Angeles Basin, the San Fernando Valley, and the Santa Clarita Valley, in turn, and then across 41 miles of the Angeles National Forest, where rugged mountains create a formidable barrier between Los Angeles County and its northern sister, Kern County. Once completed, the 20-inch-diameter pipeline will daily carry 130,000 barrels of crude oil–heated to a temperature of between 1207F and 1707F–at a speed of two to three miles per hour. The pipeline will be buried in the ground at an average depth of five feet, deeper in areas where it crosses rivers, streams, and the California Aqueduct. It will pass near or directly over dozens of major earthquake faults, including the areas hardest hit by the 1971 Sylmar and the 1994 Northridge Earthquakes.
Construction on the section of pipeline traversing the Angeles National Forest began in June 1997. This portion of the project presents unique challenges to the designers and builders. Here, just a few miles from the San Andreas Fault, the 5,000-foot-high mountains are extremely rugged, choked with thick chaparral and brush and prone to frequent landslides, floods, earthquakes, and mud and debris flows. The canyons are deep and frequently have 100-percent slopes, high vertical cliffs, and rocky chasms. The mountains are traversed by Interstate 5, an eight-lane freeway that was plowed across their rugged contours in a feat of civic determination. Several winding mountain roads connect the outlying towns and enclaves with “civilization.” There are few roads throughout the rest of the forest, and the best access is often by hiking, climbing, mountain bikes, motocross cycles, or helicopters.
EXISTING RESPONSE PROTOCOL
The U.S. Forest Service and the Los Angeles County Fire Department have long-standing automatic-aid agreements to provide fire, rescue, and EMS services in the forest areas. Both agencies have active full-paid fire stations in strategic locations throughout the region. The USFS and LACoFD respond together to fight wildland and interface fires, including major “campaign” fires that sometimes burn for days, cover tens of thousands of acres, and require the response of thousands of firefighters.
EMS incidents, vehicle accidents, and other mishaps are handled by both agencies responding together, with LACoFD providing advanced life support via paramedic ground units and three Bell 412 helicopter “air squads,” each staffed with a pilot and two USAR-trained firefighters/paramedics. For most technical rescues in the forest, the LACoFD supports the USFS with a first-alarm response that includes two engine companies, USAR Company 1 (the department`s central urban search and rescue unit responds by helicopter when necessary), one USAR-trained truck company, one brush patrol, one ground paramedic squad, one air squad, and a battalion chief. The Los Angeles County Sheriff`s Department also dispatches a search and rescue team comprised of local volunteers to mountainous rescue incidents. In these situations, all three agencies respond simultaneously, operating under the unified command concept.
PREPAREDNESS BASED ON HISTORY OF RESCUES AND DISASTERS
Despite its wild desolation, the Angeles National Forest is the site of dozens of technical rescues every year. Part of the reason for this high rate of activity is the close proximity of the forest to the Los Angeles metropolitan area, which has millions of residents who are increasingly inclined to travel into the mountains for recreation and adventure. The national trend toward ever-expanding forms of wilderness adventure ensures that the rate of technical rescue operations will continue to climb for the foreseeable future. In addition to ground-based activities in the forest, the skies overhead are among the most crowded in the world. Literally hundreds of airplanes of all different sizes fly over these mountains each day.
These factors, in combination with tens of thousands of people who commute over mountain roads between Los Angeles and outlying cities each day, cause a steady stream of mishaps, including “cliff hangers,” stranded hikers, plane crashes, off-road vehicle accidents, boating accidents, injured campers, swiftwater rescues, confined space rescues, people trapped in waterfalls, trapped explorers in abandoned old mines, and vehicles that crash and go “over the side” off mountain roads, falling into steep canyons that have depths sometimes exceeding 1,000 feet.
These mountains are also the site of some of the most ambitious public works projects in the world, such as train tunnels (including the 6,300-foot Newhall Tunnel) bored straight through the mountains, dozens of major dams, and the California Aqueduct and other water projects that have been put through and over the mountains by vast systems of pipelines and tunnels. As an inherent side effect, Los Angeles County has also experienced some of the most lethal disasters to strike the United States, incidents that presented difficult challenges to the local response agencies and required unique uses of available resources.
One of the most notorious disasters here caused more than 500 deaths. Late one night in 1928, as a result of causes that are still hotly debated in some circles, the St. Francis Dam catastrophically collapsed, sending a 90-foot wall of water through the Santa Clarita Valley, an area served by the LACoFD and located some 30 miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles.
On its way to the Pacific Ocean, nearly 40 miles away, the flood wiped several towns practically off the map. The number of fatalities from this event was exceeded only by the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake. Search and rescue operations required weeks of difficult work by firefighters and sheriff`s deputies. They were forced to rely on unique uses of available resources that included heavy equipment and all-terrain vehicles to reach the site of the disaster, operate in deep mud and debris, extract victims from debris piles and hardening mud, and transport the injured and the dead.
Over the years, other public works-related accidents in Los Angeles County have forced emergency responders to find unique uses for available resources to manage the consequences.
In 1970, work began on a water tunnel that would bring water to Los Angeles from the Feather River project in Central California. The tunnel was to pass directly through several earthquake faults on its way beneath the mountains of the Angeles National Forest to the northern desert. Then, just months after the 1971 Sylmar earthquake caused 65 deaths in the north San Fernando Valley, a giant explosion killed 17 tunnel workers as they bored through a section of the tunnel that was within one-half mile of the fault that had caused the quake. This multiday rescue and firefighting operation required firefighters to use cranes, tunneling equipment, and a host of unusual tactics.
In recent years, mishaps related to the Metro Rail tunneling project have confronted firefighters with similar challenges. They included the Metro Rail tunnel fire in 1990 and the infamous “sink hole collapse,” an event that came within seconds of killing up to 20 firefighters and construction workers in the twin tunnels that run 80 feet below Hollywood Boulevard.
After decades of unusual incidents generated by the major public works projects that proliferate in the Greater Los Angeles region, local emergency responders have become somewhat accustomed to managing the wide variety of technical rescues that occur during the construction and revenue (operational) phases.
From the time the Pacific Pipeline project was first announced, the Los Angeles City and County fire departments and other local agencies began to scrutinize the project, embarking on a cooperative preplanning effort. Early on, it was recognized that some potential accident scenarios would–once again–require unusual uses of available resources, supported by task-specific equipment and extensive logistics. Local firefighters were made aware of the proj-ect and some of the unique conditions that might be encountered should an accident occur. Jurisdictional fire station personnel began conducting preplanning sessions to identify problem areas, determine communications capabilities, and develop contingencies for unusual “events.” These efforts paid off when the first major accident of the construction phase occurred on July 19, 1997.
THE ACCIDENT
On that morning, several pipeline workers were accompanying a 35-foot flatbed truck loaded with heavy timber, which was being towed by a D-10 bulldozer across miles of dirt road that had been constructed along the ridge lines for the movement of supplies. The entire length of the road had been ground up by constant bulldozer traffic until it was covered knee-deep in fine dust that was nearly the consistency of corn starch. It was, therefore, accessible only by four-wheel-drive vehicles, bulldozers, or people on foot. The road was completely inaccessible to fire apparatus, which would quickly become mired in the powdery soil.
About seven miles from the nearest paved road access, the construction road dropped into a deep canyon that had a slope that easily exceeded a grade of 100 percent. To get the heavily loaded truck across the canyon, the bulldozer had to stop towing it and reposition to its opposite end to prepare for a lowering operation. Once the bulldozer was in position, its heavy winch-driven cable was attached to the truck`s hitch. As the wheel chocks were removed from the truck, the high-strength cable was the only thing preventing it from crashing headlong into the canyon.
The plan was to extend the cable slowly from the bulldozer`s hydraulic winch spool, allowing the truck to descend the slope in a controlled manner. But there were two main problems: First, the load was extremely top-heavy, with the timber piled high and secured to the truck with several tightly cinched nylon cargo straps. Second, three workers inexplicably decided to ride in the trailer during the descent, possibly to help steer it.
What happened next might have been predictable and nearly turned tragic. One-third of the way down the slope, the load apparently shifted, and the truck began to list toward the downhill side. Gravity took over and quickly flipped the truck, causing its ball to separate from the hitch, while at the same time pitching the lumber off the bed. The truck and its load then began flipping downhill, sometimes end over end. The truck disintegrated, tossing the three workers down the hill amid the flying debris. The bulldozer operator and others looked on in horror from the top of the ridge as the truck, its load, and the coworkers disappeared in a cloud of dust at the bottom of the canyon.
After scrambling down the slope into the dust cloud, they searched for their friends, two of whom were partially pinned by debris and half-buried in dirt. The third man had miraculously escaped with minor injuries; he joined the others in the rescue. While they pulled their coworkers from the pile, a supervisor used his cellular phone to report the accident in accordance with the company`s emergency plan.
THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The USFS and LACoFD responded simultaneously to the accident. LACoFD units included Engines 77 and 149, Patrol 149, Squad 124, USAR Truck 73, USAR Company 1, and Air Squad 9. Because of the location and the type of incident, the on-duty captain of USAR-1 responded aboard Air Squad 9`s Bell 412 helicopter, taking along several multisized air bags, pneumatic rescue tools, and other extrication equipment. The rest of USAR-1`s crew responded in the heavy rescue apparatus.
En route to the scene, Captain Jim Bettencourt of first-due LACoFD Engine 77 recognized that the site was inaccessible to most fire apparatus and directed ground units to stage at a point where the construction road intersected with a narrow, paved access road. The exceptions were the USFS`s first-in unit; Engine 36; a Type II, four-wheel-drive apparatus; and one four-wheel-drive brush patrol unit from each agency. Engine 36 and both patrol units responded onto the construction road in an attempt to reach the scene.
At this point, Bettencourt recognized that Air Squad 9 would be the first unit to arrive on the scene and requested that it perform an aerial reconnaissance to report on conditions and take actions as necessary. He also advised Air Squad 9 to consider whether it was necessary to fly additional personnel and equipment from the staging area to the rescue site if a prolonged extrication were necessary.
Ten minutes later, Air Squad 9 arrived in the general vicinity of the accident and scanned the terrain for the accident site while following an unpaved construction road that ran along the pipeline`s course. The road skirted a ridge line and crossed several precipitous canyons. Finally, the squad noticed a jumble of lumber and the wrecked flatbed truck at the bottom of one of the canyons. Several people waved their arms at the helicopter, whose crew spotted two bodies on the ground being attended to by a knot of construction workers. Pilot Gary Lineberry began circling to better size up the situation from the air.
SIZE-UP
It was immediately apparent that heavy fire apparatus would not be able to reach the scene and that even the four-wheel-drive vehicles would have a tough time. To make a better assessment of the rescue problem and begin treating life-threatening injuries, it would be desirable to use the helicopter`s 240-foot hoist cable to lower two or more firefighters into the canyon. However, when Lineberry descended to test the helicopter`s power reserve while hovering over the site, the rotorwash appeared to funnel into the canyon bottom, stirring a blinding dust cloud that blossomed up, threatening to envelope the helicopter. It was apparently an effect of the canyon; the thick layers of accumulated dust had nowhere to go but up under the influence of the rotorwash.
Lineberry decided–and everyone else on the helicopter concurred–that it would be unnecessarily risky to attempt a helicopter hoist rescue at this site unless conditions improved. Realistically, the only way to address the dust problem was to apply tons of water in coarse spray form to the road where it crossed the canyon–which would be unfeasible considering the distance to the closest water source (six miles) and the problem of getting that water to the rescue site. Another slightly more drastic option might have been to make a series of helicopter water drops into the canyon, but this would have endangered the victims.
After ruling out these options, it was agreed that Plan B, a ground-based extraction from the canyon, would be implemented. Lineberry picked out a landing spot on a nearby ridge, from which Firefighter/paramedic Joe Moline and USAR-1`s captain (identified now as Team 1) might depart for a “hike-in” rescue. Lineberry brought the helicopter into a one-skid hover to the tip of the ridge, while Team 1 offloaded essential medical and extrication gear from the cabin and stepped off the skid to the chaparral-covered ridge. Then Lineberry departed to find a more distant landing site where he could set the helicopter down and await a report from us when we reached the bottom of the canyon.
Firefighter/paramedic Dan Fourniet remained aboard Air Squad 9, in case he was needed to act as the topside crewman if a hoist rescue became absolutely necessary or to assist in any other way. The plan was to evaluate the situation from the top and the bottom of the canyon to achieve a consensus on a plan to remove the victims to safety. As it turned out, Fourniet and Lineberry would come up with the solution by organizing an unusually but effective ground-based extraction system.
When the helicopter lifted off from the ridge, Team 1 made its way across the slope until it reached the construction supervisor at the top of the road. Looking into the canyon, they estimated it was about 400 feet to the bottom, with slopes that approached a 100-percent grade. After a briefing with the construction supervisor, they began down-climbing on the road. Down-climb was the operational term because the slope was sufficiently steep to force one to choose whether to descend in a “switchback” pattern or to rappel as a precautionary measure to avoid a nasty (and potentially fatal) fall. Also, the dust was so thick that each step left us thigh-deep in powdery dirt. It was obvious that rope systems or some other form of positively controlled hauling method would be needed to safely remove the victims. Attempting to carry them up the slope without the support of rope or cable systems might have been possible if we literally crawled, but it would have been excessively dangerous for the victims and rescuers alike. One false step could easily send everyone tumbling “tail over tea kettle,” probably not unlike Dudley Moore`s fall in the movie “10,” hundreds of feet back into the canyon.
THE SCENE
On reaching the bottom of the slope, Team 1 was met by several construction workers. They were huddled around two badly injured men who were actually in a deeper, thickly wooded “slot” canyon just below the road, where they had been thrown, along with tons of lumber and twisted metal. They were lying on a steep incline; it took considerable personnel to place them in Miller boards for C-spine precautions. Moline directed patient care, which included splinting and packaging the victims in rescue litters, while options for evacuating the victims were explored.
Meanwhile, Fourniet and Lineberry landed Air Squad 9 and began brainstorming an alternative method for evacuating the patient up the steep canyon wall. At that point, USFS Engine 36 and the patrols were still attempting to reach the site. Fourniet and Lineberry talked to the construction supervisor and several workers, including a bulldozer operator who had arrived on-scene. Lineberry requested that a four-wheel-drive water truck be brought in to wet down the area and prevent another dust cloud that might blind him or damage the helicopter`s engines on takeoff.
Then they discussed options for bringing the victims and rescuers out of the canyon. Among them was to use the helicopter to shuttle additional firefighters and equipment from the staging area to establish a dual-line raising system. Fourniet noted it would be time consuming to shuttle the personnel, establish “bombproof” anchors, and operate the system. Just then, the bulldozer operator had a suggestion.
Meanwhile, Team 1 was packaging the victims. Because they had carried everything in, splinting materials were limited. Making good use of available resources, Moline used rolled sections of carpeting taken from the flatbed truck as padding for two cardboard splints as he immobilized the legs of Victim 1, who appeared to have tibia/fibula fractures. The carpeting was also used to pad one cardboard arm splint each on both patients and to line Patient 1`s rescue litter.
A SOLUTION
The USAR-1 captain radioed Lineberry to discuss options for the extraction plan. Lineberry explained that he and Fourniet may have found an “interesting” solution involving some available resources that included a winch-equipped D-8 bulldozer and a construction sled (similar to a flatbed truck except that instead of traveling on tires, it travels on round pipes welded to the frame as runners).
Construction sleds are built to be loaded with tons of cargo and dragged by a bulldozer across a dirt road or other surface to a construction site. Learning that, Team 1 was more assured and became more confident in the belief that whatever “interesting” method Lineberry and Fourniet had come up with would be reasonably safe (although, from a personal standpoint, they still wanted to see it for themselves before committing to it). The captain thanked Lineberry and told him, “Just let us know when you`re ready to send it (the sled) down.”
Ten minutes later, as Team 1 was updating vitals and establishing dual large-bore IVs on the patients (both victims were relatively stable considering the trauma to which they had been subjected), a bulldozer appeared on the crest of the slope above us. It slowly backed up to the point where the slope dropped away. Behind the bulldozer was a metal contraption we now recognized as the construction sled. It resembled the type of a dolly cart one might find at a lumber yard. Large O-shaped steel pipes had been welded to the bottom to act as runners, instead of wheels. The bulldozer`s driver backed up until the sled had been shoved right up to the edge, where it began to slide in our direction. In the next instant, the sled abruptly stopped, and we noticed that it was attached to the bulldozer by a thick cable.
The operator exited the D-8 and walked to the rear, where the winch cable controls were apparently located. As he manipulated the controls, the sled began to descend the slope, and the extreme angle of the canyon wall became evident. The sled appeared to practically hang; only the cable prevented it from falling. If the cable failed, the sled would plunge headlong into the bottom of the canyon; its runners would merely increase the speed of descent.
At first, it seemed that strapping the victims and the rescuers to the contraption–completely at the mercy of a single steel cable–would be a dubious proposition. One question immediately presented itself: Would it be safer for the firefighters to be securely attached to the sled or to remain unattached, leaving them free to jump in case the cable snapped? The answer was immediately apparent: To be strapped to the sled would mean a definite “E-ticket” ride if the cable were to snap, whereas jumping from the sled would without a doubt cause them to tumble the entire length of the slope. They would then land in the canyon bottom in a heap, probably on top of the crumpled sled. Freedom to leap at will, while not exactly desirable in this situation, seemed far preferable to riding the sled to the bottom.
The patients, on the other hand, were in the unenviable position of having no choice in this matter: Their litters would, of necessity, be attached to the sled with nylon webbing for the return ride. There was no other reliable way to secure them to the sled because of the extremity of the slope angle. In case of a cable failure, the victims would suffer the double misfortune of experiencing two plunging trips into the canyon within the course of a single morning.
Despite the potential danger, Team 1 recognized that the sled would allow us to deliver the patients to the waiting helicopter (and ultimately to Henry Mayo Hospital`s Trauma Center) in an eighth of the time it would have taken to haul them up using standard rope rescue systems and rescue litter teams. And with the necessary personnel and rope system equipment staged six miles away, they had calculated that the time required to transport them to the site and to establish and operate rope systems would be excessive considering the seriousness of the injuries with which they were dealing. If the patients had not been injured and time were not critical, Team 1 might have opted for the rope systems, which seemed more controlled. But Patient 1 was critically injured, and Patient 2 was questionable at the time. Team 1 agreed that the sled was the most appropriate method of transportation under these conditions.
THE OPERATION
Once the sled reached the bottom of the canyon, the USAR-1 captain inspected it and its connection to the cable. The sled was sturdy, built to carry tons of equipment, and had solid railings on either end to which the litters could be secured using tubular webbing and standard packaging methods. The large metal pipe runners were welded to the bottom of the sled, allowing it to track gently on a sand or dirt surface and to slide over larger rocks that might be encountered along the way.
The cable, which now led from the top of the hill to the bulldozer, was securely fastened at uphill end. With assistance from the other pipeline workers, the rescuers positioned both patients on the sled and began to secure them so that their legs pointed uphill, essentially simulating a modified shock position. Although it might have been more comfortable for the victims to face downhill, because of the slope`s angle, they would practically be in a standing position if they were positioned with their feet pointing downhill. Neither patient appeared to have a serious head injury, and Patient 1 was sufficiently in shock to warrant precautions that would avoid having his blood pressure drop during the ascent. Because of the extreme angle of the slope, the patients had to be “leveled out” somewhat or they would be practically upside down on the way up. Using some of the undamaged lumber as cribbing, Team 1 and the workers built a platform that would keep both patients at a more desirable “shock position” angle without risking excessive cranial pressure in case there were closed head injuries that hadn`t yet been exhibited. The litters were then secured to the platform and sled.
With everything ready to go, Team 1 members took their places on the sled, assuming positions from which they could tend to both victims. Two construction workers volunteered to accompany them to assist in caring for their coworkers. The escape plan was reviewed. The sled passengers would simply hold onto the rails, without any attachments. In case of a cable failure, everyone (except the patients) would immediately bail off the sled and tumble down the slope behind the sled in the most comfortable manner possible (there was little or no possibility of any of us remaining on the slope if we jumped). The powdery dust was 212 feet thick; a choking dust cloud enveloped the entire canyon bottom. It would be critical, therefore, to get to the patients immediately and protect their airways from the dust.
Everyone agreed on that plan and was ready to go. The captain radioed Fourniet, positioned with the bulldozer operator to ensure uninterrupted communication, that Team 1 was ready. The sled began inching up the slope.
In reality, there was no need to be excessively concerned. The cable was more than adequate for the job with a rating that exceeded tens of thousands of pounds. The combined weight of the cargo–victims, rescuers, and equipment–was probably less than 1,000 pounds. Including the drag produced by the uphill trip, the group was well within the safe working limit of the cable and the bulldozer`s winch.
The helicopter hoist cable system, with which personnel from Air Operations and USAR-1 are routinely lowered to pluck people from cliffs mountainsides and other situations, is rated “only” for a 600-pound live vertical lift, with no belay system at all. So, in reality, we were operating with a greater safety margin on the sled than if we had attempted a helicopter hoist operation.
Still, to personnel who were weaned on the basic concept of using dual ropes, belays, and other redundant safety systems whenever possible during technical rescue operations, it is sometimes disconcerting to rely on a single cable or rope of any diameter in extreme high-angle situations.
The biggest concern was actually for our two victims, who would in essence be strapped to a missile pointed at the canyon bottom if something were to go wrong.
The bulldozer operator and Fourniet kept a close eye on the cable and the sled as it ascended; there was never a problem. During the trip, Team 1 calmed the two victims, who remained wide-eyed as the vista opened up below them. When they had crested the slope, the operator hopped into the bulldozer and drove forward, towing the sled all the way to Air Squad 9`s location. It was smooth going all the way. The USFS engine and the patrols had arrived sometime during the raising operation, and their personnel assisted with releasing the litters and transferring the patients.
With the help of personnel from the USFS, both patients were quickly loaded into the helicopter, and Lineberry lifted off once everyone was strapped in. Within 10 minutes, the helicopter landed, and the patients were handed off to the Trauma Center staff at Henry Mayo Medical Center in Valencia. Both men survived; they sustained broken bones and some internal injuries.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Preplans for emergencies at special projects like the Pacific Pipeline are desirable, if not required. They need not be too detailed; however, certain basic strategies for likely scenarios should be worked out in advance.
For remote sites not accessible to normal fire apparatus and ambulances, ensure the availability of bulldozers, four-wheel-drive vehicles, and other all-terrain units to transport personnel, equipment, and patients.
The availability of hoist-equipped rescue helicopters is extremely desirable for remote incidents. Agencies without their own helicopters can generally make arrangements with neighboring agencies, the military, or other providers.
If the incident site is determined to be inaccessible to ground units, consider staging units in a place where personnel and equipment may be transported to the actual rescue site by helicopters, four-wheel-drive units, or bulldozers.
Be prepared to send teams of firefighters from the staging area for the following assignments:
–Rope rescue teams to extract victims from situations where helicopter hoisting is deemed unfeasible. If the construction sled had not been available at this incident, high-angle rope systems or vehicle-mounted rescue winch operations would have been required.
–Litter teams to carry victims (in litter baskets) to locations where they may be picked up by an air squad or a ground vehicle.
–Extrication teams to free victims trapped in vehicles or debris.
–Medical teams to treat multiple patients on the site as necessary, especially during extended extrications.
–Shoring teams if heavy equipment must be stabilized or lifted.
Determine before incidents occur the manner in which communications will be established with on-site supervisors and workers, including the use of radios, cellular phones, or even “runners” if necessary. Determine radio frequencies if possible.
Meet with project supervisors to determine what equipment will be available on the site. This is the time to find out about resources like construction sleds, bulldozers, water trucks, and any on-site medical or extrication gear. Discuss methods of transporting rescuers and equipment to potential accident sites.
For major projects, and especially those with special hazards, consider joint training exercises to simulate likely scenarios. Consider including other public safety agencies that may be required to assist.
Develop a written plan, and maintain it in prominent places so that “overtimers,” move-up companies, and other “newcomers” will be able to find and use them when an incident occurs.
Above all, be prepared to consider unusual solutions for unusual problems. Some of the best solutions for unique fire and rescue problems may not be found in any book.
Share information about lessons learned with others who may be confronted with similar problems. n
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LARRY COLLINS, a 19-year member of the Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD), is a paramedic, a rescue instructor, and one of three captains assigned to USAR-1, the department`s central rescue company, responsible for supervising technical rescue operations within the LACoFD`s 2,700-square-mile jurisdiction (including the incident described in this article). He is a search team and rescue team manager of the LACoFD FEMA USAR Task Force and a member of the LACoFD Anti-Terrorism Committee.
