THE KOBE EARTHQUAKE: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

THE KOBE EARTHQUAKE: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

BY FRANK W. BORDEN

January 17 is a date I will always remember. On that date in 1994, I experienced and responded to the damage caused by the Northridge Earthquake in California. On that same date in 1995, I was in Osaka, Japan, awaiting the opening of the Fourth U.S.-Japan Workshop on Urban Earthquake Hazard Reduction when, at 0546 hours, a 6.8-magnitude (originally reported as 7.2) earthquake devastated Kobe. The irony of this was the title of our workshop, “In Wait for the Next One.” Our hotel shook violently, but there was no damage, even though we were next to Kobe and 18 miles from the epicenter on an offshore island known as Awaji.

Japan has a long history of earthquakes going back through the 1900s, including the worst one of all–the 1923 Kanto earthquake that occurred in Tokyo and killed more than 140,000 people. During the past two years, three major earthquakes have occurred on the north end of Japan offshore from Hokaido. Fortunately, fewer than 250 people were killed. The earthquake in Kobe was not anticipated in planning or preparedness, since it has been more than 1,000 years since a major earthquake hit the region.

THE QUAKE

In less than 20 seconds, buildings fell, pipes broke, fires started, and more than 5,400 people were killed. Our workshop chairman, Professor Kameda of Kyoto University, told our group that morning that our mission was to produce knowledge to save lives and property in dedication to the earthquake victims.

The damage statistics were staggering as the morning of January 17 turned to noon. Our group met and developed a strategy for our research trip into Kobe. Our participants–about half American and half Japanese and experts in their various fields–would focus on various elements such as emergency response, structural damage, lifeline systems, seismology, and the like. We were fortunate to have this caliber of people at the workshop.

We traveled from Osaka along the shoreline and main access into Kobe, the Hanshin Expressway. Damage was visible on the outskirts of Osaka and became severe in the city of Hishinomiya and Ashiya. The elevated expressway was badly damaged, reducing access and egress to a crawl. The quarter-mile collapse of this gargantuan section of concrete was an awesome sight. The business and residential areas were badly damaged: Structural collapses were everywhere, utilities were out of service, people were still trapped in structures–and there were the walking wounded. Residents appeared dazed and shocked at the devastation they faced. Their lives were totally changed in an instant of the earth`s movement–310,000 persons were made homeless.

We were transported into Kobe in taxis and vans furnished by the Japanese television news medium, so we were able to get into many areas using the medium`s influence. Reporters were then able to interview members of our group on what we saw.

Kobe, less than 15 miles from the epicenter, is a port city four or five miles wide and about 18 miles long and has a population of 1.5 million. It rests on alluvial soil–which does not hold up well in earthquakes–and sandy ground and has a high water table, which is subject to liquefaction (wet sand pushed up through the pavement). In many areas, more than three feet of ground deformation occurred, and the evidence of liquefaction was observed. These factors had a great impact on structural collapse caused by foundation failure and on the breakage of water, sewer, and natural gas pipes. Nearly one million people were without water, sewers, and gas.

More than 100 fires broke out in several areas; many turned into conflagrations, burning about 200 acres of densely built structures–some already collapsed with people trapped inside. The Kobe Fire Department (about 1,200 members with a 4,000-person volunteer fire corps) was faced with making priority operational decisions concerning whether to rescue people trapped under debris or combat the fires without a reliable water supply while facing heavy traffic of evacuees on foot and in vehicles. The fires would have grown to major proportions if the wind had been moderate to strong.

Firefighters and police officers, along with civilians, were immediately involved in rescuing people trapped in their buildings. There were many collapses; most appeared to be of the pancake type. Most of the larger buildings were engineered pre-1980 reinforced nonductile concrete; many had first-, second-, and mid-floor collapses. It was our opinion that the leading killer was the older “shinkabe”- or “okabe”-style houses made of very lightweight materials, lacking partitions, and having a very heavy tile roof. These structures came down in a pile of splintered wood and broken tile. An estimated 3,000 to 4,000 people were killed in this type of collapse alone. Approximately 107,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged beyond use.

Responders were faced with widespread damage, a major life loss, 36,000 injuries, and a near total shutdown of the city`s infrastructure. Fire, police, EMS, and emergency responders were immediately overwhelmed in the cold darkness of morning. Mutual-aid assistance was slow to arrive, although we did see fire companies from other cities, including Tokyo–which is more than 300 miles from Kobe–working. I believe this was one of the first times in recent history that the Japanese fire service provided this kind of mutual aid.

The Japanese government was reluctant to ask for international assistance, even after the scope and magnitude of the disaster became known. Cultural norms may have been a factor in excluding the vast rescue and relief resources of the United States. Those of us involved in the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Program were of the opinion that an early response by United States US&R Task Forces could have made a positive difference in the outcome of the disaster. We made every attempt to accomplish this plan through the Japanese and U.S. governments.

PROBLEMS

As with most disasters, problems were abundant. The Japanese admitted they were not prepared for the “Big One” in Kobe. Public apathy exists even in Japan, which has one of the highest incidents of earthquakes in the world. My observations in Tokyo, however, indicate a high level of community and government preparedness in that region.

Damage assessment. It was difficult to make an assessment in the darkness and considering there was no electrical power and normal communication and transportation systems were disrupted.

Disaster management, coordination, and response. Emer-gency organization and establishing priorities for responder re-sponse and co-

ordination ap-peared to develop slowly during the first 24 hours. The Japanese Prime Minister an-nounced that more than 32,000 self-defense force mem-bers, police, and firefighters were engaged in re-sponse and relief activities 72 hours after the earthquake had struck.

Access. The primary access highway and rail system was heavily damaged. Minimal traffic control resulted in heavy traffic and pedestrian movement that impeded emergency response into Kobe.

Structural collapse. Approximately 107,000 buildings collapsed or were damaged beyond future use. As already mentioned, “shinkabe”- and “okabe”-style houses were a major factor in life loss (possibly as high as 4,000). Many two- and three-story commercial buildings collapsed due to open first-floor areas (soft first story). Eighty percent of the larger buildings damaged were mostly pre-1980 reinforced nonductile concrete. Pancake collapses on the first and mid floors were predominate. Some large buildings collapsed due to foundation and ground failure. Many were tilted to one side (racked) or actually fell over. Elevated highways, bridges, and railways collapsed at the support columns due to shear failure. Many vehicles, mainly commercial trucks, were crushed; at 5:46 a.m., the traffic was relatively light. Liquefaction, ground deformations, and strong ground acceleration contributed significantly to the collapse of buildings and structures.

Urban search and rescue. The number of people trapped in debris far exceeded the resources of the emergency responders. Many of the fires killed people still trapped in collapsed structures, and the prevailing cold temperatures (near freezing at night) reduced their chances of survival due to hypothermia.

Fire and police departments were in-volved in search and rescue operations. Some of the mutual-aid vehicles from other fire departments, such as Tokyo, were specialized rescue vehicles with a variety of light to medium rescue tools. The self-defense forces (Japanese military) later joined the efforts, primarily for body recovery. Most of the early rescues were made by relatives and neighbors who were able to remove the debris trapping the victims. The predominate collapsed structures were one- and two-story older wooden residential and small commercial buildings. Large numbers of search and rescue personnel were needed. Search dogs would have been beneficial for rapidly covering the large number of collapses.

It was difficult to determine if a systematic search and rescue plan had been developed and implemented within the first 36 hours, since buildings were not marked. It appeared that rescuers were directed to locations where known victims were trapped based on sounds heard or verification from neighbors.

The transition of victims extricated from structures into the EMS system was problematic. EMS intervention was not evident in the field, as patients were immediately transported by ambulance or private vehicles to the hospital. This may have exacerbated problems associated with crush syndrome. (For more on crush syndrome, see “Medical Treatment at Collapse Rescues,” December 1990, page 27, and “Crush Syndrome,” May 1994, page 64.) This situation is related to the shortage of EMS expertise and resources available in the field.

MEDICAL

Most of the 12 hospitals in the immediate area of the earthquake were overwhelmed with patients, most of whom arrived on their own. Many hospitals were damaged and not able to care for the thousands of injured; one suffered a mid-floor collapse.

EMS activities in the field were minimal. The firefighters and police officers do not normally have this responsibility and do not have the training and equipment needed. The prehospital system relies on the ambulance service, which is primarily a basic life-support service.

More than 36,000 people were injured; many were in bandages around their homes trying to obtain their personal items.

FIRES

The Kobe Fire Department has 26 stations, 196 vehicles, two fireboats, and two helicopters and responds to an average number of 800 fires per year.

The water system consists of 23,000 hydrants and 970 underground water storage cisterns (10,000-gallon capacity).

At the initial stages of the earthquake, approximately 100 fires broke out in densely built-up areas of the central city, where structures are predominantly made of wood. The total number of fires for January 17 was 142. The fire response was hampered by access problems, traffic, and evacuation. Many water mains in the area were broken, and the cisterns were depleted in minutes. Water was drafted from several streams and supplied by fireboats from the bay, but the small diameter and length of hose carried on the fire engines limited water-relay operations.

The fire, which spread from radiant heat and flame impingement, resulted in 12 large fires that went uncontrolled for 24 hours. An estimated one million square meters of land, 50 percent of which is in the Nagata Ward, burned. Fortunately, the wind was not strong.

Ignition sources still are under study but could be assumed to have included electricity, open flame devices, and chemical spills. Despite the presence of automatic gas shutoff valves on many of the buildings and many broken supply lines, gas leaks fed fires in some areas.

Many firefighters in these areas suffered from smoke inhalation for hours.

LIFELINES

The lifeline system consisting of utilities, transportation, and communications was heavily affected by the earthquake`s crippling of the city`s infrastructure.

Widespread power outages and damage to water, wastewater, and natural gas leaks affecting more than one million people resulted in a degraded response capability and created the major need for immediate shelter.

The heavily damaged Port of Kobe was completely shut down. Considering its importance to the local and national economy, its closing will have a major long-term impact on the area.

SHELTER AND CARE

It is estimated that 200,000 people needed shelter immediately after the earthquake; within four days, the number grew to 310,000. Shelter, water, and food were immediate requirements. Spontaneous neighborhood volunteers set up the first shelters. People waited in long lines to get water from broken water mains in the street. Food and sanitary facilities became in short supply as the shelters filled with people.

Few yards and open spaces were available for tents, many of which were set up in parks. Several thousand temporary housing units are scheduled to be built in the future.

LESSONS LEARNED

All can learn from the Kobe Earthquake, especially when considering it was one of the largest earthquakes to hit an urban center in modern times and had many characteristics in common with earthquakes that occur in the United States.

The following information may be useful in developing emergency plans:

1. Develop realistic plans for worst-case events:

make a comprehensive risk assess-

ment, and

develop multidiscipline, multijuris-

dictional, all hazard plans.

2. Design and construct earthquake-resis-

tant buildings and structures:

improve design and construction and

raise code standards;

research and implement retrofit sys-

tems;

assess locations for new construction

(risk potential); and

determine the future of unsafe struc-

tures.

3. Design and construct earthquake-resistant lifeline systems:

underground pipes;

aboveground electrical lines;

aboveground pipes and water sys-

tems;

storage vessels;

transportation systems, roads, rails,

shipping, and airports; and

system redundancy and alternatives,

i.e., temporary aboveground water

mains, water cisterns, electrical gen-

erators, site hardening, and so on.

4. Need effective community education, training, and preparedness plans and programs:

provide for community self-suffi-

ciency and trained volunteer respon-

ders.

5. Need an effective standardized all-hazard disaster management system:

command and control system,

coordination/mutual-aid system,

rapid postearthquake damage assess-

ment system,

urban search and rescue capability,

mass-casualty EMS operational sys-

tem,

firefighting capability for conflagra-

tions,

evacuation and traffic-control plan,

logistical support and communica-

tion system, and

training and exercise plan.

6. Need international response plans:

awareness and education program,

international network,

operational procedures and system,

international disaster response train-

ing, and

written agreements.

7. Need recovery and reconstruction plan:

shelter and welfare,

immediate and long-term restoration

plans, and

pre-event plans and procedures and

applicable laws.

8. Research needs:

structure design, construction, and

retrofit programs;

lifeline systems;

causes of postearthquake fire igni-

tion and spread;

injury epidemiology;

rescue methodology;

mass-casualty systems;

community preparedness and train-

ing;

disaster-management systems;

seismic hazard assessments and risk

analysis;

communication systems; and

mapping and computer applications.

We once again have been given na-ture`s warning and lessons to be applied to the future. Technology in design and construction and disaster preparedness techniques, communications, and specialized equipment have been steadily improving, but they have not kept pace with rapid urbanization and increasing populations and the infrastructure in high-risk areas.

Response and recovery from the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge, California, earthquakes may have fostered a passive attitude toward our capability to manage earthquakes. While losses were significant, they cannot compare with what happened in Kobe.

The Kobe, or “Great Hanshin,” Earthquake should have sent a mental shockwave to us, especially in regions with low-to-moderate risk, such as the new Madrid seismic region; Pacific Northwest; and Utah, Idaho areas. These may be “low-probability” areas, but they have high consequence potential.

IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

Can we prepare? YES

Will it cost money? YES

Can we survive? YES

Do we need to be

reminded again? NO!

When do we start? NOW!

These are simple answers to simple but important and often-asked questions. Whether we are responders, planners, designers, builders, volunteers, or private citizens, we all have a responsibility to others and the community in which we live. n

Resources

Earthquake Engineering Research Institute.

EQE International.

4th U.S./Japan Workshop participants.

Risk Management Solutions, Inc. and Failure Analysis, Inc.

Tokyo Fire Department.

Firefighters in Kobe rescue an 82-year-old man from a collapsed two-story structure. His wife, who was extricated 30 minutes later, was killed. (Photos by author.)

(Top left) The collapse of the upper level of the Hanshin Expressway left this bus fully loaded with passengers going on a ski trip hanging precariously over the edge. (Top right) The quarter-mile collapse of the elevated concrete deck of the Hanshin Expressway was an awesome sight. (Right) A broken concrete column caused this elevated concrete deck to collapse, crushing a van and a truck.

(Left) The collapse of the “shinkabe”-style house probably was the leading cause of death. (Right) Many wooden structures collapsed onto the first floor, trapping or killing sleeping occupants.

(Above left) A pancake collapse of a two-story market in Nishinomiya. (Above right) A 10-story reinforced concrete apartment house pancake-collapsed onto the entire first floor, probably killing the occupants in those crushed apartments. (Left) A building collapsed across the street in central Kobe.

FRANK W. BORDEN, a 35-year veteran of the fire service, is assistant chief of the Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department where, as commander of the Training Division, he directs activities to prepare the department, community, and government to cope with the impact of disasters through training, education, research, and development. He served as investigation team leader for the Coalinga, Mexico City, Whittier, Loma Prieta, and 1994 Northridge earthquakes; has been involved in local, state, national, and international preparedness with various other countries; and has helped to develop a national multidisciplinary Urban Search and Rescue System. He is a member of the IAFC Integrated Emergency Management System Implementation Committee, the National Fire Service Incident Management Consortium, and the Los Angeles Emergency Management Committee and is program manager for the L.A. City Fire Department School Outreach Program.