Canada’s Oil Refinery Fire
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FIRE REPORT
A charge pump producing pressures up to 21,000 kpa (3,046 psi) malfunctioned in the hydrogen treating unit at the Gulf Oil Refinery in Mississauga, Ontario, causing a hydrocarbon fire. The pump fire caused processing equipment to collapse and burst a high-pressure hydrogen line. The escaping hydrogen resulted in a large explosion and fire, injuring four plant firefighting personnel, destroying a new 6,000 liters per minute (1,585 gpm) Squirt foam pumper, and severely exposing other processing equipment and pressure vessels.
Pre-planning and cooperative firefighting efforts between the Mississauga and Gulf Refinery Fire Departments kept this incident from escalating into a major disaster.
The Gulf Oil Refinery is a large complex on the shores of Lake Ontario at the southwest corner of the city of Mississauga. The refinery covers an area of 250 hectares (617.5 acres) and processes and refines crude oil into a variety of petroleum products.
The plant is protected with a water main and fire hydrant system. Manually operated monitors and fixed water spray systems are provided for key processing equipment and pressure vessels. All light product tanks are equipped with fixed foam systems. The water mains are supplied by two 10,000 liters per minute (2,642.5 gpm) diesel-fired fire pumps and one 14,000 liters per minute (3,699.5 gpm) steam turbine fire pump. These three pumps can draft directly from Lake Ontario. The in-plant process water system can also be diverted into the fire protection water system during an emergency.
The refinery operates a private fire brigade made up of plant operating staff under the direction of Fire Chief Chester Whynot. The shift superintendent acts as the on-duty fire chief. All firefighting personnel participate in weekly training exercises. The Refinery Fire Department is equipped with two 6,000 liters per minute (1,585 gpm) foam pumpers (one with a Squirt tower), one twin agent fast attack vehicle, one 9,000-liter (2,378-gallon) foam tanker, and two 4,500-liter (1,189-gallon) foam trailers.
Photo courtesy of Mississauga Fire Department
Mississauga, a city west of Toronto, has a population of approximately 340,000 people and covers an area of 284 square kilometers (110 square miles). Mississauga has a variety of fire risks within its borders, including over 250 high-rise buildings, Pearson International Airport, and two refineries. The rapid growth of the city in the last two decades has seen major changes in the municipality and its emergency services. The Mississauga Fire Department, under the direction of Fire Chief Gordon E. Bentley, has expanded to include 350 personnel operating 17 first-line pieces of firefighting apparatus from 11 fire stations.
Mississauga has experienced a number of serious fire incidents. The largest being a train derailment in 1979. That nine-day firefighting and hazardous materials incident necessitated the evacuation of 250,000 people. During the entire operation, there was no loss of life or serious injuries. As a result of this emergency and others, the Mississauga Fire Department developed, under the direction of Chief Bentley, a disaster and serious emergency plan. This plan was instrumental in the effective control and extinguishment of the Gulf Refinery fire. In addition to the disaster and serious emergency plan, the municipal and Gulf Refinery fire departments have for many years had an emergency plan for fires within the refinery. The municipal fire department conducts annual tours of the refinery to familiarize department personnel with hazardous areas and the location and operation of the plant’s fire protection equipment.
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At the time of the fire, the weather was clear, the temperature was approximately —4°C (25°F) and the wind was from the east-northeast at 11 kilometers per hour (7 mph). The refinery was celebrating a company recognized holiday and, therefore, although operating normally, had a reduced staff.
At approximately 11:05 a.m., the hydrogen treating unit operator noted a decrease in operating pressure for one of the unit charge pumps. An operator was sent to investigate the problem. At approximately 11:10 a.m. the pump failed, spraying oil at 21,000 kpa (3,046 psi) into the air. This oil was ignited by sparks from the hot steel parts of the pump. The shift superintendent and on-duty fire chief, Malcolm MacKenzie, was in the unit control room at the time and immediately activated the plant’s fire/emergency alarm system.
By the time the plant brigade arrived, the fire was burning under the process equipment fueled by oil from tanks supplying the charge pump. Chief MacKenzie ordered the control center to contact the municipal fire department, isolate the hydrogen treating unit, dump the product to the flare system’, and have all the fire pumps started. He directed his crews to activate the hydrant mounted monitors surrounding the fire area. The Gulf firefighting personnel activated eight manually operated monitors to protect exposed pipe and pressure vessels in the fire area. Two portable monitors were also set up to protect pipe racks and pumps. The Gulf foam pumper and foam tanker were positioned at the south side of the fire.
Chief MacKenzie and three Gulf personnel were setting up the foam pumper at the east side of the fire when a cooling unit, exposed to the radiant heat of the fire, collapsed. This collapse ruptured piping containing hydrogen at 21,000 kpa (3,046 psi). The leaking hydrogen ignited in a huge and sudden exploding fireball. The fire engulfed the Squirt foam pumper. The other fire vehicles were severely exposed and could not be moved. Chief MacKenzie and the three firefighters were burned by the explosion and all personnel immediately moved back from the fire to protected locations.
* A flare system is a diked containment area at a remote location from the storage area. In the event of an emergency in the storage tanks, the flammable products can be pumped to the flare pit. The pit Is equipped with pilot (flare) fires which ignite the “dumped” material and bum it off safely as it enters the enclosure.
Photo by John Vogelaar
The first alarm to the Mississauga Fire Department was received by telephone at 11:16 a.m. from a citizen who was about two kilometers (1.2 miles) from the refinery. She reported seeing a large fireball and column of smoke. Shortly thereafter, numerous area residents began to call, reporting a fire in the area of the Gulf Refinery. The dispatcher immediately sent a firstalarm assignment consisting of two pumpers, one aerial, a rescue squad, and District Chief Rod Arnold to the scene.
As this assignment was being dispatched, the Gulf Refinery personnel notified the fire department that they had a fire. Just as the first-due pumper arrived at the refinery, the hydrogen explosion took place. Captain Gord Wood immediately called for a second alarm. This alarm consisted of two additional pumpers, one aerial, the fire department command post, the foam unit, and Deputy Chief B. McKee.
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Photo courtesy of Mississauga Fire Department
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With the activation of a second alarm, Chief Bentley decided to initiate the disaster and serious emergency plan. He established a disaster command center at fire department headquarters. From there he could insure that the necessary resources were available and that normal service was maintained in the rest of the city. Uncommitted companies were relocated to continue fire protection in the vacated stations. Administration and fire prevention personnel began recalling staff to man standby equipment in case additional alarms were sounded at the refinery. Police and ambulance agencies were placed on standby and the fire department canteen service was activated. Within 30 minutes of the first alarm, all standby vehicles were manned with firefighters who had been recalled to duty.
Captain Wood reported a serious working fire in a process unit in the west section of the refinery. Incoming units were ordered to stand by at a pre-arranged marshalling (staging) area at the front gate of the refinery and await instructions.
While Wood conferred with Gulf personnel at the marshalling area, Chief Arnold and Pumper 7, under the direction of Acting Captain Roy Jones, moved up to Dock Road on the east side of the fire area. They met with Gulf Chief MacKenzie who had been injured by the hydrogen explosion. Chief MacKenzie remained on the scene despite his injuries to direct the initial attack on the fire.
As Pumper 7 was moving up to the fire area, Chief McKee arrived at the scene and conferred with Chief MacKenzie. It was decided to have Mississauga Fire Department set up exposure lines to protect pressure vessels and process equipment.
A forward command post was established in the process control building in the refining area and a rear command post was established at the administration building and marshalling area.
District Chief Bruce Herridge, who responded from his home near the refinery, operated the command post in the marshalling area and directed the commitment of firefighting vehicles from the marshalling area.
Peel Region police closed the roads leading to the refinery and were requested by Chief McKee to evacuate within one kilometer (0.62 miles).
Gulf Refinery firefighters were directed to isolate the processing unit and pump off as much product as possible to starve the fire. Pumper 7 laid a 100 mm (4-inch) diameter high volume line to a hydrant on Dock Road and a 100 mm (4-inch) high volume line wyed to two 65 mm (2.6-inch) lines to a 2,000 liters per minute (528.5 gpm) monitor to protect the hydrogen unit at the east side of the fire.
Pumper 3 was directed to Dock Road and laid a 100 mm (4-inch) line to supply its portable 2,000 liters per minute (528.5 gpm) monitor and protect the hydrogen unit. Pumper 7’s monitor was then repositioned to protect a pressurized oil tank at the east side of the fire.
Captain Mark McDonald in pumper 10 was directed to place his vehicle on the north side of the fire between the hydrogen unit and the hydrogen treating unit. The Pumper 10 crew connected a 100 mm (4-inch) line to a plant hydrant and supplied its portable 2,000 liters per minute (528.5 gpm) monitor to protect hydrogen pressure vessels beside the pump fire.
Captain Larry Anderson in Aerial 7 was directed to set up a 2,000 liters per minute (528.5 gpm) ladder pipe at the northwest corner of the hydrogen treating unit in an attempt to protect a reactor located in the center of the fire area. Aerial 7 is a quint equipped with a 4,000 liters per minute (1,057 gpm) pump and a pre-piped 30-meter (98foot) aerial ladder. The ladder pipe was able to extend above the pipe racks and the pressure vessels to reach the involved reactor.
After approximately two hours, problems developed with the two 10,000 liters per minute (2,642.5 gpm) diesel fire pumps. As a precautionary measure, Acting Captain Doug Dow on Pumper/Aerial 4 [a quint equipped with a 4,000 liters per minute (1,057 gpm) pump and a 23-meter (75-foot) aerial ladder] was directed to the refinery dock on Lake Ontario to draft from the lake and pump into the fire protection water main system through a manifold provided at the dock for this purpose. While Pumper/Aerial 4 supplemented the water supply, the diesel pumps were individually taken out of service and repaired. The steam turbine fire pump continued to operate throughout the fire.
Although the fire was under control in about two hours, it continued to burn for approximately six hours until the fuel was consumed. Water was continuously applied to all pressure vessels until the danger to these exposures from radiant heat passed. Firefighters remained on the scene until 7:19 p.m. The fire burned itself out.
Critique
A number of problems had arisen during the fire, particularly related to communications. At the initial hydrogen explosion, pipes carrying steam at 4,200 kpa (609 psi) had ruptured. The noise from the escaping steam made voice and radio communication impossible. All personnel were directed to wear hearing protection. In many cases, communications between personnel were by hand signals and occasionally a sketch had to be used to communicate orders. Situation updates had to be relayed to the command post at the marshalling area and then to fire department headquarters to keep Chief Bentley informed of the situation.
A reserve pool of firefighting personnel and equipment were also at the marshalling area. Mutual aid companies from the neighboring Texaco Canada and Petro Can refineries responded to the Gulf refinery and stood by at the marshalling area. Fortunately, their assistance was not required. Personnel were rotated from the fire area periodically to rest and warm up in the canteen van. A total of 35 Mississauga firefighters and 50 Gulf firefighters fought the fire.
During the height of the fire there was concern that one or more of the exposed pressure vessels would BLEVE. As a precautionary measure, an evacuation was made for approximately a one kilometer (0.62 mile) radius. This evacuation involved only a few industrial premises since there were no residential areas initially endangered by the fire. Peel Regional police restricted access to this area and were prepared to evacuate beyond the one kilometer (0.62 mile) range had the emergency become more serious.
An extensive investigation was carried out by Gulf personnel, the Mississauga Fire Department, and the Office of the Fire Marshal of Ontario. It was determined that the fire was caused by the failure of a piston in a charge pump. The explosion was caused by the rupture of a hydrogen pipe that broke due to the structural failure of process equipment supports.
Refinery process equipment fires of this nature, although infrequent, can cause devastating damage. Refinery process pumps should be monitored for vibration failure wherever possible. Pump assemblies, pressure vessels, unprotected steel support piping, and process equipment should be protected by automatic operating fixed water spray systems. Such a system would have greatly limited the damage in this fire.
