By MICHAEL J. BARAKEY
On April 23, 2015, the Virginia Beach (VA) Fire Department (VBFD) was presented with a fast-moving, multifamily structure fire that challenged first-arriving officers and crews. The incident occurred in the Lynnhaven Shores section of the city, an area at the northernmost end of the resort area that borders the Chesapeake Bay. The area consists of a dense arrangement of condominiums and mid- and high-rise residential and retirement buildings designed to allow occupants access to the Chesapeake Bay beaches. This area is inundated with three- and four-story Type V wood-frame construction multifamily-/condominium-style buildings, which creates the potential for large fires and conflagrations.
Not only is this area densely packed with condominiums, but most complexes are isolated by gates, ingress and egress is limited, and adjacent buildings are close together to maximize the number of residents who can enjoy the beach. This scenario, combined with the size of the condominiums, the combustibility of furnishings and finishes, wood floors, wood ceilings, wood exposed exterior staircases, large open spaces, and lightweight truss construction led to a complex incident with a well-advanced fire.
The fire building was “L”-shaped and featured three stories of living space above enclosed parking garages, also of wood frame construction. The building, built in 1983, contained no fire protection systems. It was 114 feet long × 47 feet wide, and each floor was 3,600 square feet in area. The building’s total living space was 10,693 square feet. Exposure B was a three-story, 90- × 37-foot wood-frame building, with each floor 3,330 square feet in area. The total living space of exposure B was 9,961 square feet. Exposure B was 26 feet away from the fire building at the farthest point and six feet away at the closest point.
Exposure D was a three-story condominium of lightweight wood frame with lofts, 100 feet long × 74 feet wide, with each floor measuring 7,623 square feet. The vinyl-clad building was protected with an NFPA 13R sprinkler system (which omitted sprinkler heads in void spaces, including the attic). Exposure D’s total living space was 22,869 square feet. Exposure D was located 10 feet away from the fire building.
The Response
Battalion 2; Engines 1, 2, 4, and 8; and Ladder 1 were initially dispatched at 2338 hours to a reported residential fire at the intersection of Shore Drive and Page Avenue (about one block from the fire’s location). One caller reported flames over the rooftops. As Engine 1 approached the area, the officer saw heavy fire at the rear of the Dunes Condo Complex on Page Court. Battalion 2 upgraded the assignment to a multifamily response, which added Ladder 8 and Rescue 2. Engine 1 stopped to lay a supply line from a public hydrant at the corner of the property on Page Court and Page Avenue. The officer advised Ladder 1 to proceed into the complex.
The complex was narrow, with limited access for Engine 1 and Ladder 1; parked cars on the street and power lines and tree branches were added obstacles to placing fire apparatus. The officer on Engine 1 established command, declared a working fire, and requested a second alarm.
With the nonconventional layout of the fire building and having seen only two sides of the building while Engine 1 laid into the fire, command had to paint a picture for the incoming units. Command identified the sides of the building early and declared side A to be facing Page Avenue (Figure 1).
| Figure 1. Aerial Overview of the Lynnhaven Shores Section of Virginia Beach, Virginia |
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With a heavy volume of fire visible from the first-floor garages to the attic, Engine 1’s crew placed a 2½-inch attack line in service on the B side of the fire building. Command’s intent was to contain the main body of fire and protect exposure B, which was 26 feet away. Command needed to see all the sides of the building to better direct incoming units. The officer initiated a walking 360° size-up of the incident, but because of the heavy fire volume, command was not able to move down side B of the fire building; he was able to go only halfway down side D. The next-arriving engine, Engine 4, established a water supply to Engine 1. The crew reported to Engine 1.
Ladder 1 parked in front of Engine 1 and positioned for a defensive attack on the fire. The operator was challenged because of the parked cars on the driver’s-side curb and the trees on the passenger side. Initially, the operator was going to short jack the truck on the driver’s side, but he was able to fully extend the two outriggers on the driver’s side between the parked cars. As the operator set up the aerial for master stream operations, Engine 1 supplied Ladder 1 with support for defensive operations (photo 1).
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| (1) The fire building and the position of Ladder 1. (Photo by Kirk P. Kellerhals.) |
The aerial’s master stream washed the fire building and the adjacent exposures. The master stream was then directed at three different structures: the fire building, exposure B, and exposure D. Meanwhile, Ladder 1’s officer and jumpseat firefighter went mobile, looking to rescue trapped occupants. The officer did a survivability profile as the two made their way to the building’s C side. They forced entry into two units. The first unit was clear of smoke, and the primary search was completed quickly. The second unit was fully charged with smoke and deemed unsafe to search without a hoseline. Ladder 1’s officer notified command that they were not able to complete the primary search because of high heat and heavy fire conditions.
While attempting to locate and rescue trapped occupants, Ladder 1’s crew worked their way to the D exposure and conducted forcible entry and searches on the second and third floors.
Because of the heavy volume of the rapidly advancing fire, the initial fire attack mode was defensive. Multiple handlines were placed into service as Engines 1 and 8 experienced difficulties suppressing the fire and protecting the B exposure. With three condo units heavily involved in fire and the ground floor garages on fire with multiple vehicles also involved-producing multiple explosions-the crews remained defensive to prevent the fire and radiant heat from igniting additional units.
Ladder 8 positioned on Shore Sands Court, the condominium complex adjacent to the D side (photo 2). Command directed Ladder 8 to the D exposure for exposure protection and suppression of the rapidly progressing fire. Engine 4’s crew pulled a handline to protect and suppress the fire on the D side, which became energized from the fire impinging the service drop; this energized the ground and began shocking crews because the water they were applying to the fire began transferring electrical current.
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| (2) Exposure D and the placement of Ladders 7 and 8. (Photo by Ray P. Smith.) |
While the remainder of the first alarm units laid additional supply lines and supported the incident objectives of command, second-alarm units were dispatched. The second-alarm units consisted of Battalion 1; Engines 3, 7, and 14; Ladder 2; and Rescue 1. Engine 11 and Ladder 11 were special called soon after the dispatcher filled the second alarm. Ladder 2 was directed to Beach Castle Lane (photo 3); this allowed the tower ladder to protect the B exposure. Engine 2 supplied Ladder 2. Ladder 7 was directed to set up on exposure D with Ladder 8. Ladder 7 was supplied by a relay operation involving Engine 14 and Engine 11.
At the original fire building, collapse was imminent. A concern involved overhanging balconies that jutted out into the street, which could come down on working firefighters. With the heavy fire conditions and the extreme radiant heat, the crew on the handlines went through multiple air bottles. Searches were completed on the initial fire building, and the fire was placed under control, with access made by ground ladders.
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| (3) Ladder 2 sets up on Beach Castle Lane. (Photo by Jonathan Austin.) |
Battalion 2 arrived and took command from Engine 8’s officer, who had received command from Engine 1’s officer early on in the incident. Identifying the need to divide the incident into workable segments, Battalion 2 assigned the engine officers as “Division A” and “Division D”; these divisions allowed the second-alarm units en route to be assigned to a division supervisor.
The shift commander-Car 6-arrived and took command. Car 6 assigned Battalion 2 as Division A and Battalion 1 as Division D. The division supervisors were provided units arriving from the second alarm to suppress fire and search for occupants. Division A handled the main fire building and prevented exposure B from igniting. The master streams from Ladder 1 and Ladder 2 as well as the well-placed handlines prevented exposure B from catching fire. The building suffered major heat damage, which included broken windows and melted siding.
Exposure D (photo 4) was also involved because of the intense fire and heat emanating from the original fire building. The radiant heat initially ignited the exterior siding and the contents on the first and second floors and broke out the windows. Then, the fire extended into living spaces. Firefighters assigned to Division D searched and removed occupants from the 12 living units.
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| (4) Fire from exposure D. (Photo by Ray P. Smith.) |
The heaviest fire damage was to second- and third-floor units. Fire progressed through the soffit, to the roof, and through the attic space. Although the building was fully sprinklered, which helped reduce flame spread within the living spaces, the building still experienced heavy fire damage. The sprinklers held the fire in check, but the system was overwhelmed. As additional crews reported to Division D, they extended attack lines to suppress fire in the living spaces as well as on the exterior of the building. Crews made aggressive attacks on the third-floor units and the attic. When attempts to extinguish the attic and roof fire were unsuccessful, all crews were removed, and the fire was extinguished with ladder pipes.
Firefighters working on exposure D were presented with concerns and safety hazards. First, several natural gas meters broke, releasing and then igniting natural gas. The ensuing gas “torch” increased the rate of flame spread along the exterior of the building. Second, the rear of the fire building was energized because the service drop was impinged by the fire. Crews working in the area were then being shocked by the energized ground as they applied water to the fire, which acted as a conductor for the electric current. Firefighters suppressing vehicle fires in the garage were also being shocked because of their proximity to the service drop, which was just behind the garage. Crews requested the power company to isolate the entire grid and remove the electrical hazard from the working firefighters.
Crews working in Divisions A and D overhauled the buildings for several hours. They went through many air bottles as they worked hot spots and searched for occupants. Fire investigators determined that the fire originated at the rear of the original fire building-directly adjacent to the exterior wall and behind the heat pump. The fire’s origin was isolated to the service drop’s underground area, which supplied the meter bases for the condominium building. The fire was determined to be accidental.
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| (5) Collapse of the fire building. (Photo by Kirk P. Kellerhals.) |
Lessons Learned
Following are some lessons learned.
- Proper apparatus placement is vital. Officers and operators have one window of time in which to properly place their apparatus. It is everyone’s responsibility to ensure that their apparatus is placed correctly the first time. As Engine 1 stopped to lay a supply line, the officer advised Ladder 1 to pass. The complex entrance was narrow, congested by numerous parked cars and trees. The decision to allow the first-arriving ladder to gain the best spot to use the aerial ladder for rescues and defensive operations was instrumental in preventing fire extension into exposure B and keeping the fire from extending past exposure D.
- A building’s construction is best identified during preplanning, yet officers and firefighters have to recognize distinct building features during an incident so working firefighters-with limited visibility-can identify the building’s construction type during their on-scene size-up and recognize signs of potential collapse. Firefighters must not only be able to identify the type of construction but also estimate burn time, to decide when floors have had prolonged exposure to fire, and to recognize any live and dead loads above the fire. Firefighters need to anticipate ceiling and floor collapse by recognizing lightweight trusses that are covered by oriented strand board panels; they will fail within minutes of direct fire impingement. Train and educate firefighters and officers to know and understand building construction, the hazards associated with buildings on fire, and the signs of impending structural collapse (photo 5).
- First-arriving officers as well as every officer and firefighter who arrives on scene must perform a size-up. For this incident, crews were originally dispatched to a residential structure fire, yet they found a rapidly progressing fire that involved a multifamily building. Continually size up the incident to identify safety concerns. As previously stated, the area on the D side of the fire building was energized because the service drop was impinged by fire, shocking crews working in and out of the garages. Share this information with the safety officer and command to isolate the area until the power company can respond to the grid or area.
- After the fire is out, have available crews assist displaced residents and occupants in returning to their units. As residents seek to gather personal belongings, medication, insurance papers, and other necessary items, this assistance affords them safety and reassurance.
- Train, train, train! Practice setting up aerial trucks with obstacles. Understand the aerial’s capabilities. The operator’s proficiency will lead to a positive outcome, especially when water is needed from the aerial in a timely manner and the operator faces obstacles and challenges such as smoke and heat, limited visibility, the time of day, parked cars, and trees (where the outriggers were set up for this fire). For this incident, the operator’s proficiency resulted in exposure B being saved and less fire damage to exposure D.
- With closely packed, multifamily building complexes, wind can change a fire’s complexity. If this was a wind-driven event, the amount of resources necessary to contain the fire would have been dramatically higher. When dealing with wind-driven fires, place the apparatus downwind and call early for additional alarms.
MICHAEL J. BARAKEY, CFO/EFO, is a district chief with the Virginia Beach (VA) Fire Department, where he is assigned to administration. Previously, he was assigned to operations and training. He is a PEER assessor and mentor for the Commission on Fire Accreditation International and served as the department’s accreditation manager. Barakey is a hazmat specialist, a fire officer II, an instructor III, a nationally registered paramedic, and a neonatal/pediatric critical care paramedic for the Children’s Hospital of the King’s Daughters in Norfolk, Virginia. Barakey is also a plans team manager for the VA-TF2 Urban Search and Rescue Team. He has a master’s of public administration from Old Dominion University and is an FDIC classroom instructor.
APPARATUS ACCESS PROBLEMS
Hoseline Operations for Fires in Multiple Dwellings, Part 1
Hoseline Operations for Fires in Multiple Dwellings, Part 3
