CONFLAGRATION IN REVERE, MASSACHUSETTS
At 0243 hours on December 14, 1990 while Revere Fire Department companies operated at a three-alarm fire in a three-decker residential structure, a call came in for a fire at 34 Highland Street, just four blocks away,
What followed reinforced significant lessons about fire operations during incidents that develop or could develop into conflagrations and about large-scale fire operations in general.
The city of Revere hits a population of approximately 50,000 in a 7.1square-mile area. The Revere Fire Department consists of 1.31 paid personnel who operate and manage five engines and two ladder companies from five stations. Revere is a highly congested residential and commercial area located north of Boston. Much of the city is comprised of three story wood-frame dwellings with front and rear porches, commonly referred to as “three-deckers’ (see sidebar).
RESPONSE
Mutual-aid companies from Malden, Everett, and Lynn, which had to cover empty Revere stations, responded to the fire under the command of Revere Deputy Chief Robert Eydenberg. As he reached the crest of a hill about a quarter-mile from the fire, Eydenberg had an excellent view of the entire area. A three-decker on Highland Street was wellinvolved, with heavy fire showing at the rear of the structure from all three floors.
The fire building was a vacant, 30by 50-foot, three-story, wood-frame dwelling of platform construction with connected, unenclosed porches on each level at the front and rear of the structure. The window openings had been sealed with plywood, but some had been removed prior to the fire. The house reportedly had been used as a hangout by teenagers for some time. The structure had no history of reported fires, but the Revere Fire Department had responded to fires in the neighborhood many times before.
Upon arrival, Chief Eydenberg established a command post at the exposure # 1 side of the structure and requested a second alarm, just two minutes after initial dispatch. Exposure problems w ere the immediate concent. Fire was overlapping occupied residential structures on exposure sides #2 and #4; only 10to 12foot alleyways separated them from the fire building. The first priority w’as to evacuate the occupied exposures and protect them with handlines and deck guns from interior and exterior positions.
The temperature at the time of the fire was 27°F, and a wind was blow ing from the west at 20 to 25 mph, with gusts to 30 mph. The windchill factor was 0°F. Fire loading in the building was heavy, and with numerous open window^ spaces throughout the building, the fire was well-ventilated. Full involvement occurred rapidly.
Fifteen people were evacuated immediately from the three apartments in each of the exposures via interior stairs and placed at a safe distance away from the fire or with adjacent neighbors. Meanwhile, Eydenberg quickly directed firefighters with 1 ¾-inch handlines to mount an interior attack in exposures 2 and 4 to cut off the fire, and he directed 2‘/2-inch fines and truck-mounted deck guns into the alleys.
The combination of rapid fire spread through the original fire building, high winds, and highly combustible asphalt siding on the immediately exposed buildings made attempts to protect exposures unsuccessful. Interior positions were untenable, and a water curtain applied to the exterior surface of the exposures was ineffective. Within three minutes of the firedepartment’s arrival, the fire fully involved the original building and heavily involved both exposures.
Photo by Bill Noonan.
FLYING BRANDS
Chief of Department James F. Connery arrived, assumed command, and requested a third alarm. With interior operations no longer an option, command switched to a defensive attack and directed firefighters to place portable deck guns in the alleyways and at the rear of the three structures. An aerial ladder apparatus with ladder pipe was positioned in front of the firebuilding, but it broke down and never operated during the firelight.
Connery placed four Revere deputy chiefs at strategic positions to command fire operations; with subsequent alarms they were assisted by mutual-aid chiefs from the metro area. Connery was joined at the command post by the Revere chief of police, the head of public works, and mutual-aid chiefs as they were called in to respond. The Revere Police Department controlled traffic and helped evacuate and relocate residents.
Three major problems surfaced at this time:
- Brands and embers, some the size of footballs, were seized by the thermal updraft of the fire and carried by strong winds uphill into the surrounding neighborhood, litis neighborhood was characterized by narrow streets crowded with wood-frame multifamily dwellings, many of which were three-deckers. Brands were landing on rooftops and porches and in backyards as far as four blocks away.
- The required fire flow was greater than the municipal water system could supply.
- A language barrier between responders and neighborhood residents—many of whom were Asian immigrants —caused evacuation difficulties.
Connery was receiving numerous reports of fires on roofs and porches and in backyards on streets east of the original fire. The flat roofs common to three-deckers and storage on porches increased the fire loads and ignitability of the structures. He requested a fourth alarm at 0253 hours. As per a mutual-aid agreement among the 33 fire departments surrounding the city of Boston, following transmission of the fourth alarm. Metro Fire Control handled dispatch through preplanned assignments. Normally, each alarm brought three engines and one truck company. Connery reported that he had a potential conflagration and placed several companies on brand patrol for a distance of four blocks east, both in areas of more heavy fire activity and, significantly, at the perimeter of heavy activity, ahead of the fire. Brand “patrol” per se was difficult to accomplish for one reason: Very narrow streets with parking on both sides made it impossible for apparatus to reposition once they were in the block. I nits were committed for the duration of the firelight. Roving patrols operating on tank water weren’t feasible; firefighters instead stretched handlines from stationary apparatus, using city water to extinguish spot fires and incipient fires.
Connery’s main objective was to get ahead of the fire —or lose the entire hill east of the original fire building. He had not forgotten recent conflagrations in the neighboring towns of Chelsea and Lynn. With brand patrols established and units braced for a difficult firefight, Connery moved the command post to a hill two blocks away from the original fire building and upwind that afforded an excellent vantage point of the entire area. A staging area adjacent to the command post was established on Bell Circle, a large circle on a main highway overlooking the fire area, providing adequate room tor more than 30 pieces of apparatus.
As the fire rapidly used up available oxygen from the immediate area, it drew the already strong winds toward it violently, thereby increasing the effect of the wind. Fire spread by brands driven by these high winds was accelerated. Across the street from the original fire building, an occupied three-family wood-frame dwelling became heavily involved, and this fire in turn produced more brands and embers that dropped on roofs and porches of surrounding buildings. Firefighters stretched handlines to roofs and porches of exposed dw ellings, with some success. Others applied handlines out of exposed structures and controlled spread to a degree. Others operating in exposures removed curtains and shades. pulled ceilings, checked attics, and so forth. The defensive attack on already heavily involved structures was maintained.
Photo by Bill Noonan.
Despite the efforts of the firefighting forces, rapid spread via brands and radiant heat was difficult to overcome. Fortunately, however, brand teams on the perimeter of the fire area were successful in confining fire spread beyond that point. The fifth through eighth alarms were requested in quick succession, and units were deployed to either engage new fires or provide relief. Fatigue was becoming a factor. Fire had taken hold of nine dwellings on Highland Street and was threatening occupancies on Thornton Street behind them. When Connery requested the ninth and tenth alarms at 0408 hours, Metro Fire Control notified Revere that all metro fire apparatus was either at the scene or relocated. Additional calls would come from Beverly Control, north of the area.
As the need for fire flow increased, supply became a problem. Most streets in the area were supplied by six-inch water mains. The system was old and its upkeep was questionable. Some companies were pulling a vacuum on pumps—and if they didn’t have the water, they couldn’t stretch a handline. There were not enough handlines to hit all the incipient fires before they extended. Firefighters stretched four-inch lines to Ocean Avenue, several hundred yards east of the fire, and connected to a 24-inch main, providing badly needed water.
(Photo by Peter Aloisi.)
During the height of the fire, pumpers were being requested four at a time. The command post took direction of routing apparatus. Revere fire alarm handled station coverage. As fast as calls were received at the command post for companies, apparatus was arriving at the same pace. Finally, large-caliber streams from apparatus located in the streets; handlines from the first, second, and third floors of exposures; and effective brand patrol combined for fire control and subsequent extinguishment.
The last fire department units left the scene at 1843 hours on December 13, 40 hours after the initial alarm. At the height of the fire, 62 engines and 16 ladder companies either were operating or were relocated. Forty -three families—135 people —were left homeless. Eight firefighters suffered minor injuries.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- Successful response to large, fastmoving fires such as the Revere conflagration hinges to a great extent on getting ahead of the fire and confining it to an area that can be handled by department resources. Getting ahead means averting a full-blown disaster. Brand patrol units at the perimeter of fire activity were quite effective to this end. The mobility of personnel stretching handlines from stationary apparatus could become a factor in brand patrol effectiveness.
- Large handlines (2/4-inch) and master stream deployment between buildings when fire is threatening exposures is an essential initial activity to contain the fire. 1 ¾-inch handlines, though more mobile, usually are not sufficient for exposure protection in alleyways or other exterior positions, as was experienced in Revere.
- Water supply was a problem during the firefight. The city’s water system was overtaxed to supply the necessary flows to the area of fire activity. All Revere engines and surrounding metro units carry four-inch hose to overcome water problems. Water preplans may be necessary in conflagration-prone areas. Fire department interaction with local government officials and the water department is necessary to upgrade the municipal system. Contingency plans
- may call for establishing a mutual-aid water tanker program if not already in place.
- Choose a command post site that works best for the fire situation at hand, and be flexible enough to change sites if beneficial to the operation. Revere’s decision to reposition the command post uphill and upwind afforded the incident commander a much better view of operations below. Strategic decisions were enhanced from this perspective.
- Evacuation and relocation problems tie up personnel. Some residents had to be moved several times because of fire extension before finally being brought to a nearby community center. Evacuation/relocation plans are beneficial, particularly in sections that are prone to large fires.
- Increased fire prevention activity in conflagration-prone areas (those with tall wooden structures, closely spaced buildings, congested neighborhoods, and generally poor upkeep) is necessary. Identifying conflagration breeders, more frequent inspections and code enforcement, greater interaction with the community, and so on can decrease the potential for disasters.
- As in the past, the established metro mutual aid was effective. Relocations went smoothly. There were no problems in dispatch, even though only one dispatcher was on duty during the fire. (An off-duty captain was in the communications center when the fire broke out and assisted.) Cooperation between cities that never worked together before (because of distant response) was excellent.
- Preplanned radio communications are necessary in a large-scale response. All mutual-aid units communicated on a predetermined fireground radio frequency, and there were no difficulties. The Metro Fire frequency was used effectively as the fireground radio channel. Revere also utilized its own channel. A command van from Chelsea Civil Defense provided Revere’s incident commander with a means to communicate with Metro Fire Control and advise some units of assignments before arrival.
