BY BILL MANNING
SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT: Before beginning this month’s editorial, I am pleased to announced that on Friday, December 15, 2000, Congress appropriated $100 million in fulfillment of the Fire Amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for 2001 (see “Editor’s Opinion,” Fire Engineering, November, 2000). The majority of this money will be used to fund the federal grant program for local fire departments. Congratulations to all those who worked so hard to make this historic legislation a reality.
To date, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has attributed 148 deaths and 525 injuries to catastrophic failure of Firestone tires. NHTSA has documented at least 4,300 complaints about Firestones, most alleging tread separation. The voluntary recall of Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires already reaches near biblical proportions.
It may get worse. NHTSA says a percentage of the reported deaths and injuries involved Firestone tire models not yet on recall. In September, the Agency issued a warning that an additional 1.4 million Firestone tires not under recall had high failure rates and posed a safety threat. And the feds currently are investigating 37 tires made by Firestone and sold under other names. Furthermore, according to a report in the December 20, 2000, issue of The Wall Street Journal, it looks as though NHTSA, at the prompting of Congress, will expand the scope of the investigation.
A review of NHTSA’s database turns up no complaints about Firestone’s big truck tires. However, it has received close to 200 allegations of Firestone light truck tire failures in addition to the thousands of complaints against the larger passenger tires commonly found on SUVs and the like, both of which are used on many ambulances throughout the country. In October, NHTSA opened a separate investigation of certain Firestone light truck tires, including Steeltex R4S and A/T models.
The November 2000 issue of Fire Engineering carried the article, “Firestone Tire Failures: Are You Tempting Fate?” written by Thomas R. MacKay, Jr., a captain with the Sun City West (AZ) Fire Department (SCWFD). In that article, MacKay describes Firestone tire tread separations on two fire department apparatus-a ladder truck en route to an incident and a paramedic ambulance returning to quarters after a call. Both were traveling on highways at highway or near highway speeds. In both incidents, according to MacKay and others in the fire department, the tires failed in a manner consistent with tires included in the Firestone recall: The tread had separated from the sidewall in catastrophic fashion. MacKay goes on to sound an alarm for all fire departments, reaching the conclusion that, based on past history of Firestone recalls and a variety of safety and political factors, it may be wise to err on the side of caution and change to another brand of tires.
Bridgestone/Firestone USA (BFUSA) is “on the case.” On December 6, a professional engineer from Texas named Mark Goodson, who claims to have no ties to the company, sent the following e-mail to the BFUSA home office in Nashville, Tennessee: “You owe it to yourselves to get the November 2000 issue of Fire Engineering magazine. There is an approx. 5 page article that…lambastes your products with sensational speculation and yellow journalism….It is incredible that it could ever get published….No scientific data, no analysis, nothing but ‘feel-good’ nonsense. I suggest that you turn it over to your legal department for review.”
John Miller, a BFUSA employee based in the sales/engineering department in Nashville, responded to Goodson the following day: “We are in possession of the article and have previously inspected the two tires documented in this article. Our inspection by a field engineer found that both tires were the result of road hazards/ impact failures.” A subsequent query to BFUSA’s public relations firm requested, “Please advise on the progress of the rebuttal of the Fire Engineering article.”
Shortly thereafter, I received a letter from Goodson, demanding that I “set the record straight.” I decided to look into the matter further.
The SCWFD ladder truck tire tread separation occurred on June 25, 2000. Fortunately, no one was injured. Members of SCWFD were shocked at the unusual manner of tire failure.
Jeff Dickey, an SCWFD mechanic with 20 years of full-time experience servicing fire trucks, inspected the failed Firestone tire (model 425/65R 22.5-20PR-T839 Radial) the day of the incident. He says, “The whole cap peeled off the tire. It was identical to the pictures on TV [of the recalled Firestones]. It just peeled away from the sidewall. The tire wasn’t new, but it wasn’t beyond its limits.
“I have never seen a truck tire fail like that,” says Dickey. Ray Williams, the SCWFD chief mechanic with 36 years servicing big trucks, concurs.
On September 1, the ambulance tire (model LT225/75R16 M/S, Steeltex Radial 4RS) blew, again, according to Dickey, in identical fashion to the recalled Firestones. “The whole cap shredded off it.” The ambulance tire failure set off the SCWFD Firestone alarm.
Shortly thereafter, SCWFD contacted its insurance provider. It sent a tire engineer to the fire department shops to conduct a battery of field tests on the tires. Although the tests, as potential court evidence, are the insurance provider’s proprietary information and may not be released, Dickey believes they reinforce SCWFD’s contention that the truck and ambulance tires failed in virtually identical fashion to the recalled Firestones.
Williams e-mailed BFUSA on September 13. “Our fire district runs 70% Firestone tires,” he wrote. “In the past months we have had tires separate from the casing, one on our ladder and one on our rescue. We are concerned as to what to do. We transport heart attack and all types of EMS (patients). We are looking for information….” The stock BFUSA response recommended that the fire department take the tires to “an authorized BS/FS dealership” or “contact the bfusa technical staff in the area.”
A week or two after the second Firestone failure, the local news media became interested and carried the story, making it a lead item for a number of days. Fueling the fire were at least two other Firestone tire tread separations experienced by residents of Sun City West about that time. The media coverage drew the attention of BFUSA.
On September 29, BFUSA representatives-two salespersons and a field engineer-met with fire department personnel at the SCWFD apparatus shops.
BFUSA Engineer Ron Snider performed a brief visual inspection of both tires in question. According to Dickey, Snider indicated that he would be unable to make a definitive assessment on the ladder truck tire without bringing it into the lab for tests. But SCWFD’s Williams says BFUSA later refused to take possession of the damaged tires after he insisted that BFUSA furnish a receipt. Snider denies this.
Snider’s field assessment of the damaged ambulance tire, Dickey says, was limited to speculation that it “might have hit a curb.” There were no curbs on the highway along which the ambulance crew (and ladder truck company) experienced the tread separation on September 1.
Furthermore, a fire department memo of June 25, 2000, from the captain of the ladder company that experienced the blowout to SCWFD Fire Chief Robert Biscoe states, “L102 entered the [highway] intersection at an approximate speed of 55 to 60 mph….At the time of the incident, there appeared to be no hazards in the road other than the normal few rocks. No other vehicles using the intersection before or after the ladder seem to experience any tire problems.”
Following visual examination of the tires, the BFUSA representatives made their pitch. “[The saleswoman] said, ‘What will it take for us to put Bridgestones on your vehicles?'” says Dickey. “In my opinion, they were there for three reasons: because there was a lot of media attention on the tire failures; because they wanted to pacify us; and because they wanted us to upgrade to their heavier, better tire.”
Snider says the BFUSA intent was straight-up. But SCWFD was not interested in a deal. As MacKay elaborated in his article, other forces-most prominently, questions about public safety-prevailed. Within a month of the BFUSA site visit, SCWFD changed over its entire fleet to another tire manufacturer.
Two months after BFUSA’s site visit to Sun City West, Snider changed his original assessment of the failed SCWFD ladder truck tire. In a November 28 e-mail to BFUSA Nashville, he reports, “[the] appearance of the [ladder truck] tire suggested a tread impact and run flat damage” and the ambulance tire “exhibited signs of failure due to impact/road hazard.”
SCWFD vehemently disagrees. “For him to make a connection like that [that the ladder truck tire failed from tread impact and run flat damage] baffles me,” says Dickey. “How can Firestone make a determination on a 50,000-pound vehicle driving 60 miles per hour that had a blowout-tread separation and drove on a flat tire for 500 yards, just from a quick visual inspection? You have to take it to the lab.” Dickey also disagrees with the assessment of the ambulance tire.
More about the site visit doesn’t add up. Snider said, in a telephone interview, that he “did not take a close look at the inside of the ladder truck tire because it still was on the truck.” Yet SCWFD reports the tire in question was taken off the truck the day of the failure and the ladder truck was back in service more than a month before BFUSA representatives visited SCWFD.
However, BFUSA’s Miller stands by Snider’s analysis. “It’s obvious when you have an impact break,” Miller contends. Determining tire failures through visual inspection, he says, is routine. “We do it all the time,” says Miller.
BFUSA thinks the firefighters are overreacting. Snider says he is unaware of one case in which Firestone big truck tires failed in a manner similar or identical to the recalled passenger tires. SCWFD’s reaction, he says, “came from the recall, from the media hype, and it blew out of proportion from there.”
“Out of proportion,” that is, unless it’s your truck tires that are failing in suspicious fashion-not one, but two, about a month apart.
Still, the evidence against Firestone’s big truck tires, in recall terms, is wafer thin. Our own informal polling of periodicals serving the trucking industry uncovered no concern. One industry consultant, Peggy Fisher, tire and wheel editor for Heavy Duty Trucking magazine, believes that, with respect to the Firestone recall, BFUSA is simply a victim of “brass-knuckles” media treatment and that improper tire maintenance is the real culprit.
As for SCWFD, tire pressures and general wear are checked every day and at every shift change. It is mandatory department practice. The ladder truck tire had 16,714 miles on it at the time of tread separation; its tread depth, according to the insurance engineer, was 7/32 inch. The tire was due for replacement in six months from the time of the incident. The ambulance tire likewise was well within legal safety limits, also 7/32 inch. Maintenance-wise, they were safe when they rolled out on the days of the incidents, says Dickey. “We are very safety conscious in these shops.”
In a broader sense, Fisher’s “poor Firestone” lament doesn’t float given that-albeit in the face of federal and public pressure (and only in the face of federal and public pressure)-BFUSA has voluntarily recalled at least 6.5 million tires and has admitted that the adhesive used to mount the tread to the tire carcass in the three recalled tires is subpar, and possibly the cause of the Firestone passenger tire failures.
Firestone is an old hand at “the politics of recall.” A search on the NHTSA site reveals that, since the early 1970s, there have been 114 recalls of Firestone tires. That number dwarfs recalls during the same period for Goodyear and Michelin, for example. To gain some perspective, we printed out the NHTSA tire recalls list for each of these three manufacturers: Michelin’s measured less than 1/32 inch thick; Goodyear’s, 5/32 inch; and Firestone’s, 14/32 inch.
In an October broadcast of the segment, “Hush Money?” on CBS’s 60 Minutes II, Dan Rather reported, “Investigation into the Firestone crisis reveals that although many people, including families of victims and their lawyers, knew about the alleged defect in Firestone’s tires, the truth was kept quiet by a series of secrecy agreements signed as part of the company’s legal settlements….[P]laintiffs’ lawyers say for years Firestone has been sealing documents that relate directly to safety issues. For example, a document from [a law suit] shows that more than 1,400 tires made at a Firestone plant in Wilson, N.C., were returned by consumers in 1992-eight years before the company recall-because of belt separations or suspected belt separations.”
Although BFUSA denies knowledge of any case nationwide in which Firestone big truck tires experienced tread separation failure-including the SCWFD ladder tire failure-Fire Engineering found otherwise.
On September 20, 2000, Chief David Klitsch of the Lake Harmony (PA) Fire Company was driving his heavy rescue apparatus along a straight stretch of interstate highway in Upstate New York when, as he writes, “All of a sudden the steering wheel began to shake, then the front end, then I saw, out of the corner of my eye, pieces flying off the truck on the right side. It took every effort to keep the unit on the road….The Firestone tire [tread] had separated ….If I had been rounding a curve, there is no doubt in my mind [the apparatus] would have rolled over.”
Klitsch’s right front tire was a Firestone T520 radial with about 7,000 miles on it and a tread depth of 8/32 inch. After the failure, he and a state trooper checked the road for potholes or debris and found none. The apparatus had been in an apparatus repair shop for rear body work on the day of the incident. The tire pressure was not checked prior to Klitsch’s taking possession of the truck, but both Klitsch and the shop mechanic say they made a thorough inspection of the entire vehicle, including the tires, and that they were not short on air.
The incident drew local media attention in Pennsylvania. In response, BFUSA dispatched a regional technical service manager to examine the tire. He concluded that the tire had failed due to tread separation. BFUSA reimbursed the fire department for the lost tire and damage to the apparatus.
Klitsch said afterward, “When I saw the photos of the [SCWFD ladder apparatus] tire in [the November Fire Engineering] article, I thought I was looking at our own failed tire-yes, absolutely.”
There are other warning signs.
In the Pinion Pines (AZ) Fire District in late September, Chief Joe Jackson, driving his department’s Ford 350 quick-attack vehicle, experienced a catastrophic failure of a Firestone Steeltex radial LT235/85/R16M/S tire. The tire had about 2,000 miles on it. Jackson believes it was a tread separation failure identical to the Firestone recalls.
Jackson took the tread strips to a local Firestone tire dealer, who refused to admit the possibility of a tread separation. Jackson, dissatisfied with his Firestones even before the incident, is switching to another brand.
The Palmetto Richland Memorial Children Hospital in Columbia, South Carolina, specializes in the transport and treatment of the critically ill, in particular, infants and children. Its paramedic ambulance transport service covers 16 counties within the state.
Fran Byrd is the manager of transport services for the hospital. She told Fire Engineering that in early 2000, before the public outcry and Firestone recall, hospital ambulance personnel experienced two separate incidences of Firestone tire tread separation failure. Both failures involved Firestone Steeltex LT225/75R16 tires, which are part of the Ford E450 Super Duty Chassis standard ambulance package.
On February 17, 2000, an ambulance unit was traveling on a highway en route to a neonatal pickup when the left front tire suddenly went flat. The driver stopped the vehicle without incident and changed the tire. Examination of the tire revealed tread separation. Byrd contacted her ambulance mechanic, who confirmed that the ambulance had been in the shop for a scheduled maintenance check on February 4. Tire pressure and wear were checked at this time. Because the hospital runs primarily interstate highway transport, tire life is gauged by tread, not miles. According to the mechanic, the tire tread depth was satisfactory.
Byrd changed the unit’s front tires over to another brand. She still had the Steeltex Firestones on the rear.
On April 7, 2000, the same ambulance unit was transporting a premature baby via highway to another medical center closer to his home, when, as stated in the hospital report, “Approximately 15 miles from the receiving facility, the passenger side, right rear tire experienced a tread separation and threw a major portion of the tread, peeling back the reinforced wheelwell casing and tearing a hole in the base of the patient compartment squad bench. The EMT maintained control of the vehicle….Upon inspection, he contacted the receiving neonatal intensive care nursery to request backup support for completion of the transport.”
This second tread separation aroused Byrd’s suspicion. She contacted the U.S. Department of Transportation, receiving and completing a standard incident report questionnaire. Byrd never heard back from DOT.
The apparatus manufacturer changed the four rear tires to match the tires on the front. Byrd is gradually replacing her Firestones. She believes the tires failed in the manner of the recalled Firestones.
Similarly, in September 2000, a Douglas (AZ) Fire Department ambulance, running Code 3 with a patient in the unit, experienced a tread separation of an inside rear Firestone, model LT225/75R16 Steeltex R4S-the standard tire for the Ford E350 ambulance package. The department’s EMS response covers about 1,200 square miles, so its ambulances log considerable highway miles.
Bob Grainger, an apparatus engineer as well as the fire department’s apparatus supervisor, says that even though the tread separated, the tire stayed inflated, but notes that the ambulance driver had a very difficult time maintaining control of the vehicle. Says Grainger, “We were lucky. If that tire had been on the front, we’d have been in a real bad situation. There’s no doubt in my mind we would have lost the ambulance, and maybe our personnel and the patient as well.”
He has since pulled all Firestones off the department’s ambulances. “It’s tough, though,” Grainger says. “It takes a lot to convince the powers that be that we need to spend the money on a changeout of tires that aren’t on recall.”
Are these isolated incidents, anomalies? There does not appear to be enough hard evidence to push the panic button. Not yet.
But there is enough evidence for suspicion. The incidents were very real to the firefighters in Sun City West, to Chief Klitsch from Pennsylvania, to Chief Jackson from Pinion Pines, Arizona, to members of the Douglas (AZ) Fire Department, and to the staff and patients in Columbia, South Carolina. The incidents were very real to the residents of those communities. That is enough to place fire departments on alert.
NHTSA’s expanding investigation and the examples cited in this article should be motivation enough to conduct a serious analysis of tires mounted on your smaller vehicles-your ambulances, chief’s rigs, quick attack vehicles, and support units. The ambulance and light truck tire failures experienced in Sun City, Pinion Pines, Douglas, and Columbia all carried the name Firestone Steeltex. In all these cases, sustained highway driving was the norm. In three of the four, hot roads may have been a factor.
The Firestone track record shows you can’t wait for the manufacturer to step up to the plate in the interest of public safety. They’re playing “The Recall Game,” a game of public denials and disinformation, sealed court transcripts, and statistical computations of product cost and sales vs. the cost of human lives.
So now, more than ever, fire departments must be vigilant and proactive about the tire issue and apparatus safety in general. Firestones are by no means the only tires that have ever failed, but it’s clear that the fire service must take whatever steps necessary to minimize a potential that jeopardizes public safety.
The job’s dangerous enough without having to worry that you may be riding on disasters waiting to happen.
