Rescue Command
BY JACKIE W. EDMONSON, MICHAEL KEETON, and MICHAEL VERNON
The Oklahoma City Fire Department (OCFD) instituted its incident management system during the initial stages of the incident. The Operations component of OCFD Incident Command (IC) was organized basically on two levels–the procurement of resources (manpower and equipment) and on-site strategic and tactical command, or the Rescue Command (RC), as it came to be known. Resources were handled through the IC post some three blocks away from the incident site. Decisions concerning resources were made based on the requests of the rescue commander. The IC was responsible for supplying resources to the RC and maintaining adequate resources to protect the other 650 square miles of the city. On-duty and mutual-aid personnel were staged in anticipation of RC needs (they were assigned in 15- to 20-member squads). Span of control was maintained through the squad leader and safety officer assigned to each squad.
At the RC, we worked with all agencies at one time or another. All requests or actions dealing with the Murrah Building site were to come through the RC. RC dealt with representatives from all sectors on a daily basis. This was a must if we were to handle the magnitude of work and coordinate operational requirements.
All agency representatives came to RC at this level. We melded all the timetables, equipment needs, and personnel requirements.
The on-site rescue commander, in concert with the incident support team (IST) assigned to this incident by FEMA, was responsible for formulating the strategic goals and tactical objectives necessary to bring the incident to completion.
Liaisons and face-to-face communication were used to work out problems and make work-site plans. This worked well for FEMA and RC, allowing needed information to flow. Relations between the two agencies were not always perfect. There were some problems with lines of authority and who should be kept informed, but we were always able to work out all issues to meet our primary goal: the saving and removal of our friends and neighbors.
A structured and coordinated working system that would best utilize the skills of firefighters, construction people, medical teams, medical examiners, and law enforcement personnel and have them perform as a unified team was implemented (see chart on page 49).
Working with the professional, knowledgeable, and skillful FEMA teams was a great pleasure, even though some adjustments had to be made with each task force change. Once they came to know us and our city, we became one unit and formed a brotherhood. Tactics/procedures were modified as the situation dictated. Because we formed a good working relationship with all the people involved, most of the modifications could be worked out face-to-face in small groups. If a more complex issue arose, we would call a formal meeting with the personnel involved. No issues were left unsettled; consensus was reached, and the operation went forward. Assessments and surveys were ongoing components of the routine. Plans were always updated and revised to meet the demands of the situation.
RESCUE COMMAND COMPONENTS
Rescue Command consisted of three district commanders, each assigned an eight-hour shift seven days a week. Each chief (rescue command) had a command staff consisting of the following:
safety officer: 12 hours, entire site;
administrative aide: eight hours;
rescue operations chief: 12 hours, interior of building;
task force leaders: 12 hours;
equipment officer: 12 hours;
manpower officer: 12 hours; and
search and rescue teams: two, four, eight, 12 hours.
SIZE-UP
We were faced with a nine-story office building, including a day care center, in almost total collapse. Only one-half of the building was standing; the rest was stacked in the rubble piles of a pancake collapse. Upward of 300 people were injured, missing, or dead.
At least five major structures had been severely damaged to the point that they required primary and secondary searches. Many victims in these structures had to be assisted/removed or recovered through extrication.
It was immediately obvious that, because of the size and weight of the collapsed material, we would need heavy equipment and experienced personnel to rig and lift the debris. (A local crane contractor provided the equipment and manpower for these tasks.) The entire scene was looked at from the standpoint of the threat of a secondary collapse, which was to become the overriding issue for the duration of the incident.
Specialized rescue equipment was also needed. Several types of search techniques had to be carried out simultaneously: high-angle search procedures on the remaining portions of the upper floors, tunneling and shoring in the lower areas, as well as surface and void searches on the face of the debris pile. The vast amount of equipment needed to support these searches was not readily available. The call for donations of tools and equipment went out to the private sector. Its response for the duration of the incident was absolutely overwhelming.
Immediate equipment needs were met by on-scene fire units; our local utility companies were among the best resources. Since they regularly respond to emergency situations, they can provide certain needed tools and equipment on the spot. Other suppliers of tools, equipment, and services were the city`s support divisions (street, park, and so on), local construction companies, volunteers, and unknown sources. Logistics was in place and providing items as needed.
In the first one-and-a-half hours of the incident, countless civilians and rescue personnel–many seemingly without direction and not under the control of other authorities or outside entities–were in and around the building. All desperately wanted to help.
It was obvious from the start that this would be a long-term incident.
STRATEGIC GOAL
The primary objective was to save lives–to locate and remove all ambulatory and nonambulatory victims from the Murrah and other severely damaged buildings–and do it safely. We had to ensure that search and rescue tactics would not cause further collapse of the already unstable Murrah structure. To perform these tasks, we had to take control of the site (the outside perimeter–a two-block area north and south and one block wide around the Murrah Building–and the Murrah Building itself). Ultimate site security responsibility was assumed by the U.S. marshals. Control of the Murrah Building was accomplished jointly by the police department; fire department; Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); the sheriff`s department; and others. The outside perimeter was under the jurisdiction of Oklahoma City law enforcement.
Rescuers` safety was of utmost importance from start to finish–even more so because of the building`s extreme instability. A major concern recognized during the incident was that equipment weighing hundreds of tons, including cranes moving tons of debris, was being used above the rescuers. To ensure coordination between construction crews and heavy equipment operators at the scene, we met with all crew and company supervisors to go over safety and organizational guidelines. Through this mechanism, RC was able to address and meet the needs of the construction people and keep them up to date on overall operations and needs.
FEMA structural engineers–whose assistance and advice were invaluable–monitored and assessed the building on a continuing basis 24 hours a day. OCFD and FEMA teams attended two briefings each day–at the start of the operational periods–to discuss strategy and select tactics. Key safety and health issues were identified and their remedies addressed. All this information was outlined in an operational period action plan and distributed to involved personnel. This system allowed the tough risk-benefit decisions to be made with a degree of confidence. We realized, however, that, regardless of how many precautions were taken, the building still would be very hazardous throughout the incident.
SEARCH AND RESCUE TACTICS
Search and rescue operations were not conducted in the “usual” manner. A team/squad was assigned to sections, floors, or areas of the building. They performed all function needs in their areas–whatever they might be.
Nearly every type of search technique known was employed to accomplish the overall strategic goal of finding/saving victims. The structures were searched using canines, cameras, listening and heat-imaging devices, and search cameras. Any voids found (there were few) were physically searched. Several operations were taking place simultaneously, including the following:
Search and debris stabilization/removal were underway on the upper floors, “the Pit,” and east extension, as well as on the north surface debris piles. Search and rescue were being conducted by the OCFD, mutual aid, and FEMA teams.
Medical examiners` teams were assisting with the identification and removal of victims and transfers to the morgue area.
The FBI and other law agencies were working the crime scene.
The FBI was working on cars in the parking lot (dismantling them into small pieces–this work necessitated six to 10 people working with tools every day until it was completed).
Teams were performing decon.
The Red Cross and other volunteer agencies were on scene.
Personnel from the State Health Department and our own EMS Division were operating at the scene.
FEMA teams and representatives were on scene.
At the same time all this was going on, the FBI, ATF, and a mixture of all law agencies were working the Water Resources Board, Athenian, and Journal Record buildings and sifting all the parking lots and streets. These are just a few of the items we had to deal with.
There were impediments. Several times during the incident, operations had to be suspended because of the weather. Crane operations were suspended because of lightning. High winds delayed outside efforts while loose debris was controlled. Though these conditions slowed work in some areas, rescue efforts continued in the sheltered areas of the building.
Much of the debris was moved by hand. In addition, the FBI had to inspect each piece of debris for evidenciary value. The fact that the entire incident area was a crime scene caused some complications and delays, which were rectified by assigning an FBI liaison to the RC post.
By approximately the seventh day of operations, we employed a more efficient technique to assist in the allocation of manpower and identification of victims. The medical examiner`s office obtained a list of Murrah Building occupants. The FEMA IST generated a map of each individual`s specific work station. This map was used to assist in identifying those areas in which rescuers were most likely to find victims. As each area was searched and a victim recovered, the specific person was accounted for on the occupant list. This system allowed search resources to be shifted to the areas of the collapse most likely to produce results.
Since this was a crime scene, victims had to be removed in accordance with the following procedure: As each victim was found, a representative of the medical examiner`s office was called to the area to assist in the recovery for the purposes of identification and evidence protection. The victims were taken to the temporary morgue just east of the Murrah Building and then transferred to the county morgue for positive identification.
HAZARD ASSESSMENT/STRUCTURAL STABILITY
On the first day, we met with Oklahoma City engineers who had constructed and remodeled the Murrah Building. They provided information and building plans. FEMA engineers met with these people to assess the building`s condition. FEMA engineers conducted ongoing assessments of the structure throughout the incident. They lived and worked alongside us, which allowed for first-hand knowledge. Without their knowledge and input, the incident`s conclusion may have been very different. With the aid of construction crews, the FEMA engineers and USAR teams were able to address numerous problems associated with the building. Two of the problems were major, however.
The first was the overhanging slabs attached at each floor level, including a huge “Mother Slab” hanging from the roof directly over the Bowl. This slab eventually was cabled to the remaining south wall and “diapered” with canvas to protect against any chunks of concrete breaking away and falling. This large piece of concrete was continually monitored by surveying instruments and watched by personnel assigned to that duty.
The other major problem was the condition of two columns in the front center of the building. These columns had suffered severe damage and had heavy debris piled around them on all sides. Rigging and removing the heavy slabs were like playing a deadly game of “pick up sticks.” Each movement of debris in effect created a new damaged building that had to be assessed. As the two damaged columns were uncovered, the stored energy created by the leaning slabs was released from them. Heavy pipe shoring had to be installed, and the mass of the columns had to be increased by setting forms and applying grout to the columns` damaged portions. These activities were accomplished as rescue-recovery operations continued.
All work was continually inspected and evaluated by USAR structural engineers. Their advice helped fire officers in making some of the toughest decisions they ever had to make.
PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS
There was never a shortage of manpower at this incident. From the start, third, fourth, and general alarms were called in rapid succession, and mutual-aid companies from many Oklahoma fire departments were requested and delivered. After the operational delay caused by the bomb scare at 10:30 a.m., we rotated 75 personnel in and out of the building. These crews initially were assigned for a maximum of two hours, which eventually was increased to four hours. When the time limit was reached, a fresh group of 75 was brought to staging and sent to resources. In addition, hundreds of military and law enforcement personnel responded to the scene. In fact, one of the problems we had was how to eliminate freelancing and maintain control over these nonfire service personnel. All workers ultimately were assigned through the RC resource area. As the area to be searched decreased, the number of assigned personnel was decreased. Safety was enhanced by maintaining only the essential number of personnel on scene.
Using OCFD special teams personnel in key positions was an early and correct decision. Trained rope and confined-space personnel were used in the task force and in group-leader positions, increasing the margin of safety for all concerned. The expertise of the USAR teams that responded, beginning on Day Two, was invaluable. They were among the best minds in the search and rescue business in the country. Their knowledge and abilities benefited all who participated in the incident. All USAR teams operated as a unit; OCFD personnel operated in units right alongside these teams.
The medical personnel (hospital and so on) were on standby and used inside the building during the first hours of the incident. After this time frame, the only medical personnel used with the RC structure were from the medical examiners` staffs, FEMA teams, and our own OCFD EMS personnel.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Establish rescue command or forward operations command in addition to overall incident command. This component of the ICS will serve as a crucial link between the overall incident commander and rescue operations/strategy and tactics.
Streamline the lines of authority. The tendency early in an incident of this magnitude is to have too many levels of command.
Ensure that no actions at a large-scale incident search and rescue operation are taken without first going through rescue command.
Include representatives from other agencies at the rescue command level as well as the overall incident command level. Create a unified team.
Use a fluid command structure to adjust to changing demands.
Update operational plans regularly.
Set work teams and hours early on to fit a long-term need.
Maintain written site plans; make sure all personnel on-site are kept updated (not just rescuers but construction people, support personnel, logistics, planning, and so on).
Take great caution so that rescue operations do not cause a secondary collapse of the remaining structure–take control of the site.
Work closely with heavy equipment operators and establish safety and organizational guidelines.
Build safety into the chain of rescue command–have safety officers at each operational level. Incorporate safety officer training for all personnel starting with company officers.
Identify critical safety and health issues–and their remedies–throughout the incident. Distribute this information to all operations personnel.
Establish a documentation mechanism (log, notes, recorder, and so on) at primary operational locations.
Seek equipment resources from outside agencies, if necessary, to better meet tactical objectives.
At a crime scene, work closely with law enforcement personnel to ensure that all potential evidence can be inspected.
Seek innovative ways/technologies to assist with victim identification.
Work closely with structural engineers to reduce the possibility of secondary collapse.
Realize that effective collapse search and rescue operations hinge on a coordinated multiagency effort.
For safety and effectiveness, keep the number of personnel operating in the collapse zone consistent with the overall size of the area to be searched.
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DEATH TOLL MOUNTS AS BODIES ARE RECOVERED
April 20 52
April 21 65
April 22 78
April 24 83
April 25 96
April 26 98
April 28 118
May 1 134
May 2 139
May 5 168
Final fatality confirmed after May 23: 169.
NOTE ON MICHAEL LOUDENSLAGER, GSA employee who rescued victims and then disappeared: Sometimes, it took weeks for the truth to emerge about some of the victims in the Federal Building. The most extraordinary example of this is the case of Michael Loudenslager, who worked in the GSA offices in the northwest corner of the Federal Building–a small area slightly outside the main force of the blast. At 8:40 a.m. on Wednesday, he phoned his wife, Bettie, and said he was clearing his desk to get ready for a planned four-day weekend. There was no trace of Loudenslager in the forty-eight hours immediately after the bombing. Then, on Friday, April 21, his family was called to Presbyterian Hospital. There, a GSA colleague, with bad facial scars and numerous internal injuries, told the family that he had been pulled from the rubble by Michael Loudenslager, who appeared himself to be unhurt. The family still hoped he would be found alive. A day later, another GSA colleague attested that he, too, had
been saved by Loudenslager.
Apparently, Loudenslager had then headed for the second-floor day-care center (the center was part of the GSA, and GSA staffers often played with the children). After that, there was no sighting of him. Then, late on the night of Saturday, April 22, rescue workers found his body near the stairwell, under a vast concrete block. It took two shifts of men working with jackhammers to free him, and on Sunday morning, the day of the prayer service, Michael Loudenslager`s family was formally notified of his death. It was then clear that he was the second fatality among people who tried to rescue victims. Rebecca Anderson, who died after being hit by concrete soon after the blast, had gone into the building from the street. Michael Loudenslager never made it to the street. His priority was the day-care center.
From the book In Their Name, edited by Clive Irving, Project Recovery OKC. Copyright © 1995. Reprinted with the permission of Random House, Inc.
JACKIE W. EDMONSON is a career firefighter and 24-year veteran of the Oklahoma City (OK) Fire Department. During his career, he has accumulated extensive skills in wildland, urban, commercial, and industrial (light and heavy) fires, including petrochemical and intercity high-rise fires. He has six years of experience as the on-duty hazardous-materials shift operation officer. He served as an on-site rescue commander during the Oklahoma City Bombing.
MICHAEL KEETON has been a member of the Oklahoma City (OK) Fire Department for more than 23 years, where he serves as a district commander. He served as shift supervisor for the hazardous-materials and dive-rescue units. He is trained in rope and confined-space rescue and is a nationally registered EMT-D and a state-certified EMS instructor. He served as an on-site rescue commander during the Oklahoma City Bombing.
MICHAEL VERNON is a 19-year veteran of the Oklahoma City (OK) Fire Department, where he serves as District 602 commander. He is completing requirements for an associate`s degree in fire technology at Oklahoma State University. Vernon served as an on-site rescue commander during the Oklahoma City Bombing.
