FIRE LOSS MANAGEMENT
DISASTER MANAGEMENT
part 1: The blind men look at the fire protection elephant.
Editor’s note: Frank Brannigan has been a student of the total fire problem for over 50 years. Years ago he recognized that there is much more to overcoming our disastrous national fire loss than bigger hoses, longer ladders, and sturdier helmets. As he perceives it, the fire problem is like Aesop’s elephant: Each blind man has a different idea of what the elephant is, but no one understands the complete elephant. In this extended series, Frank will attempt to provide to the serious student an understanding of the entire fire protection “elephant.”
THERE ARE AN infinite number of opinions as to how to reduce our disgraceful national fire loss.
Some place all their fire protection eggs in the “fire prevention” basket— “We are very careful here; we have no trouble.”
Some concentrate their attention on the “damage” done by fire extinguishing procedures, wholly oblivious to the fact that fire extinguishing procedures are only necessary when management* has permitted a fire to get under way.
There are those who are expert in one area of the subject but whose experience is not well-rounded. I’m always astonished at the number of “smoke control experts” who have never been in a fire building.
There are those for whom fire suppression is a dynamic, soul-satisfying exercise of humans against the elements—to the extent that they resist any efforts to make automatic fire suppression more universally accepted.
Some believe that new and better codes or better code enforcement will solve all problems.
Some who know better or should know better advocate a specific course because it is to their financial advantage.
Different managers regard one aspect or another of the problem as the total problem. The fire chief often just wants more men and apparatus; the corporate manager believes that insurance to assure profits is all that is necessary; many legislators and public-interest champions place their sole reliance in codes and laws; some place the blame on “men, women, and children” (the three causes of fire???), and extol education as the panacea; psychologists lecture about accident-prone people. And after every disaster the responsibility is passed around in a circle faster than the basketball is passed by the Harlem Globetrotters.
*In this series, the term “manager” is used to denote any person with authority over any part of the fire protection problem, such as the mayor, building commissioner, legislators, insurance executives, business owners, builders, architects, etc.
It is no secret that, in general, the fire service considers manual fire suppression to be its primary function. When a fire occurs, firefighters and machines are assembled to suppress the fire —to “put the wet stuff on the red stuff.”
On a hit-or-miss basis we support an activity misnamed “fire prevention.” No fire service meeting is complete without the statement, “If we spent more effort on fire prevention, we would need less fire suppression.” This is surely a noble thought, but not necessarily true. The difficulty starts with, but is not limited to, the term “fire prevention.” It is true that some fires can be “prevented.” Removing all matches and lighters from those entering a munitions plant can prevent all fires from those sources. Most “fire prevention” work, however, assumes that there will be a fire. All resultant systems and installations are only cost-effective based on that assumption. A sprinkler system or an emergency exit is a “waste of money” unless a fire occurs.
A simple distinction between “fire prevention” and “fire suppression” is that the former is anything that is done by firefighters who aren’t wearing protective equipment.
The sum total of all efforts to control fire can best be called fire loss management.
This term denotes that “system”— formal or haphazard—by which we control fire and hopefully limit the extent of disasters. Haphazard as it may be, there is a system. It exists with little attention from the body politic and without any semblance of an overall policy, the fact that there is a U.S. Fire Administration notwithstanding. The fact that a fire department exists satisfies the concern of the city dweller, and in surveys he usually gives the service high marks.
Most adults have never been involved with the consequences of a serious fire.
Since there is no systematic approach to the fire loss problem, the perception of the manager of any enterprise, public or private, is very personal. In great part this is due to the difficulty we have in demonstrating directly and immediately the flow from cause to effect. Citizens are all more or less aware of a tremendous national fire waste. After every major loss there is a hue and a cry, a formal investigation, and a determination never to let that particular loss occur again. In truth it rarely does. The fire protection advisor therefore is often rebuffed by the official, public or private, who can say with a clear conscience and good reason, “Our experience has shown us that we do not need the extravagant recommendations that you are making. However, we recognize that the bare possibility of a disaster does exist and therefore we will execute a portion of your recommendations—preferably those which cost the least. How much do a thousand of those fire safety pamphlets cost?”
In an attempt to arm the fire protection specialist with a total approach to the problem and to provide an organized approach that government and private management can accept, this series was constructed. It will provide an overview of the entire field, a framework on which all of the various bits and pieces of information acquired by students can be interrelated so that an organized picture will emerge.
PROBABILITY VERSUS CERTAINTY
Very few buildings collapse. A major building collapse such as the Hartford Arena collapse or a devastating partial collapse such as the Kansas City Hyatt collapse” shakes the architectural and engineering professions. The book of major collapses is a slim volume. The histories of major fires, however, will fill volumes. WHY?
**In 1978, the roof of the Hartford Arena collapsed under a snow load. There were no injuries; however, just a short time before collapse, thousands had been watching a hockey game there. The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel collapse on July 18, 1981 killed 113 people. An improper field change in the suspended walkway design was to blame.
The constant enemy of the building is gravity. The probability of gravity is a certainty, and the punishment for disobedience of the law of gravity is immediate and accurately proportional to the degree of violation.
Fire is not a certainty. The probability value is set at whatever the interested party makes it. The fire professional estimates one value; the manager estimates quite another value that’s almost always far lower. The fire professional draws on his own experience and the vicarious experience of others. The manager often values his own experience (or more accurately, lack of experience) very highly, and dismisses vicarious experience as not pertinent.
The gambling slot machine provides us with a useful analogy. Three wheels revolve independently. Certain combinations of symbols pay small sums, but the objective is to have all three wheels show
JACKPOT—JACKPOT—JACKPOT. The slot has no memory. Each play is independent and not at all influenced by what has happened previously. The law of averages will apply for the casino owner with a number of slot machines, but does not apply in the short run to one machine.
Our emotions often refuse to accept what our intellect understands. Many people who understand the operation of slot machines and the laws of chance let emotion rule when a call of nature dictates a recess: “Don’t touch my slot machine.” Emotions or deeply believed fallacies often govern the management of the fire loss problem.
The slot machine provides a framework for the study of fire loss management. The “fire slot machine” has three wheels: (1) the CAUSE of the fire; (2) the potential for EXTENSION; and (3) what has been done to MANAGE the problem. When all three wheels line up—JACKPOT—disaster results. Fire loss management is not concerned with the prevention of fires but, rather, the prevention of disasters.
To regulate the payoff rate on a cash slot machine, the operator “gimmicks” the machine to reduce or even eliminate the probability that the three wheels will show JACKPOT simultaneously. Successful fire loss management consists of “gimmicking” the fire slot machine so that JACKPOT will not show. Suppose we place a gimmick between the CAUSE and the EXTENSION wheels of the slot machine so that the two will never show JACKPOT at the same time. One of the best and least recognized “gimmicks” is the clay flue liner in a chimney. This makes it possible to have a needed raging fire (the CAUSE) in a combustible building with an infinitesimal probability that the fire will EXTEND to the building—thus the DISASTER is almost impossible.
Let’s develop the detail of the fire loss slot machine.
CAUSE can be divided into three types:
Friemlly: those that we usually must have—light, heat, power.
Unfriemlly: those that serve no purpose-arson, lightning, metallic sparks, spontaneous ignition, static electricity. Friendly Unfriendly: friction, smoking.
Under the heading of EXTENSION, we discuss:
Kindling: Anything that can be ignited directly by one of the CAUSES. Some causes are universal and others require Specific kindling.
Mechanism of Extension: To the commonly named conduction, convection, and radiation (really mechanisms of heat transfer) we add moving flaming or hot materials.
Surface Spread: The spread of fire varies widely on different interior surfaces. This is regulated by code under the term “flame spread.”
Fire Containment—Structural Damage Fire Resistance (Endurance): We discuss what it is and what it is not.
Fire Load: Considering a fire as a chemical reaction, fire load is measured in Btu’s per square feet or in K’joules per square meter. Infinitely more important to management may be fire load, which may be expressed as dollar density (or dollars per minute), production continuity, priceless value, or supreme national interest.
The third wheel is MANAGEMENT. The word is overused, but there aren’t precise words available that will better explain the concept. There are two different aspects to management: (1) who the manager is and (2) the management of a specific potential fire risk.
- The manager is any person or agency that plays any part in the control of the fire loss, from the backstep firefighter to the president of the United States. It includes the designer, the builder, the owner, the tenant, the insurer, the supervisor, the worker, the local government, the state government, the federal government, private and quasi-public organizations that develop or lobby for legislation or provide support to the regulatory process.
- If disaster is to be averted, there _____re five phases that must be adequately provided for before the fire occurs. They are:
There is a crazy split of responsibilities and actions with many overlaps, conflicts, and dangerous gaps. There is no necessary relationship between effort expended and fire loss management results.
Discovery—The discovery of most fires is a hit-or-miss matter—entirely unmanaged.
Alarm — Many fires that are discovered are not alarmed promptly. It is a common but tragic error to assume that discovery necessarily means alarm. Evacuation—Human beings have very low tolerance for the hostile fire environment. All must reach a safe environment in a few minutes. Exits belong to the occupants, not the owner. Suppression—What some think of as the whole “elephant.” For manual suppression, realistic prefire planning is necessary. Automatic suppression must be adequate and continuously maintained.
Recovery — A large proportion of businesses hit by a major fire never reopen. Recovery starts before the fire.
