RADIOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES, STRATEGY, AND RESPONSE: THE MASSACHUSETTS APPROACH

BY STEPHEN CLENDENIN, DAVID LADD, and THOMAS O’CONNELL

Our country has been challenged with developing a new paradigm for preparing and training our emergency responders to respond safely to accidents/incidents involving radioactive materials as well as for the reality of terrorist attacks that involve radiation. A radiological response system based on strategic outcomes will create a viable response structure. Strategies to meet the challenges of the new paradigm can be developed and standardized through the review of various regulatory requirements, guidance documents, and existing protocols, and also from the input from multiple agencies at the local, state, and federal levels.

This article presents the Massachusetts strategy for radiological incident response for the first on-scene emergency responders. The objectives of this strategy are as follows:

To provide training geared toward understanding the basic principles of radiation and radiation safety, to identify existing state resources (self-protection/asset protection/assistance), and interagency cross training.

• To standardize the types of radiation detection instrumentation (three categories of equipment).

• To develop standardized dose limit guidance for first responders.

EQUIPMENT

The three categories of equipment being deployed are personal dosimeters, radiation detection, and radiation measurement.

Personal Dosimetry

Various first responders and organizations that may be potentially impacted have pocket optical dosimeters (POD) and electronic dosimeter units. Electronic dosimetry, because of the availability of audible and visual features not found on PODs, appears to be the unit of choice for first responders. The dosimeters can be programmed for preset alarm set points for accumulated dose and dose rates. An organization can preset the alarms for a generic response as well as program the dosimeters on-scene for event-duration and mission-specific applications.


PODs can be very difficult to read when wearing full-face respiratory protection, and they do not have alarming features that would notify the user when accumulated dose set points have been exceeded.

Depending on the range of the dosimeter being used, the POD will record accumulated doses in units of millirem (mrem) or rem (R).

Measurement Equipment

Measurement equipment typically is a radiation meter with an energy compensated Geiger-Muller (GM) detector. This equipment measures general area dose rates in clean and in impacted areas. The information obtained with this equipment is used to establish exclusion and safe areas and to develop the down-range stay times for entry teams. Recently, radiation measurement instrumentation technology developed for use in the field provides responders the ability to identify the radioactive isotope(s) that is emitting the gamma radiation.


The overall incident strategy and prioritization of missions will depend on the ability of the response system to obtain radiation dose rate measurements on a long-term basis.

Detection Equipment

Detection equipment is used to check for loose or fixed contamination on surfaces, personnel, and equipment. This category of equipment usually is comprised of a pancake GM detector attached to a radiation meter. This equipment can be used to obtain qualitative data and would be most effectively deployed along the decontamination corridor of an incident.

Detection equipment would also be deployed for survey activities involving the removal of samples or evidence from the exclusion zone. All samples should be given a radiation screen before packaging and shipping to a laboratory for radiological or forensic analysis.

Radiation measurement and detection equipment should be used to establish and to constantly reevaluate the environmental habitability of areas such as the incident command post, the decontamination corridor, and staging areas.

The environment in which the equipment will be deployed can be harsh. The first responder community should keep the standard operating guidelines (SOGs) simple for optimal and accurate use. Standardization of equipment categories is a key element of the overall strategy. It achieves interoperability among responder organizations.

MEETING FIRST RESPONDER NEEDS

Firefighters, emergency medical services (EMS), and law enforcement personnel are in the first responder category. Secondary responders include specialized regional or state haz-mat teams and specialized response organizations such as the state Nuclear Incident Advisory Team (NIAT), the state police, and other state emergency response teams. In larger incidents, federal assets will be available for response assistance.

This is a wide-brush stroke of responder types. It should come as no surprise that each responder group has a different mission. These differences in mission can place individuals closer to a radiological-impacted area and, therefore, pose a greater potential of receiving higher radiation doses and of working in higher-dose rate fields.

A standard radiation dosimetry set point guide (Appendix A) and a radiation down-range stay time table (Appendix B) that identify typical first responder radiation accumulated dose, dose rate limits, and guidance actions are presented on page 112.

For long-time duration incidents, keep in mind that their incident mission may drive response agencies to select dose rates and accumulated dose parameter alarm set points within the electronic dosimeters that are different from those given in Appendix A. It is, therefore, critical that the individual response organization validate through documentation the reasons for selecting its mission alarm set points.

TRAINING AND RETRAINING

Training opportunities on radiation basics and radiation instrumentation have been developed and were made available to first and second responder organizations. Local, state, and federal agencies have made strides in training with each other in their respective areas of expertise. In addition to the training, radiation response equipment has been distributed to various entities including local, state, and federal organizations.

This response strategy should position the state of Massachusetts to have the mechanisms and resources in place to respond to an incident involving radiation.

ANATOMY OF A RESPONSE

Basic Forms of Radioactive Materials

Radioactive materials can be found in two basic forms. In the sealed source form, the radioactive materials are sealed inside of a matrix that does not allow the radioactive materials to escape. In some instances, such as the industrial use of radioactive materials, these sealed sources were designed to withstand the extremes of heat, water immersion, and various drop tests. This design minimizes or eliminates the possibility for widespread radioactive contamination.

Sealed sources can contain large quantities of radioactivity and, therefore, can create potentially large-dose rate radiation fields when the sealed source is outside of its shielded container. The greatest danger posed by intact sealed sources is an external exposure hazard.

An emergency responder wearing an electronic radiation dosimeter with the alarm set at an appropriate set point would be alerted to the fact that a radiation field above the established department standard operating guideline level had been surpassed. The emergency responder would be able to complete the mission and at the same time minimize the radiation dose received by using the principles of time, distance, and shielding.

Nonterrorism-related emergency response to incidents involving radioactive materials contained in sealed sources can be safely responded to, and they typically result in minimal radiation dose to the responder.

These types of incidents are short in duration; however, you must detect the radiation hazard to the emergency responder and monitor the dose to personnel.

Radioactive materials in an unsealed form present the greater challenges to emergency responders. The materials may be present on the ground or be airborne. Emergency responders would receive a radiation dose from the direct exposure external pathway and, if respiratory protection is not effective or in use, the internal pathway. Also, response activities most likely would be of longer duration.

It should be noted that the current consensus regarding the terrorist use of radioactive materials in the form of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) would result in a contamination event, but the majority of deaths would be directly and indirectly caused by detonation of the explosive ordinance, not from exposure to the radioactive materials.

Electronic Dosimeter Alarm Set Points

Up until now, we have identified the background and reference materials currently being used for radiological emergency response. The radiation dose values and dose rate values contained in these documents, in conjunction with standard emergency response concepts, allow us to develop a consensus set of preset alarm values for electronic alarming dosimeters.

These preestablished alarm set points for accumulated dose and dose rates will help minimize the confusion and concern that may arise at an incident scene where multiple response agencies are present. In this scenario, if one set of responders has set its alarm set points on the electronic radiation dosimeters at values drastically different from the other responder organization, there is a chance that one set of dosimeters will alarm before the other.

Remember, these recommended alarm set points are based on generic incident response scenarios and on the various reference materials listed above. Generic set points will allow for responder safety and protection and make it possible to monitor radiological conditions across a wide variety of incidents.

In an incident of long-time duration, additional radiological expertise from state, federal, and professional organizations should be available to assist in determining mission-specific dose limits. These dose limits would be based on the incident-specific radioactive materials, dose rates present in the operational area of the incident, the level of personal protective clothing required, the levels of contamination present, and other hazards in the incident’s operational area; they would become part of the incident Health and Safety Plan.

The main purpose of the personal dosimeter is to assess the accumulated dose to the individual assigned the device. To monitor the radiation levels present in a response activity, you would use a detector in the radiation measurement equipment category. This type of instrument would help give you information relative to the radiation dose rates and enable you to develop incident stay times.

The majority of electronic radiation dosimeters used in the first responder community measure only gamma radiation. With most electronic alarming radiation dosimeters, you can establish alarm set points in the accumulated dose mode and the dose rate modes. Each mode usually has two alarm set points that can be programmed into the device.

For the two accumulated dose alarm set points, refer to the values listed in Graph 1. Other information you will need to consider are the specifications relevant to the personal dosimeter’s ability to respond to radiation. The baseline specifications for manufacturers of personal radiation dosimeters were considered in developing this document.

You can use the guidance and the specifications for the accumulated dose values, adjust them for a factor of safety, and generate a set of accumulated dose alarm set points. The guidance takes into consideration the safety of the responder, the ability to safely accomplish the mission, and the flexibility the incident commander needs to safely manage the incident.

RADIATION MEASUREMENT AND STAY TIME

Radiation measurement equipment is used to establish the zones around an incident. Radiation detection equipment is used to establish and to monitor the radiation levels in locations such as the incident command post; cold, warm, and hot zones; and the areas around the incident that have been secured by law enforcement.

As with any equipment deployed in the field, radiation measurement and detection equipment must pass the required checkout procedures and bump tests that determine if a piece of equipment can be placed in service. One of the critical check-out parameters for radiation measurement/detection equipment is establishing the baseline (background) radiation levels present in nonimpacted areas of the incident.

To determine down-range stay times, start with the baseline radiation levels established in the nonimpacted area. Subtract the baseline radiation levels from the radiation data for the impacted and nonimpacted areas. This will give you mrem units per hour or rem per hour. The net result is the radiation level above the established baseline radiation level.

This net result is one of the values used to calculate the down-range stay time for personnel entering the hot zone. Appendix B is a generic example of a down-range stay timetable based on the values listed in the Reading column of Appendix A. An SOP for radiation dose limits should be preplanned and be part of the response plan.

Based on the radiation levels encountered in the field, incident-specific stay time determinations will be made on-scene. Determine mission-specific down-range stay times. One note of caution on stay times: The presence of radiation may not be the driving factor that limits the down-range stay times.

References

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html/.

EPA 400-R-92-001 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/pags.html/.

Emergency Response Guidebook 2004, http://hazmat.dot.gov/gydebook.html/.

FEMA 358 Publication, 3/00 Transport of Radioactive Materials.

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Report Number 138, Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material (2001) ISBN 0-929600-71-1, http://www.ncrponline.org/138press.html/.

Guidance for Protective Actions Following a Radiological Terrorist Event, http://hps.org/hpspublications/papers.html-position.

Background Information on “Guidance For Protective Actions Following a Radiological Terrorist Event,” http://hps.org/documents/RDDPAGs.Background.pdf.

U.S. Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/.

STRATEGIES FOR RADIATION DOSE LIMITS AND RADIATION DOSE SET POINTS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

Review
Many hazardous substances are present in our communities, and many of them are available for unlawful uses, including radioactive materials. Responses to incidents involving the presence of radioactive materials can be conducted in a safe manner. We have the tools to measure for the presence of radiation, detect radiological contaminants, and monitor personnel radiation exposure levels.
Planning and training are essential components of an organization’s strategy for responding to radiological incidents. Standardization of equipment will build confidence in the personnel using and deploying the equipment during a radiological incident.

Purpose There has been much discussion regarding the radiation exposure guidelines responder organizations should use when deciding on the preset alarm set points (dose-R and/or dose rate-R/hour) to program into their electronic dosimeters or radiation dose rate guidance when entering areas where radiation is a consideration at an incident.
Responder safety has been and will always be the primary and overriding consideration. The objectives are to operate in a safe manner and to achieve an essential response objective that contributes to overall incident mitigation and recovery.
Radiological incidents do not occur as frequently as structural fires, emergency medical calls, motor vehicle accidents, and other incidents involving hazardous materials. This fact may work against the responder’s level of comfort when responding to radiological incidents, because the more we know about and the more familiar we are with any given incident response type, the better we become at responding to and mitigating that type of incident.
Interestingly enough, radiation, as a hazardous material and cancer-causing agent, has been widely studied since being discovered in the late 1800s. A great number of documents and reference materials have been written, and therefore exist, on the characteristics of radiation and radioactive materials and the methods for safely handling radiation sources.

REGULATORY BASIS AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
There are state, federal, and international regulations that pertain to the amount of radiation dose (typically expressed in REM radiation equivalent man, a unit of biological damage to living tissue caused by the amount and type of radiation to which the body is exposed) that individuals can receive when they are employed in a job that uses or produces radiation. These individuals are called “occupationally exposed workers.” Radiological technicians, nuclear medicine technicians, radiation regulatory staff, and nuclear power plant personnel would fall into this category. Regulatory limits have also been set for the general population because of the operation of facilities that employ the occupationally exposed individuals.
These above-mentioned radiation doses are in addition to the radiation dose each and every person receives annually from naturally occurring radiation sources present in air, earth, building materials, and consumer products.
The emergency worker/emergency responder group, although considered as part of the general population when not responding to an incident involving radiation or radioactive materials, also has the potential of being exposed to radiation while performing their job.
Most of the guidance currently available and used in the United States is for the radiation dose an emergency worker receives during a radiological incident response to a commercial nuclear power station. This guidance is contained in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 400-R-92-001 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents document. Section 2.5 of this document provides guidance for controlling doses to emergency workers. Appendix B discusses risks to health from radiation doses, and Appendix C provides supporting information for early phases of an incident.


Additional information on strategies for response to transportation incidents involving the U.S. Department of Transportation hazard Class 7 radioactive materials is contained in the Emergency Response Guidebook 2004 and the Federal Emergency Management Agency publication FEMA 358, 3/00 Transport of Radioactive Materials.
Information and guidance on the response to terrorist use of radioactive materials can be found in the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Report Number 138, Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material (2001) ISBN 0-929600-71-1.
The data that exist pertaining to the effects of radiation dose to humans come from the studies on the populations that survived the detonation of the nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during World War II. Other studies have been conducted on uranium mineworkers, radium dial painters, and U.S. military personal exposed during the atomic weapons testing programs. Appendices B and C of EPA 400-R-92-001 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents contain lists of relevant reference materials. The Health Physics Society published in January 2004 Guidance for Protective Actions Following a Radiological Terrorist Event and Background Information on Guidance for Protective Actions Following a Radiological Terrorist Event. These two documents contain a compilation of information found in the previously mentioned documents and expand the long-term response activities that would need to be performed for recovery and reentry into an area contaminated with radiological materials. It is also valuable to look at the military and the international guidance, as our organizations most likely will be working with our military counterparts from the Civil Support Teams that exist in the U.S. Army National Guard. Figure 1 shows the various dose limits for exposures to radiation. The numbers presented here are accumulated radiation doses over a year-long period. Although this is a good way to show the relative dose comparisons, be aware that for emergency response to incidents involving radiation, the accumulated dose takes place over the length of time of the incident. Therefore, the guidance numbers in the EMERGENCY portion of the graph reflect the radiation dose guidance for the incident to perform different tasks. One guidance value from EPA 400-R-92-001 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents should also be considered for emergency response dose limits. In Table 2-2 on page 2-10 of the EPA 400-R-001 document, the dose limit for lifesaving or protection of large populations is given as greater than 25 rem. This value fits in well with the military use of 100 rem as indicated in Figure 1. Excess lifetime risk of cancer is 0.05% per 1 rem of dose. Our personnel are our greatest assets. Therefore, the radiation dose values presented in Graph 1 represent upper-level values. An operational strategy would consider keeping the exposure of personnel to the hazardous material(s) as low as achievable to minimize the impact to our personnel and still accomplish the assigned mission.

STEPHEN CLENDENIN retired as a captain with the Framingham (MA) Fire Department. He has been involved with hazardous materials response for many years and is the deputy director of the Massachusetts Department of Fire Services-Haz Mat Response Division, is the chairman of the National US&R WMD working group, and serves as a member of Interagency Board on Equipment Standardization’s deputy director of Massachusetts Hazardous Materials Response.

DAVID LADD has served as the director of hazardous materials response for the Massachusetts Department of Fire Services since 1999. He began his emergency services career as an EMT and call firefighter in 1974 and has had a 19-year career with the City of Boston, serving as its first paramedic and, ultimately, as its chief of operations for his final five years. During this time, he began the development of many aspects of EMS that are now standard, including Boston Med. Flight and Worcester Life Flight. Ladd was heavily involved in state and federal disaster planning efforts, including those of the National Disaster Medical System, where he served as national co-chair of the field operations subcommittee of the national steering committee. While in this role, he acted as field command for the first 10 days of this system’s first major activation, Hurricane Andrew.

THOMAS O’CONNELL is the Massachusetts Department of Public Health liaison to the Massachusetts Department of Fire Services-Hazardous Materials Response Division. He is a certified health officer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, an instructor for the Radiological Training Series of the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency, and an instructor for the United States Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training Program. O’Connell has also worked as a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency on first responder technical documents and training course development.

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