BY LARRY COLLINS
In mid-afternoon of August 30 (Hurricane Katrina made landfall at 6 a.m. on August 29), FEMA Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) “White” IST Leaders Rick Martinez [chief of the Sacramento Metro (CA) Fire Department] and Dean Cathey [assistant chief of the Los Angeles (CA) Fire Department] completed their initial tasking at the federal staging area at Stennis Space Center and responded to Gulfport, Mississippi, where they had previously assigned the remainder of the IST to establish contact with the local authorities, initiate search and rescue operations in support of the local and state resources already working there, and establish a base of operations for what was going to be a massive multiagency search, rescue, and recovery effort.
Martinez and Cathey had been in contact with IST Operations Chief Endricat [Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department] and Deputy Ops Chief Dan Cuoco [Miami-Dade (FL) Fire & Rescue Department] by satellite phone the entire time, essentially maintaining a mobile command for urban search and rescue operations in Mississippi. Based on reports from their ops chiefs, the IST leaders had already requested additional US&R task forces and other resources identified by personnel on the ground in Gulfport and surrounding areas.
Meanwhile, at the Harrison County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Gulfport, Endricat and Cuoco had been collaborating with the local emergency coordinator and fire chiefs to work out a basic Incident Action Plan (IAP) to start federal operations in the Mississippi Gulf Coast areas known to have been hit the hardest.
 Gulfport Fire Station 7 was in ruins on Day 1 of US&R operations. (Photos by author.) |
The local unified incident commanders had agreed that because of the nature of this event and the devastating effects to the local infrastructure (as well as the sheer volume of structures and land that needed to be physically searched for missing and trapped victims), the US&R operations would be conducted under Unified Command including the IST; the Mississippi State Fire Marshal’s representative; and liaisons from the Harrison County Homeland Security law enforcement representative, the county coroner’s office, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other allied agencies.
Several groups of US&R-trained firefighters had already arrived at the Harrison County EOC. Some were from local fire departments whose members had already been through an intense and dangerous period and had bravely held the line during the storm (and even attempted in some cases to respond to rescue people under conditions that forced them to return back to quarters because of near-zero visibility and flying missiles). They had already saved many lives under dire circumstances that included the total destruction of several of their fire stations and at least 16 apparatus and vehicles.
We knew that similar efforts were being organized at a local level up and down the coast, including places like Biloxi, where firefighters had ridden out the storm in quarters that filled to the rafters with storm surge. In at least one case in that city, firefighters had taken shelter in an inflatable rescue boat in their own apparatus room; the boat had floated literally to the underside of the roof, trapping the personnel inside because of the pressure applied to the boat from the rising water under it. Stories like these would be told as the disaster unfolded and the extent of the extraordinary local response efforts became evident.
 Structures like this required a thorough physical search for live and deceased victims. |
While details for coordinated search and rescue operations were being worked out at the Harrison County EOC, the resources that were on the scene were being immediately applied to assist the local and state responders. Indiana US&R Task Force 1 (IN-TF1) was assigned to begin primary search operations in Jackson County (in coordination with the Florida State US&R task forces and the overhead team from Florida), assisting the Biloxi Fire Department and other local fire/rescue agencies that had already been conducting search operations. They would soon be joined by Mississippi’s “Bravo” US&R Strike Team, established that afternoon.
Florida US&R Task Force 2 (which had been federalized as a FEMA team prior to Katrina’s landfall and which was now operating as a FEMA resource) was already on the ground organizing and conducting primary search operations in Gulfport, in support of firefighters from the Gulfport Fire Department and other local responders who had been working hard since Katrina made landfall. They would be joined by the Mississippi “Charlie” US&R Strike Team, which also was established that afternoon.
Ohio US&R Task Force 1 (OH-TF1) was beginning to work a hard-hit area that stretched from the town of Pass Christian to Gulfport. Later that evening, they would be paired up with Mississippi’s “Alpha” and “Delta” US&R Strike Teams.
All these resources, and many others to follow, were assigned to the East Branch, with FEMA US&R IST member Jim Gruenberg (an IST US&R specialist from OH-TF1) as branch director. Gruenberg divided the branch into three divisions, whose supervisors began organizing grid searches to clear every structure, debris pile, and vehicle of potential victims.
EAST BRANCH
The East Branch was an immense job. The entire coast there was devastated, with collapsed structures; boats and barges washed inland; many natural gas leaks; a mile-long derailed freight train tossed about through a residential neighborhood and hotel zone with potential hazardous materials spilled; destroyed roads; and practically every sort of debris pile imaginable, stretching miles back from the beaches.
There were many collapsed multistory buildings, including some reinforced concrete structures flattened by floating casinos that had broken loose and had been pushed inland by the flood surge, crushing buildings as they were shoved around by the wind and crashing waves.
 Nearly the entire Gulf Coast of Mississippi suffered this level of damage (or worse). This aerial view gives an idea of the complexity and enormity of the search and rescue operations required. |
Within the East Branch divisions, the FEMA US&R task force leaders, as they arrived, were assigned large areas that had to be thoroughly searched. As more intelligence was developed (including 911 phone records from the various cities and the EOC), targeted searches were required. There was also a need to maintain a rapid intervention capability throughout the search operations. All these issues were being addressed by IST-A US&R Specialist Jim Gruenberg from OH-TF1, East Branch director, and the IST personnel assigned as division supervisors in the East Branch.
INTEGRATING LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESOURCES
For the first few days, the FEMA US&R IST worked mainly out of the Harrison County EOC, which had been partially flooded and badly battered but was still in service and running on generator power in the sweltering heat. This allowed very good coordination with local unified commanders, the county’s emergency director, and the officials of the various affected cities.
Even after the US&R Base of Operations (BoO) was established several miles away, the IST maintained a constant presence at the EOC and constant contact with the local commanders and officials. It was truly an interoperable, highly coordinated, collaborative, multiagency unified command, with the local and state officials calling the shots strategically and the IST managing the search and rescue function under the direction of the local/state unified command.
Other firefighters from around the state were arriving in Gulfport. They were sent by their chiefs, who anticipated that their specialized skills might be needed. Some regional teams from larger cities were in Mississippi, and we were told to expect several organized teams of rescue-trained firefighters who were en route from neighboring Alabama.
One of the US&R IST’s main priorities was to use all these resources to conduct an organized search and rescue effort that would leave no stone unturned in terms of attempting to locate and rescue any survivors.
With consensus from state and local fire officials, Endricat directed the IST to form the Mississippi-based firefighters and their equipment into three US&R Strike Teams and to organize the Alabama teams in a similar fashion. So Mississippi US&R Strike Teams A (Alpha), B (Beta), and D (Delta) were created for this disaster. They were integrated into the Incident Action Plan (IAP) with the FEMA US&R task forces.
 This freight train wreck was scattered across a mile-long swatch of the Mississippi coastline. |
Soon thereafter, an Alabama-based swiftwater rescue team with personal rescue watercraft (PWC), inflatable rescue boats (IRBs), and hard-bottomed boats showed up. They were integrated into the IAP and assigned to begin searching swamps, bayous, and the many fish camps along the coastal boundaries.
Other boat assets were trickling in from Alabama, Florida Fish and Wildlife, Georgia state police, and some federal law enforcement agencies. These teams were used to help gain access to inundated areas and the swamps and lakes, as well as the many remote fish camps found along the coast of Mississippi and neighboring states. It was a truly interagency, multistate, local/state/federal government effort, all organized under Unified Command. And it worked.
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) already had a huge presence on the coast, and USCG units were engaged in searches of the coastal zones, mostly in the East Branch. Eventually, a Marine Branch with a USCG liaison (Lieutenant Steve Lyons, head of the now-destroyed Gulfport USCG headquarters) was established. He attended most of the planning and operations meetings. The branch’s operations were coordinated with the FEMA US&R IST. Using this mechanism, the entire coastline of Mississippi, including the barrier islands, inlets, and all tributaries leading to the Gulf, were eventually searched for victims. Helicopters were available on request through the military and reserves, the USCG, and law enforcement agencies.
But with the life-saving operations in New Orleans (just 60 miles to the west) ramping up and the tremendous scope of the search and rescue problem there becoming evident, helicopters were going to be in relatively short supply for several days.
Since the appropriate representatives from affected Gulf Coast counties had their hands full in their home jurisdictions dealing with the damage and critical problems demanding their time and resources (with not enough of either to go around), they ceded responsibility for organizing and managing the overall search and rescue operations to the FEMA “White” IST, which was predeployed to Mississippi with several US&R task forces before the hurricane struck.
One of the first orders of business after getting the first “down and dirty” reconnaissance/damage report from the local authorities, who had an idea of where their highest-priority search areas were, was to establish the General Control Objectives of the US&R IAP. However, we had heard relatively little about Hancock County and Pearl River County. This lack of information had Endricat concerned because the eyewall of the storm made landfall in that section of the coast.
GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES: MISSISSIPPI US&R OPERATIONS, AUGUST 30
The General Control Objectives for the local, state, and federal US&R resources were as follows:
1 Conduct life-saving operations while maintaining personnel safety, accountability, rapid intervention capabilities, and emergency medical capabilities for injured personnel and trapped victims.
2 Conduct primary search (and rescue) in highest priority areas in the East Branch (Harrison, Jackson, Stone, and George counties) using the “blitz” mode of operation (nonstop, around-the-clock operations, breaking only for personnel rehab, feeding, and safety).
It had already been determined that Harrison and Jackson counties, being right on the coast, were high priorities for search and rescue operations. Within those two counties, the communities along the Gulf were the most critical areas because of the tremendous storm surge and winds that had racked the coastal zones. The first FEMA US&R resources to arrive in Harrison and Jackson counties began their operations until reinforcements arrived. The following divisions were assigned to accomplish this objective:
- -East Division (Biloxi to Ocean Springs Bridge): IN-TF1, Mississippi “Bravo” US&R Strike, and Florida State US&R task forces in Biloxi, working eastward to the Alabama state line.
- -Central Division (all of Gulfport): FL-TF2 and Mississippi “Charlie” US&R Strike Team.
- -West Division (Long Beach Line, West to Bay St. Louis): OH-TF1 and Mississippi “Alpha” and “Delta” US&R Strike Teams.
3 Conduct primary search (and rescue) in highest priority areas in West Branch (Hancock and Pearl River counties). VA-TF2 was assigned to initial search operations in the following priority neighborhoods in Hancock County: Waveland, Diamond Head, East Hancock, Bayside Park, Shoreline Park, Lakeshore, Claymont Harbor, Bay Estates, Pearlington, and Springwood Park. (VA-TF2, on the road all day and all night, arrived in Gulfport around 0100 hours on August 31. After a briefing, VA-TF2 and the West Branch director convoyed into Hancock County around 0300 hours and initiated the first federal US&R operations. VA-TF2 was joined on August 31 by Maryland Task Force 1 and Massachusetts Task Force 1).
4 Complete primary search of other identified areas.
5 Complete secondary searches in the above counties.
WEST BRANCH ESTABLISHED
The West Branch took longer to establish because the FEMA US&R task forces that would be assigned there were still responding to the coast, fighting debris and strong winds across Interstate 10 from the east. The first to arrive in Gulfport was VA-TF2, which had responded from Virginia Beach and arrived just after midnight.
I was assigned as the West Branch director. Later, Captain Bill Kang of the Montgomery County (MD) Fire and Rescue Department, a member of Maryland US&R Task Force 1 (MD-TF1) and a US&R specialist on the FEMA ISTs, was assigned as deputy branch director.
The West Branch included Hancock and Pearl River Counties, but Hancock was the first priority because it is more populous and has large communities along the coast stretching from Diamond Head to Pearlington. After an operational briefing at the Harrrison County EOC, the VA-TF2 leaders and I convoyed the Virginia task force 30 miles down Highway 10 into Hancock County.
There was a total absence of lights, as is typical in areas in proximity to the storm’s epicenter. After leaving Gulfport, which also was dark save for the headlights of emergency vehicles and National Guard trucks at major intersections, we convoyed west on Highway 10, heading the 30-odd miles into the heart of Hancock County.
There was no sign of civilization anywhere at night; it began to seem blacker the more westward we went. A strange ground fog was starting to develop along the coastal zones, which made the driving more treacherous.
There was no cell phone service along the entire coast, which compounded the loss of hard-line communications. If not for satellite phones (which present problems of potential mechanical failure, battery power issues, and inoperability indoors and vehicles) and ham radios, the only reliable form of long-distance communication would have been light signals, signal fires, and messengers.
The convoy of SUVs, trucks, buses, and tractor-trailers picked their way around downed trees, piles of mud and debris, and even some 3,000-gallon propane tanks strewn across Interstate 10. They had been deposited by the winds and rain and the 30-plus-foot-high storm surge that had overtopped the highway, which is several miles from the coast. The level of devastation seemed to be increasing with every mile. Sections of homes and significant debris piles could be seen in the woods below, which could only have been deposited there by a tremendous storm surge.
After leaving Interstate 10, we headed south into the area of Waveland, where it seemed there was an even deeper level of destruction. The roads were thick in Mississippi mud that had been swept out of the swamps and woods and deposited when the storm surge subsided. And although we were still three or four miles inland, homes were strewn everywhere, with the debris layers 30 feet up in the trees. In daylight, we saw that the numbers of collapsed and severely damaged structures were in the thousands and even tens of thousands.
Literally hundreds of automobiles were scattered across and adjacent to the road between Interstate 10 and Highway 90, which parallels the coast closer to the beach. Again, it was evident that they had floated or been swept there. Some of the vehicles may have been parked along the roads for safekeeping by evacuating residents who assumed that the areas closer to Interstate 10 would be “high ground” and out of the inundation zone of any storm surge. Later, in the daylight, we discovered that the mud had been swept from nearby swamps and bayous, and much later we discovered pockets of destroyed neighborhoods among the swamps hidden from the main roads.
Slowly our caravan approached a major intersection at Highway 90, where a Rite Aid store and some strip malls were still standing in the dark. We noted two state trooper cars in the parking lot, headlights on, and gingerly walked up (making sure we didn’t surprise them at 3 a.m.) with the VA-TF2 task force leaders.
The troopers explained they were there on security duty, preventing looting of the strip malls; people were coming there for medical supplies, water, and food that were still available. An ambulance pulled up, and two EMTs went into the pharmacy and returned with bags of medications, syringes, and other supplies. They explained that several local firefighters had stepped on nails that day and were in need of treatment. They also indicated they were dealing with all types of other injuries as people waved them down. Since the local hospital was flooded out, the people were instructed to care for themselves as much as they could until reinforcements, including disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs), arrived. Ambulance transportation was limited to the closest functioning hospital (nearly 25 miles away)-and only for serious injuries. That told us a lot about the level of devastation in Hancock County.
After a quick briefing, I designated Virginia Beach Battalion Chief Chase Sargent (who was deployed as VA-TF2 rescue team manager) Hancock Division supervisor. VA-TF2 Leaders, Battalion Chiefs Mark Piland and Randy Journigan, operated their US&R task force as the Division’s only formal resource until the arrival of additional US&R task forces responding from their home bases as far away as New York, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and California.
There was no sign of fire department or police presence in many communities. In some areas, there was little sign of any functioning local government at all. The county EOC (in Bay St. Louis) had been blown out and washed through; all the police cruisers were washed away from some of the local police stations.
Later, the scattered intelligence that began trickling in from Pearl River County (mostly to the east and inland of Hancock County, far more sparsely populated and less directly impacted by the storm surge) indicated that there was serious wind damage but not the catastrophic level of destruction we were witnessing in Hancock County. This was confirmed later by multiple Resource Needs Assessment (RNA) flights by FEMA US&R personnel who overflew the impact areas in military helicopters. This made Pearl River County a secondary priority after Hancock in terms of the need for immediate primary search operations.
As we looked around the Waveland and Bay St. Louis areas, and especially as the early dawn light began to illuminate the devastation during the initial windshield damage surveys, it quickly became evident that Hancock County (and particularly the communities of Waveland, Bay St. Louis, Lower Diamond Head, and surrounding communities) was the “ground zero” of Hurricane Katrina. The eyewall had made landfall here, causing a 30-foot storm surge and severe winds. Most of the buildings near the coast were wiped out or flattened. An unknown number of people were missing and trapped. Reports from local survivors indicated these numbers were going to be significant (perhaps in the hundreds).
Contamination from flood waters, chemical leaks in industrial facilities and homes, and human and animal remains were serious issues. Decontamination for personnel and canines was required. This meant we needed clean water and other supplies to maintain operational effectiveness. All vehicles and vessels had to be decontaminated before they returned to the BoO, to prevent cross-contamination that could ultimately reduce the effectiveness of the teams. Basic issues like hand washing before eating MREs and maintaining other standard precautions were important throughout the operations.
In the field, search operations were made more difficult by deep, thick mud; swamps; bayous; and temperatures over 100°F with nearly 100-percent humidity. There were all manner of potential hazards from downed power lines to trees and power poles on the verge of falling over to unstable structures that needed interior search to trip hazards from all the debris scattered on the ground to natural gas leaking from ruptured piping. Snakes and alligators were also hazards; several were observed during the operations in Hancock Division.
All these hazards were accentuated at night, and the absence of functioning medical facilities in the region made it all the more important to stress safety issues and avoid personnel injuries, or worse. It also required that US&R IST, US&R task force leaders, and other command staff and supervisors have very flexible rapid intervention plans and a robust medical plan in place. This was covered in the US&R IAP daily and stressed in the field. Under Katrina’s catastrophic conditions, getting injured personnel to facilities like trauma centers in a timely manner would have been a challenge and almost certainly would have involved the use of helicopters.
The major priority in the Hancock Division initially was a primary search for trapped victims who might still be alive in any of the thousands of collapsed structures; sunken boats; swamps; debris piles; and the communities of Waveland, Bay St. Louis, Diamond Head, East Hancock, Bayside Park, Shoreline Park, Lakeshore, Claymont Harbor, Bay Estates, Springwood Park, and Pearlington.
The VA-TF2 leaders and Sargent (Hancock Division supervisor) quickly mapped out a strategy for priority searches in the most densely populated parts of Waveland and requested additional FEMA US&R task forces to expand the search in the most timely manner. Endricat approved the request for additional task forces; two more were eventually directed to head toward Hancock County (to be joined later by four additional FEMA US&R task forces).
VA-TF2 members embarked on a grid search that included house-to-house operations, searches of debris piles and the surrounding woods, the beaches, the bayous, and other areas in Waveland. Every building (most of which were completely collapsed or severely damaged) was physically searched and marked with the standard US&R structure and victim search markings in flourescent orange paint. GPS and maps were used to document findings to be collected and collated back at the Hancock BoO.
Eventually, we integrated multiple Coast Guard resources into the Hancock Division operations for marine search and to begin searching the bayous and swamp areas. A number of fire and rescue assets from multiple states, arriving through Emergency Management Compact (EMAC) agreements, were also integrated into these operations.
When MA-TF1 and MD-TF1 arrived in Waveland, they were assigned to the Hancock Division. Later, Pennsylvania Task Force 1, New York Task Force 1, Tennessee Task Force 1, and Florida Task Force 2 were assigned to the West Branch to assist with primary search operations. Because of the remote location of Waveland in relation to the main US&R BoO in Gulfport and the lack of communications complicated by the shortage of available fuel for vehicles to drive back and forth between Waveland and Gulfport, all the US&R task force leaders agreed that the best way to ensure nonstop search operations in the Hancock Division was to establish a satellite BoO in three adjacent commercial parking lots at the central intersection of Waveland, on Highway 90.
The alternative, working from a BoO in Gulfport, would have been counterproductive because of the distances, which would simply cause search and rescue teams to travel farther back and forth, using additional fuel (which was in critically short supply along the entire coast) and wasting rescuers’ energy and time.
Establishing the satellite BoO allowed the division supervisor and task force leaders to coordinate the search operations from a central location where a robust command post could be established in relative proximity to the county EOC about a mile away.
The footprint of the task forces assigned to Hancock County was sufficiently large that it precluded being much closer to the EOC, which had been completely washed through by the storm surge (which completely destroyed the city hall and fire station in central Waveland).
It took several days to gear up the EOC here, using command trailers towed in from elsewhere and eventually positioned in a way that allowed for an effective unified command at the county level. The local officials who did this work at the EOC in Hancock County (many of whom had basically lost everything they owned) operated beyond the call of duty under these daunting and sweltering conditions.
As the search operations progressed and it became apparent that the destruction in Hancock County was so bad that it was going to require a massive operation, it became increasingly apparent that Hancock County was practically an incident in itself. The Area Command model seemed to be the most appropriate way to handle the situation, given the distances, other complications, and the size of the area to be searched.
Therefore, the US&R task force leaders, Division Supervisor Sargent, and I basically established a separate unified incident command to conduct the search, rescue, and other US&R operations in Hancock County. The US&R task forces there developed a Hancock IAP and essentially operated as a separate incident under the umbrella of the overall US&R command back in Gulfport.
Maryland Task Force Leader Mike McCarty [assistant chief, Montgomery County (MD) Fire & Rescue Department] was designated as the Hancock US&R IC. He coordinated operations of the US&R resources assigned in that county from the satellite BoO in Waveland.
Every day, the appropriate Hancock division/incident leaders would travel into Gulfport to attend the operational briefings and return to run their operations. In their absence, the search and rescue operations continued nonstop under the direction of deputy division supervisors. This arrangement worked very well in ensuring constant search operations, immediate rescue operations when live victims were discovered, basic logistics support under very austere conditions, and better coordination with the branch director and the rest of the IST back in Gulfport.
Town by town, neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, house by house, and along the beaches-on foot and using various vehicles-US&R task forces divided into search crews working in close coordination with local and state US&R resources conducted a grid search of the worst-hit areas of Hancock County.
Every bayou and swamp was searched by water-capable assets, the woods were scoured for victims by search teams on foot and in helicopters, the barrier islands and the Gulf were searched by the Marine Branch resources (mostly USCG and law enforcement), and every boat was searched by a combination of all the above.
USING 911 CALL RECORDS FOR TARGETED SEARCHES
In addition to physical reconnaissance missions to determine the worst-hit areas (and the places where live rescues were most likely to be performed), the local 911 systems were used to determine where actual known emergencies had been reported.
With assistance from Harrison County’s Homeland Security Director (a member of the Sheriff’s Department), a list of all the 911 calls reporting trapped or missing people in Harrison County was compiled, along with excerpts from the actual text/transcripts of the phone calls for assistance received. We assigned US&R teams to conduct physical searches of locations from where people had called for help during the worst parts of the storm, when the fire department and other responders were unable to get to them.
There were hundreds of 911 calls from people from the attics of their homes, reporting that the water was still rising and they had no way to escape through the roof. In other cases, people indicated that drowning conditions were imminent.
In most of the cases on the list, the dispatchers had had no choice but to inform the callers that the fire department and other responders were unable to respond. Everyone knew at that point that projectiles were flying, electrical lines were coming down, roads were being blocked by trees and debris, and many areas were going under water so deep that people were driven into attics or onto rooftops or into the open water.
Fire department officers, in many cases, were allowed to determine whether they could attempt to reach particular emergencies, allowing for changing conditions in different parts of the Gulf Coast.
All these locations required a physical search to determine the disposition of the people who had called for help. In many cases, the locations turned out to be totally collapsed structures that had been washed through with the storm surge and scoured by the winds. There were only slabs, if remnants of the buildings that had stood there could be found at all. With most street signs and other landmarks gone in many areas, finding particular addresses was exceedingly difficult for teams from out of the area who had never been there before. Some victims were found in these 911 locations; others were found nearby in debris piles or in the open. Others may never be found.
MARINE BRANCH ESTABLISHED
Endricat ordered a Marine Branch to be developed. As noted above, the branch director was USCG Lt. Steve Lyon. I was assigned as Lyon’s laison to the IST, since much of the coastal water search operations would be concentrated in the West Branch, where barrier islands, many small Gulf inlets, and numerous bayous and swamp areas and the Pearl River all had to be thoroughly searched.
The Marine Branch’s mission was to coordinate waterborne and aerial search operations along the entire coastal boundary of Mississippi. Boats of varying sizes were assigned daily to search swamp areas and narrow channels; helicopters conducted grid searches of the coast, wetlands, and islands. Lyon also coordinated with the US&R task forces that had made arrangements for acquiring rescue boats and were ready to search swamps and several small inland lakes where victims might be found.
State and local officials asked that the FEMA “White” US&R IST coordinate search and rescue operations along the entire Mississippi coast, including an estimated 80,000-plus damaged or flattened structures. Eleven FEMA US&R task forces were deployed in Mississippi, along with three Florida state US&R task forces, and a number of state US&R and water rescue resources from Mississippi, Alabama, and other states.
LARRY COLLINS is a 26-year member of the County of Los Angeles (CA) Fire Department (LACoFD). He is a captain, USAR specialist, and paramedic assigned to Rescue Task Force 103 and a search team manager for the LACoFD’s FEMA/OFDA US&R Task Force for domestic and international response. He is an urban search and rescue specialist on the “Red” FEMA US&R Incident Support Team. He has authored many articles, published in Fire Engineering since 1989, and Rescue: A Guide to Urban Search and Technical Rescue, Volumes I and II (Pennwell, 2004, 2005, respectively). Volume III (Pennwell) is in the preparation stage.
