Two Fire Fighters Are Killed At ‘Routine’ Training Session
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Two fire fighters were killed while engaged in what was scheduled as a routine smoke and search drill in Boulder, Colo., last Jan. 26. An abandoned 28 X 61-foot wood-frame building was being used for the exercise. Two companies had successfully completed their training. While the third company was executing the search routine, a flashover occurred. In addition to the two deaths, two fire fighters were burned, one seriously.
Boulder is located 30 miles northwest of Denver. It has a population of 76,000, about one-third of whom are students at the University of Colorado. The Boulder Fire department consists of six fire stations with seven engine companies and 75 uniformed fire fighters. Although the department annually receives a thousand alarms for fire, there are on the average only 50 actual fires per year.
When land was being cleared for construction of an apartment complex in Boulder, three buildings on the property were given to the fire department for training purposes. These were the 28 X 61 -foot primary shed, a smaller wood-frame garage to the north and a detached wooden shed just southwest of the primary building.
Lieutenant Cyrus Pinkerton of Engine 2 was asked by Battalion Chief James Fyffe (with the knowledge and agreement of Assistant Chief for Training Larry Stern) to conduct a training exercise at the primary shed, although it was unusual for a lieutenant to conduct training beyond his own company. Pinkerton was a 14-year veteran of the department with an associate degree in fire science. However, he had never before been directly involved with any fire training evolutions.
According to the book
According to the Boulder Fire Department “Manual of Operations,” the assistant chief for training is responsible for the overall training program and the supervision of the training facility by department members. Specifically the manual states: “Hazardous training activities shall be conducted under the direction of the Assistant ChiefTraining, who shall be responsible as Safety Officer during these training activities.”
With regard to this particular training exercise, neither Fyffe nor Stern were directly involved with the setup nor did they specify any training objectives.
Pinkerton devised two different activities. One was a smoke training evolution to be conducted in the primary shed. This involved advancing a hose line into the building and recovering three items: an old water heater, a tire and a stack of cardboard. The second activity was centered in the garage where an actual fire was to be extinguished. The third building was not included in the exercise, although all three structures were scheduled to be burned completely at the end of the training drill.
Hazardous training activities shall be conducted under the direction of the Assistant Chief-Training, who shall be responsible as Safety Officer during these training activities. ”
Ceiling not noticed
A few days before the exercise, the buildings were examined by Stern, Fyffe and Captain Paul Steele, among other fire personnel. No one took notice that the ceilings were composed of combustible, low-density fiberboard.
Under Pinkerton’s direction, personnel from Engine 2 and other fire fighters prepared the primary shed for the exercise. At this time the larger openings to the building were covered with cardboard panels which had been firmed with wood furring strips. Also, the building was divided into four sections by temporary walls. The building had two doors.
Pinkerton planned the setup for four smoke-producing fires (one in each room) using rubber tires, empty paint cans with motor oil in them, and sheets of tar paper. Both Stern and Fyffe claim that they were aware only of smoke training, but in the official report, Pinkerton claimed that there had been a telephone discussion concerning the use of flammable liquids that could advance a smoky class A fire into a class B. On the morning of Jan. 26, Pinkerton prepared the tires by pouring a small amount of gasoline and safety solvent (a 50-50 mixture) on them, then igniting them with a road flare. Only one smoke bomb was used.
Open flaming observed
When the first crew entered the shed, the smoke condition was not yet fully developed, but, although very little heat was present, open flaming of the tires was observed. A 1 1/2-inch hose was stretched inside according to the exercise plan, but the fire fighters were instructed not to put out the fires. This crew also conducted a fire suppression evolution later in the garage.
Next, a crew of three conducted the same exercise. They were instructed by Pinkerton to use a booster line for the evolution. At this time the smoke conditions were more encompassing and some heat was noted. Again, open fires were observed by the crew.
After completing their smoke evolution, the men were ordered to cut a hole in the roof of the shed in order to demonstrate to one of the newer members how roof ventilation could be accomplished with an ax and why it was necessary to push down the interior ceiling when a hole was opened up. While doing this, one of the crew observed that the ceiling was Cellotex covered with aluminum paint. A sheet of metal and a wooden pallet was placed over the hole. The men then extinguished the fire in the garage with the booster line, completing the exercise.
More tires delivered
The tires used for smoke in the primary shed were burning off more rapidly than Pinkerton had expected and he put in a call for more tires. Stern and Fyffe delivered 10 more tires to the training site, checked into the progress of the exercise and then left the scene.
Engine 3 then arrived. This crew consisted of Fire Fighter Scott Smith, 21, a three-month member of the department; Engineer William Duran, 30, an eight-year member; and Lieutenant Daniel Cutler, 37, a four-year member.
At this time, Rooms 4 and 2 were burning moderately. Room 3 was burning well and the fire was about out in Room 1. The crew members advanced their booster line into the building, entering from Room 4, on the east side. There was no one left outside with Engine 3, but the motor was running with the pump in gear. Engine 3 is a pumper that holds 300 gallons of water. Also on hand, but unattended and not running, was Reserve Engine 2 with 500 gallons of water on board.
Flashover
As the three other men were advancing the booster line into the building, Pinkerton was checking the Fires in the other rooms. He noticed a rapid heat building up and fire starting to roll along the ceiling. He yelled for the crew (between Rooms 1 and 2) to get out. The fire was spreading rapidly along the ceiling and had already involved the temporary barriers and the walls. Flashover occurred. Pinkerton lost contact with the crew and exited the building through the south door in Room 1. He was burned over 5 percent of his body. Cutler left through another opening in the south wall. He was burned severely over 35 percent of his body.
Evidently Smith and Duran became disoriented and lost contact with the hose line they apparently were following back to the place of entry. When the two bodies were recovered, Smith was not wearing his SCBA. It was assumed that due to the heat, the shoulder straps had burned through and that Smith had to rip off his facepiece. Smith had a carboxyhemoglobin concentration of 19 percent while Duran had a concentration of 37 percent.
Cutler had used the booster line inside, and only a limited supply of water was left. Upon being called back to the site, Fyffe took command while Stern began stretching a long supply line with Reserve Engine 2. An additional engine also proceeded to lay a 2 1/2-inch line.
Independent investigation
The City of Boulder later hired David P. Demers, P.E., of Lunenburg, Mass., to investigate the incident. Demers reported that the single most important factor affecting the fatalities and injuries was extremely rapid fire development due to the combustible, low-density fiberboard ceiling in the primary shed.
Consultant’s Recommendations
- The establishment of a drillmaster position that would involve everyday training exercises. This is especially important to fire departments with a low volume of fire activity.
- The development of strict, written, comprehensive procedures for burning exercises.
- The construction of a specific building for both smoke training and hot fire exercises, giving a controlled environment and significantly lowering the risks attendant on such drills.
- Rubber gloves should be banned, since many fire fighters have been seriously burned due to steam burns when moisture is trapped in these gloves. Ears should also be protected (Cutler was burned on the ears) either with a type of Nomex ear flaps or over-the-head Nomex hoods.
- Forbidding the use of booster lines for structural fire fighting. Limited manpower is not a justification for using booster lines.
Other contributing factors, according to Demers, were:
- The use of tires and other highheat-potential fuels in an open flame mode to produce smoke;
- The use of inadequate size hose line inside the building in the form of a booster line;
- The lack of a water supply line or other reliable means of water supply on the training ground; and
- The lack of manpower at the scene with appropriate back-up hose lines in case of a problem during the training exercise.
Lack of planning cited
Demers also stressed that there had been an overall lack of planning, supervision and control of this training exercise by the assistant chief for training and the shift battalion chief.
Following Demers’ report, disciplinary action was initiated against the four people most intimately involved with the tragedy. Pinkerton, Fyffe and Stern were to be fired from the Boulder Fire Department. A letter of reprimand was to be put into the personnel file of Steele. Some of these actions are being challenged.
Despite the fact that low-density fiberboard was also a primary factor in well-discussed fires like those involving Our Lady of the Angels School fire, the Hartford Hospital fire and the 1979 fire in Chapais, Quebec, the Boulder tragedy occurred. This underlines the constant need for safety precautions.
According to Demers, “It does not appear that there is a comprehensive recommended good practice on burning exercises available on a national basis, although there are some checklists in some of the fire service literature.” None of the training manuals that Demers checked made any specific mention of highly combustible interior materials.
The lesson bears repeating. Safety comes first and foremost in training evolutions, as well as in actual fire fighting situations.
