This month’s discussion looks at a house fire that occurred on February 18, 2013, at 39 Flora Drive in Erie County, New York. The video is from Erie County NY Fire Incidents.
This was a reported kitchen fire in a 1½- story, wood-frame, single-family dwelling with basement. It appears the home previously underwent renovations, and additions were added to enlarge the structure on the first and second floors. With the additions, I would classify the house as a two-story structure, but would also be mindful of the half-story areas and knee walls. At least some of the additions include lightweight wood and vinyl structural materials.
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On arrival, fire is evident from the kitchen door and window on the Delta side, Charlie quadrant. Moderate, turbulent, thin (hot), black smoke is showing from the adjacent window in the Delta quadrant. Light gray, laminar smoke is showing from windows and seams on the Alpha side. The fire is rapidly autoexposing up the Delta side via the vinyl siding and spreading to the second floor, roof soffit, and attic space.
Analysis
Given the year of this fire, the Underwriters Laboratories Fire Safety Research Institute (UL FSRI) and the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) modern fire science findings were relatively new, and modern tactics, derived from the science, were not well known and/or being used by many fire departments. It is evident this fire is relatively isolated to the kitchen area. Visible, reachable fire is showing from the area of origin.
The fire is getting its air from the kitchen door on the Delta side. This area shows bidirectional flow (air coming in the bottom of the doorway and exhausting out the top). The windows on Delta are showing unidirectional flow (exhaust). The front window on Delta is showing smoke, indicating cracks in the glass. The chief officer is seen venting this window further and removing the screen. Flow at this window becomes bidirectional, allowing an additional air source to the fire. Remember, ventilation without water does not equal cooling. The additional air will allow fire to intensify and draws fire to each air intake.
The attack crew forces the front door and makes entry from this point. While there is some intermittent door control at the storm door, opening this door creates another flow path in which firefighters will have to operate. Fire will draw to the air intakes. We see this at the vented Delta window, which begins as smoke, transitions to vent point gas ignition, and eventually becomes fire venting from the window. The same would hold true if the front door were allowed to remain open or if the front windows were ventilated, and no water application/surface cooling took place to control the fire.
As firefighters, if we know and understand the fire dynamics, we can anticipate what will happen without interventions and what will happen with each intervention we apply to the fire. This is where we want firefighters to be—thinking firefighters. We also know we have to get fast, effective water on fire as quickly as possible to be truly effective and efficient.
Strategic/Tactical Considerations
The fire operation was an offensive attack mode, as was clearly justified by the possibility of an occupied house, searchable/survivable space, and a fire relatively contained to the kitchen area on arrival. As mentioned, the date of this fire has some influence on how it was handled, because of the information that was known at the time, the training, fire service culture, and experience from what was ordinarily done. It’s not a surprise crews decided to attack from the unburned side.
However, given what is known today, let’s explore the possibilities of an alternative approach. On arrival we see visible, reachable fire coming from the kitchen area on Delta. We have a door and two windows from which we can immediately begin to apply water directly on fire. This is the most direct route to active fire. The autoexposing fire is minimal on arrival, and a fast, exterior attack from the Delta side would likely have stopped this fire travel and would slow, at a minimum, fire advance to the second floor, soffit, and attic space. We also would get water directly into the area of origin to surface cool and to quickly gain fire control. With a good knockdown on the fire from the burned side, we could advance from the side entrance, if structurally safe to do so, or reposition the line or have a second line advance to the interior from the front door under improved conditions.
The initial exterior attack is versatile in that it can douse exterior fire, interior fire, and fire on multiple levels with little effort, and from a relatively stationary vantage point with good visibility and less inherent danger. Gaining fire control early may have prevented the thermal damage to the electrical wires running along the house, which eventually became an additional hazard. It may have prevented burning debris from falling on the hoseline, causing it to develop a leak or burst while crews are working on the interior. This also goes to effective line management.
Anything we can do to eliminate delays in getting water on fire, minimize creating extra flow paths and air intake to the fire, and prevent our hoselines and equipment from being exposed to fire will benefit our fireground operations. Modern tactics are often proactive, and allow firefighters to work more effectively and efficiently while reducing inherent dangers. Our goal as firefighters is to make conditions immediately better upon arrival without making things worse. Fast, sufficient water on visible, reachable fire, regardless of where it’s delivered from, will start the ball rolling in the right direction.
Summary
Today firefighters have the benefit of organizations like FSRI and NIST conducting fire research to improve firefighter knowledge and understanding of fire dynamics and modern tactics, and to help us evolve as firefighters to better mitigate today’s fire challenges and keep ahead. This fire, at the time, was handled the way many firefighters would have handled it; today we have more information that can help us operate in a more effective manner. Address the fire as quickly as possible to immediately begin to improve conditions and eliminate delays, without worsening conditions first. To do that, we must evolve and remain thinking firefighters who understand what will happen without intervention and what will happen with each intervention on the fireground.
NICK J. SALAMEH is a 36 year veteran of the fire service. He was a Fire/Emergency Medical Services Captain II and previous Training Program Manager for the Arlington County (VA) Fire Department, where he served 31 years. He is a former Chair of the Northern Virginia Fire Departments Training Committee. Nick is also a contributor to Fire Engineering and Stop Believing Start Knowing (SBSK).
