On a clear March evening, the Seattle (WA) Fire Department responded to a report of fire near a University District marina (photo 1). Initially dispatched as a 4RED (two engines, one truck, and one battalion chief), the responding units reported seeing heavy fire visible from blocks away. Engine 22 (E22) reported the following (while a block out):
ALSO
- Inspection and Preplanning of Marine Facilities
- Fireboat Use for Water Supply at Structure Fires
- Let’s Talk Fireboats
“Dispatch from E22, this is the high-rise boat storage. It’s fully involved. There’s an exposure to the main building to the north as well.”
With multiple units arriving at the same time, Battalion 6 (B6) established Northlake Command and began giving initial assignments. The boat storage structure was well off the main access road and behind locked gates with obscured visibility as to the full extent of the fire. There was a large, attached building in front of the burning boat storage, and it appeared the fire had spread to that structure. B6 gave the following report:
“Dispatch, Battalion 6 is at location establishing Northlake Command. This is a multiple 2½-inch fire, escalating. Go ahead and give me … let’s make it a 2-11.”
Initial progress was delayed as rigs navigated the driveways into the boat storage area and numerous locked gates, just to gain access. Once inside the gates, E17 gave the following report:
“Command from E17, the fire is already into the exposure building; recommend that you have the next two units start getting a line through the front door.”
Because of the challenging access issues, some delay occurred in giving accurate reports. B6 next relayed the following:
“Dispatch from Command, this looks like it’s gotta be at least a dozen or more boats in a high-rise, with a high-rise boat storage, that’s extending to a metal warehouse adjacent to it. We’re going to force our way into the building and try and get handlines in there to protect the structure and we’re also …. Stand by, we’re gonna decide the best way to get water down there.”
Initial Attack
With the challenges associated with a large body of fire, difficult access, and distant water supply, command had to make quick decisions on a few key areas:
- Extent of the fire spread into the adjacent structure and whether interior attack should proceed.
- Recognition of the dangerous fire load (fiberglass, fuels) stacked in a lightweight structure.
- Need for significant water supply, with hydrants a block or more away.
- Placement of lines to best attack a multi-tiered boat storage with a heavy fire load and collapse potential.
- Crew accountability, given the presence of water on three sides of the dock and limited space to work.
Extent of Fire Spread
Command ordered Ladder 9 (L9) to force the access gate on the D side and position the apparatus in coordination with E22 for ladder pipe operations. L9 Team Alpha continued down the D-side driveway, along with E9, and forced a man and roll-up door, allowing access to the structure (photo 2).
E9 extended a 2½-inch attack line into the structure and encountered fire entering the warehouse from the burning boat storage area. They successfully knocked down the fire and were able to position their line with direct access to the burning boats through an open roll-up door. This quick positioning would prove critical to keeping the fire from advancing to the interior of the main buildings and allowing additional attack lines to take up positions on either side of the burning boat storage (photo 3). A second ladder pipe was set up on the B side of the incident by L8 and E34, who were on a hydrant.
(1) The Seattle (WA) Fire Department responded to a report of fire near a University District marina. (Photos by John Odegard.)
Multiple Points of Attack
One of the key challenges to formulating a fire attack was the location of the burning boats and accurate size-up information. It was unclear, in initial views of the incident, that this fire was heavily involved in multilevel boat storage racks contained in two separate side-by-side structures. The fire started toward the middle of the D-side rack and quickly accelerated because of highly flammable boat materials and the open-air flow path. At one point, crews had fires burning on both sides of the attack line because of autoexposure from radiant heat and highly flammable fiberglass (photo 4). Once this was determined, the tactical decisions of getting lines into the proper place became clearer.
The deputy chief of operations (DEP1) arrived and assumed command of the incident, enabling divisions to be formed closer to the action. He reported as follows:
“Deputy 1 is at the command post. Incident is escalating. Multiple large stream appliance fire.”
With the fire now extinguished on the interior of the main building, the focus became a four-sided attack of the side-by-side boat storage. Over the course of the operation, the following were used to extinguish the fire:
- A/Interior: E9 with assistance from L9 Team Alpha.
- D Side: E17 and E22, Ladder pipe E22/L9 Team Bravo.
- B Side: E2, E21, E34, Ladder pipe E34/L8.
- C/Water Side: E4 (fireboat).
- D Division: B6.
- B Division: B4.
With alternating hose streams from the various sides, in conjunction with the ladder pipes, the fire was knocked down and prevented from further extension into the main structure. Crews focused on the burning boats closest to the structure and moved toward the water. The final extinguishment came from Chief Seattle, the fireboat, which blanketed the pile of boats with water and foam. Handline crews were moved back to allow the heavy streams that flowed for an estimated five to 10 minutes. This alternating of the positioned handlines and fireboat streams would occur four times as pockets of fire were attacked and debris was opened up. The foam applied from the boat would ultimately tap the fire (photo 5).
Water Supply
Early recognition by command that water supply needed to be prioritized was critical to the successful outcome of this incident. A Water Group was established, headed by B2, and proved crucial to the large supply of water that was needed for multiple handlines and ladder pipes. Credit goes, however, to multiple engine companies staging on distant hydrants to help facilitate the relay without being given specific direction. Given the challenging location of the building and difficulties in accurately determining the full extent of the fire, command’s attention was focused on those issues. The quick establishment of a sufficient relay operation benefited greatly from these engines doing the right thing.
Lessons Learned
Delayed reports are going to happen. Don’t give out bad information just to fill out the checklist. The challenging location of the structure on fire had a significant impact on the radio reports, assignments, and ultimate tactical outcomes. That should be expected and factored into any reasonable plans, standard operating procedures, or tactical worksheets. The fireground is not a training session, intellectual exercise, or simulation. In the calm of an air-conditioned office or training room, we can work toward solid plans that form a baseline for our operations. Those plans can further be vetted on the drill court, training tower, and acquired structures, but those aren’t the fireground with all its variables, complexities, and challenges. Those with expectations, especially of fire department leadership, need to be reminded of this and reminded again.
Radio transmissions and updates may be delayed while crews are forcing access, navigating challenging pathways, or even locating the fire. The need for good information is critical but only when what is being transmitted is factual. Giving reports to fill out a preordained checklist of how the fire or incident is supposed to happen will just lead to bad information that needs to be corrected.
This incident was a good example of the information that was known being transmitted in a timely and understandable way. That was critical given the complex location and nature of the fire.
A 360º survey may be difficult and partial. Just let everyone know what has been observed and accomplished. Seeing all sides of the incident is a basic skill. It should be prioritized whenever possible and the results factored into overall tactical decisions. There are always exceptions to a rapid 360º survey, such as an imminent rescue or large structures that take up a block or more. Many times in Seattle, because of so many structures built on hills, a 360 had to be accomplished from two 180º views because you couldn’t get around the sides.
This fire presented another challenge in that access was difficult, the footprint was enormous, and the escalating nature of the fire made quick action essential. A true 360º report was not done initially, but all the necessary pieces were in place. Included in these was a very good description of what crews were doing and assignments by the incident commander (IC).
Focus on what needs to be done immediately or nothing else we do will matter. The 360 is an important skill and should be addressed as soon as possible. There are fires, and this is one of them, where a full and accurate 360 will need to be relegated to later in the event as primary issues are resolved. It is of critical importance that communications on the radio accurately reflect what is being done, what is known, and any changes that occur.
Relying on trusted people is essential. Not all crew configurations are created equal, and risk/benefit may fluctuate based on who is assigned and their experience/competence level. Experienced ICs know that crew configuration matters—who is working that day, the experience level of specific crews, and who will be running the fire.
During my career, I checked the roster every shift to see which chiefs were working, who was on the crews of the rigs in my area, and where the gaps existed. I wanted to know because experience and reputation matter. That may not be popular, but it is the truth.
More than one of the officers who led the fight on this fire identified the quality of leadership on particular engines and ladders as influencing the level of fire attack that was authorized. The confidence in the officer’s decision-making ability, experience, and communication from the point of attack allowed the IC to make an offensive attack on the fire. The level of trust was evident in all my conversations with the IC. More than one witness to the fire was incredulous that the enormous fire they witnessed was stopped and did not destroy the attached warehouse. That opinion is supported by the citizen-recorded video at the following link and in the digital version of this article (video by Daniel Seliger).
It is imperative that you know your people and adjust your strategic and tactical decisions accordingly. Some days, you will have to be more conservative, given the experience level or competence quotient of the arriving crews. For those responding, I hope this serves as a wake-up call and source of motivation to be viewed as the type of officer/firefighter that your leadership would see as competent and trustworthy. Those two elements were present in abundance at this fire and responsible for its successful outcomes.
(2) Initial forcible entry allowed handlines to attack the fire in the main structure before focusing on boat storage.
(3) Ladder pipes were set up with relay water supply in support.
(4) Multiple, coordinated points of attack were crucial in getting to all sides of this rapidly moving fire.
(5) The fireboat Chief Seattle supplied the knockout punch with heavy foam application.
The Hazards of Fiberglass Boat Fires
By Richard Milligan
Fiberglass boats have always been a popular choice for commercial and recreational boaters, making them very common in all areas of the United States and abroad. Despite their advantages, fiberglass boats pose specific hazards, particularly concerning the potential for fires. Understanding the risks associated with fiberglass boat fires is critical for firefighters responding to these incidents. Here, we will discuss some of the hazards of fires aboard these vessels and preventive measures to minimize the risks to firefighters.
Hazards
High heat and rapid fire spread. Fiberglass is a highly combustible material that can ignite easily and release toxic fumes when burning. Once a fire starts on a fiberglass boat, it can spread swiftly, engulfing the entire vessel and other vessels in the immediate area within minutes. The compact and confined spaces of boats further complicate the fire’s spread, making it challenging for firefighters to reach the seat of the fire for extinguishment.
Toxic smoke and fumes. Burning fiberglass releases toxic smoke and fumes including styrene, acetone, and phosgene that can be harmful to surrounding bystanders as well as firefighting crews. Inhalation of these toxic substances can lead to respiratory problems, dizziness, loss of consciousness, and even death.
Limited escape routes. Boats typically have limited escape routes compared to other structures, which makes evacuating during a fire emergency more challenging. Passengers on a boat may find themselves trapped without a clear path to safety, increasing the risk of injuries or fatalities. This also puts firefighters fighting these types of fires in greater danger than the typical structure fire we are all used to.
Common causes of fiberglass boat fires. Many boats on the water are in a state of repair, as well as being lived in by owners. The causes of onboard fires are vast. Faulty wiring, overloaded circuits, and damaged electrical components are common causes of boat fires. These issues can lead to sparks or short circuits that ignite flammable materials onboard, including fiberglass.
Boats often carry fuel for propulsion, cooking, and other onboard equipment. Fuel leaks can occur from damaged fuel lines, loose connections, and faulty tanks, leading to the potential for fires if the fuel contacts an ignition source.
Improper storage and handling of flammable materials. Since most boats are in a constant state of repair, they may be storing flammable substances such as gasoline, oil, and cleaning agents. Inadequate storage or careless handling of these materials can result in accidental fires.
Extinguishment
For extinguishment of fiberglass boat fires whether on the water or in storage, a rapid assessment and risk/benefit analysis for boat fires are the keys to a successful outcome. Get a good picture of what is on fire—perform a 360º survey. This can be difficult with boats on the water or in storage, but the big picture is needed.
Ensure all firefighting crews working on or near the water are properly equipped with personal flotation devices and firefighting gear.
If other boats in the area are at risk and can be safely moved from the area, this is a good tactic to reduce the exposure risk and minimize property loss.
Think large water or foam operations early. Use of foam has shown to be a best practice in mitigating these types of emergencies. Effective foam application will adhere to the vertical surfaces more readily than water, and the blanket helps smother any resulting fuel spill fires. Foam should be deployed early in the incident. Firefighting foams are more environmentally friendly than the products of combustion produced by burning vessels.
Fiberglass boat fires can lead to devastating consequences, including injuries, loss of life, and property damage. Understanding the hazards associated with fiberglass boats and taking proper measures such as prefire planning on boat construction and layout familiarization can significantly reduce the risk of injuries to personnel fighting fires on these vessels.
Richard Milligan retired after a 30-year career as a driver/EMT with the Seattle (WA) Fire Department, where he worked on the marine technical firefighting unit housed in the harbor island marine area. He is also a long-time instructor for various fire subjects as well as first aid and CPR/AED. He was a volunteer fire captain for Black Lake Fire prior to a merger when he ran and won a position as a commissioner for Thurston Fire District 9.
(6) High-pile storage and highly flammable fiberglass boats created a fast-moving and dangerous hazard zone.
Water supply is essential—Water Group. The early recognition that this was going to be a difficult location to get an adequate water supply was crucial to the successful extinguishment of this fire. This insight may be old news to those of you who deal with limited water supply areas all the time, but know that Seattle is not one of those. The Tolt and Cedar Rivers supply the city with a robust water supply, and Seattle firefighters typically find a hydrant at every corner and midblock. It is easy to take that for granted, and we have had some fires that clearly showed a training deficit in low water supply situations. This fire exemplified the steady training that has been done, mostly by committed street firefighters, to improve that area of our game.
The determination that the closest hydrants were a block or more away resulted in the establishment of a Water Group. The focused tasking of these resources resulted in a difficult water supply becoming a nonissue with a relay occurring from multiple apparatus. The successful operation made water supply from the fireboat unnecessary. Engine companies took it on their own initiative to prestage at hydrants distant from the actual fire—a nice synergy of good decision making and solid training.
Collapse zones. High-pile stock in any configuration should be a red flag when involved in fire. High-pile stock that consists of racks of fiberglass boats filled with who knows what else inside, all on racks of varying strength and design, should be a red flag on steroids. (See the sidebar “The Hazards of Fiberglass Boat Fires” by Richard Milligan for more on the challenging fire load.) Collapse should be anticipated and planned for.
Crews need to be continuously reminded that, in the heat of the battle, a tendency to get in too close or get tunnel vision can easily occur. Good leadership by company officers and team leaders was essential in this dangerous fire. The assignment of divisions also enabled crews to focus on their assignment with clear direction from a central source.
Although collapse zones were not specifically defined or announced at this fire, they were adhered to. Emphasizing the creation and transmission of these zones was identified as a point of future improvement (photo 6).
Good radio communication essential. An excellent series of coordinated communications made the ultimate extinguishment of this fire happen. The clearly articulated strategy of attacking the initial structure, and successful extinguishment of that part of the fire, was critical to the positioning that occurred on the boat rack storage. Clear and concise instructions on where water attack lines would be flowing, confirmation of water supply from multiple sources, and the backing off of handlines to allow the ladder pipes and fireboat to attack the fire were essential. In the heat of the battle, operations occurring on different sides of building or fire can often work against each other or even prove deadly. The fireboat was throwing 5,500 gallons per minute onto a heavily involved, multi-tiered, flaming pile of molten fiberglass—all on a dock surrounded by water with foam making the surface area very slippery. Communicating the necessary pullback by other attack lines was an exemplary way of ensuring all pieces of the attack were executed in a coordinated manner.
Mike Gagliano is a captain (ret.) with more than 33 years of fire/crash/rescue experience with the Seattle (WA) Fire Department and the United States Air Force. He teaches across the country on fireground tactics/decision making, air management, leadership, and company officer development. He has written numerous fire service articles and is co-author of the bestselling books Air Management for the Fire Service and Challenges of the Firefighter Marriage. He is a member of the Fire Engineering/FDIC Advisory Board and the Firefighter Air Coalition and the Emeritus Board of the Firefighter Safety Research Institute. Gagliano co-hosts the popular Fire Engineering radio webcast “The Mikey G and Mikey D Show” and partners with his wife Anne (Firelife.com) to teach on strategies for developing and maintaining a strong marriage/family.
