This is the second segment of a four-part series on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conference, organized and directed by RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute on behalf of NIOSH.1,2 attended by 150 responders to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001; the anthrax bioterrorism incidents of Autumn 2001; and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The emergency responders –assigned to one of eight panels–took part in guided discussions covering topics such as tasks performed during the initial and sustained phases of the response, hazards encountered, availability and relevance of personal protective equipment, and training and information about the use of protective equipment.
Following are some summaries of additional major points covered in the conference.
Personal Protective Equipment
The availability of PPE was a concern at the WTC. Adequate supplies became available by the third or fourth day, as commercial air transportation resumed. Some panelists reported that adequate supplies of respirators were not available until seven to nine days later. Availability affected responders’ health in that workers at the WTC who had only a single set of protective clothing did not want their clothes wetted anymore during decon, making. PPE decontamination efforts in some cases were haphazard and ineffective.
Clothing
Firefighters’ traditional on-duty clothing was too heavy for an extended response and for performing heavy labor such as hauling concrete on 12-hour shifts. The first firefighters to respond at the WTC and the Pentagon in standard structural fire turnout gear-heavy bunker pants and coat-reported that the suits’ limited breathability in high-heat environments and that heavy weight contributed to fatigue and heat stress.
Moisture caused layers of garments to be compressed–from sweat on the inside or water penetration (e.g. through boot-pant interface). This reduced the thermal protection capacity. Also, once the inside of the garment became damp, reexposure to heat sometimes led to steam burns.
Battle dress uniforms (BDUs)–military fatigues–are lighter and more flexible for working in confined spaced, but they do not offer the thermal and abrasion protection of bunker gear, nor do they protect against biological hazards.
Most of protective clothing was designed for one hazard, not the multiple hazards present on such sites. Panelists cited lack of proper inventory control. Moreover, gear often didn’t fit some rescuers, they noted and said there is a need for garments in sizes that would fit women and all types of responder physiques.
Footwear
Firefighter boots were not fitted properly. They became soaked because the seams failed in hot water or water came in over the sides. The rubble pile at the WTC was so hot in places that the soles of the rubber boots melted. Work shoes with steel reinforced soles and toes conducted and retained heat, causing blisters or scorched feet. In all, the fire boots are not designed for long-term wear and extended operations.
Gloves
The gloves available hardened when wetted and dried and limited dexterity. Panelists noted the need for gloves that are well fitted, are flexible enough to pick up small items, and protect against piercing and contamination. Biohazard protective glove liners were seldom used inside the heavy dugout gloves.
Eyewear
Safety glasses were readily available but did not protect against airborne particles, the most prevalent hazard. The sides of the glasses were open, allowing dust to enter and irritate the eyes. Safety goggles worked better for keeping dust out workers’ eyes but were not comfortable, hindered peripheral vision, and tended to fog–even the “anti-fog” goggles distributed by U.S. Government Services Administration. In some cases, the goggles did not fit well with half-face respirators.
Full-face visors, also available, were more comfortable to wear, but they were not as effective as goggles for keeping dust out of eyes. Another problem was that the lenses of eye protection equipment became scratched.
Hearing Protection Equipment
Hearing protection became an issue during the sustained response phase when heavy equipment was brought in to break up and clear away rubble and debris. Some of the hearing protection available was designed for high-impact noise such as sirens, not for the constant lower-frequency noise from heavy-duty equipment. Earplugs were readily available at the WTC, but it was difficult to achieve a level of protection that would muffle some of the high-impact sounds and still enable rescuers to hear their radios or their colleagues.
Head Protection Equipment
Standard firefighter helmets were effective against a broad range of threats. In a prolonged response, however, the weight of the standard fire helmet is difficult to endure for more than several hours. The traditional fire helmet with a large brim to protect the back of the neck is inappropriate for working in confined spaces. A “kiwi” helmet–without a brim and with a smoother surface and a tighter fit to the head–helped to reduce the risk of becoming snagged on debris. Chinstraps not well suited for responders wearing respirators. Helmet face shields and goggles designed for impact and splash protection did not protect against dust and particulates.
WTC responders wore their fire helmets for several weeks for identification purpose. (To be continued)
References
- The Science and Technology Policy Institute is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the National Science Foundation and managed by RAND. The institute supports the Office of Science and Technology Policy and other Executive Branch agencies, offices, and councils.
- Brian A. Jackson, D.J. Peterson, James T. Bartis, Tom LaTourrette, Irene Brahmakulam, Ari Houser, Jerry Sollinger are authors of the report (CF-176-OSTP, RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute, 2002). To order hardcopies of this report and other RAND documents, contact Distribution Services at (310) 451-7002, fax: (310) 451-6915, e-mail: order@rand.org.
