BY MICHAEL STURM
New York City’s skyline has always been famous for its crowded office buildings and high-rises. On September 11, 2001, one of the most prominent features of that skyline, the World Trade Center (WTC) towers, was taken away by an act of terrorism. Among the emergency responder heroes was the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), whose service during and after the tragedy highlighted FDNY’s important role in nonfire-related emergencies. A series of inquiries and commission-led investigations followed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and led to the promulgation and enactment of several recommendations that were adopted into the New York City Fire Code (FC).
Although the adoption of these recommendations has tremendously bolstered the ability of the FDNY to respond to nonfire emergencies, certain aspects of the FC’s Chapter 4: Emergency Planning and Preparedness, specifically Emergency Action Plans (EAPs), could be improved. Changes including more detailed language regarding EAPs and expanding the EAP requirement beyond Group B occupancies would strengthen the FC’s ability to address nonfire emergencies.
The FDNY is certainly well established as the agency responsible for putting out flames across the five boroughs. Its nonfire emergency responder profile has also risen considerably as the result of many recent unfortunate events. By now, anybody who has not been living under a rock knows the sacrifices made by the FDNY on 9/11 and has seen the department play a substantial role in responding to the attempted Times Square Bombing in 2010. The FDNY is not only a primary responding agency, along with the New York City Police Department, in many nonfire related emergencies, but it is also the lead agency for search and rescue incidents, building collapses, and the like. After the 9/11 attacks, operational advancements were made within the FDNY to strengthen its ability to deal with nonfire emergencies. This article focuses on one particular part of the FC—Section FC 404.3.2, which deals with EAPs.1 By covering the historical context and inclusion of an EAP in the FC, it is possible to fully realize the intent behind it as well as develop well-informed suggestions for its future.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE EAP
Prior to the current FC, which became effective on July 1, 2008, fire safety was solely administered by the fire commissioner through Title 3 of the Rules of the City of New York (RCNY).2 The 9/11 terrorist attacks led to several significant changes, which were ultimately incorporated into the FC, including a required EAP from all high-rise office buildings or Group B classified structures. Some difficulty may arise from looking at various documents from different time periods with regard to high-rise office building classification. The reason for this is that prior to adoption of the 2008 New York City Building Code (BC), high-rise office buildings in RCNY and elsewhere followed the 1968 BC in which they were classified in occupancy Group E.3-4 The EAP, which is essentially a plan for the evacuation of office building occupants in the case of a hazardous material release, an explosion, a natural disaster, or an emergency, is specifically focused on high-rise occupancies, such as the WTC towers or the other more than 1,000 high-rise buildings in New York.
THE AFTERMATH AND THE STUDIES
As we know, on 9/11, two hijacked airliners slammed into the Twin Towers in lower Manhattan, causing them to collapse. Among the emergency responders, the FDNY, who were trained predominantly for unintentional acts, were faced with a new scale of acts deliberately carried out to kill thousands of people.5 Shortly after the attacks, the FDNY retained the consulting firm McKinsey & Company to analyze FDNY response during 9/11 and make recommendations for increasing preparedness for such events. (5, 89) The McKinsey Report was released in August 20026 and suggested several key areas for improving preparedness including operations, planning, management, communications, technology, and support services.7
Under section 2.2 of the report’s recommendations to improve planning and management, a foundation was laid for the development of EAPs that ultimately would appear in the FC. The section titled “Develop and Maintain an FDNY All-Hazards Emergency Response Plan” suggested that the FDNY develop an All-Hazards Emergency Response Plan that included an emergency specific annex addressing terrorism-related incidents as well as other nonfire-related emergencies. (7, 83) The most significant difference between this recommendation made by the McKinsey Report and the EAP described in Chapter 4 of the FC is that the McKinsey Report established standard operating procedures and policies for the FDNY itself to follow (7, 83), whereas the FC EAP is meant for other parties to adopt. Other groups followed the McKinsey Report in advancing FDNY’s preparedness for nonfire emergencies, which were primarily focused on high-rise office buildings.
Around the same time that McKinsey & Company was conducting its investigations to come up with suggestions for improving FDNY emergency operations, the Fire Safety Directors Association of Greater New York (FSDA) was also taking an active role in promoting the advancement of high-rise office building safety.8 On completing an initial EAP for all-hazard emergencies other than fire, the FSDA Task Force joined forces with the FDNY Bureau of Fire Prevention to create the first official draft of an EAP. In 2002, the FSDA provided the City Council and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with testimony in support of enhancing life safety needs in high-rise structures.9 The FSDA supported the passing of NIST’s National Construction Safety Team Act, which authorized NIST to investigate major building failures and the creation of a High-Rise Building Safety Advisory Committee by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). (9) The FSDA convened its own task force to specifically develop plans for emergencies other than fire in high-rise buildings. (9)
In March 2002, the New York City Department of Buildings created a WTC Task Force to review existing building codes, designs, construction, and operating requirements and to determine if modifications were needed to ensure the safety of occupants in new and existing buildings during emergency events.10 Several other city agencies and private organizations convened task forces to investigate emergency preparedness in high-rise office buildings as well. In some cases, public and private-sector groups collaborated to develop plans designed to protect the lives of Group B occupants.
LOCAL GROUPS GET ON BOARD
In April 2003, the Building Owners & Managers Association of Greater New York (BOMA) established its own task force, which communicated with several industry partners including the FDNY, FSDA, Mayor’s Office for People with Disabilities, Department of Homeland Security, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as well as other groups.11 BOMA released its White Paper, which provided guidance for agencies seeking to implement an EAP, in 2004. (11) The BOMA White Paper addressed multiple subjects including total evacuation and sheltering in place.12 Unlike the McKinsey Report, which made recommendations specifically for the FDNY, the various task forces and their reports were developing EAPs for Group B occupancies. Many of the recommendations, however, were very similar. The BOMA report, for example, did not exactly have an annex for every possible nonfire emergency, but it did explore the possibility of several incidents such as explosive devices and chemical biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events. (12, 2, 9-10) The Building Code/WTC Task Force released its findings and recommendations in February 2003.
The task force made 21 recommendations. Number seven on the list suggested the following: “Mandate a full building evacuation plan for nonfire related events.” (10, 21) In explaining this recommendation, the task force stated that while existing fire code requirements for evacuation during fire-related events had proven successful, there was a need to create a separate plan for other emergencies; the task force specifically recommended “… a requirement that all high-rise office buildings [occupancy Group E (currently Group B)] have full evacuation plans for nonfire related events.” (10, 21)
In 2004, the various recommendations for the inclusion of EAPs in building and fire codes were enacted through Local Law 26. (9) This local law articulated all of the concerns of all the different task forces with regard to an EAP in Group B occupancies. It stated that rules should be established for the standards and procedures required for the orderly evacuation of occupants of Group B structures during fire, explosions, CBRN incidents, natural disasters, or other emergencies. The amendment also called for a written EAP with provisions for identifying qualified personnel, conducting drills, and distributing information or instructions to occupants.13 The FDNY incorporated the requirement of an EAP from Group B occupancies in its rules via Rule 6-02, entitled “Office Building Emergency Action Plans,” which became active in 2006. (4) In 2010, RCNY was repealed and repromulgated to coincide with the FC that took effect in 2008. (2) Sections 404.3.2 through 406.2 of the FC deal with subjects relating to the EAP. (1, 92-96)
Most of what is outlined in those sections reflects the recommendations made following the 9/11 attacks on the WTC and elaborates on what was enumerated in Local Law 26. Among the key points of the EAP requirements that are visible in the FC are the following: a written EAP document, designation of qualified EAP staff, a response annex for all types of emergencies, and the conduct of drills among other provisions. (1)
The EAP requirements were designed to meet certain life safety standards. Although fire safety and evacuation plans were still governed by Local Law 5 (9), there was an observed need for plans tailored to nonfire emergencies in the wake of 9/11. Certain aspects of the EAP demonstrated that its architects not only absorbed the lessons learned from investigating the WTC attacks but also exercised foresight into how to avoid future problems with EAPs.
Relevant sections of Chapter 4 of the FC dealing with EAPs put tremendous stress on designating qualified EAP personnel, conducting drills, and subjecting the EAPs to periodic review and revision. (1, 92-96) This indicates a tremendous amount of concern for accountability regarding the implementation of EAPs. The stipulations for drills in Sections 405.3-405.5 of the FC ensure that EAPs will not simply exist on paper but that occupants will participate in simulated events, which amounts to training. (1, 94-95) Such preparation is invaluable for life safety in the event of a nonfire emergency such as active shooter or CBRN incidents.
ENSURING COMPLIANCE AND MAKING CHANGES
The Fire Code Chapter 4’s outline for EAP requirements is presently undergoing a code cycle update. There are three steps that, if taken, would augment the effectiveness of EAPs. The first is to strictly enforce compliance with the FC regarding Chapter 4. For the EAP to be effective in high-rise buildings, it must be in compliance with the requirements set forth in the code. The second step would involve a slight revision of certain portions of the FC. Language is crucial in code development because it could be used by building managers as a means of ignoring some requirements. For example, Section 404.7, which describes a building information card, states that the “commissioner may require by rule the preparation of a building information card.” (1, 93) The problem with this language is that it assigns no authority. If a building information card is intended to be a required part of an EAP, and it should, then the language should reflect that. By simply replacing the word “may” with “shall,” the statement becomes a decree and enforceable. The third step involves a change to Section 404.2.2, which states that EAPs are required in high-rise office buildings. (1, 90)
Although it is understandable that EAPs were designed for these buildings, future tragedies are likely to occur in other occupancies such as hotels and other buildings equipped with two-way voice communications systems similar to a high-rise office structure. This concern has already been expressed by New York City’s theater district owners and employees after the failed Times Square Bombing in 2010.14 Those theater district owners and employees expressed concern about their unfamiliarity with what to do in case of an emergency. (14, 5)
Because of the unpredictable nature of emergencies, planning for them should not be relegated to a particular occupancy. Emergency managers are beginning to understand that to be prepared for some incidents, they must imagine the unimaginable. Across the country, recent active shooters have appeared anywhere from theaters to schools, which do not necessarily fall into the high-rise office building Group B classification. Expanding the requirement of EAPs beyond Group B occupancies may be difficult, and the cost-effectiveness of such a change might be questioned; but the alternative is having another man-made disaster such as the 9/11 or Times Square Bombing occur without the level of emergency preparedness required to meet today’s unique all-hazard challenges as the EAP affords.
Endnotes
1. New York City Fire Department. (2008). New York City Fire Code. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/firecode/2009/fire_code_ll26_2008_amended_ll37_41_64_2009_final_complete.pdf.
2. New York City Fire Department. (2011). NYC Fire Department Rules. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/rules/rules_overview.shtml.
3 New York City Department of Buildings. (2008). Code Compass: Navigating the New Construction Codes. Retrieved from http://www.mzarchitects.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/codecompassfactsheetcc003.pdf.
4. New York City Fire Department. (2006). Title 3 of the Rules of the City of New York: Office Building Emergency Action Plans. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/rcny/rcny_6_02_final_rule.pdf.
5. Scoppetta, N. (2008). Disaster Planning and Preparedness: A Human Story. Social Research, 75(3), 807-814. Retrieved from JSTOR database.
6. Bloomberg, M.R., Kelly, R.W., & Scoppetta, N. (2002). Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, and Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta Release McKinsey and Company Studies of NYPD’s and FDNY’s Responses to World Trade Center Attack. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.b270a4a1d51bb3017bce0ed101c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=nyc_blue_room&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2002b%2Fpr223-02.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.
7. McKinsey & Company. (2002). McKinsey Report: Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/index.shtml.
8. Fire Safety Director’s Association. (2002). Proposed High-Rise Local Law 5 and Building Code. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/pdf/murphey.pdf.
9. Fire Safety Director’s Association. (2012). FSD/EAP Director Overview. Retrieved from http://fsdagreaterny.org/fsdeap-director-overview-2.
10. New York City Department of Buildings. (2003). New York City Department of Buildings World Trade Center Building Code Task Force: Findings and Recommendations. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/pdf/wtcbctf.pdf.
11. Building Owners & Managers Association. (2003). BOMA Facts. Retrieved from http://www.bomany.org/files/public/BOMAFACTS7-14.pdf.
12. Building Owners & Managers Association. (2004). Emergency Action Plan White Paper. Retrieved from http://www.bomany.org/files/public/EAP%20White%20Paper.pdf.
13. New York City Department of Buildings. (2004). Local Law 26. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/bldgs_code/locallaw26of04.pdf.
14 New York State Assembly Subcommittee on Workplace Safety. (2010). Emergency Preparedness in New York City’s Theatre District and its Impact on Workplace Safety. Retrieved from http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/WorkPlaceSafe/20110107/index.pdf.
Emergency managers are beginning to understand that to be prepared for some incidents, they must imagine the unimaginable.
Enter 234 at fireeng.hotims.com
MICHAEL STURM is a special officer at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City. He has a master’s degree in public administration with a concentration in emergency management from John Jay College. He received a bachelor’ s degree in history from Syracuse (NY) University.
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