Arriving at the address given by the dispatcher, you notice fire blowing out two windows of a second-floor residential structure. Although it is midmorning and the occupants should be awake and out of the house, the cars in the driveway cause your heart to skip a beat. As first-due chief, you again review the tactical assignments you will be giving to the incoming companies. You think about the staffing you will need for fire attack, forcible entry, search and rescue, laddering, ventilation, rapid intervention, water supply, and pump operations.1 You also think about other nonsuppression tasks that must be addressed-accountability, safety, staging, and communication.
However, unless you are in charge of a large suburban or metropolitan department, it is unlikely that you will have the 20 or more firefighters needed to complete the tactical assignments, especially during daylight working hours. With staffing shortages, you can’t even begin to worry about “command staff” or general staff positions since the fire must be put out! To accomplish your suppression goals, you call for additional companies or departments to assist in battling this fire. These additional companies will usually be directed by a company officer or senior firefighter and may be accompanied by a battalion chief or chief officer who will assist in coordinating the efforts of his own department’s firefighters.
But is this traditional use of the mutual-aid chief the best practice? And what if you do have enough firefighters in your own department to accomplish the suppression tasks? Do you also have a sufficient number of chiefs within your own department to address the needed command functions? Does your department fill these command positions by pulling company officers away from the firefighters they ordinarily supervise to assign a safety or an accountability officer?2 Too often, incident commanders ignore the resources of their neighboring communities when filling the command staff positions.
USING COMPANY OFFICERS
The volunteer fire service is subject to the provisions of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1720, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Departments. NFPA 1720 specifies minimum standards for the delivery of effective and efficient volunteer public fire suppression (NFPA 1720, Section 1.2.).
NFPA 1720-like its counterpart for career departments, NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments-requires that “personnel responding to fires and other emergencies shall be organized into company units or response teams and shall have appropriate apparatus and equipment” (Section 4.1.4.). In addition, this same standard also requires that orders addressed to individual members of the department (particularly verbal orders) at incident scenes be transmitted through the company officer (NFPA 1720, Section 4.2.1.6.).3
Company officers are usually (or should be) in a position of leadership because of their fire service knowledge, experience, training, and education. The company officer’s job is to complete the assigned task while looking out for the safety of the firefighters assigned to his individual company. If the chief pulls a company officer away from the troops to fill one of the command or general staff functions, the company is deprived of the officer’s knowledge and experience. The company also loses an extra pair of eyes and ears that should be focused on fire conditions and scene hazards. Removing a company officer from the engine or truck crew, in an effort to improve accountability and safety staffing, could actually have the opposite result of placing the individual company at greater risk.
MUTUAL-AID CHIEF OFFICER
The answer to this dilemma is found in the mutual-aid chief officer (MACO). Incident commanders (ICs) must request a sufficient number of chief officers to the scene to cover the command positions present at every fire or emergency incident. Dispatching of the MACOs may be done automatically, on notification that a specific fire condition exists (such as a working fire), or only at the request of the incident commander at the scene. However, it is unlikely that a chief faced with emergency conditions will consider the immediate need of the command and general staff functions, since the chief will be too busy “just putting the fire out.” Instead, the dispatchers’ standard operating guidelines or procedures should require that MACOs be dispatched on determining that a working fire or other special emergency condition exists. This procedure will reduce the delay in receiving the needed assistance because of time and distance considerations.
STAFF FUNCTIONS
You have now realized, as the IC, that you need help, but you cannot strip your companies of their officers. Having decided to use your MACOs for command or staff positions, you must decide which positions you will fill. Because of a single IC’s ability to safely supervise all operating companies at smaller incidents and first-alarm assignments on larger incidents, the staff functions of safety, accountability, and senior advisor may be filled first.
SAFETY OFFICER
The incident safety officer (ISO) is one of the most important positions to fill at any emergency scene. The ISO is responsible (with the IC) for the overall safety of firefighters operating at the emergency scene. Among other duties, the ISO supervises personnel accountability for all firefighters within the hazard zone; develops, implements, and revises an incident safety plan; corrects safety problems; develops a firefighter rescue plan; and appoints additional safety sector officers as needed.
The ISO must be part of the incident management system (IMS) and is included within the current National Incident Management System (NIMS) standard. The ISO may also provide technical assistance to the IC and may serve as a liaison to federal, state, or local agencies or companies on safety issues, such as the termination of utilities.
A chief officer is ideal to serve as the ISO for many reasons, among them the years of experience and training that typically come with serving as a chief officer and an IC. In addition, “a chief officer responsible for safety at the command post also brings a higher level of influence on decision making. A chief-to-chief relationship eliminates the awkward situation of a company officer’s acting as a safety officer and challenging the IC.”4
This very situation occurred in a nearby department when a junior company officer demanded that the IC not undertake a specific course of action on the fireground because of safety considerations and concerns. An argument ensued over rank and responsibility. The challenge by the junior officer ultimately led to a major split within the department. This situation would not have arisen if a department policy stipulated that a chief from a mutual-aid department provide critical assistance to the IC.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICER
Accountability must be employed at every incident. Firefighter safety depends on an organized and well-run accountability system. At the very least, an accountability system requires that the IC (or his specific delegate) account for all personnel on the scene, the officers maintain awareness of all assigned members’ positions and functions on-scene, and individuals entering and leaving the structure be specifically tracked.5
In most fire scenarios, the IC will not have time to track all firefighters on the scene. Likewise, a safety officer will be busy ensuring that continual risk assessment of ongoing fire operations is provided, that the IC is assessing and accounting for all potential hazards, that rapid intervention teams are in place, and that an accountability system is initiated. The ISO will not have time to track every fire company operating on the scene, and it is even less likely that the ISO will have the mindset to track individual accountability without making this task a major part of this job. It makes much more sense to assign a MACO as accountability officer to track individual companies and to require the periodic accounting of all personnel on the scene using a personnel accountability report (PAR).
SENIOR ADVISOR
This position is used most often in certain larger metropolitan departments. As the title implies, the senior advisor provides advice to the IC regarding strategy, safety, or other critical issues at the emergency scene. This seldom-filled position should be used to lighten the IC’s load and stress level by filtering information sent to the IC or to oversee and address certain strategies that have not been accomplished. The senior advisor can also assist in many critical decisions by serving as a sounding board. The senior advisor, if used, may also serve as a coach and can lead to both the IC and senior advisor learning from each other and from the incident itself.6
COMMAND ASSIGNMENTS
As more companies arrive on-scene or as an incident grows in size or complexity, it may no longer be possible for the IC to oversee and control the operations of the individual companies. In that case, the IC must consider expanding the IMS to include specifically designated command staff. For structure fires, these positions may include an operations chief, sector officers, an attack chief, and a logistics officer.
Operations chief (OC). A single individual, usually the chief in whose jurisdiction the fire occurs, assumes responsibility for the overall control of an incident. NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System, defines the essential elements of the incident command system. Section 3-1.1 provides: “There should be one clearly identifiable incident commander for the duration of the incident, from the arrival of the first unit until the incident is terminated.” Nonetheless, the IC may delegate portions of his command. These delegated roles, standardized throughout the IMS, are operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. Typically, in the structural fire scenario, planning, logistics, and finance are not needed. However, as more companies are summoned and become involved at the fire, there may be a greater need for an OC. The OC is responsible for managing the tactical activities up through implementing the incident action plan.
When the IC initiates this position, he must review with the OC the strategy and tactics already in place, the outcome desired, and any anticipated problems. The operations position is usually delegated to someone already operating at the scene. “A natural progression to this position can occur when a higher-ranking officer assumes command. The officer relieved of command can be assigned to operations.”7 For many departments, this is a radical change. In a mutual-aid fireground situation, it may be more prudent to assign a mutual-aid chief to the operations sector. This makes sense when issues other than operations must be addressed. This permits a mutual-aid chief to focus on the fire at the command post with the IC, who will address other issues including safety, accountability, logistics, and public information.8
The IC or the OC may consider assigning sector chief officers. The sector officers may supervise multiple companies operating within their geographic area or “division” or may be assigned by task, such as ventilation or fire attack. These companies are organized by “groups.” By using sector officers, the IC or OC maintains a manageable span of control.
In a smaller structure fire, where an OC may not be required to assume command for overall operational decisions or where sector officers are not needed to maintain a functional span of control, the IC may wish to consider assigning an attack chief (AC), a label recently given to chief officers who enter the fire building and operate in the vicinity of the fire. The AC provides critical information to the IC so the IC can determine if his fireground strategies are working or need to be revised or changed completely. In addition to providing and receiving information to and from the IC, the AC also supervises multiple units operating in the interior fire area. As needed, the attack chief can call for additional hoselines for suppression or can direct search operations in the fire area. The attack chief can supervise overhaul, since he should be in the best position to see and know the suppression activity that has occurred, especially where fire attack crews were changed.9
Logistics officer. Most fire chiefs will not consider a logistics officer for the typical house fire. However, depending on the mutual-aid companies used, a logistics officer may be necessary to relieve the IC of duties that might otherwise overwhelm him. A logistics officer may serve as a communications coordinator. A logistics officer can address the supplies or resources needed, such as water, foam, spare SCBA cylinders, fuel for apparatus, rehabilitation supplies and needs, and portable toilets. In the structural fire scenario, one MACO can handle these assignments systematically, beginning with initial communications coordination. As the situation progresses over time, the MACO will be able to focus on the other tasks (usually with the assistance of other public agencies, such as emergency management).
MUTUAL-AID OPERATIONS
For fire departments considering using their mutual-aid chiefs for additional assistance, they must be willing to sit down and discuss a common plan all chiefs involved in the response can use. Written standard operating guidelines (SOGs) that address a number of issues must be drafted. As stated previously, you must establish the criteria to be used in determining when mutual-aid chiefs will respond. From a technical standpoint, you also must determine how the mutual-aid chief will be notified. It is likely that the mechanism will be more difficult in a volunteer department, where individual or battalion tones are not often used. You must write SOGs that address the incident command staff and their duties. Again, these guidelines should be drafted with the participation of mutual-aid departments. SOGs that address general operations, including accountability and rapid intervention team procedures and communication, must also be drafted, reviewed, and adopted. Although SOGs can and should be written specifically for each department, there must also be regional planning. As has been noted in prior line-of-duty fireground deaths: “The complexities of a large-scale incident are already difficult without the added confusion about differences in coordinating critical operations.”10 Ultimately, the departments should consider amending their written mutual-aid agreements (or drafting one if one is not already adopted). The agreement would formalize the response plan, liability issues, and insurance coverage, among other topics.
Once the officers have met and agreed on procedures for operating at structural fires or other mutual-aid incidents, they must then place significant energy into training with each other before the incident occurs. Ultimately, the mutual-aid chief officers at the command post operate as a team. They build trust and learn each other’s strengths and weaknesses. You would not bet on any sports team in a playoff situation that did not practice. Homeowners should not risk their lives and property on command teams that have not practiced either. Simulations, tabletop exercises, and full-blown operational exercises are some examples of practice methods. The point is that officers must be able to practice and refine operations in an environment that permits quick feedback and correction without the risk of adverse consequences.
SHORT- AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS
Incident commanders who choose to delegate duties to their mutual-aid counterparts will find many short-term advantages. First, the delegation permits the IC to focus more on the problem at hand. Using additional chief officers also brings more experience and knowledge to the command post. Also, as chief officers share their knowledge and experience with each other, there is a reduced potential for mistakes, since the partnership creates an opportunity for feedback and backup. In addition, from the technical standpoint, the safety, accountability, and operation functions tend to be run more efficiently.
Using mutual-aid chief officers in the command and staff function also provides each officer with greater “real-world” experience, which is especially important when the number of fires is declining nationally. This additional experience will improve the quality of short- and long- term officer decision making and will result in more efficient and safe fireground operations in the future. In addition, when chiefs practice and work together, political and geographical boundaries break down more quickly. This breakdown usually leads to a greater willingness to have departments work together as a whole in the long run, especially after firefighters witness the cooperation at the command level. Ultimately, chiefs willing to delegate many of these areas of responsibility to their fellow mutual-aid chief officers will find that their own command performance has improved, as has the safety of their community’s residents. ■
Endnotes
1. For staffing standards on fire attack, see NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, and NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments.
2. NFPA 1710 requires that career supervising chief officers have staff aides deployed to them for the purposes of incident management, logistics, and accountability (see Sections 3.3.32 and 5.2.2.25). Staff aides in career departments are also referred to as “Field Incident Technicians, Staff Assistants, Battalion Firefighters, or Battalion Adjutants.” (See NFPA 1710, A.3.3.32.). Also see Burton W. Phelps, “The Case for an Aide at Multiple-Alarm Incidents,” Fire Engineering, Aug. 2002, 107-108.
3. Savia, Steven A., “NFPA 1720: The Forgotten Standard,” Fire Engineering, Oct. 2001, 26-32.
4. Morris, Gary, “Many Faces of Safety,” Fire Chief, April 2001, 64.
5. See NFPA 1500 and NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System.
6. Kelalas, James E. and Jonathan S. Smith, “A Coach for the Command Post,” Fire Chief, April 1998, 52-56.
7. Smith, James P., Strategic and Tactical Considerations on the Fireground, Brady Prentice Hall (2002), 39.
8. Coleman, Skip, Managing Major Fires, Fire Engineering Books and Videos (2001), 17.
9. Salka, John J. Jr., “The Attack Chief,” Firehouse, July 2003, 104-105.
10. “Career Firefighter Dies Searching for a Fire in a Restaurant/Lounge-Missouri,” NIOSH Report F2004-10, July 1, 2004, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 5.
