BY ROBERT KLECZYNSKI
At 1200 hours on Saturday, December 18, 2010, Bayonne (NJ) Fire Department companies were dispatched to a report of a structure fire in the Bayonne Dry Dock Complex. The dry dock facility is in the eastern section of the city, adjacent to Upper New York Bay. En route to the incident, responding companies could see a large volume of dark smoke in the vicinity of the reported fire.
Squad 5 was the first fire unit to arrive at 100 Port Terminal Boulevard and reported a working fire in a two-story commercial occupancy (photo 1). A second alarm was transmitted on the arrival of Battalion Chief 3.
 |
| (1) On arrival, companies saw heavy fire conditions on side A. (Photo by Felix Lopez.) |
Squad 5 led off with an aggressive interior attack using a 2½-inch attack line supplied by tank water and requested a feed while the rescue and truck companies completed a primary search of the fire area, which was negative.
Securing a primary water supply at this location proved to be challenging. The principal water supply on the site is a dry loop standpipe system that services the dry dock facility. Installed around the perimeter of the dry dock itself is a 10-inch above-ground piping system that is 2,000 feet in length, capable of supplying 110 pounds per square inch (psi). Three saltwater pumps, each capable of supplying 3,000 gallons per minute (gpm), fed the system.
Fortunately, a ship was undergoing repair in the dry dock at the time, and the system was wet and functional. To prevent freezing, the system was constantly flowing water through a discharge valve back into the river, which indicated to the incident commander (IC) that the system was operational. Even though Engine 6 tied into this system to feed Squad 5, this necessitated long hoselays of more than 1,000 feet and involved time-consuming relay pumping.
Members assigned to Fire Department of New York (FDNY) Marine 9 in neighboring Staten Island, New York, had a visual on the smoke plume and responded to the incident. Since Marine 9 was there in the initial stage of the operation, the fireboat fed Squad 5 with a five-inch supply line (photo 2). Additional engine companies obtained secondary water supplies using off-site municipal hydrants. These hydrants were in an adjacent property and required forcible entry, breaching metal fencing, to access.
 |
| (2) FDNY Marine 9 positioning to feed Squad 5 with a supply line. (Photo by Mark Bottino.) |
FIRE VENTING FROM WINDOWS
On fire department arrival, fire was venting from several large window openings on the northeast corner of the first floor; autoexposure was extending to the second floor. The window openings throughout most of the building were boarded up, including those in the original fire area, which had burned through prior to our arrival.
Because of the large volume of fire; reports that all civilian personnel were accounted for; and the fact that the main body of fire was in the flammable storage area that contained paints, solvents, and other chemicals, we initiated a defensive operation (photo 3). A special call was made for a hazardous materials response when the nature of the burning materials was identified.
 |
| (3) Heavy black smoke was present in the area of origin inside the building, which contained large quantities of paints, solvents, and other chemicals. (Photo by author.) |
After the arrival of the deputy chief of operations and the chief of department (who eventually would operate as the IC), a third alarm was transmitted. Companies quickly positioned to operate elevated streams and deck guns to darken down the large body of fire. This strategy was followed immediately with an aggressive interior attack to knock down all visible fire. This seemed like a routine enough commercial fire with a good stop.
SMOKE FROM ROOF
During salvage and overhaul, while checking for fire extension, crews saw light smoke coming from the center of the roof some 150 feet away from the main body of fire. Interior crews were assigned to investigate the area under the roof and were soon driven back by excessive heat and heavy smoke, as well as an unusual and confusing floor design. The construction of the flooring on the second floor was atypical. The finished floor was constructed of 4- × 6- × 2-inch interlocking wood blocks, comparable to brick pavers, on top of a concrete subfloor. The wooden floor was designed to be nonsparking, since the military used it for maintenance as well as for ammunition storage. When exposed to large volumes of water from suppression efforts, the blocks began to absorb water and expand, which caused thousands of individual blocks to dislodge, giving an indication to the firefighters that the floor was weakened and perhaps compromised (photo 4).
 |
| (4) The finished flooring on the second floor made up of thousands of 4- x 6- x 2-inch wood blocks. (Photo by Donald DeRogatis.) |
EVACUATION ORDER
The smoke continued to increase in volume; almost immediately, smoke was visible seeping through the vertical expansion joint in the center buttress of the building on side A. With obvious fire extension to the roof, companies quickly repositioned to attack the roof fire, which was now clearly visible from sides A and C (photo 5). All members were ordered to safely evacuate the building.
 |
| (5) Fire involvement of the underside of a raised roof section from side C. Note the concrete construction of the building, with buttresses and a parapet. Also notice that there is no fire or smoke from the windows on the right, although that is toward the direction of the fire origin. (Photo by Mark Bottino.) |
Within 20 minutes of the evacuation, sections of the roof deck began collapsing with significant force. Even though the roof deck was collapsing onto the second floor, the reverberation effects could be felt by companies on the ground and by members operating in aerial devices (photo 6). This was obviously substantial weight collapsing and impacting the second floor.
 |
| (6) Wood and concrete roof deck debris on the second floor. Note the concrete beams and girders above that supported the raised roof sections. To the left is a section of the main concrete flat roof. (Photo by author.) |
FDNY Marine 1 arrived to offer additional assistance and was preparing to operate its turrets if requested. Special calls were made for an additional engine company and a mutual-aid ladder company (Jersey City L-11). The Division C supervisor received information that the marine captain of the vessel being repaired in the adjacent dry dock was in the wheelhouse and had a unique vantage point of the roof fire. The Division C supervisor would liaison with someone assigned to the wheelhouse to assist with master stream applications, changing roof conditions, and fire spread reports.
A primary search had been conducted earlier in the operation, and even though fire spread to the roof, civilians could be seen entering the building by areas remote from fire personnel activity. A request was made for the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey police to set up fire lines in these areas.
Another search was conducted to ensure all civilians were evacuated; it was confirmed that all personnel were accounted for. The elevated master streams were making only moderate progress with the roof fire; later, we would learn why.
After several hours of our operating up to six master streams, the fire was brought under control. Companies remained at the incident throughout the night; pockets of fire continued to be extinguished some 24 hours after the initial response.
THE BUILDING
The Bayonne Fire Department was very familiar with the Bayonne Dry Dock Complex, since we had responded to numerous ship fires, electrical fires, and technical rescues at the site in recent years. We developed a good working relationship and cooperation with the business management and conducted frequent fire company familiarization tours of the site. We jointly developed improvements to the fire suppression systems and addressed access issues for apparatus and water supply. We partnered with this business in 2010 to host regional Marine 2 shipboard firefighting evolutions on a commercial vessel. Our primary focus at the site was always the unique hazards that come with a vessel under repair inside the dry dock.
The building was built in 1941 on the site of a military base (Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne), which the city later acquired as a result of a 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The building was built during World War II at a time when steel was a critical raw material needed for the war effort, so concrete was the building material of choice. The building was a significant size (453 feet × 200 feet) and was built primarily of reinforced concrete with a foundation of concrete piles and eight-inch-thick concrete walls and floors. This building, like several others on the former military site, were said to be “bombproof.”
The roof was a flat roof constructed primarily of concrete, with the exception of eight raised roof sections (25 feet × 184 feet), similar to that of an inverted roof. These raised roof sections were uniquely constructed using concrete girders and beams on which a wooden framework was constructed that held up nonreinforced three-inch-thick concrete slabs. These elevated roof sections were designed as platforms for temporary housing erected on the roof. Military personnel were assigned to patrol the roof and protect the military base using antiaircraft artillery. The building was constructed to withstand an air attack; the roof even had a fire hydrant for suppression efforts in the event of such an attack. What made for a high and dry platform for the military personnel proved to be a difficult construction design for firefighters to battle.
The fire quickly weakened the wood framework supporting the massive concrete load and caused entire sections of the wood and concrete roof to fail. The weight of the concrete in the two failed raised roof sections was estimated to be 173 tons, which were now resting on the second floor (photos 7, 8).
 |
| (7) A view of a raised roof section from the roof level. Note the heavy concrete slab supported by the wooden framework. (Photos by author.) |
 |
| (8) Construction of the built-up roof sections. Each section was 4 feet high, 25 feet wide, and 184 feet long. Construction of the built-up section from top to bottom was asphalt roofing material on three-inch nonreinforced concrete, on 1½-inch tongue-and-groove planks, on 11-inch × 1¾-inch wood beams, on five-inch × 1¾-inch wood sole plate on concrete girders/beams. |
The roof design and construction made master stream penetration arduous and effective top-side ventilation difficult. Once fire was visible under the roof, outside elevated streams went into operation applying water from openings made under the parapet. These streams were only minimally effective because of the large horizontal concrete girders that spanned each section of the raised roof, which blocked further progress.
The application of the master streams from above the roof level was even less effective, since the fire was in the wooden framework beneath the protection of the large concrete slabs, limiting effectiveness. Incorporated into the center of the building, from sides A to C, from ground floor to roof, was a four-inch fiber expansion joint, penetrating the roof through the wood framework (photos 9, 10).
 |
| (9) The four-inch expansion joint void on the floor and wall, which extended to the buttress. The expansion joint was actually made up of four one-inch fiberboard joints compressed together. (Photos by author.) |
 |
| (10) View of the expansion joint from side C (foreground) to side A and the collapsed roof sections. Note the concrete girders and beams that supported the wooden framework, which was topped by concrete. |
The building was essentially built resembling two separate buildings abutted to each other, joined by the expansion joint. The unique construction characteristics of the building were in contrast to its visual appearance of concrete and buttresses, which indicated that this was a substantial building of Class 1 or Class 2 construction. The initial occupancy was a ship repair shop to support the dry dock operation and was still continuing in that use.
Originally, there were numerous windows in the building, but, as noted, the majority of them had been boarded up. The ground floor had a ceiling height of 45 feet; the second floor was 25 feet high. Although there were only two floors, the height of the building was 80 feet (equivalent to a six-story height). The ground floor had two large overhead doors on each short side of the building.
There were no visible signs of fire travel by conduction or radiation from the area of origin to the roof. The heat transfer occurred by convection through the expansion joint into the raised roof sections, with minimal involvement of the second floor. Evidence of spalling was observed on the ground-floor ceiling (45 feet high) in the vicinity of the expansion joint, indicating significant heat had accumulated there as a result of the burning paints and solvents. The fiberboard expansion joints used in the building were combustible and, even with a reinforced concrete ceiling, the weak link with regard to fire travel was the expansion joint.
EXPANSION JOINTS
Concrete joints are engineered for a variety of concrete construction applications. These joints are typically designed to allow concrete to expand and contract with changes in temperature and moisture. Without these joints, the stress forces of the movement would eventually crack and weaken the concrete. Depending on the application, they could be referred to as control joints, construction joints, expansion joints, contraction joints, sawed joints, or isolation joints. For our purposes, they are similar enough in that they all could potentially become an avenue for fire extension. The majority of these joints are set in place during the construction phase at predetermined, engineered locations. Typical expansion joints are ¼ inch to ½ inch thick and as wide as the full depth of the concrete, although some joints are engineered to be up to 18 inches. These joints come in a variety of materials including fiberboard (frequently permeated with asphalt), silicone rubber, sponge rubber, cork, composite, closed cell poly foam, plastic, asphalt, neoprene, and polyurethane.
These materials have various resistances to fire; however, the majority are flammable or combustible and are often an overlooked path for fire travel within concrete construction. It should be noted that there are expansion joints for specific applications that are fire-rated. Many of these joints, particularly the fiberboard type, deteriorate over time and are no longer a tight joint, thereby creating a void space within the joint opening to allow for fire spread. The conventional fiberboard concrete joints, with an obvious petroleum odor, will smolder longer than wood and must be closely examined during the overhaul phase. The fiberboard joint is a common type of expansion joint and was the type found in the dry dock fire (this joint was actually four one-inch-thick fiberboards sandwiched together). Material safety data sheet information regarding fiberboard expansion joints rates flammability as minimal, because of the high ignition temperature, but they do burn. Even if the expansion joint material does not ignite, the fact that older joints are no longer airtight increases the chances of fire spread. It takes only an opening less than ¼ inch to allow fire to penetrate and extend.
Firefighters confronted many challenging obstacles at this dry dock fire, from water supply to flammable materials burning to roof extension from an expansion joint, to the hybrid construction, but effective command and control, coupled with effective strategies and tactics, along with discipline and proper training, resulted in an excellent outcome.
LESSONS LEARNED/REINFORCED
• Looks can be deceiving. An initial size-up of a building is a split-second determination we like to categorize into one of the five classes. However, there are many hybrid construction variations that do not fit nicely into one of these five categories. These hybrid-constructed buildings could prove to be very challenging for an IC.
At first glance, the dry dock building, with its massive concrete walls and floors, numerous concrete buttresses, and built to military specifications, would appear to be of fire resistive (Class 1) construction. However, determining the precise construction of the roof is nearly impossible while standing in the street. Critical strategic and tactical decisions will be determined based on the construction of the roof. Prefire plans and routine fire inspections are valuable tools to assist with identifying the hazards that could potentially affect fireground operations and personnel safety. Without this information, roof operations should proceed cautiously. Getting a truck company to the roof early to confirm the construction type and identify any hazards is a good idea.
• Buildings that possess a significant footprint must be tackled differently than a typical 2½-story wood frame. When operating at a substantially sized building, it is time consuming just to visually conduct a 360° view. Operations can be hampered by the storage of materials or the presence of fencing in the vicinity of the building. Entrances to the building, even those remote from the fire, must be secured and a patrol set up, if necessary, to deny entry. Keeping a door or window open for ventilation may invite a civilian or worker to enter the building. Additionally, the sheer size of the incident may necessitate multiple rapid intervention companies and assigning assistant safety officers to increase effectiveness. Communication is crucial, since conditions can vary in different parts of the building.
• Since 1988, there have been more than 100 major military base closures nationally. Many of these military installations have been transitioned to local communities and are being used for something other than for what they were designed. Many of the buildings within these installations could have been built with construction that is uncommon by local community building standards. Buildings constructed to conform to federal military standards may not meet local building construction norms. It is crucial to become familiar with these buildings and the hazards they present.
As an example, at the Military Ocean Terminal, all types of construction were present and included roof structures incorporating trusses (including bowstring) and heavy timber. Remember, firefighting is probably the furthest thing from the minds of the designers and construction workers who built these buildings in and around which we are operating.
• Remember the basics. Fire spread through conduction is conventional; therefore, that’s why we begin overhaul in areas adjacent to those with the most fire damage. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that convection and radiation are also mechanisms of fire spread. Superheated gases naturally rise and accumulate at the ceiling level. Flammable materials, such as expansion joints, within this area may be heated enough to ignite them. Soaring ceiling height is another factor that can deceptively conceal the fact that high temperatures exist. Firefighters may be able to comfortably walk in a room and not realize that extreme temperatures exist overhead. It is essential to use thermal imaging cameras during suppression and overhaul to check temperatures at these upper areas.
• The IC must determine risk vs. reward. When no civilian life hazard exists, consideration must then move to the life safety of the firefighters. In this case, once the fire unexpectedly extended to the roof, a decision was made to safely evacuate our personnel. Approximately 20 minutes after the evacuation, sections of the roof began to violently collapse. Had members continued with aggressive interior operations on the second floor, what would have been their reward? Even for members operating on the ground floor, the impact and additional load of 173 tons of debris resting on the second floor could have compromised that floor to the point of collapse. As fire conditions change, so must our strategies and tactics.
• Depending on the type of construction, any void space is a potential opening that allows fire to spread. These void spaces include utility shafts, pipe chases, HVAC openings, and fire doors or dampers that fail to close tightly. Consider that combustible fiber expansion joints are another type of opening that allows for fire travel. Expansion joints are commonplace in concrete parking garages. If there is a vehicle fire inside a multilevel parking garage with an expansion joint in the vicinity of the fire, check for extension on the level above, since another vehicle could be parked directly over it.
ROBERT KLECZYNSKI is a 19-year veteran of the Bayonne (NJ) Fire Department, where he is a captain, training officer, and incident safety officer. He has a bachelor’s degree in business administration with a minor in fire science. He is a New Jersey Level II fire instructor, a hazardous materials technician, and the department’s grant writer. He is on the advisory board for the New Jersey Metro USAR Strike Team.
