By Dennis Reilly
The need and role for a rapid intervention team (RIT) on the fireground is one that generates many conversations and, at times, strong opinions. Some of these opinions are productive and support firefighting operations. Unfortunately, some opinions are not necessarily ones that will help the members engaged in a RIT operation. If a fire department is going to have an effective RIT and position their members for success, the fire chief must take a strong role in the department’s RIT philosophy.
The first step in addressing the RIT issue is for senior leadership to acknowledge the need for an effective RIT program. It is not inconceivable to hear chief officers make statements that diminish or dismiss the RIT function. As shocking as it may sound, some chiefs will say that “smart firefighters will not put themselves in the position where they need a RIT, and if they do it’s their own fault.” Another less than supportive view goes along lines of: “Hey, if you call for my guys they want to get a chance to play. If you make them RIT, then they probably will have a mechanical breakdown on the way to the fire.” As disturbing these comments may be, these are real statements made by chief officers. If chiefs are making these type comments, don’t expect the organization to embrace the concept of RIT. You might be justified in restricting your response assignments to eliminate these attitudes from your fireground operations. Fire chiefs can have tremendous influence over their organizations and as such they should be very careful with the statements they make.
- Proactive RIT: Preventing a Mayday
- Rapid Intervention Team: Is Your Commitment Sufficient?
- RIT Activation and Firefighter Optimization
- Essential Hoseline Management for the Rapid Intervention Team
The organizational philosophy regarding RIT must be data driven. Thankfully, people like Brian Brush of the Firefighter Rescue Survey Project and the late Don Abbott’s Project Mayday are providing the objective data that fire service leaders can use to make informed decisions. Regarding Maydays, we know from Chief Abbott’s research that, of the 6,438 Maydays documented, 44.2% happened at residential properties, and 13.2% of the Maydays happened at multi-occupancy properties. These are the types of fires that almost every fire department responds to, and they account for 57.4% of all Maydays. The data shows that in 35.5% of the Maydays, the members in question were able to self-rescue. Another 51.4% of Maydays were resolved by the member’s own crew or other crews operating on the interior. The logical conclusion is that if you are operating on a fireground, you could very well be the person who resolves a Mayday.
A superficial look at the data might lead one to say that RIT is not all that important. The data says the RIT is only responsible for resolving fewer than 10 precent of Maydays. Using data is an important piece of making good decisions, but one must always analyze what the data is really telling us. The small percentage of the Maydays that were resolved by the RIT accounts for more than 430 distressed firefighters who were assisted by a RIT. For whatever reason, the RIT went to work and made a decisive difference. If you or one of your coworkers are involved in the 6.6% of the Maydays resolved by the RIT, then the importance of a highly capable RIT probably becomes an important topic to you.
Another possibility is that the 6.6% of the Maydays were so complicated that a highly competent RIT was the only way the Mayday was going to be resolved. A partial collapse in a one-story, single-family dwelling can present difficult challenges that must be quickly and efficiently addressed. Add to this the real possibility that there are two members trapped in the collapse, and you have now taken a “bread & butter” operation and turned into a very complex scenario. Although this might never happen to your agency, it is a very real possibility that will require an effective RIT team.
Preparing a fire department to effectively handle a Mayday is a multi-step process; the first step is realistic operating guidelines. Guidelines give latitude to the operating forces, whereas procedures tend to dictate specific steps that must be done in a specific order. The data from Project Mayday clearly shows the wide range of possible scenarios that result in a Mayday scenario. Procedures do not allow for the adaptive thinking that is needed in a Mayday event. For example, requiring a huge tool staging, having fixed positions, and prohibiting RIT from taking any actions prior to a Mayday may prove counterproductive and do not serve the end state of rescuing a firefighter in distress. Realistic guidelines that emphasize actions such as gaining and maintaining situational awareness, taking proactive steps such as “softening” the structure, throwing ladders, and ensuring a RIT hoseline is available will allow for the flexibility needed to address the needs of the fireground. The development of guidelines is definitely a fire chief issue and will have a huge impact on all tactical operations conducted by a fire department.
Lieutenant Bassel Ibraham of the Orlando (FL) Fire Department has long championed the concept of a “proactive rit.” His concept allows a RIT to take steps to minimize the hazards of a particular incident by taking actions described above. As the proactive RIT moves around the incident scene, members will also gain situational awareness. They will see with their own eyes, in real time, what the fire is doing. They will be able observe smoke conditions and the physical state of the building as the tactical operations progress. The proactive RIT can be a huge asset to the incident commander (IC), feeding back information from locations that are beyond the IC’s vision. The use of a proactive RIT approach will add value to a fireground operation and reduce the risk to the members operating at the scene.
Once an agency has adopted realistic and workable guidelines, training of all members is the next step. As already stated—and is clearly shown by the data—all members who might operate on a fireground should receive RIT training. For best results, the training should approach tactical proficiency from both the cognitive and practical standpoints. By cognitive I mean training all members to be able to think and evaluate an incident from the RIT standpoint. If this is strictly an officer obligation, we are not using all the resources available. What an officer might miss, a firefighter might pick out. This is not to say decisions will be made by committee; rather this says that all available resources will be used to construct the best workable plan. The practical part of training encompasses the physical skills needed to effect the rescue of an incapacitated member. Everyone must be able to convert a harness, employ a RIT pack, and move a member up or down a flight of stairs. All these things are perishable skills that will be lost if not practiced. If a fire department wants to be effective in RIT operations, then the training must be realistic and ongoing.
- Rapid Intervention Team Size-up and Actions
- Rapid Intervention Teams: Saving Their Own
- Do We Really Do RIT Justice?
- Fundamentals of RIT
Should a fire department adopt the proactive RIT approach, they must train their members not to overextend themselves in the proactive role. Whatever action the company assigned to proactive RIT takes, firefighters must be able to immediately stop and deploy if there is a Mayday. This takes considerable discipline and should not be overlooked in a department’s RIT training.
There is something else to say about RIT training and the fire chief’s role. This is tough, dirty, bull work. No doubt some members might not embrace the idea of doing realistic RIT training. The aforementioned data clearly makes a strong case for all operational members to be RIT proficient. If what has been discussed so far makes sense, then the fire chief must put steps into action that will produce the desired end state: firefighters who are capable of operating in a RIT situation. Required proficiency testing is just one way this can be done. Do not allow vacation schedules, sick time, or other workplace absences allow a member to “slip through the cracks” and not get the training they need to be effective in a RIT tole. If a department is going to have an effective RIT, then operational proficiency is a must.
The last element that must be addressed at the fire chief level is staffing an adequate number of command officers at working fires. Data indicates 31% of Maydays happen when a company officer is operating as IC. Another significant number of Maydays occur when there are two or fewer companies operating at an incident. The simple takeaway is that a lot of Maydays happen early during an incident. Managing a Mayday is a complicated, demanding task. It is unreasonable to think that a lone chief who is trying to operate at the strategic level can react to a life-threatening Mayday event, let alone when a company officer must detach from his or her company and act as an IC. Mayday events require both tactical and strategic thinking. On the tactical level, the incapacitated firefighter needs to have his or her air supply managed, be extricated from an entrapment, and perhaps packaged and then moved from the hazardous environment. All these actions are tactical activities and will require the direct supervision of an officer. The strategic elements of Mayday mitigation involve determining resources for the tactical operations: possibly multiple resource needed for the movement of the downed member, and some type of overwatch to ensure that the RIT does not get itself into trouble. It is simply impossible for a single chief to run a fire and address all these additional problems. If a company officer is supervising the tactical aspects of the RIT—itself a very demanding task—how can he or she be expected to also address the strategic concerns of a Mayday operation? Multiple chief officers dispatched early into an incident, preferably on the initial dispatch, is the best way to address all the complexities of a RIT operation.
Most fire departments struggle with staffing, and it is foreseeable that the RIT function will receive low priority when hoselines need to be placed and structures need to be searched. Fire chiefs must consider the impact of a properly staffed RIT on operational effectiveness. If the recommendations made in this article are followed, it is likely that the operating forces will have a greater level of confidence engaging in high-risk operations. The more an agency manages risk, the more likely it is to increase that sense of confidence among those members operating on the fireground. All the apparatus and fancy high-speed gear will have no impact if the folks operating the equipment do not have confidence in their being able to get out of a tight spot. Providing a solid RIT is much more than just checking a box on a tactical worksheet. The RIT, done the right way, can enhance the tactical operations and provide for the best possible outcome to those who are having an emergency. Fire chiefs play a critical role in this, and they must take the steps to ensure that the RIT function is properly addressed.
Firefighting is inherently dangerous and comes with many substantial risks. Our community expects its fire department to accept and manage these risks. If a fire chief wants to position their organization for success, they must manage the risk associated with RIT operations with as much thought and effort as they do with firefighting, search, and rescue, or any of the other operations that make for the successful resolution to an emergency event.
Dennis Reilly is a 48-year fire service veteran and retired fire chief. He served as chief in Pittsburg, Kansas, and Sunrise Beach, Missouri; as assistant chief in North Carolina and California; and retired as a battalion chief in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. During his time in New Jersey, he became one of the original members of the New Jersey Urban Search & Rescue Task Force 1, where responded as part of the response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. He is a U.S. Army veteran, having served in Iraq during the Operation Desert Storm. He holds a master’s degree in public administration from Penn State University and is a CFO. He is the owner of The First Line Fire Service Training Company LLC.
