Article and photos by Lance C. Peeples
This year, the nation reflected on the 10-year anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center. Thinking about this tragic day, it struck me how much the firefighters of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) resembled those members of the armed services who took up the fight and carried it to the enemy. Although firefighters have an advantage over soldiers in that we face a non-thinking enemy, it nonetheless remains true that we are engaged in a war against fire. If it is true that firefighters are engaged in mortal battle with a lethal foe, then perhaps it would be instructive if we took some lessons from an elite group of “warfighters”: the United States Marine Corps.
In 1989, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant A.M. Gray wrote Warfighting. This short, 77-page document provided the official doctrine of the Marine Corps concerning the conduct of war. The military concepts enumerated in Warfighting and how they can be applied to the battles we firefighters wage in our towns and cities are discussed below.
Why We Fight
…the object of war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to that end is the organized application or threat of violence by military force.
The primary mission of the fire service is to impose our will on (i.e., extinguish) uncontrolled fires. Although we may undertake other missions (i.e., hazmat, EMS, etc.), we must always be cognizant that our primary mission is the application of force (i.e., water at a rate sufficient to absorb generated British thermal units (Btus)) against uncontrolled fires. This is our core mission. We must not fail. Good intentions are not enough. The fire cares not one iota about our intent. Showing up with six firefighters when 12 are required or 12 when 24 is the necessary number will not impress the fire. We must impose our will on our enemy.
The fire does not care if a municipality cannot afford a suppression force capable of subduing it. The fire listens only to force, and that force is applied by firefighters in the form of sufficient water. Firefighters must be very careful to determine the amount of fire they can extinguish with the resources available to them. This information then needs to be communicated to the political leaders (in a manner they can understand) who are charged with providing those resources. Failure to inform political leaders of the resources needed to protect a particular community constitutes cowardice and a lack of leadership.
Friction
Friction is the force that resists all action. It makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. … Friction may be mental, as in indecision over a course of action. Or it may be physical, as in effective enemy fire or a terrain obstacle that must be overcome. Friction may be external, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance. Or friction may be self-induced, caused by factors such as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear or complicated plans, complex task organizations or command relationships, or complicated communication systems.
Clearly, General Gray’s manual offers a tremendous amount of insight regarding a firefighter’s need to overcome friction. Friction goes to the core of why firefighting is such a difficult endeavor. Understaffed companies, severe weather, “difficult terrain” (i.e., tough forcible entry, cellar fires, high-rise jobs, dilapidated buildings) all increase the “friction” we face as we prepare to engage the enemy. Firefighters cannot let friction defeat them!
What is the prescription offered against friction in Warfighting? Commandant Gray offers this critical insight:
While training should attempt to approximate the conditions of war, we must fully realize it can never fully duplicate the level of friction of real combat.
Here, then, is a major problem facing the American fire service: We don’t train as if we’re fighting a life-and-death war. As America’s population has shifted from urban to suburban areas, the fire problem has shifted with it. In many areas, we now see suburban fire companies with two or three members, long response times because of low population densities, and a complete lack of any type of fire training facility. We have been set up for failure by the low number of fires per firefighter in these jurisdictions as well as inadequate hands-on, repetitive, skills-based fire training.
Once again, the fire does not care if the only training we can muster is to wash down the high school parking lot yet again. The fire cares only that we defeat the friction that prevents us from applying the force (i.e., gallons per minute) needed to extinguish it! And the only way we can defeat friction is to attempt to approximate the conditions of war! That’s right WAR! Because of a lack of frequent fires in many jurisdictions, it is easy to get lulled into a sense of complacency. If it’s been a month, two months, or six months since your last job, it is easy to get sucked into the deadly trap of complacency. We must not allow this to happen! We must understand that from the moment we enter the firehouse until the moment we leave the next day, we are at WAR and our enemy at any moment IS preparing to kill us. We must screw our heads on straight and understand that we are walking into an ambush every time we walk into the firehouse.
We MUST overcome friction. The only way to do that is to attempt to approximate the conditions of war! Every tour–no exceptions! We must be physically and mentally prepared to do battle at all times. Perhaps the rear door of every firehouse should have a sign that reads,: Danger–Do not enter unless you are physically and mentally prepared to do battle with a brutal and lethal enemy.
(1) Train as if you‘re going to war. You are!
Disorder
In an environment of friction, uncertainty, and fluidity, war naturally gravitates toward disorder…. The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork. Thus, we cannot hope to impose precise, positive control over events. The best we can hope for is to impose a general framework of order on the disorder, to prescribe the general flow of action rather than to try to control each event.
Far too many incident commanders (ICs) attempt to micromanage the fireground. These micromanagers are doomed to failure from the commencement of operations because the fireground moves far too rapidly for the IC to dictate every action. Instead, the IC should convey his intent (ideally by standard operating guidelines) and delegate the authority to the officers and/or firefighters responsible for executing that intent. This, of course, mandates that everyone know the plan (i.e., first-due engine stretches the appropriate size line; second-due engine secures the water supply; first-due ladder splits into the outside ventilation team and the inside search team, etc.).
By ensuring that each member understands his intent at a “standard” fire, the IC is now free to manage by exception … a much faster and efficient process. We need only to issue orders if something unusual dictates that we amend the “standard” plan. The caveat to delegating authority commensurate with the commander’s intent is that the subordinate officers and firefighters must be thoroughly informed as to exactly what the commander’s intent is through standard operating guidelines AND training in the actual execution of the tactics needed to implement that intent (strategy).
Imagine what would happen if a Marine lieutenant had to tell his marines in the heat of an ambush: “John, take the M-60 and go over to that hill and lay down suppressing fire. Bob and Joe, take four grenades each and head over into that ravine and try and protect our left flank. Sergeant, I want you to take your squad and cover the right flank. Make sure you don’t shoot any friendlies, and don’t waste a lot of ammo!”
How much more efficient if the lieutenant simply yelled “ambush” and the well-trained Marines–who have drilled hundreds of times on what to do in the event of an ambush–simply set about their jobs of taking cover and killing bad guys! If the lieutenant was forced to issue each command separately, it is entirely possible that the enemy would take advantage of the inherent time delay to kill the lieutenant and his men. Likewise, a house fire may take advantage of the delays inherent in micromanagement to kill you and your men.
(2) This is no time for micromanagement. There might be kids in that back bedroom. Do you know the commander’s intent? Do you have standard operating guidelines for operations at single-family dwellings, multiple dwellings, high-rise fires, car fires etc.? Does your department have predetermined tool and job assignments? There is simply no time for the incident commander to formulate his plan AND communicate it AFTER he arrives at the fire. Nothing prevents the IC from changing the “standard” approach if conditions dictate.
Violence and Danger
Experience under fire generally increases courage, as can realistic training, by lessening the mystique of combat. Strong leadership which earns the respect and trust of subordinates can limit the effects of fear. Leaders should develop unit cohesion and esprit and the self-confidence of individuals within the unit.
We once again return to the observation that actual experience and realistic training are essential to both the Marine and the firefighter. It is not unexpected that untrained firefighters would be incapable of accurately calculating the danger inherent in a particular action. If a given jurisdiction cannot provide its members with actual fireground experience, then it is absolutely essential that we substitute REALISTIC training conducted by people who do have real solid fireground experience AND education. Squirting water in the high school parking lot and throwing a ground ladder every third month does not constitute realistic training. Would the Marines get some squirt guns and plastic grenades and call that training? The obvious answer is no, because they are preparing for WAR, just as we should be doing! Fake, pretend training designed to create a paper trail will not impress your next fire–guaranteed!
(3) Training must be realistic.
Moral and Physical Forces
Moral forces are difficult to grasp and impossible to quantify. We cannot easily gauge forces like national and military resolve, national or individual conscience, emotion, fear, courage, morale, leadership, or esprit. Yet, moral forces exert a greater influence on the nature and outcome of war than do physical.
The Marines provide us with considerable insight in this brief paragraph. Far too many fire officers operate in an egocentric fog where they fail to understand their primary mission is to provide their subordinates with the tools and skills needed to get the job done. Simply put, officers must instill a sense of pride in their firefighters. This esprit de corps will prove essential in making a tough push down a long hall. It can’t be measured, but it must be cultivated. Firefighters are warriors and should be treated as such. Officers should at all times respect their firefighters.
Art and Science of War
Owing to the vagaries of human behavior and the countless other intangible factors which contribute to it, there is far more to the conduct of war than can be explained by science. The science of war stops short of the need for military judgment, the impact of moral forces, the influence of chance, and other similar factors. We thus conclude that the conduct of war is ultimately an art, an activity of human creativity and intuition powered by the strength of the human will.
Firefighting, like warfighting, is also ultimately an art. Although it is informed by the sciences of physics and chemistry, in the end, our decision making is more intuitive than empirical. Rarely will the fire officer have all of the facts necessary to make an optimal decision, yet decide he must! There is as yet no test to determine if a probie will be able to push down a long hall and “make the turn.” Chance will no doubt play a role at many fires. Although we must avail ourselves of every opportunity to understand the science that informs our craft, we must also understand that in the end, science will rarely offer us a magic bullet. In the end, a determined firefighter will be needed to kill the enemy!
The Spectrum of Conflict
The Marine Corps, as the nation‘s force in readiness, must have the versatility and flexibility to deal with military and paramilitary situations across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is a greater challenge than it may appear; conflicts of low intensity are not simply lesser forms of high-intensity war. A modern military force capable of waging a war of high intensity may find itself ill-prepared for a “small“ war against a poorly equipped guerrilla force.
The fire department must be capable of defeating hostile fire along the entire “spectrum of conflict.” If a community has only one high-rise building, then the fire department must be capable of extinguishing a fire on the upper floors of that building. If the fire department is understaffed or lacks the necessary training and equipment to fight a high- rise fire, then it is essential that policy-makers understand that this particular threat is beyond the capacity of the fire department to “impose its will.” At the other end of the spectrum, firefighters must not be lulled into a sense of complacency by a “small” war as in the case of a dumpster or car fire. Many firefighters have lost their lives while operating at these “small” wars. We should prepare for and operate at these “small” war fires every bit as diligently as we prepare for more intense conflicts.
Offense and Defense
The offense generally has as its aim some positive gain; it is through the offense that we seek to impose some design on the enemy. The defense, on the other hand, contributes resisting power, the ability to preserve and protect oneself. Thus, the defense generally has the negative aim, that of resisting the enemy’s will.
If we are to win in the battle against our enemy, it is essential that we correctly identify when our forces should be on the offense and when they should be on the defense. This, of course, is much easier said than done. The suppression force should be on the offense when there is reasonable cause to believe that savable lives and/or valuable property are at risk. The risk the forces undertake while on the offensive should be commensurate with the value of the lives or property at risk. Therefore, since a human life is of great value, firefighters should endure great risk to effect a rescue. A fire in a valueless dumpster should be extinguished while undertaking no (read minimal) risk. Between the two extremes lies a continuum along which firefighters will be subjected to increasing amounts of risk.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a rising faction in the fire service that argues that firefighters should undertake no risk to protect property. This is, however, unethical. The public supports its fire department with the expectation that firefighters will undertake some degree of risk to protect their property. If we do not inform the public that we are not prepared to accept any risk to protect their property, then we are being untruthful, and thus unethical. Ultimately, both the value of the property and the risks inherent in protecting it are subjective, and therein lies the problem. Fire officers and fire officers should be trained to make subjective judgments as to both value and risk before undertaking offensive operations. This returns us once again to our previous observation that firefighting is as much art as science. Defensive operations should be reserved for those times when the fire clearly exceeds our capacity to enforce our will or there is no valuable property at risk. If we commit our forces to offensive operations at defensive fires, we risk massive defeat. If we operate offensively at fires involving property without value and where lives are not in jeopardy, we are risking our forces without benefit. Finally, if we operate defensively at offensive fires, we fail in our mission. Fire officers must be able to select the correct mode of operation.
(4) Fire officers must be able to correctly weigh the risks and benefits of offensive operations.
Leadership
As military professionals charged with the defense of the nation, Marine leaders must be true experts in the conduct of war. … Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives.
Have no doubt about this: If you are a fire officer, you are making decisions today that will one day be paid for in human blood. You must be competent. Just because you’re certified doesn’t make you competent. Just because you’ve been hanging out the longest at the firehouse doesn’t make you competent. Just because the guys like you the best doesn’t make you competent.
What makes you competent is BEING competent. Competence can only be arrived at through a combination of experience (as contrasted with tenure), education, and NEVER ENDING, REALITY-BASED TRAINING! You must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of your office. This is not a game! We are engaged in a war where our enemy may rise up and kill us at any time!
Summary
Warfighting has provided us with an instructive analogy that allows the fire service to benefit from the accumulated wisdom derived from years of United States Marine Corps’ combat experience. The observation that warfare (minus the willful intent of our opponent) is remarkably similar to firefighting allows us to draw a number of lessons from Leatherneck doctrine. One of the main lessons is the need to avoid friction by publishing the commander’s intent through standard operating guidelines and delegating decision-making authority to the tactical level. This prevents the need to micromanage the fireground with its inherent delays that prevent us from getting ahead of the fire’s power curve. The Marine Corps’ experience demonstrates the need for realistic, never ending training; an appreciation for the difference between offense and defense; and the need for skillful leadership at all levels. Make no doubt about it: Firefighters are at war with a formidable foe that wants to kill us at every opportunity. We MUST prepare for that eventuality.
Lance C. Peeples is a firefighter in St. Louis County, Missouri. He has 30 years of fire and EMS experience. He has A.A.S .degrees in fire and paramedic technology and an M.S. degree in fire and emergency management from Oklahoma State University.
You can read Warfighting in PDF form at http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/mcdp1.pdf.
This article is dedicated to the 343 Bothers who died on 9/11, those who continue to suffer and die in the aftermath of that horrific day, and to the men and women of our armed forces who took up the fight following that terrible day 10 years ago and continue to bear the burden to this day.
