California: Construction-Site Fire Leads to Over $2-Million Loss

California Construction-Site Fire Leads to Over $2-Million Loss

The early morning chill was not bitter, but the heat radiating from a scrap-wood fire in an old oil drum felt good to the carpenter. Other members of the construction crew were coming and going in the open-framed and partly sheathed apartment complex. The fire in the barrel had burned low. One of the workers reached for a handy two-gallon can of gasoline used to refuel the various motors at the site. As he splashed gasoline from the spout onto the fire, the flame flashed back to the can. Instinctively, the young man tossed the can away from him, splashing the nearby walls and floors with the remaining contents. As he leaped for the door and his exit, the room behind him flashed as the gasoline ignited. It was 7:34 A M., March 12,1985.

Four minutes later the alarm tones sounded for the San Luis Obispo, CA, Fire Department. Twenty-eight of the 45 department members were available for response to the alarm location.

Routine, first-alarm response for the department was made up of two two-man pumpers, a one-man ladder truck, a two-man rescue squad, and a battalion chief. California State Polytechnic University (Cal Poly) responds, by mutual aid agreement, with their pumper, to all structural alarms of fire.

Within a matter of minutes, flames rose 150-feet high from the base of a column of dense black smoke that also rose skyward about 400 feet. It was apparent to Bob Wilkinson, the acting battalion chief responding to the scene, that a large, rapidly accelerating fire was in progress. He transmitted a second alarm, recalling all off-duty personnel and the response of the remaining two engines in the department.

The first-arriving pumper found the access to the complex blocked by workers, vehicles, and a tractor trailer loaded with plaster board. After these vehicles were removed, access was still impossible, as recent rains had turned the unpaved roads into axel-deep impassible mud.

In the center of a horseshoe layout, two 3-story, framed structures, both measuring 120 X 40 feet and both under construction, were in flames. The arriving firefighters noted their exposures. Three twostory 12-unit buildings surrounded the fire structures. In addition, a large recreation building, 90% complete, was located to the south of the blaze.

The firstand second-arriving engines were committed to the south side (#1 side) of the fire. They hand-stretched two 200-foot 3-inch lines to a monitor positioned defensively to protect the exposures. Initial fire suppression efforts were directed at providing protection for the surrounding exposed structures.

Photo courtesy of San Luis Obispo, CA, Fire Department

A third-arriving engine, redirected from a relocation assignment to the fire, took a defensive position at the northwest corner of the site, between exposures 2-1 and 31. Their objective was to protect the medical offices to the west of the complex. Two large-caliber streams were now in a defensive operation protecting exposures and operating from opposite corners of the complex. The telesquirt dispatched from Cal Poly set up an elevated stream on the west side (#2) and directed a stream on the fire over the intervening 2-story building.

With immediate large-caliber streams in place and operating, manpower present was ordered to augment the defensive attack, and an additional monitor was put in service at side #1 to defensively attack building 45. Recalled personnel began arriving and were ordered to stretch a 3-inch line to the center court between the two fire buildings. This line was “wyed” and two 2’/2-inch handlines were also put into defensive/ offensive operation.

Fire Chief George Truppelli arrived and assumed command of the incident. Acting Battalion Chief Wilkinson was then relieved of his command duties and assigned as operations officer and ordered to cover exposures # 1 and #4 (Division 1). A request for a strike team of engine units was made through San Luis Obispo County Fire Department. Engine companies from five communities formed this strike force, which was commanded by a battalion chief from the California Division of Forestry.

Two of the responding units were assigned positions and began defensive/offensive operations within the complex. The additional three engine units were ordered to remain at a nearby staging area.

The combined fire-flow from the attack lines approached 6,000 gpm. The momentum of the fire slowed and then began to reverse. Gradually, portions of the open burning structures darkened down and the fire appeared to be under control.

At this point, a number of 5-gallon propane bottles stored in a trailer near side #4 B.L.E.V.E.’d, sending fire balls into the air that measured 100 feet in diameter. The fire was reversed, however, and declared under control at about 8:30 A.M. Operations and overhaul continued for an additional two hours.

Direct losses were placed at $2.3 million. The indirect loss will raise that figure considerably.

In conducting a critique of operations, several factors emerged that were detrimental to effectively extinguishing the fire:

1. Access to the site via an allweather road was not maintained by the developer. Placement of apparatus and lines was further delayed by parked vehicles and general congestion of the area.
2. At least two of the seven required on-site hydrants were not in service.
3. The presence of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in the trailer east of the fire buildings was not anticipated and not known until it began to B.L.E.V.E.

LESSONS LEARNED

On-site inspections of an irregular frequency by field units would help alleviate the above problems. These inspections and record keeping may have even eliminated the source of ignition in this case.

LESSONS REINFORCED

1. The fire was, tactically speak-
2. ing, a “forgiving” fire, dictating defensive attack and aggressive protection of exposures.
3. The fire occurred at shiftchange, providing extra manpower at the ready and eliminating some of the time lag that accompanies manpower recall.
4. A rapid size up and order for a second alarm had additional logistics “on the road” as soon as possible.
5. The Incident Command System was implemented immediate-
6. An effective size up and initial strategy decisions did not waste time with initial offensive operations.
7. Coordination of mutual aid units. The history of joint training exercises between San Luis Obispo and Cal Poly paid off in smooth fireground interaction between units of each agency.
8. A specifically located command post was established early in the incident, a block away from the fire.
9. ly, and clear strategic objectives for the segmented divisions were given.
10. Early call for public works personnel to cope with extra demands on the water system allowed for effective use of available water supplies. At no point in time did any pump operator report residual pressures of less than 20 psi, even though 6,000 gpm were being drawn from mains during the peak demand period.

SUMMARY

Fortunately, this fire did not result in the loss of lives or serious injuries. The community will continue to feel the impact of lost housing, and the insurance company and owners will absorb the direct financial loss. And, like most other major fires, this fire can be readily labeled as “preventable.”