On Tuesday, April 3, 2001, Eden Fire Company No. 1 in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, encountered an incident personnel had feared would occur for more than a decade. A gasoline tanker overturned on a limited-access highway interchange ramp and burst into flames. Free-flowing burning product threatened dozens of townhouses and residents in the middle of the night. Quick fire department response and favorable incident circumstances helped avert a disaster.
THE SCENE
The incident occurred on an interchange ramp from U.S. Route 30 east to U.S. Route 222 north in Manheim Township. U.S. Route 30 is the primary east/west transportation corridor through Lancaster County and carries nearly 100,000 vehicles daily. U.S. Route 222 is the primary limited access north/south corridor that leads to and from the heavily traveled Pennsylvania turnpike. The highway was built in the 1960s and was modified in 1999.
Bordering the ramp is the Grandview Chase townhouse complex, built in 1990. The townhouses are of wood-frame construction. Each townhouse building is made up of between six and 12 three-bedroom units. Most are two stories with a loft or attic; others have basements.
The ramp on which the accident occurred is no stranger to tractor trailer rollover incidents. Dozens of trucks have overturned while attempting to negotiate the ramp curve. Some truck drivers have died, and some trucks and their contents have completely rolled down the embankment. The most hazardous incident was in 1984, when a truck loaded with isopropyl alcohol overturned, spilling its contents down the hillside. But that was before the townhouse complex was built.
Construction of the townhouses concerned local fire officials, considering the past history of the interchange ramp. Even after the ramp was reconfigured in 1999 during a major highway reconstruction project, trucks continued to overturn.
THE INCIDENT
Shortly after 0400 hours on April 3, a tanker carrying 8,500 gallons of gasoline exited U.S. Route 30 east onto U.S. Route 222 north. The truck was exceeding the posted speed limit of 35 mph and failed to negotiate the curve. It overturned on the ramp onto its passenger side. The trailer breached (the tank compartments failed from the impact of overturning), and its contents ignited. The ignition source was undetermined. Burning fuel raced down the ramp hillside toward the Grandview Chase townhouse complex. More burning fuel was traveling along the natural slope of the interchange ramp and into a storm water drain in the median that separates the northbound Route 222 on ramp and Route 222 south off ramp. The drain empties both on the north side of the ramp into an open storm water basin and into a swale on the south side of the ramp that separates townhouse buildings on Delancy Place, Melrose Lane, and Federal Way.
INITIAL SIZE-UP AND ASSIGNMENTS
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I reside in an adjoining neighborhood and was awakened by explosions (from vapors igniting from the breached tank). As Eden Fire Company’s deputy chief, I prepared to respond when the dispatch was made for a dwelling fire at 121 Delancy Place at 0409 hours. The dwelling assignment called for an engine and truck from Eden, two engines from Southern Manheim Township, and an ambulance from Manheim Township. I arrived 45 seconds after the dispatch and assumed command. I confirmed a working truck fire with residential townhouse exposures and immediately called for a second alarm and the county foam task force at 0410 hours. I established the command post at the base of the hillside near the townhouses. Eden Fire Chief J. Michael Roten arrived shortly after I did and began working with the Manheim Township Police Department to ensure all residents were evacuated from four buildings as a precaution. The driver of the truck was at the bottom of the hill. Fortunately, when his truck overturned, its windshield broke out and he was able to escape. He suffered only minor injuries and was able to confirm the contents of the trailer: 8,500 gallons of gasoline.
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I instructed Eden Battalion Chief Rick Harrison to respond to the ramp to perform size-up-I could not determine if other vehicles were involved from my position, since the ramp was elevated.
I sent one arriving engine to the northeast side of the incident for size-up and mitigation on the ramp and another engine to Federal Way because the burning fuel was rapidly following the swale and exposing the townhouses to radiant heat. Two engines covered the exposures that were experiencing extreme radiant heat. A ladder supplied by an engine positioned on side 1 of Federal Way Building 8 and trained a water curtain to the roofs of the Federal Way and Delancy Place buildings.
On the ramp, Harrison reported that no exposures or other vehicles were involved and that he would need no other resources. The material was burning, and there was no possibility of confining the spilled burning material.
SECOND ALARM
The second alarm brought four engines, two trucks, two rescues, two air units as well as the foam task force (a foam truck, a tanker, an engine, and the county hazardous materials team).
An engine positioned at the dead end of Delancy Place to control the easterly spread of the hillside fire toward another townhouse and wooded areas. All other units were sent to staging. Incoming firefighters replaced firefighters on the initial lines.
INCIDENT STABILIZATION
By 0430 hours, the situation was stabilized. The spilled product was being consumed, and the townhouses were being protected from the radiant heat. Although most of the fuel was being consumed, the efforts to control the fire spread through the swale area between the Federal Way, Melrose Lane, and Delancy Place townhouses left a gasoline sheen on the runoff water. Personnel used a foam blanket to suppress the gasoline vapors. In all, approximately 100 gallons of AFFF concentrate were used, applied using handlines with foam nozzles. The haz-mat team placed booms along the swale that divided the townhouses to absorb any product and built dikes constructed of earth.
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
For nearly an hour and a half, crews concentrated water streams on the exposed townhouses. By 0600 hours, after we allowed the tanker to burn uninhibited, the radiant heat being emitted was no longer a threat to the townhouses. After checking each affected townhouse unit with an air monitor for lower explosive limits and a thermal imaging camera for heat concentration, we permitted evacuated residents to return to their homes at 0619 hours. Some fire units were released, and the incident was placed under control at 0709 hours. By 0900 hours, the tanker had all but burned itself out. Hot spots still remained in the tractor and in the tires.
RECOVERY
A cleanup contractor with heavy equipment arrived at 1000 hours. After the police department completed its accident investigation, a front end loader worked to remove the truck remains. Portions of the trailer had melted to the ground; however, the remains were displaced with virtually no damage to the roadway. Representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) coordinated remediation of the gasoline-contaminated earth with the cleanup contractor. Because the gasoline was left to burn, there was little earth to remove for recycling-only five dump truck loads, according to the cleanup contractor reports.
The elevation of the ramp reduced the radiant heat. Because the truck overturned and stayed on the ramp, which is elevated to about the roof-eave level of the townhouse buildings, the exposures were not subjected to the full degree of intense radiant heat being generated by the burning gasoline. The Delancy Place building is only 58 feet from the base of the ramp hillside. This townhouse building suffered superficial damage to vinyl siding as well as some damage to electric utilities and central air units but no structural damage, and most residents were able to reoccupy their homes without special provisions. Had the trailer fire been at ground level, the townhouses certainly would have been destroyed.
Representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PADOT) arrived and evaluated the road surface. Transportation officials feared that ramp sections would have to be replaced, which could close the ramp for one to two months. However, after lengthy evaluation, PADOT determined that damage was minimal and that it would not prohibit traffic from traveling over it. After extinguishing hot spots of the tractor and tires, the fire department left the scene at 1232 hours. The ramp, however, remained closed until 2016 hours.
FACTORS FOR SUCCESS
The incident had potential for a great life and structure loss. Luckily, many circumstances turned the incident into a success story.
Incident size-up. The IC’s quick size-up, with the immediate priority to evacuate residents and protect exposures, prevented a large structure and life loss.
Quick response. The quick response by first-alarm companies prevented the fire from igniting the townhouses. The second alarm was requested only a minute after the first alarm was sounded.
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The truck did not roll down the embankment. The situation would have been far more dangerous had the trailer or its parts gone over the embankment, as so many have done before. I have no doubt that had the truck gone down the embankment, we would have lost at least three townhouse buildings and dozens of lives.
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The location of the storm drain channeled the burning fuel. The close location of the storm drain presented a challenge to the responders. However, the natural channeling of the burning fuel through this medium limited the materials’ dispersal and the threat to exposures. Although the burning material in this area contributed to the exterior damage to the townhouses, it provided firefighters with an identifiable confinement area. The burning material was stopped just 13 feet from side 4 of the Federal Way building and 23 feet from side 2 of the Delancy Place building.
The contents burned. Perhaps one of the most important factors was that the material burned. Had the tank breached and unburned products spilled down the hillside toward and possibly into the townhouses, we would have had a more volatile situation. The 8,500 gallons of unburned gasoline racing down the hill toward the townhouses would have encountered numerous ignition sources, since each townhouse had a central air unit in the rear.
The incident was dispatched to the townhouse complex. This fortunate circumstance initiated the response to the townhouse area. Had the incident been dispatched to the interchange, apparatus-including mine-would have responded onto the highway. This would have delayed the initial incident size-up and the immediate request for assistance. It may have also delayed the immediate protection of the townhouses, resulting in their ignition.
Incident command system. This incident proved the value of maintaining a structured incident command system. Each sector was under the direction of a chargeable officer. Each officer gave the incident commander periodic updates on exposure protection and the hazards presented by the ramp storm water drain.
Because of the nature, time, and location of the incident, the media pressed for information on the incident and how it would affect motorists. As at all major incidents, the media was aggressive in getting information. We had two pubic information officers to give updates on the accident investigation, detour information, and exposure control efforts.
Safety of the residents and the firefighters was a primary concern, as it should be. Our designated safety officer kept a careful eye on personnel protecting the exposures, who were positioned between the tanker fire and the townhouses. He limited nonessential personnel within the exposure area. He also coordinated with the haz-mat team the air monitoring for lower explosive limits outside and inside the townhouses and recommended foaming the swale area between the townhouse buildings.
LESSONS LEARNED
No matter how well an incident seems to have progressed, there are always lessons to be learned. Some of our lessons include the following:
Let it burn or extinguish. In some cases, letting a fire burn itself out is the best course of action. Although this decision may be unpopular at times, reasons for letting a fire burn may range from environmental impact to lack of resources to control and sustain suppression. In this case, after the exposures were protected, the fire basically was of little concern. The product was being consumed rather than absorbed into the ground. The burning fuel was not going anywhere except to the drain, where its spread was then confined. Efforts to extinguish the fire would have placed firefighters at risk from additional runoff as well as spillover of the product from the breached container.
Preincident surveying. Preincident surveying is perhaps the most critical lesson. Do not overlook the importance of surveying highway hazards (see my article “Preincident Surveying for Highway Hazards” in the February 1998 issue). Limited-access highways pose a significant threat not just to motorists but to surrounding exposures. Identifying natural topography and man-made conduits can significantly impact the incident. Understanding runoff and where a material may collect or travel beyond the initial incident boundaries is critical. Whether the material is burning or not, it still can affect exposures.
Water supply. Determining existing and alternate water supplies may be critical to the incident’s outcome. Although the tanker itself was not extinguished, exposure control required a consistent water supply. Fortunately, in this instance, a municipal water system was nearby.
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Access. Determining alternate access is also important. Because of the interchange’s history of tractor trailer rollovers, the local fire companies knew auxiliary access points to the ramp. This is a critical factor for disseminating immediate and specific instructions to incoming apparatus.
Information sharing. One of the most important components of preincident surveys is sharing the information. If company officers and mutual-aid departments are not provided with and trained to utilize the information that the host company is referencing for tactical operations, it could hamper efforts. During the response of mutual-aid resources, many units were unfamiliar with the residential address. Nearly all of the second-alarm companies requested cross streets and directions-over the radio and on the fireground frequency. This not only consumed too much air time but also prevented me as the IC from giving and receiving instructions and reports. At one point I had to instruct apparatus to switch to another frequency for directions.
Mutual-aid companies must maintain such information on their apparatus. After checking Eden’s records, we found that we had provided maps and narrative directions to all of the second-alarm companies except one two years prior to the incident. The companies simply did not prepare a “run” book of our first-due area.
HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF
Although this ramp has been prone to tractor trailer incidents since it was built, the contents and hazards associated with past incidents were not significant and posed little threat even after the townhouses were built. As recently as 1999, PADOT, recognizing the hazards of the ramp, “improved” the ramp to prevent such occurrences. Improvements included realigning the ramp so that vehicles had to decelerate to maneuver it, adding rumble strips, and installing warning signs. However, since those improvements were made, four tractor trailers, including the one highlighted in this article, have overturned.
During the planning phase for this reconstruction in 1994, fire officials petitioned PADOT and local municipal officials for special controlled access points to improve their ability to respond to incidents. Fire officials also requested that special water supply mediums be installed to improve their ability to supply water to the limited-access highway without using too many resources and to ensure a consistent water supply. The water supply mediums included dry hydrants as well as through-the-barrier standpipes. The local municipality did not support these requests, and PADOT denied them.
This incident was the second fiery tractor trailer crash in the area since 1997. The 1997 incident occurred during the reconstruction project. Fire officials documented how the lack of access and water supply mediums affected the incident and were confident that this would convince the municipal and transportation officials to install these mediums. Again, the fire service’s request was denied.
In October 1999, fire officials again were involved in the planning of the next phase of the reconstruction project. Fire officials, citing the 1997 incident, again insisted on specific water supply mediums including a dry standpipe. They sent letters to elected officials as well as the county local emergency planning committee. However, without support from the local municipality, their words fell on deaf ears.
ERIC G. BACHMAN, a 19-year veteran of the fire service, is deputy chief and the former chief of the Eden Volunteer Fire/Rescue Department in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He is the hazardous materials administrator for the County of Lancaster Emergency Management Agency and public information officer for the Local Emergency Planning Committee of Lancaster County. He has an associate’s degree in fire science and certification in emergency management through the state of Pennsylvania. He is also a volunteer firefighter with the Manheim (PA) Fire Department.
