In June 2005, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) New York Task Force I (NY-TF1) was deployed to The Center for National Response (CNR) for training. This was the first time I was deployed as a technical search specialist. On previous deployments, I had been assigned as a rescue squad member or an officer. The CNR is in West Virginia, 30 miles south of Charleston, and has support facilities nearby. The Memorial Tunnel, a 2,800-foot-long former highway tunnel built in 1953, was an active part of the West Virginia Turnpike until 1987.
DEPLOYING
At approximately 2 a.m. on June 20, task force (TF) members began to arrive at the assembly point (AP), the site of the FEMA cache. Earlier, our new activation system had been tested; all members’ home and cell phones were called. As part of standard operating procedures, our families would be notified of our safe arrival in West Virginia. At the cache, we were issued final personal gear, including radios and uniform items specific to our positions. We were given physicals (which were to continue daily throughout our deployment), turned in our car keys, were fed (the Red Cross was on-scene), and received briefings from the TF leaders.
I was assigned to the Blue Team; hence, this report represents that team’s perspective. We broke up into teams, loaded our gear onto trucks, and boarded buses for New York’s Kennedy Airport. We arrived at Kennedy at 5:45 a.m., checked in, and boarded a flight to Charleston. During the flight, team members discussed operations, worked on computers, read FEMA operations guides (FOGs), or slept. I worked with my global positioning system (GPS) and laptop, downloading detailed maps of West Virginia onto the GPS and going over other tasks. Flight attendants took pictures of the search dogs, which are always popular. On arrival in West Virginia, we continued on the final leg of our journey, again in convoy, eating lunch en route.
SUPPORT FACILITIES
The nearby support facilities complemented the main training area. Accommodations included housing units with kitchens; facilities for washing clothes; TV, VCR, and other amenities; and a separate bivouac area. A conference room and running trails were nearby.
SCENARIO
On arrival at the CNR, we received an initial, real-world, welcome/safety briefing from the CNR staff. We then were briefed by the chief of the Boston (MA) Fire Department [in reality, a CNR staff member and the designated incident commander (IC)] and the TF leaders.
In the initial briefing, we were told that an explosion of unknown, possibly (to our minds, probably) terrorist origin occurred in the Ted Williams Memorial Tunnel. The explosion completely sealed off the tunnel; there was no other means of egress. The collapse area was about 2,000 feet within the tunnel. Before the system went down, the closed-circuit cameras within the tunnel showed numerous ambulatory and trapped victims. An advanced recon team had been sent out to assess the area.
The TF leaders adopted an eight-hour-on and an eight-hour-off rotation so the team would be up for 24-hour operations. Eight hours on, eight hours off is just theoretical. In reality, before your tour there are planning briefings, an information exchange with your counterpart on the team you are relieving (for me, this was the other technical search specialist), equipment issue, and travel to the site. At the end of your shift, you maintain your equipment, brief your counterpart, and drive back to the base of operations (the BOO).
 (2) Inside the tunnel: Vehicles and slabs to lift, move, or stabilize and various spaces to enter and materials to breach. |
The Red Team, the first team up, headed up to the point of operations. The Blue Team and Logistics began to set up the BOO. The members in the Logistics section are the unsung heroes of the TF; they are overworked and underappreciated. When they do their job right, it goes unnoticed; when they make a mistake, everyone notices. Nothing happens without a good Logistics section.
Team members were assigned to housing units according to their team positions. Two TF members, those holding the same position on each team, were assigned to each bunk so that one member was on duty while the other had access to the bunk. Dining facilities were always available at shift changes. The food, prepared by the CNR staff, was good and plentiful.
 (3) The FEMA structures specialist assesses the area for shoring placement. |
After setting up, planning, getting our gear and quarters ready, dinner, and listening to reports from the collapse, we, the Blue Team, boarded the buses to the point of operations.
THE TRAINING FACILITIES
In 1987, the CNR portion of the West Virginia turnpike was bypassed and went through several metamorphoses until the year 2000, when Congress authorized the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish a training facility for military first responders. It was to encompass weapons of mass destruction (WMD), consequence management, and counterterrorism training. In addition, it was to be a testing ground for new equipment and techniques.
 (4) Members stabilize an area prior to a lifting operation. |
Today, the CNR is open to DoD, federal, state, and local responders. It offers the following training scenarios.
Post-Blast Rubble Area
Simulations of collapsed structures caused by various triggers, including terrorist attacks, are offered. Also, chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive hazards can be simulated. Vehicles and victims (manikins or CNR staff) are part of the site.
Subway Area
A multitude of scenarios can be presented, and the subway cars can be in the station or the tunnel. WMD hazards can be simulated.
Chemical, Biological Laboratories/Meth Labs
This section contains three separate labs of varying levels of complexity, ranging from a simple meth lab to a very sophisticated “terrorist” laboratory that manufactures chemical or biological weapons.
Highway Hazardous-Materials Area
The scenario is a chemical release by terrorists, which can occur on a highway or in a tunnel. Numerous vehicles, including box trucks, tanker trucks, buses, and cars, are available.
Cave Area
The area is designed to approximate current regions of conflict to which the military is now deployed. Activities include entry and search operations, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations, and chemical and biological sampling.
Bunker Area
It is designed in accordance with bunkers being uncovered in the Middle East. The bunkers can contain a hidden WMD lab or improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
In addition to the main training areas is a confined space trainer; 10,000 acres around the tunnel can also be used for training.
OPERATIONS
We received several briefings when we arrived at the tunnel’s entrance. Communication is everything; the larger the event, the more crucial clear communication is for a coordinated (i.e., successful) operation. The team leaders met and then briefed the other members of their team. Many team members then met with their counterparts on the other team. I met with the other technical search specialists to exchange information pertinent to my specialty, such as which tools and search techniques had been successful.
 (5) A member is breaching into a confined space. A hazardous materials specialist is standing by to monitor not just the existing atmosphere but also atmospheric changes caused by this operation. |
The Red Team had had a productive shift. Members completed the search of a train while making their way to the collapse zone; they found and extricated numerous victims.
The Blue Team proceeded directly to the collapse zone. Some specifics of our operations will not be discussed for the benefit of future teams. General operations were as follows.
The hazardous materials technicians monitored for, located, and mitigated various hazards. Various mitigation techniques were used, including identification, ventilation, various forms of personal protective equipment (PPE), and continuous monitoring.
 (6) A rescue squad member is breaching plate steel with an exothermic torch. The oxyacetylene torch is ready to ignite the next rod. |
When rescue squads encountered confined spaces, they entered wearing SCBA. Breaching, breaking, and heavy rigging were employed to deal with the collapse zone. Breaches ranged from two-inch holes for search cameras to openings large enough for removing victims. Materials breached ranged from heavy reinforced concrete to vehicles to heavy steel. Breaching equipment included gasoline-powered, pneumatic, hydraulic, and electric hammers, drills, torches, and saws. Each tool had limitations and advantages.
We monitored the atmosphere continuously for hazardous substances, some of which were created by our equipment. Monitoring results affected our choice of tools and PPE. If we had to wear a full SCBA to use a certain tool, that could negate the tool’s advantages.
 (7) Viewing through a breach. |
Much of the breaking and breaching had to be done in confined spaces, which influenced our selection of techniques. We had to remove, move, or stabilize concrete and vehicles thrown about the tunnel. These tasks necessitated shoring (wood and mechanical) and heavy rigging. In some cases, where space was less of a consideration, we taped off and bypassed a danger area, a good example of how to keep it simple.
As the members at the front were gaining entry, other members cleared a larger pathway to transport equipment in and victims out. By this time, we had acquired ATVs for this purpose. We conducted searches and technical searches to remove victims or mark their locations. Most of the victims used for this training were real people; however, some manikins had to be substituted for live victims in cases where the victims would be buried in inaccessible areas for a long time or had suffered crushing injuries.
Visual devices proved more useful than listening devices in this particular technical search environment. Victims’ conditions involved numerous injuries, various medical conditions, psychological first aid, extrications, impalements, and crush injury syndrome. The victims had to be packaged and removed to a safe area. Planning and coordination were needed to remove the simulated “victims” over the main body of debris without their becoming real victims.
 (8) Live victims (this one with full impalement moulage) made for a very challenging scenario. |
The teams operated in the collapsed area of the tunnel around the clock until all operations preceding the general debris removal stage were completed. General debris removal, the final stage of a collapse rescue, involves spreading out the debris, searching it, and logging it for transport.
As we progressed, the scenario evolved. With new information came slight changes in our plan of operations. As more hazards manifested themselves, we adjusted the plans to address the new problems. The few “victims” who were not removed were pronounced dead, their locations were marked, and they were removed in the general debris removal stage, usually conducted after all known victims had been removed.
LESSONS LEARNED/REINFORCED
Logistics is a key element in any operation, especially one of this magnitude. A rescuer should be resourceful and flexible but still must have the proper equipment on the front lines to perform rescues in a timely manner. Logistics entails not only providing equipment for the rescue. It also encompasses a list that is virtually endless: fuel, food, shelter, transportation, and communication are only a few of the necessities. If you have to concern yourself with basic survival needs, you can’t effectively help others.
Communication is another key element and cannot be stressed enough. From past experience at large or complex operations, this is one of the areas prone to breaking down. Communication occurs on many levels: between agencies, between the squads and the IC (the squads are the IC’s eyes and ears; the IC cannot make good decisions without them), and within the squad (to execute a plan, everyone must know it). Too often in the hurried environment of search and rescue, sending clear, concise communication is looked on as taking too much time. This attitude should be discouraged.
TF briefings, planning within the teams, and exchanging information with counterparts on the other team contributed to this operation’s success.
The need for proper training and equipment was reinforced. Some of our preferred tools and techniques could not be used for various reasons or had to be used in a modified configuration. This reinforced the need to have on hand a variety of tools that can do the same job in a different way. Fire Department of New York units carry a large variety of seemingly redundant equipment. As an example, a squad or rescue carries dozens of types of saws-reciprocating, ring, pole, partner, chain, pneumatic, whizzers, hand, diamond bladed chain, glass, chop, and circular, as well as saws for underwater use, and more!
Personnel must be fully trained. Some of the disciplines needed for our operation were collapse rescue and shoring, confined space rescue, hazmat, breaching and breaking, patient care and packaging, heavy rigging, extrication, and technical search. In our cutting and breaching operations at the CNR, we went in with a plan and had to be flexible. Changes in tool choice had to be made for a variety of reasons, including the inability to obtain appropriate water for a tool’s operation, atmospheric changes, variations in the materials being breached, and confined-space operations.
The CNR offers a unique training experience. As of this writing, 12 states have held full-scale exercises in the facility. Some CNR clients include the U.S. Special Operations Command; the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical, Biological, Incident Response Force; the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams; the 52nd EOD Impact Exercise with its British counterparts; the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit; the U.S. Navy Major Case Response Team; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Drug Enforcement Agency; the Environmental Protection Agency; the American Red Cross; and numerous fire, police, hazmat, and K9 search teams.
Thanks to the CNR and Lt. David J. Marmann, FDNY SOC Squad 270 and FEMA US&R NY-TF1 technical information specialist, for their assistance with this article.
James W. Kiesling, a lieutenant in Fire Department of New York’s Special Operations Command (SOC) Squad 1, joined SOC in 1991, where he was a firefighter in Squad 1 and later Rescue 2. He previously was a firefighter on 104 Truck and, upon promotion, the Special Operations dive officer. He is a lead instructor and helps to develop curriculum at the FDNY Technical Rescue School as well as teaches at the New York State Fire Academy. He is also a search team manager on FEMA US&R, NY-TF1.
