NEAR TRAGEDY UNDERSCORES NEED FOR SAFETY WHEN TRAINING
BY M. “Mick” MASTRINO
A recent training exercise in Virginia almost turned tragic when a gated wye appliance was ripped apart after having been pressurized with 4,500 psi. Names and locations have been purposely omitted from this article, since the primary objective is to share the lessons learned from this experience and not to discredit anyone.
The drill, a multiagency exercise, was conducted at a school. The simulated scenario included a propane tank that was leaking and on fire; the roof was involved. To prevent water damage to the building, which was an operating school, the lead instructor decided to pressurize the hoselines with air instead of water, to simulate a charged hoseline.
An aluminum alloy gated wye was hooked up to a fire pumper, and 112-inch lines were deployed. The lead instructor told the firefighter responsible for pressurizing the lines to crack open the valve on a 4,500-psi air cylinder to obtain the pressure needed for the lines. The 4,500-psi bottle had no reducing regulator. The firefighter apparently opened the bottle and allowed the full 4,500 psi pressure to enter the gated wye, fire pump, and hoses.
The high pressure detonated the gated wye, which was slammed into the firefighter`s body. He sustained a grazing blow to the chin, bruises on the right shoulder, and damage to the left forearm.
RETROSPECTIVE
In an informal interview, the firefighter told me that after opening the cylinder valve, he felt uncomfortable with the situation and was preparing to close the cylinder. The catastrophic failure occurred while he was closing the cylinder. The angle of his body prevented the flying parts from directly hitting him. This firefighter had no formal instruction for this procedure. His only “instruction” was being told how to accomplish the task by the lead instructor.
The lead instructor, whom I also interviewed, told me that he had practiced the procedure the week before the training exercise and that several training organizations are using this technique to simulate charged hoselines. When asked about a reducing regulator, he answered that none was available. When questioned about using air pressure from the air chuck on a piece of fire apparatus, he said he did not have the proper equipment to accomplish the task.
A training exercise must be as safe as possible. Certainly, this one could have turned deadly had the injured firefighter`s body been in a different position. Blunt trauma to the head could have killed him instantly. Blunt trauma to the torso could have been so devastating that if death did not occur instantly, the injured firefighter would have been subjected to excruciating pain.
LESSONS LEARNED
Simulation is a great way to teach and is highly encouraged. Using air pressure to simulate charged hoselines is a unique approach and, if properly executed, could be a safe procedure.
Using high-pressure cylinders without reducing regulators is suicide.
Cracking a valve is not the proper way to regulate pressure. In fact, the compressed gas industry discourages this practice.
Another factor contributing to the catastrophic failure was the type of metal used in the wye device. An aluminum alloy cannot contain this much pressure. It was designed for typical water pressures that could go to 600 psi in rare instances. The manufacturer never built the appliance to be pressurized from a 4,500 air cylinder, especially one without a reducing regulator.
The fire service has been very innovative, and we can be thankful for that. The use of air pressure in hoses for rescue work and for assembling decon systems has been proven to be safe. The devices used on these hoses, however, have been tested and have built-in relief protection.
This incident serves as a reminder to all, especially instructors, that safety must always be the primary consideration and that the safety aspect of the training exercise must be planned just as the training aspect is. When using procedures that are new or with which participants are not familiar, they must be rehearsed in detail before the event, and the evolutions that are to be performed must be evaluated from the perspective of safety. In this case, the situation was equivalent to that of “a loaded gun that went off.” It was just pure luck that no one was killed. n
M. “MICK” MASTRINO, a 39-year veteran of the fire service, is president emeritus/past chief of the United Steam Fire Engine Co. No. 3 in Frederick, Maryland, and a retired sergeant from the Maryland State Police. He is a certified Level II instructor with the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute and a certified environmental trainer.
