THE FIREGROUND OFFICER: JUST A BACKUP SYSTEM?
BY STANLEY E. EARL
During a recent airplane flight, I had occasion to think back on a television documentary I had seen some time ago. From that program, which dealt with the subject of flight safety, I learned that there is an old axiom in flying: “Always stay ahead of the airplane”–that is, always be thinking one step ahead of your present situation. If you don`t, you`ll be trying to play “catch-up” when confronted by the unexpected. I also learned that many pilots have a difficult time admitting to themselves that something is critically wrong. This statement was difficult to comprehend. It was hard to accept that a trained professional, when confronted with a problem, would refuse to accept the reality of the situation.
The documentary also revealed that the pilot, in many ways, has become the “backup system” to modern aircraft`s many automated systems. Today`s aircraft can, and do, fly themselves. The airlines have learned over time that the lack of hands-on interaction with the aircraft could cause a certain amount of complacency to develop. In some cases, the flight crew`s ability to react quickly and decisively to certain emergency situations was found to be severely hampered.
As I pondered the problems created for pilots by this type of “system-bred” complacency, I began to identify certain similarities with my position as a fireground officer.
“AUTOMATION” AND THE FIREGROUND OFFICER
First, I recognized that we in the fire service depend on many “automated systems.” Some of these “systems” are persons–not machines–but they are automated just the same. In fact, many of our daily activities depend on automation: We train again and again to promote speed and efficiency in activities such as the donning of our breathing apparatus, the placement of ground ladders, hoseline advancement, etc.
These types of activities, while very important, are also fairly simple to execute once they have been learned. Once the decisions of whether to stretch an attack line, which line to stretch, and where to stretch it have been made, performing the task becomes rather automated. Fireground officers depend on the automated activities of our firefighting equipment and personnel. Since many of our incidents are somewhat similar in nature, we tend to become complacent after a time.
A TYPICAL SCENARIO
Let`s examine a “typical” scenario and see just how this complacency can manifest itself in the fire service.
You and your engine company respond to a report of fire in a two-story, single-family dwelling. The crew consists of the driver-operator, one firefighter, and you, the officer. En route to the scene, you receive an update from the dispatcher that the caller reported a fire in a pan on top of the stove. It`s 5 p.m. You begin to develop a mental picture of what you`ll find on arrival.
We all do this subconsciously. Our knowledge of the area to which we`re responding, the time of day, additional dispatch information, the known water supply, and so on all come into play to help us develop a mental picture of what we think we will be dealing with at our destination. This type of mental activity, of course, is a necessary and important part of that process we call size-up.
You might think to yourself, Yeah, smoke in the house, maybe a little extension to the cabinets…probably just use an extinguisher…maybe not even that.
You turn to your firefighter and say, “Just food on the stove; bring an extinguisher.”
On arrival, you find some “light” smoke showing from the front of the structure. You know, that type of smoke so “typical” of the food you`ve been picturing on the stove. You give your initial on-scene situation report and proceed to the front door.
The occupant meets you in the front yard and tells you that there are flames “leaping” from the top of the stove where she had been frying chicken. You pacify her by telling her that everything will be alright and ask where the kitchen is. After she tells you, you ask her if anyone else is in the house. “Yes,” she replies, “my mother-in-law is in the back bedroom. She`s an invalid.”
No problem, you think. Just a little smoke. The truck crew will have her out in no time. Might not even have to take her out if the smoke`s not back there yet.
As you and your firefighter pause on the front steps to mask up, you are met by the truck company officer. “Whadya need, Lieu?” he asks.
“Yeah, just food on the stove. I need for you to go to the back bedroom and check on an elderly lady. After that I need for you to open up.”
“No problem,” the officer replies as he and his crew of three proceed into the house.
As you and your partner enter the house, you notice that the color of the smoke has changed dramatically in the past couple of minutes. It`s much darker and denser now. Something clicks in the back of your mind; something tells you that all may not be as you had presumed, but still you go on toward the kitchen. On arriving at the kitchen, you find not the small fire you had pictured but a well-involved kitchen with flames extending into the hallway where you are. Your partner appears confused. You feel a sense of embarrassment over your lack of planning. You turn to your partner, “Go outside and pull the 200-foot preconnect. I`ll hold it here with the extinguisher.”
You estimate it will take the firefighter no more than two minutes to return with the attack line. The flames suddenly grow in intensity. The truck company now has opened up just as you instructed. After unsuccessfully trying to hold it with the extinguisher, you begin to back out of the building.
What started out as a series of small errors in judgment was compounded by incorrect assumptions and now has developed into a very serious, life-threatening situation. You surely didn`t mean for this to happen.
THE CRITICAL ERRORS
Let`s examine the critical errors involved in this scenario and see how they can be applied to all situations we might face.
Overlooking the Possibilities
First, let`s examine the size-up. This isn`t some complicated process devised long ago by some forgotten fire chief. All of us conduct size-ups almost every moment of our day–that is, we weigh the facts, probabilities, possibilities, and resources regarding almost everything we do. After weighing these factors in our minds, we determine a course of action. Of course, it is easier to size up incidents with which we have had prior experience. We have few problems conducting size-ups pertaining to everyday situations. Our problems begin when we encounter situations we`ve never experienced before. Of course, it`s impossible to have encountered every situation we might be called on to face. That`s where preplanning and practice come in. We must never train ourselves or our personnel to believe there is only one way to handle a given situation. Size-up is a dynamic, ongoing process that changes whenever the facts, probabilities, possibilities, or resources change. The key factor to keep in mind is that your size-up of a given situation is constantly changing and, therefore, your course of action may change.
In the above scenario, the officer was confronted by a situation that not only was radically different from his initial size-up en route to the scene but also was changing dramatically after his arrival. His course of action (directing the firefighter to bring an extinguisher and the truck company to immediately open up) was predicated mainly on the size-up conducted prior to arrival. We see here that he had neglected to stay ahead of the situation. He left out the possibilities component of the size-up. When conducting a size-up, you constantly must ask yourself, What if…? We have one tremendous advantage over our adversary, fire: Given the same set of circumstances, it always behaves in exactly the same way. This is a tremendously important factor.
It became evident that the officer in this scenario could not admit to himself that something was going wrong. He noticed the primary signs (in this case, the smoke color and density) and failed to act accordingly. Instead of admitting to himself that his original size-up was incorrect, he continued to press on with his original action plan. The fireground officer cannot allow vanity or pride to interfere with the decision-making processes during an incident. The results could be, at the least, embarrassing and, at the most, disastrous.
Depending on “Automation”
Now let`s look at how this officer`s dependence on certain “automated” activities affected the outcome of the incident. After informing the truck crew of the apparent situation and the course of action to take, the officer failed to observe one key principle: Never assume that other units operating on the fireground are aware of changes in your situation. In this case, the truck crew still was operating on the premise the officer had given them. The fireground officer constantly must be aware of the consequences of actions taken by other units on the incident scene. In this instance, the officer failed to communicate with the truck crew (who initially had been instructed to “immediately open up”) and apprise them of the gravity of the situation.
Another error the officer made was to expect that the firefighter would pull and advance the preconnected attack line within a specific period of time. Indeed, it was his right to expect a certain level of performance of such an automated procedure, but he failed to remember that his job is to be prepared for the unexpected. He did not take into consideration the vast number of things that could hamper the advancement of that attack line. He failed to ask himself, What if…? At this point, the officer ceased to have any constructive influence over the outcome of the incident. In fact, he was hard-pressed just to save himself.
* * *
Is the fireground officer just a simple “backup system”? Inasmuch as the officer is responsible for adjusting to the failure of any automated procedure, then, yes, he indeed is a “backup system.” But today`s officer must realize he is something more. He is responsible for constantly being aware of the ever-changing dynamics of any emergency incident and adapting his personnel and equipment to cope with those changes.
If you can meet these requirements at the next incident to which you respond, then you have taken a giant step toward becoming an effective fireground officer. n
STANLEY E. EARL, a 28-year veteran of the fire service (including time spent as a military and volunteer firefighter), is currently assigned as an engine company officer in the Fairfax County (VA) Fire & Rescue Department and is a Virginia state-certified instructor.
