Buildings that Change the Rules of the Game

By Anthony Avillo

Our work demands that we understand the arenas in which we operate: the structures. If we know how structures are put together, we can understand not only how fire spreads in them and the tactics required to tame them and the fire but also, most importantly, how buildings fall apart under fire. To be inside, on top of, or around the perimeter, especially at the front and in command, and to have an insufficient understanding of building construction is like playing Russian roulette with your personnel. No matter what your rank, a lack of understanding of building construction and its inherent weaknesses is unacceptable and will lead to a tactical breakdown at some point.

Buildings have changed over the years, and the fire service must change with them. We must understand that when the aggressive tactics we were taught are used all the time, the same way, we will eventually put ourselves and our people in a compromising position. We need to recognize when the tactics of old do not fit into the game plan of the building in which we are fighting a fire. Aggressive tactics worked for many years in what some call the “legacy” construction, but this same aggression must now be tempered with a good size-up and an assessment of the dangers these structures pre-sent. First-arriving personnel almost always conduct the initial size-up and assessment. What they do in the first few minutes will make or break the operation. A good decision based on a sound size-up, an understanding of the building’s construction and inherent limitations, and a coordinated attack and support operation will usually create a favorable fireground experience. Bad decisions because of the “one-size-fits-all” mentality have resulted and will continue to result in firefighter casualties.

There are three building types that come to mind that fit into the category above. They are all especially dangerous when handled improperly. A seemingly “routine” fire in any one of them can give personnel more than they bargained for, especially if they are stuck in one mindset and do not adjust their strategy and tactics to address the limiting characteristics of each.

LARGE-AREA STRUCTURES

The first of these is the large-area structure. Whether it is a one-story warehouse or a five-story old-style storage facility, we must not allow ourselves to operate in a fashion that is going to compromise personnel safety. Residential structure strategies and tactics just do not work here. We have seen many examples of this in the past decade, and we need to learn the lessons that have been well-documented by the line-of-duty death (LODD) and near-miss reports.

Often, the dominoes begin to fall as the first hoseline is stretched, most often an improper decision of the first-arriving company officer. Entering any large-area building with a small-diameter hoseline can put attack teams at a tremendous disadvantage for two reasons. The first is the length of the stretch likely to be required. We can’t stretch 300 feet (or more) of small-diameter hose (especially with a fog nozzle) and expect to have a sufficient hose stream that can provide proper suppression power for the British thermal units (Btus) being generated. Speaking of Btus, the second reason we need a larger hoseline is the typically larger fire loads in these structures. How often have you heard, “Big Fire = Big Water”? Incident reports have shown that stretching the small line in these instances has almost always had a negative impact on the situation.

(1) Photos by author.

Photo 1. Not only is this a disorientation hazard, but the fire loading is severe. The building also happens to be Type II construction. Fire will rapidly take hold of this area and severely affect the building’s structural integrity. Personnel inside this building with small-diameter hoselines or without lifelines are operating at a great risk. Don’t enter or allow your personnel to enter a structure like this unprepared for the hazards presented by the fire and the building.

Additionally, ladder company personnel get into the act in an even more dangerous manner. For this reason, incident commanders (ICs) must demand and reinforce before the incident as a matter of department policy the use of lifelines in any structure that has a large area and/or a disorientation hazard. Firefighters in heavy smoke conditions often have difficult times finding their way out of 10- × 12-foot rooms in residential structures. Expand that room size exponentially, and you expand the risk even more exponentially that firefighters will not be coming back out without some type of umbilical to the safe exterior. This has also become apparent in the LODDs over the past decade. We have to reinforce discipline on a department level and ensure that small-area tactics are never introduced into large-area buildings.

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Photo 2. In a heavy smoke condition, what are the odds a firefighter is going to make it out of here without a lifeline? Chances are that decision will be made when you, a chief officer, are not yet on scene. If your personnel are not taking the bag containing the lifeline off the apparatus when there is nothing showing, don’t expect them to do it when the place is on fire, especially if you do not say anything about it when nothing is showing. Safety requires perseverance.

VACANT BUILDINGS

The second building that will create issues for us when we try to fight a “normal” fire is the vacant building. Our track record in vacant buildings is poor at best. How is it that we have suffered as many as four times more LODDs in vacant buildings than in residential structures? With the exception of very few departments, we certainly don’t go to four times as many vacant building fires. Look at the root cause: It is not just that the buildings are unsafe; the fact that we are treating them as normally occupied buildings sets the stage for operational disaster. Unless there is an obvious life hazard, we must attempt to make the building behave a little before committing resources to any interior positions. This means checking all sides of the building, removing obstacles such as boards on windows and doors, and ensuring multiple means of egress from all areas. Take a very pessimistic approach with regard to the projected success of interior operations.

Two concerns must be noted here. The first is that if we are the only life hazard in and around the structure, our priorities must be focused more on our own safety than on saving a property. In addition, we have to be careful about what we are actually risking ourselves for. A good rule of thumb to follow is, don’t risk your neck tonight for something that will be going in a dumpster tomorrow. Also, overhauling an unsafe structure has cost firefighter lives in the past. Whether the building was vacant before the fire or not, if the building will not be occupied again or for the foreseeable future, carefully assess whether you want to conduct overhaul on the interior. We have also seen recent LODDs and injuries resulting from needless overhaul in dangerous buildings. Buildings can be rebuilt—or torn down.

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Photo 3. This building was open to the elements for so long it had trees growing out of the top floor. If you think this building will behave just as it did when it was occupied, you are making a grave mistake. Have in place a good abandoned building survey program and a mechanism to alert responders to dangers.

LIGHTWEIGHT CONSTRUCTION

The third situation where the buildings change the rules of the game is when we are operating in a building that has been built with or renovated to contain lightweight building materials. We are killing more firefighters in floor collapses than any other type of collapse. In these structures, we simply cannot charge headlong into the fire area as we once did in older dimensional lumber or “legacy” construction. These buildings do not stand up to the assault of fire like the older buildings did. We must immediately investigate for void involvement and, if present, take appropriate steps to fight the fire from a safe area—based on the location and extent of the fire as well as the safe access (and egress) points we can identify. This operation can be from a protected doorway (cautious offensive), from an adjacent structure or behind a fire wall (interior defensive), or from the exterior (defensive). This is, again, addressed in prefire planning, training, and constant reinforcement of the need to adjust tactics as required.

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Photo 4. How are jurisdictions allowing buildings like this? This is all lightweight stick-built construction, including parallel-chord floor and roof trusses. Although the apartments will be protected by a sprinkler system, the most vulnerable area in the structure—the voids (where collapses will be initiated)—will not. Fire in a void here will cause a loss of a large portion, if not all, of the building.

I often ask my students, If you are not sure, how can you determine if a building was constructed using lightweight materials? The answers run the usual gamut from prefire planning to telling by the building’s age or by assumption—i.e., treat it as lightweight if you are not sure. Prefire planning is great, but we don’t preplan every building. Age is a good indicator, but there are always exceptions. Assumptions in this business are unacceptable and have led to disaster. To paraphrase Chief (Ret.) Alan Brunacini, Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, “A chief should be the first one to think a fire is burning and the last one to think it is out.” To take it further, I say, “The first-arriving officer (and the IC) should be the first one to think that lightweight materials are involved and the last one to think they are not.” Physically checking the building is the only surefire way to determine this. Punch a hole in a ceiling or lift a ceiling tile (in an uninvolved area, of course). This will tell you right away if there are lightweight support materials in the floor and/or roof systems so you can adjust your action plan.

Analysis of the tragedies that have occurred in these buildings points to a root cause most often attributed to lack of supervision by chief officers before, during, and after the incident as well as a lack of awareness, training, and complacency on the part of the first-arriving companies. Although decisions are often made in a split second, the adjustments that need to be made on the fireground to address improper initial action may take more time to accomplish than the IC has, making the scene unsafe and causing a delay in proper operations. It is very difficult to undo improper actions on the fireground, and it almost always involves an increased degree of danger.

Once identified, these mistakes cannot be overlooked, brushed aside, or chalked up to experience and never discussed further. They must be addressed as soon as possible, and the lessons must be disseminated to all personnel. Failure to recognize when the building has changed the rules of the game and to operate in a proper manner in regard to those changes is not only a training issue but, more importantly, an expectations issue. Departments and chief officers must set expectations based on sound policy in regard to how companies conduct themselves in these structures. Chief officers who do not relay their expectations to their subordinate officers are usually the reason that the first-arriving personnel do not operate in the safest and most appropriate manner. If the expectations are not communicated properly, documented somewhere in department policies, and enforced through active supervision, then the chief officers have no one to blame but themselves when things go wrong on their fireground.

As a chief, tell personnel what you expect, make sure they have the resources to do it, and then reinforce it on a consistent basis. Their proper actions before you arrive, based on the expectations you set, will make it easier for you to manage the incident once you arrive. As a chief officer, it is your responsibility to make sure that the job is done properly and safely, even (and especially) when you are not there yet.

ANTHONY AVILLO, a 27-year fire service veteran, is a deputy chief in North Hudson (NJ) Regional Fire & Rescue. He has a B.S. in fire science from New Jersey City University and is an instructor at the Bergen County (NJ) and Monmouth County (NJ) Fire Academies. Avillo is a member of the FDIC educational advisory board and the Fire Engineering editorial advisory board. He is the author of Fireground Strategies Scenarios Workbook, Second Edition (Fire Engineering, 2010). He is a contributing author to Fire Engineering’s Handbook for Firefighter I and II (Fire Engineering, 2009) and is co-author of the Fire Engineering Firefighters Handbook Study Guide (Fire Engineering, 2010). Avillo was a collaborator in the Tactical Perspectives DVD series (Fire Engineering, 2011) and has a blog and a radio show (“Fireground Strategies and Other Stuff from the Street”) on fireengineering.com. He is the recipient of the 2012 Fire Engineering/George D. Post Instructor of the Year Award.

Anthony Avillo will present “Fireground Officer Development: Preparing for the Hard Environment” on Monday, April 16, 2012, 8:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m., and “Fireground Strategies: When Buildings Change the Rules of the Game,” on Wednesday, April 18, 2012, 10:30 a.m.-12:15 p.m., at FDIC in Indianapolis.