OCFD Logistics
BY VANDON R. HOTTLE
The logistics operation in the response to the April 19 bombing in Oklahoma City was extremely complicated and fragmented. While successful in that almost all equipment needs were met during the 17-day emergency operation, there were a number of lessons learned through trial and error that could have produced more efficiency.
The biggest asset of the logistics section was the enthusiasm of the individuals who worked in that area. A large number of individuals were working in the logistics section at various times. These included firefighting units from Oklahoma City and the surrounding area, as well as firefighters from as far away as Oregon. Civilian volunteers from the local companies and agencies such as the Red Cross also took part. The diverse backgrounds of the people working logistics and their lack of logistics experience made their task difficult but not impossible. Almost without exception, those assigned to logistics worked extremely hard and very innovatively in an unglamorous but critical part of the emergency scene.
Getting the necessary equipment for the rescue operation was not the problem; rescue personnel after the operation confirmed that when they asked for equipment, it was almost always provided. However, tracking the equipment already there and prioritizing orders for more were difficult.
The amount of equipment flowing into the logistics section in the first few days of the operation was phenomenal. Truckload after truckload of tools, first-aid supplies, and soft goods were delivered, the bulk of it donated (no invoice, no charge) from businesses and individuals. The news media would announce that gloves were needed, and instantly great quantities of gloves would arrive. While the donations were greatly appreciated, a large number of unneeded supplies arrived at the site.
Logistics fragmentation was the biggest obstacle during the operation. The Oklahoma City Fire Department (OCFD), as the lead agency, had a logistics center in operation. Most of the goods, purchased and donated, were delivered there, especially in the early days of the operation. However, a number of other entities also had logistics centers, including the Red Cross, Feed the Children, the Salvation Army, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Postal Service volunteers, and the MACC (multiagency communications center).
This fragmentation created enormous problems, many of which were never resolved. Inventory control became impossible because, when requests for equipment came in, it could not be verified whether the equipment was already on the scene or at another location. Equipment was arriving in such enormous quantities and with such speed that none of the logistics areas could verify what they had at any one time. The OCFD logistics center supplied not only its own rescue workers but also the volunteers from other departments; the initial USAR teams on the scene; as well as other agencies involved in the incident, such as the FBI and the ATF. The lack of just a single logistics operation was a major glitch.
There was a secured perimeter area around the bombed Murrah Building. The scene was a rescue operation and also a crime scene, and the law enforcement agencies treated it as such. The perimeter stretched for several blocks, and the OCFD command post and logistics center were located within the secured perimeter. In hindsight, the logistics center would probably have worked more efficiently if it had been located just outside the secured area. This would have allowed goods to be moved quickly, without law enforcement obstruction, to the central logistics area, inventoried, and then distributed at the emergency scene in an orderly manner–probably through only one entry point. Locating logistics outside the secured perimeter also would have allowed many of the donated goods, intended for emergency workers but delivered instead to other agencies, to arrive where rescue workers could have used them.
Documentation was another major failing. Inventory tracking was primitive at best, done manually by personnel unfamiliar with inventory-control problems. The fact that some of the goods were purchased, some donated, and some loaned added to the confusion. Even after improvising some kind of workable system at the OCFD logistics area, none of the other entities receiving goods could ever give an accurate inventory list. A laptop computer, complete with an inventory-control program and staffed 24 hours a day by an experienced operator, would have helped immensely in accurately tracking the equipment received and distributed.
Logistics staffing consisted of a supervisor with at least one assistant and various personnel maintaining inventory lists, unloading trucks, stacking goods, moving items to various places on the scene with small vehicles, and ordering equipment by telephone. The OCFD maintenance shop kept people at logistics and at the maintenance facility 24 hours a day. Although vendors that could supply many of the needs were available, many items ordered were so specialized that vendors had to be found on the spot. The staffing remained on shift work, rotating every 12 hours after the first day. Because the OCFD had three separate shifts, six different supervisors were working the incident. Frankly, there were too many fingers in the pie. Each person was doing his best to perform the best job possible, but it was impossible to maintain a uniform system with so many different people and personalities involved. Logistics would have operated much better if no more than three people were involved and if they had been taken off shift work and worked eight-hour increments for the duration of the incident. Other key personnel on eight-hour shifts and logistics should have done the same thing. With only a few key players, a uniform operation should have been the goal.
The overall logistics staffing was not a high enough priority early in the incident. The fire service is not used to long-term incidents. Virtually all the incidents in which we are involved can be stabilized the same day. Seventeen-day incidents with massive equipment needs are not the norm. Setting up logistics early and adequately with sufficient personnel is crucial for bringing a long-term incident to a successful conclusion.
The equipment ordered from the OCFD logistics area was varied, to say the least. Heavy equipment such as cranes, heavy trucks to move debris and trash, Bobcats®, front-end loaders, forklifts, and fuel trucks to supply the fire service and other agencies all had to be brought to the scene. Other equipment needs included cribbing and shoring supplies, fencing for perimeter control, lighting, generators, extrication equipment, hydraulic rebar cutters, air hammers, boots, fatigues, filter masks, gloves, hard hats, eye protection, rain gear, large quantities of first-aid supplies, and restroom facilities. An example of the thousands of small items needed included boots and food for the USAR teams` rescue dogs.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
A number of lessons for running an efficient logistics operation at a large scene were learned and reinforced; among the most important are the following:
Constantly gather information. Get copies of any resource status and situation status reports from the scene. Logistics must be aware of the situations elsewhere and not operate in a vacuum. Along these same lines, the overall situation should be continually passed along from command to the various divisions on the scene. For example, on this particular scene, it was imperative to let everyone know when the situation changed from a rescue operation to a body recovery. That type of change has an impact on everything, from safety concerns to equipment orders.
Set up communications quickly. Set up telephone hard lines immediately. We did this early in the operation, and it helped the operation immensely. Do not rely on the radio system.
Limit supervisory staffing. Keep as few people as possible supervising the major areas such as logistics. Set up one uniform system as early in the incident as possible. Staff with adequate numbers of personnel to perform the multitude of logistics tasks required at a major scene (minimum of 12 in the Oklahoma City incident).
Have inventory control ready. Set up an adequate inventory system before the incident occurs–not during the incident. Use a computer with an inventory program, if possible, and trained personnel. The record keeping should be simple and designed for speed. Have the goods delivered to logistics separated and stored in three major categories: tools and equipment, first-aid supplies, and soft goods. Color code if possible. Above all, set up a system immediately and stick to it. Stay organized, and make every effort to track inventory and invoices. Lease equipment instead of purchasing it when possible.
Centralize logistics. Have only one logistics center with a representative from the various agencies involved. This will help prioritize needs, keep agencies from ordering duplicate supplies, and facilitate coordination among the many agencies involved in a response of this magnitude. Locate the center at a central point just outside the secured perimeter and then have logistics move the equipment and supplies through one entry point into the perimeter to the end user.
Determine length of incident. Recognize how vital the logistics function is in a long-term operation. As soon as it is realized that the scene will require more time and equipment than normal to stabilize, set up a logistics area and adequately staff it.
Many things could have been improved logistically in the Oklahoma City Bombing. Hopefully, you can take these ideas and incorporate them into your department`s procedures for major incidents. Many things also went right logistically during the incident. It was one of the largest operations in the history of the United States; and when equipment and supplies were needed, they arrived–usually in an extraordinarily short period of time. n
VANDON R. HOTTLE is a 23-year veteran of the Oklahoma City (OK) Fire Department, where he is a district chief. He is a graduate of the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program and has a bachelor`s degree from the University of Oklahoma.
