Photos by E. Joseph Hoffman.
FIRE IN MILL CONSTRUCTION: BREEDING GROUND FOR CONFLAGRATION
In their heyday before World War II, Philadelphia’s factories and mills were a dominant force in American manufacturing. The city led the nation in the output of such diverse products as locomotives, streetcars, saws, hosiery, hats, leather, and cigars. It was also among the leaders in rugs and carpets, worsted goods, women’s clothing, and dying and finishing textiles. In 1935, Philadelphia had approximately 1,500 textile mills. Typical of industrial cities on the Pastern seaboard, surrounding these mills and factories were streets and streets of attached row houses, residences for thousands of workers.
As the economy and demand for goods changed from the war till the present in many Eastern cities, the manufacturing base declined, leaving large, vacant, and forgotten facilities as reminders of a busier past. Hie declining tax income from these mills—a target lire hazard to begin with—compounds the difficulty in providing the level of lire protection needed to contain large fires of conflagration potential. The row homes, of course, have remained occupied in spite of the demise of the mills, and these present a very serious exposureproblem to a very serious lire hazard.
Such was the case on an August night this past summer, when Philadelphia (PA) firefighters responded to a call for fire in a vacant warehouse in the North Philadelphia section of the city, a mixed industrial and residential neighborhood. Before the night was over, the spectacular fire would claim the warehouse, place a severe burden on units from 10 alarms charged with preventing extension to multiple exposures, and reinforce significant lessons about fires in mill-constructed buildings and the special resources required to extinguish them.
THE FIRE BUILDING AND EXPOSURES
The former Sterling Dye Company complex consisted of four interconnected buildings set on an area of approximately 100,000 square feet (500 by 200 feet). The two main buildings were four and three stories high with floor-to-ceiling dimensions of 18 feet; the other buildings were one and two stories high.
The two large building sections (four-level and three-level) were of heavy timber (mill) construction; solid masonry exterior bearing and nonbearing walls, massive wood columns and beams supporting thick woodplanking floors, and a heavy woodplanking roof supported by heavy timber. Heavy steel and cast iron connectors/supports also were used throughout the structure. As is common in vacant warehouses, the integrity’ of original fire protection features had been compromised through renovation, vandalism, abuse, and neglect. Compartmentation was not a factor in limiting horizontal spread of fire. Many vertical openings were unprotected. (See sidebar on page 58.)
The building was vacant except for between 75,000 and 100,000 pounds of fabric stored on the first floor in the southernmost building, not far from the point of fire origin. This burning material contributed to the spread of fire and generated considerable dense, black smoke.
At the time of the fire, the property was in violation of the city’s fire code. The fire department had been involved in trying to bring the property under code since 1984. Since then, the building’s automatic fire sprinkler system had been out of service. The Board of Safety and Fire Prevention (the city’s recommending body on fire code issues) had denied the various appellants’ three requests in 1987 and ’88 to waive sprinkler system requirements; unfortunately, however, .compliance by the owners was never achieved.
The fire building was bordered on the north, south, and east by narrow streets with contiguous attached row dwellings. Generally, these homes are two-story, 15by 35-foot structures of masonry/brick construction with wood-frame roofs. Some were modified over the years with wood-frame construction and shingle siding.
To the immediate south of the fire building (within the complex) was an occupied, partially’ attached, one-story building of masonry construction with a reinforced concrete roof. It contained paints, solvents, lacquers, and other flammable materials. This exposure at one time was occupied by the Sterling Dye company, but more recently interior access from the main building was sealed off by a solid masonry wall. The fire sprinklers in this structure were not in service.
To the west (rear), separated from the fire building by a 100-foot railroad right-of-way, is a twoand three-story mill-constructed building with dimensions of 100 feet by 500 feet. This rear exposure is a warehouse for building materials and baled commodities and also is bound by row homes to the north, south, and west. It is protected by a combination of inservice dry and wet sprinkler systems.
OPERATIONS
The box-alarm assignment was dispatched at 2152 hours on August 26, 1991, to 3302-64 N. 3rd Street. Temperature at that time was 73°F and the relative humidity was 74 percent. Winds were from the south-southeast at 7 mph. Initial size-up indicated a heavy, fast-accelerating fire with a heavy smoke condition.
Battalion Chief Pat Campanaro established a command post at 3rd and Westmoreland streets (southeast cornt-r of the fireground) and was provided with vital building information and water hydrant maps. On his arrival heavy fire already was involving all three floors of the building’s south section and was showing on the west side. Based on this size-up and additional risk analysis factors—the building was vacant, the automatic sprinklers were not in service, and significant vandalism had occurred over time—Campanaro determined that an interior attack would be ineffective and would put firefighter safety in extreme jeopardy. He directed firefighters to place aerial and ground master streams into operation outside the collapse danger zone, establishing a water curtain that would contain the fire to that section of the superstructure.
Campanaro knew that this was not going to be a “finesse” operation — they needed an abundance of personnel and heavy-caliber appliances as soon as possible to protect exposures from the growing fire and amplify the defensive firelight. Within the first nine minutes of the operation he requested six additional alarms. The primary exposure hazard at this time were the row homes directly east of the fire building across 3rd Street (# 1 exposure side), which because of the fire’s original location and subsequent growth were taking the brunt of its radiant heat. Companies were detailed to interior defensive firefighting with 1 Vi-inch handlines within homes on the # 1 side closest to the fire building. The attached building on the south (#2 exposure) side containing flammable liquids also posed a serious threat to the row homes east and south. Firefighters positioned deluge guns at Interior positions within the exposure and then withdrew.
The municipal water supply was adequate during the early stages of the operation, although a few of the hydrants in the area were inoperable due to vandalism. Operating in the streets, however, became quite dangerous, as outside electrical transformers exploded front the radiant heat and power lines fell around the perimeter of the building. Fortunately, as the collapse zone was maintained and observed by firefighters, no personnel were struck by these lines. The Philadelphia Electric Company was notified and asked to send a representative to the scene and shut down power to the area. Meanwhile, sections of the building’s infrastructure began collapsing within and temperatures were intensifying.
Acting Deputy Chief James Winward arrived and assumed command. He reestablished primary strategic goals—containment of the fire and protection of exposures—by sectoring incoming units around the building. He also ordered the evacuation of homes in the immediate vicinity, beginning with 3rd Street and continuing with intersecting streets: Cornwell, Wensley, and Thayer to the east; Westmoreland to the south; and Ontario and Orianna to the north. The Philadelphia Police Department did an exceptional job first in assisting the fire department with the evacuations and then, as more police units arrived, in taking full responsibility for evacuating the homes and relocating residents to a safe location.
As per the Philadelphia Fire Department’s incident command structure, a safety officer and logistics officer automatically were assigned and dispatched with the second alarm, taking some of the stress off the incident commander in these areas. The department’s mobile communications unit was brought to the scene. Two staging areas for support and medical vehicles were established (later this was moved several blocks away as the fire progressed). Front-line apparatus were placed immediately into service on arrival.
With fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-alarm companies now arriving, command had row home exposures on the south, north, and especially the east well-covered with companies controlled by sector commanders. Master streams and handlines were rotated to wet down homes and extinguish brands, while firefighters continued to implement the defensive/offensive strategy from within the homes closest to the fire.
The windows on the large, millconstructed #3 exposure still were intact but were showing the effects of the fire’s radiant heat. Winward knew that preventing fire extension to that building was crucial to incident stabili/.ation. He called for the seventh alarm at 2213 hours and dedicated the full assignment to exposure protection at that location. The building’s sprinkler system was activated and augmented through the fire department connection. Additional largecaliber streams were established on the #3 exposure side. Efforts in this area benefited from the distance between the two structures and the downward slope from fire building to exposure, creating the condition for some of the radiant heat to pass over the top of the exposure without damage to the building. At 2218 hours Winward requested the eighth alarm to increase exposure protection for the east row homes.
ADDITIONAL WATER SOURCE
With a growing fire and a growing number of on-scene companies came the need for more water. Winward contacted the city water department and requested that the area’s highpressure water system be activated with a pressure of 100 pounds so that additional lines could be supplied. This water system, independent of the domestic water supply system, supplies unfiltered river water at pressures as high as 200 psi from pumping stations to pressurized hydrants located in high-value and mill districts. It does not require additional pumpers. High-pressure hydrants in this area are located on Allegheny Street, oneblock south of the fire building, and as such were used primarily for exposure protection in that sector.
Commissioner Roger l Ishafcr and Deputy Commissioner Christian Schweizer arrived on the scene approximately 30 minutes into the operation. I Ishafcr assumed command of the incident and maintained span of control. He designated Schweizer as operations officer, then split the severely threatened eastern sector into two. Tactical operations in each of the five sectors now were controlled by a battalion chief. The commissioner called for the ninth and 10th alarms at 2237 and 2317 hours to increase exposure protection on the east side and to form brand patrols. He assigned staff officers to handle medical emergencies, public relations, and liaison coordination. The safety officer continued to maintain safety around the perimeter of the fire building and the logistics officer continued to handle the necessary support functions— lighting, additional generators, etc. The fire marshal was on the scene to coordinate the investigation into the origin and cause of the fire.
Meanwhile, extensive efforts to limit the fire to a part of the Sterling Dyebuilding were unsuccessful. It w-as now fully involved. Less than an hour after fire department arrival, the fire building began to sustain what was to be catastrophic collapse. Large interior sections were falling, and flying embers and brands lit up the sky. It was only a matter of time before exterior walls collapsed as well.
The southern, eastern, and parts of the western perimeter walls collapsed outward. The southern wall fell onto the #2 exposure. Structural integrity to that exposure held, however—only a section of the roof was breached — and both interior unstaffed lines and exterior heavy streams prevented extension to the flammable products. While extension to southern, western. and northern exposures continued to be a real concern, it was the eastern exposures that required the greatest concentration of forces fighting the fire from defensive and defensive/offensive positions.
UNDER CONTROL
For all the water applied to the fire —approximately 20,000 gpm were flowing at the height of the incident—fire personnel could not control it until it had consumed most of the available fire load. The fire was declared under control by Ulshafer at 0028 hours on August 28. The Sterling Dye building was totally destroyed. At the height of the fire, 240 firefighting and support personnel operated at the scene, along with 70 vehicles—45 of which were front-line apparatus. This equated to about 50 percent of the operating forces available on that tour of duty. Approximately 500 people were evacuated from their homes. Two firefighters sustained minor injuries and three civilians required treatment unrelated to the fire.
Investigation of the fire determined the cause to be incendiary in nature.
In spite of the severityof the fire and the extension threat, firefighters performed an excellent job of keeping extension to a minimum: Only three properties on the east side of the fire sustained minimal damage. Fire was kept out of the large, heavy-timber building on the #3 exposure side.
Although the many row homes were the primary life hazard and property conservation priorities, without stabilization of that structure, the fire could have escalated into a major conflagration costing millions of dollars.
The city of Philadelphia incurred (and may not receive reimbursement for) a cost of approximately §250,000 for demolition of the remaining building because of dangerous building conditions.
A postfire critique was conducted and attended by officers of firstand second-alarm companies and command personnel. Strategy and tactics, water supply, fire investigation, communications, incident command system, emergency medical services, and support services for the incident were discussed as part of a continuing learning process. The general consensus was that the operation was a success from start to finish, particularly when weighing the magnitude of the fire against the number of surrounding occupancies threatened hut saved. It also was agreed that this was just one battle in a war that is far from over. Some of the lessons reinforced appear below.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- The Sterling Dye fire was a graphic illustration of the potential for fires in mill construction to reach extremely large proportions quickly. That potential never should be underestimated by fireground commanders. This fire anil others throughout history should dispel the belief that “slowburning’’ mill-constructed buildings represent an advantage to fire department operations once the building becomes significantly involved and firefighters cannot operate from the interior. The Sterling Dye building proved to be impossible to extinguish after it became heavily involved, as was the fire condition by the time the fire department arrived.
- Fireground commanders must carefully evaluate and reevaluate the efficacy of an interior attack at a vacant or abandoned structure. Presence and condition of engineered fire protection systems (automatic sprinklers in particular), building integrity due to lack of maintenance, vandalism, structural defects, speed of fire travel, and other risk analysis factors must be considered before committing forces to such actions. No vacant (or otherwise unoccupied) building is worth the life of a human being.
- For a defensive firelight on a large volume of fire, water supply is crucial. Special-calling large-diameter hose companies and special apparatus on early alarms is advantageous. Pumpers with telescoping booms, for example, can be placed in critical positions on the fireground without obstructing or being obstructed by other apparatus. I.DH pumpers can supply several master streams from their manifolds. Subsequent-arriving engine companies can supply additional backup water from distant hydrants into LDH pumpers to keep their compound pressures up and stabilized. Secondary water supply often is required at a largescale fire incident. Fortunately, at the Sterling Dye fire, units were able to connect to high-pressure hydrants only a block away. An independent water supply system is rarely so available. Flan ahead for long supply line stretches and/or tanker shuttle operations.
- Successful implementation of strategy for fires in mill construction is contingent on prompt calls for additional resources. Make a quick, accurate, complete size-up, then call for help fast.
- Continuing efforts to bring buildings to code compliance and to maintain up-to-date preplans are vital. This is no less true for vacant structures that ire the potential breeding ground for conflagrations. Local Philadelphia
- Hydrants pay the price in areas of high vandalism. This condition should be anticipated and covered in preplanning, noting all functional and out-of-service hydrants. This can save precious time and eliminate the difficulties in repositioning apparatus at the fire scene.
- Use your fire experiences and those of other departments to lobby for stabilized or increased staffing and equipment levels. The Philadelphia Fire Department handled this fire with a swift deployment of considerable personnel and equipment resources. This is empirical evidence for at least maintaining the current staffing levels and support services. However, some departments do not have readily available resources to handle a fire of this magnitude or receive mutual-aid assistance early into the operation. A thorough community risk analysis, defining your department’s current capabilities to protect the community in a worst-case scenario—and defining what resources are needed —is recommended. Municipal and county government officials must understand what is required to increase protection and avert a community disaster.
- The Philadelphia Fire Department’s standard procedure to designate automatically safety and logistics officers and dispatch them to the scene with the second-alarm assignment paid off in this and other incidents. This policy is very useful for maintaining control of an incident in its early stages and taking some of the burden off the 1C, who at this point is implementing and evaluating fireground strategy.
Francis I.. Brannigan, in his book Building Construction for the Fire Service, states, “In fact, slow burning is an advantage only as long as the fire department can maintain inside positions. If the fire cannot be extinguished. the slow-burning characteristic merely prolongs the air pollution” and “Once the fire department is driven from the building, the ‘advantage’ of resistance to collapse.’ which is offered for slow-burning construction. is meaningless.” These statements held true in the Sterling Dye fire.
The potential for large, dangerous, and last-spreading fires in this type of construction is increased when such structures are vacant and subject to abuse over time, often destroying vital protective building features such as fire doors and fire walls. The likelihood of sprinkler system shutdown or disrepair also increases dramatically.
This is not to discourage an aggressive interior attack should it be an option at a fire involving heavy timber construction; rather, it is to remind officers that a complete risk analysis, with life safety as the first priority, is essential before committing firefighters to that strategy.
fire units are responsible for an ongoing survey of large vacant commercial properties to determine the extent of fire code compliance and violations. All fire code violations are reported to the city’s Department of License and Inspections, the enforcing agency on fire code issues. Local fire companies also preplan these target hazard properties; this was done for the Sterling Dye complex and proved quite useful to the incident commander in this operation.
