The sound of air horns and radio transmissions initiating the transition from an offensive to a defensive firefighting strategy is not the sound of defeat; it is a deliberate strategic maneuver to limit the damage being done to the smallest area possible. This transition should not be a haphazard, leave-equipment-behind, free-for-all to get out of the building. When it is time to pull the plug on an offensive operation, command must aim for a safe, protocol-driven transition designed to limit the time lag between getting everyone out and the onset of defensive-oriented tactics. First, let’s look at transition cues and then address the steps of initiating, preparing for, and executing that transition.
Recognizing Cue-Driven, Pre-Evacuation Activities
If your experience with radar, visual observation, and radio reports tells you that a strategic shift may be warranted, you, as the incident commander (IC), must prepare to set up your fireground for this transition. If you do it right, the last thing you will do is a building evacuation; you will have set up most, if not all, of your defensive operation beforehand. This is the ideal and it does not always happen this way, but it is what an IC should be striving for if a defensive shift is forecast. The following cues may guide an IC in the proper direction.
RELATED FIREFIGHTER TRAINING
- Viscuso and Terpak: Transitioning from Offensive to Defensive
- Angione: SWITCHING FROM OFFENSIVE TO DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
- Initial Company Operations and Considerations for Defensive Attacks
Cues for Strategy Change
Seat of Fire Not Found in a Timely Manner
If we can’t find the fire, it is getting bigger. It may also be eating away at the building’s structural integrity. Things can get ugly quickly. Take a hard look at the smoke. How violent or angry is it? Is it pushing hard? That is an indicator of excessive heat and potential for rapid fire development. Usually, the more violently the smoke is pushing out without ignition, the deeper the fire is in the structure. Make no mistake—it will eventually find ways to vent and show itself, potentially overrunning personnel trying to escape through those same exits. The question is, if the life hazard profile has already been secured and we can’t find the fire, would we rather have it find us?
Worsening Fire/Smoke Conditions Despite Water Application
Unless the first hoseline pulled was too small for the size of the fire, the fire should show signs of diminishing once water is applied. If it is not, something is wrong. Maybe that first-floor fire is a belowgrade fire. Maybe the fire in this building extended from that seemingly unattached structure in the rear. Maybe this is an arson fire and multiple fires were set. Command is responsible to react accordingly when the expected attack outcome does not happen.
Often, I have relied on my interior and roof division commanders to give me information that confirms my suspicions that we are not going to knock this one down right away. The fact that they are in the thick of it might give me a better insight into my hunches. Although, as the IC, it is ultimately your responsibility and decision, using the eyes and experience on the scene can reinforce your thinking (photos 1-2).
(1) Placing trustworthy “eyes-on, hands-off” people in the areas that command does not directly control plays a big part in determining the strategy and in deciding to modify it, too. (Photos by Ron Jeffers unless otherwise noted.)
(2) Even though I could see from the command post that companies were putting water on the fire, I could also see that fire was breaking through the roof in many different areas at once. It was time for withdrawal.
Forcible Entry Difficulty
If something is blocking your access to the building, the problem is getting worse. Primary access problems make secondary egress all the more difficult.
Ventilation Difficulty
Command must know immediately about any delay in support operations to evaluate whether to commit personnel further or to pull them out.
Water Supply Concerns
When you have committed companies to an interior attack, the only protection they may have is a sustained water supply. Pump operators must be trained to notify command immediately on recognizing any water supply issues so companies can have the best chance of evacuating while the apparatus tank still provides limited protection.
Discovery of Lightweight Construction
The discovery of lightweight construction is not necessarily a cue for strategy change. Once identified, it should be a priority of command to immediately ascertain if fire has entered the voids. If it has, it is time to change strategy in the area of involvement, which might mean abandoning the whole building if there are no defendable spaces or withdrawal from the involved part of a larger complex. Do not wait for the fire to confirm the presence of lightweight construction by collapsing; it has cost countless firefighter lives.
Indicators of Rapid Fire Development
Smoke is fuel waiting for someone to make a mistake. Become a reader of smoke and train your personnel to do the same, since their reports will assist in your decision making. Be alert for angry smoke or projectile-vomiting smoke. Firefighters inside a structure will not see this cue, although they might feel it. Pressure means heat. Find the seat, cool it down, and make the building behave through proper and coordinated ventilation. If this does not work, change the plan (photo 3).
(3) This is some really angry smoke. Command must recognize the pressure and heat that are driving this and react accordingly.
Structural Compromise Indicators
Buildings on fire do not last forever. All personnel must be alert for indicators of structural compromise and report them to command without delay. The use of an urgent transmission is required when reporting structural compromise indicators. A timely urgent can prevent a Mayday.
Operations That Eat Up Personnel (Tough Rescue)
When first-alarm companies have to be committed for a rescue, think of what is not getting done. Who does forcible entry? Who searches the interior for people who can’t get to the windows? Who does ventilation? If the engine is involved in the rescue, who is going to put water on the fire? The ripple effect of our inability to complete and coordinate other aspects of the required fire attack and support often allows the fire to get an upper hand. There are no time-outs called by the fire.
Hazardous Discoveries
This may be information that is not presented initially but becomes part of the incident as companies enter, recon the building, and discover them. Hazardous materials, bombs, drug labs, and major structural deficiencies are all issues that may lead to a quick change in strategy. Never take any surprise lightly.
Fires in Attached Buildings with Any of the Above Concerns
Attached buildings present a larger fire problem simply because there is more real estate to burn. Fires in these buildings often find common voids (cockloft, shafts, poke-throughs, and so forth) in which to spread from structure to structure. If you are losing a handle on the original building, hopefully you already have resources in the adjacent exposures to keep the fire where it is so you don’t have to chase it down the block. It is okay to lose one building. Losing more than one when you could have avoided it through proper and timely dispersal of the troops at hand is just unwarranted.
Fireground Experience or Gut Feelings
Don’t ever rule out the gut feeling that comes about as a by-product of experience and recognition-primed decision making (RPDM). If things feel like they are going wrong, they probably are. If you change the strategy, no one says you can’t change it back after knocking down an unruly body of fire from the exterior.
We had a fire that was blowing out of two second-floor windows on the A-D corner of a corner building. The first lines were stretched inside and the companies, because of some renovations and sloppy housekeeping, were having trouble accessing the fire. Remember that two red flag situations addressed above were (1) the inability to find the seat of the fire and (2) things getting worse even though water is being applied. These rules applied here.
Things were not getting better as they should have, especially with a venting fire. I saw the attack team’s stream hit a window on the A side, but it was obviously not in the fire room. My radio direction that they were in the wrong room did not solve the issue. The fire was soon showing from an additional window on the D side and the window next to that was showing heavy smoke. I was not comfortable with what I was seeing, and my gut was to knock it down from outside before it got worse and possibly outflanked the attack team and searchers.
In this case, I could see things they couldn’t see. I went with my gut feeling, withdrew the companies temporarily, moved the roof division firefighters to the other side of the roof, and opened up a deck gun on the fire. While this was happening, I regrouped the attack with fresh crews and an additional line. We shut down the big guns, let the building settle for a few minutes, then went back in and finished the job. It was the right decision (photo 4).
The decision to change strategy is always more critical during offensive operations because personnel are inside the building. Don’t waffle over it or let your ego get in the way. The fire does not care about ego or emotion. Get a second opinion from subordinates in areas you can’t see if you have time. If you did not pay attention to the aforementioned cues, you may not have time. It is still your decision, no matter how many people you get involved in it.
(4) Heavy fire on the A side that spread to the D side was compounded by renovations. It precipitated a temporary withdrawal and use of a master stream to knock this fire down. Once this was accomplished, companies entered to finish extinguishment.
Strategic Transition Steps
These are actions that I have found to be essential for a smooth offensive-to-defensive transition.
Assign a Transition Coordinator
Command should delegate the responsibility for setting up the defensive positions and helping organize the revised action plan. For command to do both (run the fire operation/withdrawal and the defensive setup) is a multitasking job that may not be smooth or successful. Assigning a responsible chief to this strategic modification operation will pay great dividends in proactive preparation and allow the IC to continue to command the current operation.
Strike Additional Alarms Early
The people fighting the fire should not be the same people who set up the defensive operation; this should come from your tactical reserve. To expect the people already in the game to set up the defensive positions is an invitation to injury. If you are forecasting correctly, you might be setting up your defensive positions over the radio to incoming companies while your personnel are continuing the firefight in the fire building. Any time you must conduct a major adjustment on the fireground, you better have people to do it.
Establish Additional Water Supplies/Set Up Master Streams
Master stream operations require water—a lot of it. To try to transition to a defensive, exterior, stream-driven operation, you cannot use the same water supply that was used to fight the interior fire, at least not initially. You will need that water supply to protect exiting crews and exposure operations.
I always tried to stay one water supply ahead of my operation. If I was using one, I would be setting up for two. If I was using two, I would set up a third, and so on. The use of manifolds will allow you to secure additional water from remote mains that the initial operation is not using. Stealing water is unacceptable. Bringing in water for master streams is manifold use at its most beneficial (photo 5).
(5) Here, a manifold is supplying additional defensive streams and is supplied from a hydrant remote from the manifold’s location. When you need more water and can’t fit more engines, think manifolds.
Set Up Divisions
Expanded operations require expanding everything—water supplies, apparatus, personnel, and especially fireground organization. To keep the span of control within manageable (safe) ranges absolutely requires additional chief officers operating as exterior division supervisors and inside the exposures. Additional alarm assignments should call for the response of additional chief officers to ensure a proper organizational balance.
Consider Additional Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)and Safety Officers
Expanded area operations require additional layers of support. A safety division comprised of a safety division commander overseeing geographically positioned subordinate safety officers is required. The same should apply to the RIT. This is especially true in large area structures where it would be difficult for a RIT positioned at the command post to access remote areas of the fireground. For example, a RIT positioned on the C side of the building would report to the C Division supervisor. The larger the building, the more RITs are required. Again, large operations require large support organizations.
Sound the Building Evacuation
Building evacuation must be a policy-driven activity. Alerts must be broadcast over the radio using a specific tone that is distinct from any other tone being used on the fireground. The air horns are fine and should be used, but they can be mistaken for arriving apparatus or not heard at all, depending on how big the structure is. It is too uncertain. Dedicated command-ordered radio transmissions are best for fireground evacuations.
Command must be specific in the evacuation message. If you only want to evacuate the fire building, then make sure you announce that personnel in the exposures should hold their positions. Using air horns exclusively will cause all the operating personnel to evacuate all the operating positions. The last thing you want is a large-scale evacuation that causes you to lose the strategic positions you have established to confine the fire to just one building. Additionally, if it has not been established beforehand, command must ensure all companies report to the command cost after evacuating the structure.
Conduct a Personnel Accountability Report (PAR)
No outside stream operation should be conducted without ensuring all personnel are confirmed out of the structure and accounted for. Conduct PARs through assigned division commanders. Command boards must be updated and personnel reassigned. If you do not know where your people are, it is tough to reassign anyone.
Establish Collapse Zones
Remember that collapse zones include anything that can come down including trees, utility poles, and especially power lines. Power lines can come down for an entire block. Be especially cautious of this—and diligent. Companies tend to do the “collapse zone creep,” which often insidiously moves them into the collapse zone. Guard against this (photo 6).
(6) The stone façade atop this multiple dwelling iis reinforced by steel rods embedded into the roof. If the roof goes, it is likely the façade will go. Command must know about this. (Photo by author.)
Announce Strategic Change/Initiate Defensive Tactics
Before opening any defensive streams, ensure all personnel are out of the building and the collapse zone and that all companies are ready for defensive duties. This may require another PAR. Here, again, it might be best to conduct the PAR using the defensively positioned Division supervisors to ascertain readiness. Once everyone is clear, announce to dispatch that defensive operations are commencing (photo 7).
(7) Release the hounds!
Strategic change that is haphazardly conducted without an obvious plan indicates that the fireground organization was probably not under control before the change was required. Failure to control any part of the fireground during any part of the firefight is unacceptable and can only lead to bad things happening. The steps of strategic change should be part of a strategic transition standard operating procedure that spells out the who, what, when, where, why, and how of changing a fireground from one strategic mode to another. There must be no surprises or unplanned activities during this potentially lethal and usually dangerous operation.
ANTHONY AVILLO retired as deputy chief, North Hudson (NJ) Regional Fire and Rescue, after serving 34 years in the fire service. He is the director of the Monmouth County (NJ) Fire Academy. He is the author of Fireground Strategies (2015) and co-author of Full Contact Leadership (2017). He is a member of the Fire Engineering Editorial Advisory Board. He was the recipient of the 2012 IFSFI George D. Post Instructor of the Year Award. He has a B.S. degree in fire science and an M.S. degree in national security studies.
