SHIFTING GEARS TO DEFENSIVE MODE

SHIFTING GEARS TO DEFENSIVE MODE

BY DONALD W. STUKEY

The decision to shift to a defensive mode may be the most important decision a fireground officer will ever make. As firefighters, we hate to give up. By nature, we seem to be a competitive and dedicated group of people. However, we must recognize when it`s time to get out.

The fire service has had a long tradition of aggressive interior firefighting. However, you always must weigh the risk vs. gain factor at a fire. As the scales shift during an incident to extreme risk for very little gain, the incident commander must consider shifting gears to defensive mode.

DECISION TIME

You must recognize, consider, and act on numerous factors to achieve a safe, effective operation. Your knowledge and ability to think clearly under stressful conditions are your most important pieces of safety equipment.

The decision to shift to defensive mode can vary–from a decision made by the first-arriving officer in a matter of seconds to a very calculated decision made by your department`s highest-ranking officers. All ranks–the rookie firefighter on the inside, the IC outside, and the company officer acting as a liaison between the two–must think about the factors involved in interior fire attack. All members also must be aware of the importance of time on the fireground. It is easy to lose your perception of time during firefighting operations. Some departments transmit the incident time every 10 minutes, for example, for this reason. It also is important for the IC to project the time it will take for companies to implement strategy (with reasonable expectations)–this factors into decision making and strategy shifts as well.

Consider the effect the following factors will have on your decision to switch to defensive mode (they are in chronological order as you leave the fire station, not in order of importance):

Weather conditions. Adverse weather conditions may cost you in terms of response time. During rainy or foggy weather, you may have difficulty finding the involved structure due to low-hanging smoke conditions. Hot, dry, or windy weather may accelerate or push your fire.

Available manpower. The experience and qualifications of your crew, the number of firefighters on your crew, or the size of the first alarm can influence your strategy. Do members on the scene know SOPs, and have they carried them out? If not, this also will cost you time.

Incident location/occupancy. Normal response times, how many resources arrive in acceptable times, types of occupanices in the area, life hazard (who is present, what are they doing, and at what time of day), construction, possible haz mats present, and water supply are some of the considerations.

Lightweight wood construction. Across the country, lightweight construction (wood trusses, I-beams) in residential and commercial buildings has made our job more dangerous than ever. Lightweight supporting members are being used for roof and floor construction. These buildings burn quicker and collapse earlier. You must be aware of the dangers of lightweight construction and act accordingly. Defensive mode may be appropriate much earlier during a fire in a building with lightweight construction than during fires in other buildings.

In the past 20 years, thousands of homes have been built with gang-nail truss roofs. These roofs sometimes support concrete tile that weighs 1,000 pounds per 100 square feet. Under attic fire conditions, the roof and ceilings will come down very early.

Modern two-story minimalls can be extremely dangerous. A working fire on the first floor can quickly expose the lightweight flooring of the second floor. The weight of storage above the fire will cause early collapse.

Buildings damaged by earthquake, windstorm, hurricane, or previous fire. In Los Angeles, since the Northridge Earthquake, the condition of damaged buildings has factored into–and accelerated–our decision to shift to defensive mode. Hundreds of abandoned, damaged buildings, which have become inhabited by the homeless, can be found throughout the city. At a recent abandoned house fire in Los Angeles, more than 100 homeless people had to be rescued. It has been said that “a building on fire is a building under demolition.” In the case of these earthquake-damaged buildings, Mother Nature has sped up the process.

Your initial mental size-up. You`ll encounter many small pieces of the incident scene that you must quickly evaluate and act on appropriately. The volume of fire is an obvious indicator. A more subtle indication is the information the smoke provides. Look at the smoke–it is the fire talking to you. Quickly analyze it, paying close attention to location, volume, color, pressure, and level (how close it is to the floor and how fast it banks down). This will help you predict the fire`s behavior. Ask yourself, What do I have now, and what will I have in 10 minutes? This may be when you decide to switch to defensive mode.

Spotting apparatus. Experienced fire and apparatus officers routinely spot for “the Big One.” Whenever possible, this is always a good practice. Consider aerial operations, ladderpipe, deck gun, placement of additional responding resources, and the possibility of building collapse. Remember, for every 250 gpm used to control the fire, you are delivering a ton of water per minute into a fire- or earthquake-damaged building.

Making an effective difference. There is always a delay between the time you arrive on the scene and the time you make an effective attack on the fire. By most standards, an effective attack is when water is delivered to the seat of the fire to contain, control, and extinguish it. To accomplish this, the truck company must support the engine company with effective operations. This may be a time period of from seconds to never getting water on the fire. There are many causes for this delay–difficult forcible entry (security doors or bars on windows), tall ceilings (difficult to pull to expose hidden fire), tin or tongue and groove ceilings that are difficult to pull, occupancy storage (packrat conditions), and multistory buildings (such as in the First Interstate Bank Fire in Los Angeles, in which the fire started on the 12th floor and extended through the 16th floor before being extinguished).

One of the most dangerous conditions for firefighters is during a working attic fire. The ceilings of the involved structure (such as a movie theater, auditorium, or large church) are too high to pull with pike poles or blow out with straight streams. Another problem with attic fires is plywood sheeting in the attic or storage blocking access even after you have pulled the gypsum/plaster ceiling. If you have no other means to access a burning attic, start thinking about pulling out and shifting to defensive mode. The time factor is extremely important when dealing with this type of fire. The IC must closely monitor Situation Status and Resource Status with information from sector officers, especially those in interior positions, to maintain company accountability; he also must know when to order companies out before the building collapses. His decision to stick with his original strategy, modify it, or switch to defensive mode is only as good as the information he receives from operating–especially interior–forces.

Initial-attack decisions. The decisions of the first-arriving company officer can make a critical difference in the outcome of any fire. It is very important for the first-arriving officer to quickly evaluate the situation, choose the correct hoseline to deliver the needed gpm, determine the best access to the fire, and quickly expose hidden spaces as the initial-attack line is advanced. At the same time, other companies should check for extension. If additional resources are needed, they must be requested in a timely manner.

GRAY AREA

After considering the factors discussed above, the IC will find his decision is not always black and white. Many fire situations call for a gray area: It is not uncommon to use a combination of offensive and defensive tactics to contain, control, and extinguish a working fire. The practice of knocking down the main body of fire from the outside with handlines or heavy streams, followed by a controlled, measured interior attack with prepositioned crews (after assessments for structural stability, haz mats present, etc.), can be a very effective and safe operation. However, the transition should be a smooth one and should not be a surprise to operating personnel.

If crews begin with an interior attack but conditions worsen and the danger of flashover becomes too great, crews should back out of the building. After verifying that all members are out, personnel then can knock down the main body of fire from the outside with handlines or heavy streams and then go back in and finish the job, keeping in mind such considerations as possibility of collapse, the burn time, etc.

The most important factor in such “coordinated attacks” is reliable and clear communication. Everyone must be aware of the plan to avoid injuries.

In Los Angeles, as in many other departments, we have a rapid intervention company (RIC) standing by during firefighting operations, whose function is to swiftly effect the rescue of injured or trapped firefighters. More than one company may be standing by. The companies are supervised by an officer identified as Rescue Group. (For more on RICs, see “Rapid Intervention Companies: The Firefighter`s Life Insurance,” by Jim Cline, Ed.D., June 1995.)

In the case of a high-rise fire, shifting into defensive mode may not be a practical option. The First Interstate Bank Fire started on the 12th floor of an unsprinklered 62-story building. It is important to know what fire protection features the buildings in your district have, which features are operable at the time of the fire, and which features have been compromised by the fire.

The One Meridian Plaza Fire in Philadelphia is an example of how effective one sprinklered floor can be. During that fire, the decision was made to go into the defensive mode. The fire spread to several additional floors but was controlled when it reached a fully sprinklered floor. All companies in the Los Angeles City Fire Department carry and use a Building Inventory Book to access this type of information on the fireground.

Another scenario could involve defensive ventilation. An alternative to abandoning roof operations after completing a vent hole cut over or near the fire may be to retreat back toward the uninvolved portion of the building. From that position, you can complete a strip ventilation hole across the roof. This usually is effective only if you have the necessary personnel to complete the job in a timely manner and you have handlines effectively advanced below you.

It is possible that a large incident will call for offensive and defensive tactics at the same time–for example, an incident involving several structures or strip stores. Conditions in the original fire building may warrant a defensive mode while at the same time aggressively attacking the fire in exposed structures. Coordinated attacks must be accompanied by good fireground communications. At escalating incidents, the IC must divide the fire into geographic areas such as sectors to facilitate incident management.

FULLY DEFENSIVE

Again, this decision may be made in seconds or over an extended time period. In either case, this decision marks the point in the incident where neither the structure nor occupants can be saved. Shifting to a fully defensive operation means using the resources on scene to protect exposures. The IC bases his decision either on what he sees or what interior forces report. It requires discipline on the part of the IC to transmit the order to withdraw when what he sees looks okay.

If this decision is made for firefighter safety, as the risk-to-gain factors become extreme, it must be made early enough to safely back crews out of and off the structure. The time necessary to accomplish this varies and must be projected by the IC. It depends on how far inside the structure crews are, what obstacles are in the path of egress, fire and smoke conditions within the structure, whether it is a multistory operation, etc.

Available resources on scene should set up for heavy streams in the gray mode so the appliances are ready to go into operation as soon as all personnel have exited the structure. The staff at the command post constantly must update Resource Status to ensure firefighter safety.

The IC is the only person on scene who can give approval to go into heavy streams after all companies are accounted for.

At a large incident, it may be necessary to designate a water supply officer to coordinate and ensure that adequate water is available to supply the needed heavy streams. The water officer must have a good working knowledge of hydraulics, pump capacity, relay operations, and the water main system in the area.

When placing heavy streams into operation, take care to ensure the safe direction of these large streams. This may require a spotter and/or a safety officer. Firefighters have been seriously injured by misdirected master streams.

Crews should use good judgment when selecting the appropriate lines and nozzles. For example, if a crew is going to place a 212-inch handline into operation on a heavy stream fire, a smooth-bore tip normally will be the best choice, as it gives the greatest gpm, reach, and penetration.

When positioning personnel and apparatus for a heavy stream operation, consider the possibility of building collapse. Also consider construction type, building height, and the length of time the fire has been burning.

Hazardous-materials fires present a special danger to all personnel. The fact that a haz mat is present may be reason enough to switch to defensive mode. Always place personnel upwind, uphill, and a distance away (for safety from flying shrapnel) at such incidents. If the hazardous material is explosive, consider setting up unmanned heavy stream appliances and evacuating the area.

(Left) Open-web trusses are commonly used for roof construction. The largest wooden member used in the construction of this building is a 2 x 4. This building will burn quicker and collapse earlier. (Photos by author.) (Right) The trusses in this building are connected with gang nails and are supporting cement roof tiles. This may add 1,000 pounds per 100 square feet of roof surface. A working attic fire in this structure will result in an early collapse.

(Left) “A building on fire is a building under demolition”: In the case of previously damaged buildings, Mother Nature has sped up the process. Such additional safety risks must be accounted for in your strategic analysis. (Right) Whenever spotting apparatus at a working fire, always consider the situation you may be facing in 10 to 15 minutes. Consider aerial ladder operations, heavy streams, and potential building collapse.

Many factors can result in a delayed attack on the seat of a structure fire. For example, increased security measures used by building owners may make forcible entry very difficult. This results in critical time lost in effectively attacking the seat of the fire.

(Left) When dealing with a high-rise fire, shifting to defensive mode may not be practical. It is important to know what fire protection features your high-rises have. (Right) When the decision is made to go into a fully defensive mode, it marks the point in the incident where the structure and any occupants cannot be saved. The decision must be made early enough to safely back crews out of the building. Reliable, clear communications are essential when the order is given to go to a heavy stream operation.

(Left) While in a fully defensive mode, personnel must always be aware of the potential for building collapse. Keep in mind that for every 250 gpm pumped into this fire-damaged building, 2,000 pounds per minute are being added to the load on the building. (Right) If faced with a fire involving hazardous materials, especially if explosive, unmanned heavy streams may be your best option. Under such circumstances, evacuate all personnel to a safe location.

DONALD W. STUKEY is a battalion chief and 26-year veteran of the Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department. He has authored and presented department seminars on “Interior Structure Firefighting and Tactical Alert Operations” and developed “Search and Rescue Procedures Utilizing a One-Inch Firefighting Hoseline.”