BY ROBERT MAYNES
In April 2011, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) exercised two unique resources at a complex terrorism drill at the Center for National Response (CNR) in Gallagher, West Virginia. The result was that FDNY reinforced its ability to field an Incident Management Team (IMT) that can support operations at a Type One complexity terrorist incident. Additionally, FDNY established the capacity to respond with a Special Operations Task Force with the ability to conduct technical rescue and hazardous materials operations at complex incidents for continuous 24-hour operational periods. The combined teams serve as a national model with the capacity to respond to a mutual-aid or Emergency Assistance Compact (EMAC) request nationally. The IMT is prepared to support complex incidents in unified command with local agencies or with additional assigned IMTs. How did the two resources coordinate a response 580 miles from New York City and operate cooperatively for more than 72 hours?
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| (1) The view into the tunnel as rescue technicians extricate victims from collapsed concrete slabs. Controllers and evaluators (in white helmets) are on the right side of the photo. (Photos courtesy of FDNY SOC Task Force.) |
In 2008, FDNY Chief of Rescue Operations Fred LaFemina recognized the value of creating a process that facilitates the response of the two resources internally and externally. The ability to deploy both teams just hours after an incident illustrates a commitment to preparedness. In coordination with Battalion Chief Joseph Downey and William Seelig, chief of the Special Operations Command (SOC), the rescue chiefs approached me, as FDNY IMT incident commander (IC), with the idea to conduct a joint drill at an intense tempo. Both were already familiar with the CNR in Gallagher, West Virginia, and developed a proposal to deploy as one integrated team and simulate technical operations resulting from a terrorist bombing of a commuter under-river train tunnel. For the first time nationally, an established IMT would respond with a specialized SOC Task Force to support rescue operations at the beginning of the incident. The projected end state was to have the two resources deploy on short notice to a terrorist incident or complex accident. The IMT enthusiastically accepted the opportunity and initiated the planning process for the exercise.
FACILITY
The CNR is an outstanding venue for conducting specialized first response operations. Currently, fire, law enforcement, and military teams use the center for operations ranging from structural collapse to military Special Forces cave operations. The facility includes an abandoned highway tunnel that spans more than 2,000 feet into the center of a mountain. The training tunnel supports a number of stations, including confined space, auto extrication, void searches, and hazardous materials. A combination of live actors serve as victims, and specialized mannequins serve as viable victims requiring treatment and extrication. As part of the exercise experience, all stations can be modified to reflect the desired level of complexity. For the April 2011 drill, the stations were set to a record level of complexity. Experienced FDNY firefighters and officers served as subject matter experts and evaluators.
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM
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| (2) An FDNY search team prepares to enter a confined space to conduct a complex search. |
The FDNY IMT was established in 2002 based on lessons learned from the 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attack. During a three-year process, the FDNY IMT progressed to the capability of responding nationally as a Type Two IMT with a competency in urban terrorism and disaster. In September 2005, the FDNY IMT responded at a Type One complexity level to Louisiana to support the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) after Hurricane Katrina. Since 2004, the IMT has deployed three times outside of New York City and more than 10 times within the city. The FDNY IMT maintains qualifications nationally to respond to complex incidents pursuant to a cooperative agreement established in 2003 with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The FDNY IMT is classified as a Type Two IMT but maintains the capability to deploy as a Type One IMT focusing on urban incidents.
FDNY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND TASK FORCE
In the 1990s, the late Deputy Chief Ray Downey had a vision of FDNY’s creating a task force of qualified and experienced Special Operations firefighters with the ability and capacity to respond to complex technical rescue incidents. A legacy of FDNY SOC chiefs and company officers supported Downey’s vision by persevering and establishing a task force consisting of specially trained hazardous materials and technical rescue technicians, meeting Downey’s original expectations. All task force members are assigned to FDNY Special Operations companies performing the specialized rescue and hazardous materials tasks daily. FDNY has created a SOC resource with the ability to deploy more than 80 individuals who can perform the most complex operations while simultaneously staffing the 19 specialized companies in NYC and maintain its commitment to the Federal Emergency Management Agency USAR Task Force, NY-TF1. The current organization maintains the capacity for the SOC Task Force to operate continuously 24 hours per day for multiple operational periods through the use of two squads operating 12-hour shifts. Under the leadership of Fire Commissioner Salvatore Cassano, FDNY has created a multifaceted special operations organization.
PLANNING
FDNY leadership approved the FDNY IMT/SOC drill to be conducted at the highest complexity level. The challenge was to deploy more than 90 SOC Task Force members and more than 50 IMT members to the CNR with their cache of supplies and equipment. All participants, including a simulation team of eight individuals, required service and support for five days while conducting a live exercise simultaneously with a complex simulation.
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| (3) An FDNY member extricates a victim from a bomb-damaged vehicle |
The IMT and the SOC Task Force assigned individuals dedicated to planning and supporting the exercise 12 months in advance. The objective was to challenge the two components while adhering to guidelines provided by the DHS in its Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). A second objective was to conduct the exercise to a level of realism so that participants would experience stress, fatigue, and challenges consistent with an actual incident. All stated objectives were attained.
SIMULATED INCIDENT
The Simulation Team, led by Captain Richard O’Leary, decided to simulate a terrorist bombing of the Queens Midtown Tunnel (QMT). This tunnel is a major commuter tunnel consisting of two tubes more than 5,000 feet in length that connects the boroughs of Manhattan and Queens, New York. The simulation would depict three bombs detonated in the two tunnels, one in the south tube and two in the north tube. The simulated damage forced operations to be conducted from the four tunnel entrances and exits.
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| (4) A view of the stabilized semicollapsed wall. |
The most complex operation was in the north tube near the entrance from the Queens portal. The FDNY IMT was assigned to manage the entire incident, including the blocks surrounding the tunnel portals. The FDNY SOC Task Force was assigned the most complex operation in the north tube entering from the Queens portal. The exercise tunnel at the CNR successfully represented the SOC Task Force assignment. The remaining operations were simulated. The FDNY IMT assumed command four hours after the incident, followed two hours later with the assignment of the Task Force.
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| (5) The FDNY SOC Rescue Team extricates a victim trapped in a void created by a concrete slab collapse. |
The Simulation Team was tasked with providing progressive injects of information with mixed complexity. The simulation cell introduced information to all components of the IMT by numerous methods, including telephone, fax, radio, and individuals reporting to various IMT personnel as simulated impacted persons. An agency administrator briefing and an initial IC briefing were conducted during a transition of command from simulated New York City field units to the FDNY IMT. The simulated information was communicated from field units, impacted citizens, elected officials, and coordinating entities. Additionally, live injects were provided by individuals portraying resources assigned to support operations in the live exercise tunnel. A collection of injects were produced in the weeks prior to the exercise; however, the simulation team remained flexible and reactive to actions taken by the IMT and the SOC Task Force.
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| (6) The typical extrication and search operations required at the tunnel exercise at the Center for National Response. |
The simulation process started on Tuesday morning and continued for 56 continuous hours. All sections were presented with complex issues and were required to make critical decisions while completing the planning process. The IMT was required to conduct all meetings and briefings adhering to ICS structure and produced five incident action plans (IAPs) for five 12-hour operational periods.
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| (7) FDNY specialists extricate a viable victim from a concrete slab void below a bomb-damaged vehicle. |
The Task Force initiated operations at 1800 hours on Tuesday. Immediately, the firefighters were faced with a complex six-foot-deep concrete structure that necessitated complete breaching. Simultaneously, CNR actors started portraying victims with serious injuries requiring technical rescue. Immediately after breaching the wall, the Task Force was confronted with a hazardous materials incident. For 49 hours, the Task Force advanced into the tunnel, confronted by progressively complex technical rescue situations. Incidents ranged from confined space search to victims requiring rescue from vehicles pinned by numerous trucks and automobiles. Paramedics and doctors were challenged by medical mannequins that needed intubation and intravenous lines while trapped or pinned in rubble. All participants reported that the challenges resembled an actual incident to a level of intensity that resulted in their forgetting that they were in a drill and not a tragedy. By the conclusion, the 92 SOC participants improved their proficiency, resulting in FDNY’s validating the Task Force as a qualified resource.
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| (8) SOC technicians use a partner saw to cut a steel plate to permit responders to access the void for search. |
The FDNY IMT was challenged in supporting the SOC Task Force and the simulated operations in the remaining areas both below and aboveground. The IMT conducted accountability operations for almost 1,000 individuals throughout the exercise. Accountability was accomplished by using the federal IMT program I-suites.
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| (9) Search specialists prepare a torch for breaching a concrete wall |
At any moment, the IMT Planning Section could report the location and assignment of any assigned resource. The Finance Section was able to produce documents stating the daily and cumulative cost of assigned and simulated resources. The Logistics Section was challenged by the complexity of incident vs. reality. All resources had to be supported in the six components of logistics (facility, supply, food, medical, communications, and ground support). Coordination and communication with logistics resources assigned to the SOC Task Force were critical. The simulated incident was in New York City, but the resources were in West Virginia. Preidentified vendors that would be readily available in New York were now 12 hours away. The IMT Communications unit was challenged with maintaining operations radios in the tunnel and surpassed all expectations.
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| (10) SOC Task Force members remove an extricated CNR victim to triage. |
The IMT Operations Section and Safety were challenged by transitioning to a simulated organization that violated span-of-control principles and was inadequate for the complexity of the operations. From the beginning of the exercise scenario, the Operations Section chief and deputies had to plan strategically and change the operations organization to one that was appropriate for the incident. Additionally, the FDNY assigned James Kane and Michael McPartland as the IC and deputy IC, respectively. Both have extensive IMT and FDNY IC experience but were limited to section chief assignments with an IMT. Both were challenged and responded to the intricacies of being an IC of a complex incident requiring numerous operational periods.
LESSONS LEARNED
Fatigue
Managing fatigue was a significant challenge. In some sections, the section staffing plan was not adequate; consequently, all members assigned experienced fatigue simultaneously. When an incident will continue at a sustained intensity for numerous operational periods, leaders must establish a process for rotating resources. The can-do attitude of the involved responders often produces an environment where all members wanted to remain on duty from the beginning for numerous hours. At the exercise, all too often the phrase “I’m OK” was muttered. “I’m OK” is a warning to leaders that the individual may be close to exhaustion.
Section and unit leaders must monitor their assigned resources to ensure they have appropriate rest. When an IMT or a task force starts an assignment that will continue for 24 hours, leaders need to select individuals within their scope of supervision to rest immediately in anticipation of a transition to the next operational period in 12 hours. If all members assigned to a section or unit operate immediately, the section or unit will suffer significant fatigue immediately, resulting in an unsafe condition. Additionally, resources assigned to a night operation require a facility with minimal noise and distraction during the day. The facilities’ unit leader and camp managers need to be proactive in supplying adequate sleeping quarters. At the CNR, the Logistics Section was challenged by sharing sleeping and eating quarters with day and night shifts. Actions were taken to eliminate light during the day and provide air-conditioning noise to block base and camp operation sounds.
Cache
Field deployments of both IMT and Technical Rescue Task Forces are dependent on having a preestablished equipment cache to support response operations for up to 14 days. In addition, each individual member must be ready to deploy with his “Go Kit” of personal supplies and equipment. Often, IMT members will arrive prior to the trucks transporting the cache. Go Kits must be stocked with the forms, stationery, and supplies needed to complete their individual assignments for up to six operational periods. As an example, all IMT operations section chiefs, safety officers, and resource unit leaders carry a commercial aircraft-approved tube each with three wall-mounted 215s and 215As.
Individuals assigned to an IMT need to be assigned or procure personal protective equipment (PPE). All are expected to respond with all PPE no matter what their individual IMT assignment for the incident is. During the demobilization process, individuals assigned to Finance and Planning may be required to assist the Logistics Section in packing the base and camp. Hard hats, gloves, and eight-inch leather boots to specifications are required.
All individuals assigned to an IMT or a task force need to maintain suitcases or duffel bags packed with all the items necessary for a long-duration assignment in any climate. Appropriate sleeping bags, tents, personal items, and medication meet only minimal requirements. Each individual must decide what specific items are needed for assignments that may exceed 14 days. Required equipment may include binoculars, handheld global positioning systems, digital cameras, and multiple flashlights.
Mobilization
FDNY maintains three large facilities for operations and training. In the past nine years, both have progressed and improved to an elevated tempo. One result is limited available parking. The combined drill required approximately 150 individuals reporting to a location to staff vehicles or ride in buses to West Virginia. The date of the drill was announced weeks prior to deployment. Car pooling and limiting personal vehicles were requested. For the drill, the Randall’s Island facility was able to support a certain number of personal vehicles in a secure location. For a four- to six-hour mobilization, additional parking was required. Additionally, FDNY recognizes that an incident may necessitate triple the resources. An agency hosting a resource prepared for mobilization must supply adequate secure parking for assigned individuals for more than 14 days. Returning from a stressful assignment to discover vandalized personal vehicles is unacceptable.
Cooperative Training
One of the objectives for the West Virginia drill was to increase cooperation and coordination between the two resources. The value of networking and improving confidence in each other’s abilities is invaluable. An IMT is tasked with managing, assisting, or supporting numerous resources at a complex incident. The SOC Task Force is responsible for performing technical tactics at a complex incident. Both resources carry qualified individuals in similar components of the ICS. Increased cooperation and coordination were achieved in West Virginia, particularly in leadership positions. The improvement will be invaluable when both resources deploy to an incident in the future. Increased networking and understanding each individual’s assignment are priorities. EMI currently supports eight command and general staff all hazard position specific courses, five all hazard unit leader courses, and the All Hazards Division Group Supervisor course. Based on the results of the West Virginia drill, FDNY determined that interagency training with cooperators will have increased value over single-agency training. The IMT and SOC individuals will attend FDNY-sponsored training with additional seats offered to state, local, and federal cooperators. By hosting the interagency courses, individuals who may work together in the future at tragic incidents will be able to develop relationships prior to meeting at a stressful incident.
Strategic Decision Making
An IMT must plan strategically for numerous operational periods into the future, which is accomplished by envisioning an end state. The challenge is not to plan reactively but numerous days or weeks into the future. For FDNY, success at the World Trade Center terrorist attack and in the response to support the NOFD after Hurricane Katrina was achieved by planning strategically. Valuable skills learned from National Type One IMTs and Area Commands were implemented with great success.
Since 2001, national first responders have been supported by the Department of Homeland Security with increasing preparedness. Agencies have accepted the responsibility of responding internally and, in many agencies, externally to disasters and terrorism. Type Three, or All Hazards Incident Management Teams, have been established in many regions. EMS, hazmat, and technical rescue competencies have improved exponentially. The West Virginia exercise established the capability of the FDNY IMT and the Task Force to respond nationally. The challenge is a timely request from an impacted agency or jurisdiction.
● ROBERT MAYNES is chief of planning and strategy for the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) and the incident commander of the FDNY Incident Management Team.
From Goal to Reality: FDNY’s Proficient, Equipped, Readily Deployable Emergency Task Force
BY JOSEPH R. DOWNEY
After the 9/11 attacks, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) had requested McKinsey and Company to work with fire department personnel to develop recommendations for changes that would enhance the FDNY’s preparedness. The McKinsey Report presented seven recommendations:
1 Expand the use of the incident command system (ICS) to provide a foundation for responding to and managing any type of emergency.
2 Further develop the existing Fire Department Operations Center (FDOC) to support the response to specific incidents and ensure that the department’s mission is accomplished citywide during major incidents.
3 Create Incident Management Teams (IMTs), specialized highly trained teams that use ICS principles to manage large or complex incidents.
4 Fully deploy a flexible recall procedure to allow FDNY to recall specific off-duty personnel required to respond to an incident or maintain citywide coverage.
5 Develop agreements with neighboring departments for fire operations mutual aid, to augment FDNY’s resources when necessary.
6 Modify and enforce staging protocols to increase command and control and the capability to track personnel.
7 Expand capabilities to deal with hazardous material incidents and reevaluate heavy rescue and marine capabilities.
The Center for National Response (CNR) was an excellent venue for evaluating how FDNY was progressing toward fulfilling these recommendations. The Special Operations Command Task Force (SOC-TF) and the IMT were able to test all the recommendations put in place after the McKinsey report and to deploy both teams for the first time. The SOC-TF and IMT model, which was discussed over a period of years prior to this exercise, proved at this simulated terrorist bombing that it would be a valuable resource for future FDNY incidents. Many of the members of the IMT and SOC-TF have worked together on a daily basis while responding to fires and emergencies in New York City, which made the interaction at this exercise much smoother. The partnership of an IMT, which is familiar with the standard operating procedures of a search and rescue TF and understands capabilities in regard to technical rescue, hazmat, and medical operations, proved extremely successful.
Almost all members of the SOC-TF are members of the SOC and are trained to National Fire Protection Association 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents.
Technical Rescue School
The FDNY has a Technical Rescue School where members of the SOC receive more than 800 hours of training to become a member of a rescue or squad company. The FDNY Rescue School follows the New York State Technical Rescue Accreditation Program and the SOC-TF uses the resource typing for New York State. The Office of Fire Prevention and Control ensures that the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework are fully integrated in operations and response policies for New York State resources.
The goal of the Technical Rescue/Accreditation Program is to identify, evaluate, and verify that local, regional, and state response entities are providing trained, qualified, and properly equipped technical rescue teams that meet federal standards. These policies and standards are intended to provide standardized capabilities so that emergency response entities will be able to effectively control these significant events as well as those on a smaller scale that occur every day. The FDNY SOC-TF is prepared to deploy a small component resource for a New York City or state request such as a rope rescue team, structural collapse rescue squad, trench collapse rescue squad, swiftwater/flood rescue team, structural collapse search squad, or confined space rescue team. For this exercise, the SOC-TF went as a New York State Type One Search and Rescue Team.
Deployment
On April 21, 2011, the FDOC sent a phone message to all SOC-TF members assigned to this exercise notifying them of the deployment. Members’ contact information was retrieved from the computerized emergency notification system, which contains each member’s personal data. As long as the information is updated, members will receive a message from the FDOC on their home and cell phones with important information concerning deployment. Available members called the SOC headquarters, verifying their deployment status. This fulfilled recommendation numbers 2 and 4 of the McKinsey Report.
SOC-TF members were scheduled to report to the FDNY Division of Training (DOT) on Randalls Island in waves to receive their uniforms, gear bags, and equipment. All SOC-TF deploying members received a medical exam by FDNY doctors and were cleared by the FDNY medical staff to participate in the exercise. SOC-TF managers briefed SOC-TF members and left the FDNY DOT at 2200 hours. The SOC-TF traveled more than 550 miles to the CNR in Gallagher, West Virginia, and arrived about 1100 hours on April 26.
THE TRAINING EVOLUTIONS
The SOC-TF leadership immediately reported into the IMT command post/base of operations (BOO). The IMT conducted an operational briefing, after which the logistic team began setting up a forward BOO down the hill from the tunnel entrance. The SOC-TF had been split into two teams before leaving NYC; the team working the first operational period was ordered to rest. The team up for the second operational period assisted the logistic team with setting up tents and unloading tools and equipment. A recon team was organized. The first operational period began at 1800 hours. On entering the mouth of the tunnel, SOC-TF members were met with screams for help from the 15 live victim role players trapped in the simulated collapse. Everyone went into game mode and picked up the intensity. The first scenario had role players trapped beneath concrete rubble piles, pinned in cars, and screaming because a nearby tractor trailer was leaking a substance, creating a plume of smoke. Hazmat specialists were requested to start metering as rescue specialists put together an operational plan to breach the 12-inch concrete slabs stacked six feet high across the tunnel 200 feet in from the entrance.
Right from the start, SOC-TF managers were challenged with a questionable environment, trapped victims without access, and team members eager to start working. It took some time to breach the reinforced concrete slabs, and the rescue specialists or rock breakers had an opportunity to use a variety of tools. It was a personnel-intensive operation where patience and knowledge prevailed.
Once the breach was large enough, three hazmat specialists and a hazmat team manager, dressed out in the Lion MT-94 suits, crawled through the rubble pile and gained access to the tractor trailer. Hazmat specialists identified the leaking gas as chlorine and were faced with a contaminated environment above the immediately dangerous to life and health area. Members were able to maneuver equipment through the rubble pile and cap the chlorine leak while victims were yelling for assistance.
After the chlorine leak was controlled, SOC-TF rescue and search specialists began extricating and packaging victims from vehicles and under debris using any kind of tool available from the logistic group, which was working tirelessly to satisfy all tool orders. Hazmat specialists continued monitoring the atmosphere because of the carbon monoxide (CO) produced from some of the gas-powered tools. Tunnel fans were activated to keep the CO levels at an acceptable level so work could continue. While members were completing their searches, an incendiary explosive device was discovered; an emergency evacuation was ordered. A roll call was taken, and the bomb squad was called to remove the device.
For the next 32 hours, the teams rotated work hours and pushed through the 2,000-foot tunnel, encountering an abundance of technical rescue scenarios. Members requested ropes and confined-space equipment to tackle a couple of multilevel horizontal and vertical entrapments. A subway station was searched with two robots the FDNY was evaluating. The robots were able to move down the tunnel and provide search team managers with a visual of the damage and hazards the team should expect.
The collapse of a large wall necessitated that members erect raker shores to remove victims and allow the team to advance. Medical managers and specialists treated a variety of medical emergencies, including crush syndrome, impalements, and intubations. The two doctors and four paramedics along with SOC-TF team members triaged, packaged, and removed more than 140 patients. Some were role players who, once removed, reset themselves farther into the tunnel.
The drill was not intended to become a mass-casualty incident, but it was impressive to see that many patients treated. As team members moved deeper into the tunnel searching and removing all victims, logistic specialists on gators moved equipment, lights, and tools in unison with the team so operations could continue without interruption. The cooperation between the logistic group and communication specialists, who set up repeaters and used the FDNY CP radio to ensure clear communications for all members, was outstanding.
The rear of the tunnel was a football field-size rubble pile littered with more than 25 vehicles and victims scattered in and around the concrete debris. Members were required to tunnel through the concrete and perform an overhead vertical breach to access this area. SOC-TF members continued to overcome all obstacles and didn’t stop until the final victim was extricated.
It was an exhausting four days for everyone who participated in this exercise, but all came away with the understanding that we had taken a big step in preparing the FDNY for the real terrorist attack, which most agree is inevitable.
Evaluation
At the conclusion of the four operational periods, SOC-TF and IMT members accomplished many of the objectives and goals. The scenarios were very realistic; at times, members felt it was a true incident. All members operated in a professional manner and worked extremely hard. Most of the FDNY members participating had never deployed as a member of a TF, yet they adapted and overcame every obstacle. SOC-TF members demonstrated the ability to perform search, rescue, and recovery activities inside a 2,000-foot tunnel under arduous conditions with very little rest. The mission to develop and maintain a level of technical proficiency and logistical readiness to rapidly deploy an emergency response TF was achieved. Through established procedures and mutual-aid agreements, the SOC-TF can provide the capability to provide intracity, intrastate, and interstate responses to all-hazard events. Whether it be a structural collapse, a water-borne emergency, or a significant natural or man-made disaster, the SOC-TF can support trained personnel to provide specialized life-saving assistance.
The FDNY should be proud of the commitment to meet the seven McKinsey recommendations that culminated with the IMT/SOC-TF deployment. It was extremely rewarding to see the pride and dedication members demonstrated in building this extremely important resource.
● JOSEPH R. DOWNEY has 26 years of service with the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), where he is a battalion chief in the Rescue Battalion, which falls under the Special Operations Command. He has spent 21 of his 26 years with FDNY in the Special Operations Command; previously, he served as a firefighter in Squad 1, a lieutenant in Rescue 2, and a captain of Squad 18. He has been a member of NY-TF1’s Urban Search and Rescue Team since its inception in 1991 and has been its leader for the past nine years, responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Ivan/Gustav as well as the Haiti earthquake. Downey is also a team leader for FDNY’s SOC-TF. He is an instructor for the FDNY Battalion Chiefs course and has written articles for WNYF and Fire Engineering.
