Firefighter Survival: Residential Frame Dwelling Fire Injures Firefighter and Yields Important Lessons

BY ANTHONY RIEHL

At approximately 0530 hours on May 3, 2014, the Sparta Township (NJ) Fire Department (STFD) responded to a report of a smoke condition in a residential area of a lake community. While monitoring the radio, police department responders are heard arriving on the scene and reporting a working structure fire. When the fire chief arrived, he confirmed the working fire, gave his size-up, and requested the necessary resources-a firefighter assist and search team, emergency medical services (EMS), and mutual aid for additional coverage.

On fire department arrival, heavy fire was venting from the windows and through the roof of a one-story enclosed porch approximately 10 × 20 feet located in the rear C side of a two-story, wood-frame occupied residential single-family dwelling. Heavy dark gray and black smoke was pushing throughout the main portion of the home. There was no window failure except in the main fire room.

Since this was a lake-style house, we knew from fighting fires in similar style homes in the past that this was a frame dwelling built in or around the 1930s. These homes typically have high cathedral ceilings covered with wood sheathing and finished with years of varnish and other flammable finishes. Also, homes like this were not originally built for all-year living although many have been retrofitted over the years with all the amenities of a year-round home. Exposure A was the street; exposure B was a two-story, wood-frame occupied residential home approximately 50 feet away; exposure C was the rear yard; and exposure D was a two-story, wood-frame occupied residential home approximately 15 feet away.

Weather conditions were clear and dry, and there was no wind to speak of. One vehicle was parked in the driveway, and the hydrant was two houses past and opposite the fire building. Neighbors reported that one elderly male occupant was inside the building and unaccounted for.

Because the fire building was several miles from the nearest responding engine, the members on scene, including another lieutenant firefighter, the chief of department, and me, used this extra time wisely, donning full personal protective equipment (PPE) including hood up and flaps down (the latter admittedly often being overlooked).

Note: STFD is a volunteer organization that covers approximately 39 square miles (mostly rural/suburban), including roughly two square miles of water. With a response area of this size, most members respond to the scene in their personal vehicles. The members who live closest to the firehouses respond with the apparatus.

The initial strategy was to force the front door, start a search while working our way through the house, and operate the line from the front door through the residence to the rear porch and out, the way the fire was already going.

With the first line stretched and charged, we were ready to make entry. As seen in photo 1, the front steps were perpendicular to the front of the house, limiting space on the landing taking us through the front door. With a charged hoseline ready, it was time to force the front door. The plan was to do a quick sweep behind the door while the nozzle team came up right behind and began working together through the building, extinguishing and searching simultaneously. When the storm door was opened, the air trapped in the space between the two doors was so superheated that it immediately ignited when fresh outside air was introduced, creating a momentary flash of fire. This was an obvious sign that heat conditions in the front of the home were much higher than we originally anticipated. It was also an indicator that the survivability of any occupants trapped inside would be slim.

(1) The post-flashover conditions from the A side of the structure. Notice the 1¾-inch handline is making no headway. Additionally, the B side shows the lack of extension because there were no vaulted ceilings in this portion of the house. [Photos courtesy of Sparta (NJ) Police Department.]

In full PPE and with a charged, bled hoseline, all members ready, we forced the front door. At this time, the front windows failed, causing a flashover of the entire first floor with explosive force. Heavy fire proceeded to vent out of the front windows and front door, filling the door with fire from top to bottom. The fire engulfed me, causing me to make an immediate retreat to the front yard. Attempts to drive the fire back with the already stretched 1¾-inch handline quickly proved unsuccessful. The water from the fog nozzle that was set to straight stream converted to steam before ever penetrating the flames.

(2) The view from the C side of the structure. The one-story porch is offset to the left in the photo, which was the vaulted ceiling side of the structure. Large window openings were found separating the one-story porch and the main living room with vaulted ceilings.

At this time, we realized that we didn’t have the right tool for the job-big fire, big water. We quickly stretched and charged a 2½-inch line. With the correct tool for the job now in hand, the nozzle team was able to quickly darken down the fire enough from the front yard to allow for a second attempt at an offensive attack. This proved successful; we operated in this mode for the remainder of the incident. This forced, “two-pronged” attack proved, in this case, to be the strategy of choice. One team extinguished the rest of the fire using the originally abandoned 1¾-inch attack line in the front of the house while a second nozzle team equipped with a two-inch handline extinguished the fire in the original fire room located in the rear.

The victim was found later behind the front door. He succumbed to the products of combustion. The initial flashover at the front door caused second-degree burns to my back and shoulder; however, judging from the discoloration on the flaps of the helmet, the turnout coat, and the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), the injuries had the potential of being far worse. I consider myself lucky in that respect and am very appreciative of PPE.

I now find it interesting and disturbing when I hear members say they don’t like to wear their hoods because they “use their ears as gauges for heat” or they don’t remember to use the flaps provided on their helmet for their intended added protection. Had it not been for these components of our PPE system, I am convinced I could have sustained injuries that would have ended my career. Maybe in time the culture will change.

Several factors caused this rapidly advancing fire condition. First and most significant was the presence of Collyer’s mansion (hoarding) conditions-occupants keep everything they can fit in their home, substantially increasing the fire load and hence British thermal units (Btus) output of the occupancy. The additional fire load triggered by this condition caused a well-vented fire to want more air because, very simply, there was a lot more fuel that wanted to burn. From the exterior, the fire was already venting, and venting well; the combination of increased fire load and high ceilings, which acted as a heat sink for a well-advanced fire, left out one component. When the front door was opened, the fire got that component. It is difficult to pick up on hoarding from the exterior. Yard conditions can sometimes be a tipoff: Many times, if the yard looks like a junkyard, that same condition may be present in and throughout the building. EMS incidents provide a good opportunity for seeing the insides of occupancies. The knowledge gained from these incidents can prove priceless if you return later for a fire. Another option is to have good communication between other jurisdictional agencies such the health, building, and zoning departments. These agencies may be aware of the problem occupancies in your response area and should have no problem sharing that information.

Another factor that contributed to the rapid fire spread was the length of time the fire was permitted to grow before the fire department arrived and suppression efforts began. This was an early morning fire that went unchecked. It wasn’t until the products of combustion showed themselves that it was reported to the local authorities. Although the fire was reported to the local dispatch center, the fire department wasn’t dispatched until several minutes later because of the procedure of dispatching the police department before the fire department for fire-related incidents. This caused an additional delay in putting water on the fire. Procedures and policies such as these are not uncommon, and in these days of high-Btu-release contents and lightweight building construction, every minute makes a difference. No matter how aggressive you are or how sound your tactics, not even the best fire departments can make up for lost time. There’s no turning the clock back on a fire.

Conditions from the exterior reflected a survivable condition in the front of the house. Attempting a search was nonnegotiable judging from these conditions-we risk a lot to gain a lot. But as stated earlier, when the storm door was opened, fresh air was introduced to the oxygen-starved fire, and the air from the space between the entry door and the storm door immediately flashed. This indicated obvious higher heat levels than we originally expected. This should have been a tipoff that we should have reevaluated our tactics.

Lessons Learned

Size-up. Conditions from the exterior may not always be a sign of conditions inside. This was a well-vented, air-starved fire. That’s quite the contradiction, but there is no other way I can describe it. Heavy fire conditions fully vented both horizontally and vertically led us to believe that this was a post-flashover fire-which it was-in the room of origin. In this case, the high ceilings and large openings between the fire room and the remainder of the house allowed the products of combustion to spread unimpeded, creating a superheated atmosphere that, combined with the hoarding conditions, created a trap that needed only air.
Ventilation. High ceilings in the main living area were a significant factor is this fire. Superheated gases will accumulate in these areas because of the natural behavior of heat; if left unchecked, these gases will ignite, causing rapid fire spread through the remainder of the structure and bringing heat and fire down on the unsuspecting members operating below. Top-side ventilation on well-advanced fires in occupancies with high cathedral ceilings should be a mandatory practice when it is impossible or impractical to horizontally vent these areas. In today’s newer homes, the cathedral and vaulted high ceiling is a common architectural feature firefighters should recognize and handle early in the incident.
Search. We are taught very early on that when searching an occupancy, it’s best to start at the front door, the assumed main entry point for occupants, and work your way in toward the fire. This accomplishes two things: You conduct a primary search on the main path of egress while simultaneously attempting to locate the fire. While searching, we made sure to check behind doors and under windows, as occupants tend to make it to these areas and then fall prey to the products of combustion while trying to manipulate door or window locks. In this case, that is what happened. The occupant was found directly behind the main entry door to the home where, I can only speculate, he went down trying to manipulate the door locks. It must be second nature to always include and make it a priority to check these areas when conducting a primary search.
Risk vs. gain assessment. I’ve been asked by members if I believed that conditions were survivable for the occupant and if they warranted attempting to make a primary search. As mentioned earlier, no fire was present in the front of the home on our arrival. This size-up fact is enough to warrant not only a primary search but also an aggressive primary search especially when there are multiple reports of an occupant who is unaccounted for. We risk a lot to gain a lot. Even with the evidence of high heat displayed when the storm door was opened, it still wasn’t enough to warrant the abandonment of a primary search. Conditions at the floor level had a chance of being survivable, and as long as that chance exists, we have a duty to continue on until proven otherwise. Once the door was forced and flashover ensued, the room was now considered unsurvivable. At that point, primary search was abandoned.
Procedures. In many locations, it is common to dispatch police units before fire units to fire-related emergencies. This procedure must be changed. At this time in history, the fire service has everything going against it. Most contents are made of petroleum-based products, yielding hotter, faster-spreading fires coupled with buildings that collapse faster because of construction methods used today; and don’t forget the problem of insufficient personnel most departments face today. These are all factors out of our control, but we can control the procedures that delay firefighting efforts. We cannot afford to play catch-up; the fire will win every time.
PPE. Proper use and care of PPE are not negotiable. Use every piece assigned to you by your department, and keep it clean-keep the hood up and flaps down, and take the time to completely encapsulate yourself as your gear is designed. This is the most important lesson I learned from this incident. Not fully donning gear because you want to use unprotected body parts as heat gauges is a dangerous game. Had it not been for full encapsulation, the injuries I sustained could have ended my career. The second part of the PPE equation is maintenance. In photo 3, you can clearly see darker splash pattern burns on the liner. These spots were the result of some unknown products to which the coat was exposed at an earlier incident, perhaps years prior. These dark spots correspond with the deepest second-degree burns I received. Had the coat been cleaned on a regular basis, this may have been avoided.

(3) The discoloration of the turnout coat shell and liner. Notice the splatter pattern from an unknown product on the left side. These darker areas correspond with the deepest burns incurred. The clear outline of the SCBA straps and back frame are also visible. (Photo by author.)

This fire was a great learning experience for all members involved. Increased fire load and high ceilings, coupled with the lack of any fire alarms or smoke detectors, which delayed emergency services, were the most significant factors affecting the operation. It also reinforced for us, as we hope it will for you, the importance of proper and complete PPE use and care, the need for and significance of vertical ventilation, and how firefighting operations can be adversely affected by the presence of cathedral ceilings and an unexpected fire load.

ANTHONY RIEHL is a 14-year veteran of the Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, where he is a lieutenant on Engine Co. 2. He is also a volunteer in the Sparta Township (NJ) Fire Department, where he has served for seven years and is a lieutenant on Engine Co. 5. He is a state certified fire inspector and an independent contractor for the private sector, instructing on self-contained breathing apparatus safety, operations, and emergency procedures.