OIL WELL EXPLOSION
BY CURT TAYLOR AND MICHAEL C. WAITS
On October 24, 1998, at approximately 1351 hours, 911 received a call reporting an explosion on an oil well location south of Bryceland, Louisiana. At that time, a column of smoke could be seen 20 miles away with flames visible up to two miles. Immediately, 911 dispatched several ambulances, the North Bienville Parish Fire Protection District (NBPFPD), and several sheriff`s deputies.
The first to arrive on the scene at 1402 hours, Chief Curt Taylor of the NBPFPD saw a workover rig (see box, page 78) fully engulfed in flames. Multiple pieces of equipment on the site were also in flames. Several men were standing at the access road, just north of the well. When approaching the men, he noticed that they all had sustained burns ranging from minor to third degree. He immediately called dispatch, assumed command, and requested a minimum of five ambulances for ground transport and a helicopter for one severely burned victim. He then triaged the patients and administered first aid to the most severely burned victims until additional personnel arrived.
At this time, he was told by workers that six men were left on the location and were most likely dead. As firefighters and first responders started arriving, Taylor set up a temporary command post, 1,000 feet from the well location, at the intersection of Quarles Road and the well location access road. Within minutes, all responding agencies gathered at the command post and started planning and gathering vital resources. From this post, all communications, logistics, and staging command were handled.
REMOVING THE PATIENTS
By 1408 hours, two engines, two tankers, one rescue truck, 30 volunteer firefighters, and several sheriff`s deputies were on the scene. At that time, Taylor turned the patients over to the first responders and approached the well area to determine the locations and condition of the six missing workers and the extent of the fire. From his position, Taylor could see several burned bodies, but the intense heat and dense smoke made it impossible to locate all the missing workers.
The fire was confined to the well location. Because of its remote location and the absence of exposures, all emphasis remained on treating and packing the patients for transport. All nonessential personnel and equipment were staged at the intersection of Quarles Road and Louisiana Highway 516, one-quarter mile south of the well location.
At approximately 1415 hours, the first ambulance arrived, and the paramedics started advanced life support protocols on the most critically burned patient. The four other ambulances were dispatched from Shreveport, 65 miles away; Monroe, 75 miles away; and Ringgold, 20 miles away. Their arrival times were staggered from between 1420 hours and 1450 hours.
Sheriff`s deputies and firefighters set up a landing zone for the incoming helicopter 300 feet from the command post on Quarles Road. At 1439 hours, Life Air Rescue arrived from Shreveport. After eight minutes on the ground, paramedics were able to stabilize the patient enough to airlift him to Louisiana State University Burn Center (LSUBC) in Shreveport, where he died that night. By 1450 hours, all five patients had been transported to LSUBC or Lincoln General Hospital in Ruston. At this time, emphasis was placed on searching for possible survivors left on the location and attempting to bring the fire under control.
SEARCH AND FIREFIGHT
While the patients were being treated and packaged for transport, several firefighters approached the pipeline to the south of the well location, checking the perimeter. When the explosion occurred, it blew several joints of tubing out of the well and through the worker rig. These joints of tubing landed approximately 400 feet southwest of the location on the pipeline. When they came crashing into the ground, they ripped down power lines and struck a pipeline riser, igniting the escaping gas and causing additional problems. The team`s leader had oil field experience; once he determined the direction of flow through the line, the team located the nearest valve and closed it, extinguishing the fire at this remote location.
At 1457 hours, Taylor, two company officials, and four firefighters–all donning full personal protective equipment and self-contained breathing apparatus–approached the well location from the south side, gaining access along a pipeline adjacent to the location. The group was divided into two teams; each would do a quick sweep of the location to find the six workers left on the location and possibly to shut down the flow of natural gas. Without having to approach the workover rig, it was confirmed that all six of the workers were dead. Extinguishment of the well now became the top priority.
WELL EXTINGUISHMENT
The first team, consisting of two company officials and one firefighter, carrying CO2 dry powder extinguishers, was to approach the rig and attempt to close one of several valves located on the “Christmas tree” (a set of high-pressure valves and blowout preventors that are stacked on top of each other and have a line protruding at a 90-degree angle) at the base of the rig. The second team, consisting of three firefighters, with a backup line, would serve as a safety team and stand by 25 yards from the rig. A second safety team–three firefighters suited up and ready for action if needed and with a charged safety line–was 50 yards from the rig. Before the teams walked on the location, however, Taylor noticed seven 55-gallon drums (later determined to contain methanol) at the base of the rig. They were being impinged by flames.
He immediately ordered all teams to back away to a safe location until the contents of the drums could be identified. Since the drums were exposed to extreme heat and were starting to deform, all personnel and equipment were relocated 1,000 feet from the location to a safe zone just past the command post until a new plan of action was formulated.
At 1545 hours, the Louisiana State Police hazardous materials team arrived and assumed joint command with the NBPFPD. In Louisiana, the State Police is in charge of all hazardous-materials incidents. After a quick briefing, the State Police haz-mat team and several firefighters accessed the north end of the location by way of the main access road. By this time, all secondary fires had burned out, and responders had a better view of the rig and entire location. The haz-mat team and Taylor surveyed the location, attempting to determine how to deal with the drums of methanol, assess the condition of the remaining tubing jammed in the snubbing unit (a hydraulic ram that places piping into the well–see “The Workover Rig” on page 78) and the possibility of its rocketing out, and ascertaining the stability of the rig and its potential for collapse. From here, the firefighters were able to remove one of the bodies, but the other five were so close to the rig and methanol that they could not be approached. The valves were found to be jammed with pieces of tubing and could not be used to shut off the flow of gas.
By 1600 hours, officials with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Louisiana State Police, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Health Investigation Board, and the Occupational Safety and Health Investigation Board had arrived and had begun to assess the scene with the incident commanders. Along with the dense smoke and gas released by the fire, salt water that had been pumped into the well was being blown out and running off the location into the surrounding forest. Officials with the responding environmental agencies were concerned about pollution and the contamination of the forest and its water systems. Other agencies were already trying to start their investigation into what may have caused the explosion.
At 1800 hours, Wild Well Control of Houston, Texas, arrived. After a quick briefing by the State Police, Taylor, and company officials, the location was surveyed again. It was agreed that at this time all equipment that could be moved would be cleared from the well location area and that the scene would be prepared for the long process of fire extinguishment. The clearance operation included also cleaning the land to the south of the location so that equipment could be staged there; digging a reservoir pit to catch all contaminated runoff from the location; and starting the water supply.
[We usually have 10,000 gallons of water available on first response, and we can usually sustain a 2,400-gallon-per-minute waterflow for 212 hours. We have 30,000-plus gallons of water on wheels at any given time. In this case, however, it was too risky to put water on the fire initially, given the presence of the drums containing methanol (the contents and number of drums varies with the type of work in progress at the time of the accident) and the fact that the source of energy to the well had not been cut off. Moreover, once a rig has been burning for some time, you don`t know the depth of the metal fatigue of the rig and what the result will be when it is hit by cold water.]
At 2100 hours, Wild Well personnel and contractors started bringing equipment to the scene. Two large bulldozers arrived first and were immediately used to start clearing a small lot next to the temporary command center. Within an hour, the land was leveled, and a small trailer house that would serve as a permanent command post was moved in. Next, the bulldozers cleared a 10-acre block of timber south of the well location so that specialized equipment could be stored there. Finally, the bulldozers dug a reservoir pit southeast of the well location.
At 2130 hours, the derrick, weakened by the intense heat, collapsed, making access to the Christmas tree more difficult. Once the lot to the south of the well location was cleared, high-flow water pumps with 2,000-gallon-per-minute monitors were brought in along with 20 tanks, each filled with 30,000 gallons of water. In addition, three 8,400-gallon tanks were on the location and used as a reserve source for the pumps and monitors. The monitors were set up around the rig. Approximately 25 hours after the explosion, crews started pumping water onto the workover rig, snubbing unit, and Christmas tree. After several hours of cooling all structures and checking for stability, Wild Well crews cooled the methanol drums and removed them from the location.
BODY RECOVERY
At 1615 hours on October 25, four Wild Well employees and NBPFPD firefighters were able to approach the Christmas tree under the protection of a water curtain provided by the monitors and remove the five bodies. The process took one hour and 40 minutes because of the extreme heat, the victims` location, and the fact that several heavy pieces of equipment could not be moved. The victims were tagged and sent to the morgue for identification.
KILLING THE WELL
Wild Well crews started positioning equipment in the well area and prepared to kill the well. On October 26, Wild Well crews approached the Christmas tree, attached high-pressure hoselines into the outer casing, opened the high-pressure valve, and left the location. The other end of the hoseline was attached to a specialized positive displacement pumping unit operated by Halliburton Energy Service crews. Once the lines were hooked into the Christmas tree and everyone had cleared the area, the Halliburton crew started pumping cement and drilling a mud mixture into the Christmas tree with up to 10,000 pounds of pressure. This was almost twice the pressure coming out of the well, and it stopped the flow of gas. The cement and mud mixture was pumped for one hour and 45 minutes at a rate of 24,360 gallons an hour.
Approximately 49 hours after the explosion, the well was extinguished and killed–at 1421 hours on October 26. However, it was still considered dangerous until the cement had time to set, which would take approximately 24 hours.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Among the lessons learned and reinforced at this incident are the following:
It is important to implement an incident command system immediately. This allows all responding departments, agencies, and company officials to know who is in charge and what is being done. Within minutes, a temporary command post was established 1,000 feet from the well location; it later was turned into a permanent command post. Also, having a centralized location for all information and data allowed questions to be answered quickly and actions to be expedited.
We also learned the importance of staging, which allowed the incident commander to control the number of personnel and amount of equipment on the scene. Keeping the scene clear of nonessential equipment allowed ambulances to approach the patients quickly and leave without having to avoid crowded roads and personnel standing near them. The staging area was first established a quarter mile to the south, at the intersection of Quarles Road and Louisiana Highway 516, and then moved to an abandoned well location to the north, one-half mile away.
Critical incident stress debriefing is very important in any mass-casualty incident. Triaging patients who have third-degree burns over 100 percent of their bodies and who are still alert and coherent is very hard on anyone. Also, performing body recovery on severely charred bodies proved to be extremely difficult for our younger firefighters. Fortunately, the Shreveport Fire Department has several terrific counselors who volunteered to come and debrief our volunteer firefighters.
Large incidents such as this one can happen in any fire district. Preplanning is necessary, as is having on hand a list of all resources that could be used. Resources should be called early in the incident so that actions can be taken quickly and safely.
We were fortunate to have a State Police haz-mat team that was eager to work with us. The team`s knowledge of these types of scenes across the state proved to be a great asset.
Lawyers are needed for litigation after the incident, but they should not be at the command level while attempts to control the incident are in progress.
Company officials should be allowed on the scene for as long as their knowledge and cooperation are needed; when their presence begins to interfere with the emergency processes, they should be asked to leave.
Quickly controlling access to the scene and requiring all personnel entering the area to be cleared by command helped to keep the scene clear of nonessential traffic and personnel. Requiring that all personnel entering and leaving sign in and out helped maintain a tightly controlled scene.
Having a large number of handheld radios allowed the fire district to distribute radios to all key personnel. Using a different frequency for every division and master radios in the command post and for team leaders allowed for good communications with ease of assignments. Extra batteries and rechargers kept communications flowing without interruptions.
As in certain haz-mat incidents, the “go slow approach” on well fires is essential. Hasty, heroic actions may result in dead heroes. Complex operations demand a well-thought-out methodical approach, continual size-up, and reevaluation. Well fires require that you determine if the pressure is dropping or building. You don`t know what the well will do next. Safety of on-scene personnel is paramount.
Never attack a well fire without redundant safety factors built into your operation.
Even though you have enough water to sustain an initial attack, you cannot always use it in a raging well fire. The source of energy to the well must be cut off, you must make sure no barrels of chemicals are on or near the fire site, and you must be aware that metal fatigue can cause a burning rig to collapse when hit by cold water.
This was one of the worst oil field accidents in the continental United States–resulting in the death of seven employees and critical injuries to five. All responding agencies were still investigating this incident at the time this article was prepared.
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(Left) The rig top bent over at the bottom basket above the snubbing unit and fell to the left. Seven 55-gallon drums of methanol and three workers were under the twisted metal at the base of the rig. (Right) The truck and trailer (right of photo) burned. A pickup truck also burned.
The Workover Rig
A workover rig is a scaled-down version of a drilling rig. The rigs finish putting flow tubing and packing into a well and remove and replace old or defective tubing from an existing well. Most of the time, these processes are done under extremely high pressures. The rig is brought in and placed beside the well head and Christmas tree–a set of high-pressure valves and blowout preventors that are stacked on top of each other and have a line protruding at a 90-degree angle. The flow line leaves the Christmas tree just below the top valve and extends about three feet with a high-pressure valve on the end. This is the line used to remove product from the well.
At the time of the incident, this particular rig was putting flow tubing into a freshly drilled natural gas well 9,500 feet deep, and against 4,800 pounds of pressure. When the workover rig is used to put tubing into a well against high pressure, a special device, called a “snubbing unit,” is needed. This unit is set up like a large hydraulic press with two powerful clamps. The bottom clamp is stationary; the top clamp moves up and down. The top clamp grips the pipe and pushes it down into the well. When it reaches the bottom, the bottom clamp grips the tubing and releases, and the process continues. Usually, seven men work on the rig itself: five on the platform just above the Christmas tree and two halfway up on the rig on a second platform. n
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Fire is all around the lower basket holding five workers. Two workers were on a platform above, about halfway up the rig.
CURT TAYLOR has been chief of the North Bienville Parish (LA) Fire Protection District for 10 years and a volunteer firefighter for 27 years. Among his certifications are Hazardous Materials Technician, Firefighter III, Instructor II, and EMT. He has had many years of experience with heavy equipment operation, oil field operations, oil field fires, well blowouts, and tank battery fires. He established command at the scene of this fire and maintained joint command with the State Police until the fire was brought under control.
MICHAEL C. WAITS has been a volunteer firefighter for six years and a career firefighter with the Shreveport (LA) Fire Department for one year. He is a certified Firefighter II, Instructor II, and EMT and has a master`s degree in biological science from Louisiana Tech University.
