Atlanta mill fire and helicopter rescue

Atlanta mill fire and helicopter rescue

BY J. DAVID RHODES AND MATT MOSELEY

At 1437 hours on April 12, 1999, the Atlanta (GA) Fire Department received a report of a structure fire at 170 Boulevard, the location of the Fulton Bag and Cotton Mill. The five-story mill was built in the late1800s and is now the country`s largest historical renovation project. The property is being converted into residential loft apartments.

On arrival, units reported a working fire in the cotton mill. Shortly thereafter, firefighters learned that a crane operator was trapped high atop a 225-foot “Hammerhead” tower crane, situated over the fire, being used for mill reconstruction.

Assistant Chief Joseph Tolbert, incident commander, established his priorities for this quickly escalating incident. Within a short time after arrival, the fifth floor of the cotton mill lit up and the floor collapsed, nearly taking escaping firefighters down with it. The mill was now fully involved, and burning embers were carried on the strong wind to exposed residential neighborhoods, presenting the threat of conflagration. Tolbert`s immediate strategy, therefore, was to protect nearby residences and rescue the crane operator.

Tolbert sectored the incident and placed Captain Tom Doyle, Squad 4–the department`s haz mat and heavy rescue unit–in charge of the rescue operation.

THE RESCUE PLAN

Since fast-spreading fire blocked the operator`s descent and the operator`s position on the tower crane was far beyond the reach of aerial apparatus, a helicopter was the only available rescue-mode option. Flames from the mill fire were directly impinging on the crane`s fourth and fifth base sections, and the immediate concern was that the structural integrity of the crane would be compromised, resulting in a collapse. A collapse certainly would not have been survivable for the operator and could also have taken out other structures in the area–specifically, a three-story renovated and occupied portion of the mill, which was quickly being evacuated.

The construction foreman radioed the operator and asked him to “weather-vane” the crane quickly and lock it in position so that it would be parallel to the wind`s direction. Doing this would limit wind resistance, which could have stressed the crane`s heated steel base. Hot convected air and radiant heat reached the operator`s cab, forcing him to evacuate to the top of the crane arm.

Approximately 30 minutes into the fire, the crane cab began burning. The operator later reported that the wind gauge inside the cab was reading 30 to 40 mph before he evacuated. The wind severely hampered firefighting efforts; more than a half-dozen exposure fires in houses near the mill were attributed to it. However, the wind can also be credited with keeping the operator alive. The intentional positioning of the crane allowed the operator to retreat to the far north end of the crane arm, where he experienced only a moderate amount of radiant heat and little smoke. Still, the steel crane got hot enough that the operator had to retreat atop the concrete counterweights; his feet were burning through his shoes.

Meanwhile, firefighters attempted to protect the exposed base of the crane with an aerial master stream.

The Helicopter

As many as eight helicopters were already in the sky and offered assistance. First, the Atlanta Police Department`s Hughes OH6 considered hovering inches off the crane to allow the operator to climb aboard. This plan was abandoned after the radiant heat began to burn the legs and arm of the pilot, Sergeant Judy Smith. She also determined that the engine power needed to sustain the hover for the operation was borderline.

Helicopters from local television stations were also in the area, broadcasting the events to the nation. WSB-TV, an ABC affiliate, had two helicopters–a Bell Long Ranger L-3, which had too much media equipment onboard, making it too heavy to lift anyone, and a Bell Long Ranger L-4, a lighter helicopter but with no attachment points for a rescue line. WXIA-TV, an NBC affiliate, and WAGA-TV, a Fox affiliate, were both operating Bell 206-B Jet Rangers; both were loaded down with media equipment, rendering them too heavy for the mission.

Pilots from Georgia Baptist Hospital, located just blocks away from the fire, considered using their Life Flight German-made Bo 105 and an Aerospatiale A-Star to effect the rescue. Equipped with a long line and a preattached harness, the pilot planned to drop the equipment to the operator, who would have had to secure himself in the harness. The fire department opposed this plan, because it did not know the operator`s mental state or level of familiarity or training with a harness; the operator`s forced retreat from the crane cab also cut off his means of communication with ground personnel.

During this time, the State of Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had advised that a Bell Long Ranger L-4 equipped for rescue was minutes away. The decision was made to wait and use this helicopter and put a firefighter on the crane to properly harness the operator.

The DNR helicopter was piloted by Boyd Clines, who had performed many rescues in Vietnam as well as in the North Georgia mountains. He and Crew Chief Larry Rogers had set up for the rescue by removing the rear doors and hooking up the long line to the belly ring. This attachment point is in the center directly under the helicopter`s belly, making it easier to balance and retain control.

Two one-inch woven polyester rescue lines from the helicopter`s cache, one 50 feet and the other 30 feet, were hooked together with a steel carabiner to each rope`s manufactured eye loop to make an 80-foot line. Firefighters performed a brief visual examination of the rope. This helicopter rope was rated at 19,400 pounds and a working load of 5,000 pounds and for a temperature of 390. The 80-foot line was needed to ensure that the helicopter would stay clear of the crane tower and cables.

The Operation

The DNR helicopter arrived one hour and 14 minutes after the initial 911 call. Firefighter Matt Moseley of Squad 4 was ready and waiting in a Class 3 (full-body) harness. The harness was donned over the firefighter`s protective bib-style turnout pants and under the firefighter`s protective jacket. Since temperatures over the crane and operator were unknown, the harness had to be protected from the heat as much as possible. Rigging to both shoulder D-rings was accomplished with a five-foot section of one-inch flat nylon webbing fashioned into a 3-bight. This was done so that the rigging points would be outside the turnout jacket. The webbing was then attached to another locking steel carabiner that was used to hook onto the helicopter line at the prerigged eye loop. The option of using a rescue basket was considered but was rejected since we had not been able to assess the victim`s state of mind. Had he panicked, he might have made a lunge for the basket, possibly causing him to fall out of the crane.

The pilot and spotter were experienced in accomplishing this type of rescue. It was Moseley`s first experience with a helicopter rescue, but he was well-trained in attaching and operating the rescue harness–he spent less than a minute readying himself before lift-off.

The flight to and touchdown on the crane were uneventful. Contact was made with the victim on the approach in an attempt to calm the victim and establish his state of mind. Luckily, the victim was extremely calm and cooperative. He was instructed not to attempt to grab or jump to the rescuer.

Once Moseley was in position on the crane, the helicopter spotter advised the pilot that the firefighter was still attached. The pilot had assumed that the firefighter would detach once on the crane, which would have made it possible for the helicopter to move away from the fire and return after the harness had been applied to the victim. However, because of the time restraints and mechanical difficulties–the radios between the fire department and the helicopter did not interface–the only “communication” between the firefighter and the helicopter pilot was line of sight between Moseley and the helicopter spotter.

The firefighter is trained to remain attached to his line at all times. The pilot was forced to improvise and concentrated on keeping the helicopter steady while providing slack in the rescue line for safety and mobility. Any sudden movement of the helicopter could have pulled the rescuer and unsecured operator away. The spotter relayed the position of the rescuer to the pilot so he could reposition as needed.

The rescue harness was created from a 20-foot piece of one-inch flat nylon webbing. A ring bend was tied into the webbing on the ground. The harness was attached to the victim by holding the ring bend under the rescuer`s chin. The bight was placed between the victim`s legs and moved even with the armpits and was then split and pulled under each armpit. The bight under the rescuer`s chin was then pulled under the two bights under the victim`s armpits. This formed both a seat and chest harness on the victim, using one piece of equipment.

The operator was rigged and ready within one minute and 30 seconds of the time the rescuer made contact with the crane. The rescuer signaled thumbs-up to the spotter, who relayed the message to the pilot. Captain Boyd Clines then carefully took the slack out of the line and lifted both men off the counterweights of the crane. The flight to the landing zone was a distance of approximately 200 yards. The pilot moved slowly to avoid a pendulum effect on the rescuer and victim.

Touchdown

On touchdown, the rescuer detached the operator from the harness, and the operator was transported by EMS to the hospital. He was evaluated for smoke inhalation and heat stress and released within 24 hours. The total lapsed time from the helicopter`s arrival and the crane operator`s touchdown was less than 15 minutes.

After a post-flight inspection of the helicopter, it was noted that the heat from the fire had melted the aircraft`s nose bubble. A structural engineer determined that the tower crane had suffered major structural damage. The crane was dismantled 36 hours after the incident.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

Because of a lack of training with the helicopter crew, combined with the time factor at this incident, a safety line was not deployed. The AFD squad currently does not carry 50-foot sections of rope, and there was no time to measure, cut, and construct a safety line from our existing equipment inventory. Preplanning and joint agency training can help to avoid this problem.

The victim was rigged to the rescuer on the left side, chest level of the harness through the nylon webbing. This configuration caused the rescuer to cantilever to the right. In the future, the victim would be rigged to the rescuer`s D-ring at the waist.

There was no radio communication between the rescuer and the helicopter crew. Preplanning can resolve this problem as well. Fire departments should ensure a compatible communications system for such emergencies–prior to the incident.

Not all helicopters can be used for rescue. Fire departments that could respond to incidents of this type should survey helicopters in their response area that would be available to them for such emergencies and determine whether they would be adequate for such an operation. Be sure they have enough power to be able to maintain a sustained hover, have attachment points for a rescue line, and are light enough (free of heavy cargo) to lift off quickly. Check the lengths of the rescue line, and plan for the rigging of a safety line. Engage in joint training exercises.

The rescuer in such incidents must establish voice contact with a conscious victim to calm the victim and provide instructions. Communicate with the victim gently but firmly so he will obey your commands. A premature reach for the rescuer could prove fatal.

Training and familiarity with equipment are important factors in this type of rescue. Stay up-to-date. Practice. A rescue such as this is not the time to learn or re-learn how to attach a particular harness or work a particular piece of equipment. (Interestingly enough, Moseley had conducted training using this type of harness for firefighters participating in Hands-On Training during the FDIC in Indianapolis last March, less than one month prior to this incident.) n

A tower crane operator, cut off from his descent by a huge fire in a cotton mill under renovation, seeks refuge from the intense radiant heat–on top of the concrete counterweights. The structural stability of the exposed steel was in serious doubt. Soon after this photo was taken, firefighters placed an aerial master stream into operation to cool the steel. (Photo by AP/Wide World Photos.)

(1) Soon after the crane operator abandoned the cab, it ignited from the radiant heat of the mill fire. (2) Moseley, on two lengths of one-inch polyester rope locked to his full-body harness, is carefully brought down to his target via helicopter. (Photo by AP/Wide World Photos.)

(3) Touchdown on the crane. For-

tunately, the victim was calm. Since Moseley stayed attached to the line while on the crane, the helicopter pilot had to expertly keep the craft steady in high winds and updrafts from the fire while the victim was secured. (4) Lift-off to safety.

Moseley demonstrates the rigging he used in the rescue. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant William Bowes, AFD.)

The Atlanta Fire Department responds to more than 60,000 emergencies each year while protecting an area of 138 square miles. On April 12, 1999, the department was faced with the largest operation it has seen in the past 15 years. The location was the Fulton Bag and Cotton Mill, situated just two miles southeast of downtown. While the dramatic rescue was unfolding high atop the 225-foot tower crane, an incredible firefighting operation was in progress not only on the Mill but also in the small 130-year-old downtown mill community known as Cabbagetown. This fire operation eventually would require seven alarms, bringing 70 apparatus and 185 Atlanta firefighters to the scene.

Cabbagetown consists of more than 200 single-family dwellings of ordinary wood-frame and balloon-frame construction built at the turn of the century. The houses range in size from 800 to 1,400 square feet and are situated close together, separated by narrow alleys. There are also several two- and three-story homes that have been converted into apartments. The area is currently undergoing revitalization; many Atlanta professionals are purchasing homes in the neighborhood and restoring them as their private residences.

INITIAL RESPONSE

At 1437 hours, the Atlanta Fire Communications dispatchers sent three engines, two trucks, Squad 4 (technical rescue unit), one medical engine, one air (SCBA) unit, and a battalion chief on the initial alarm. Battalion 5 Chief Clarence Walker requested a second alarm to assist crews on the scene. Division 1 (Citywide Tour Commander) Assistant Chief Joseph Tolbert was dispatched with the second alarm and assumed command on arrival.

It was a very windy day. Winds were at 30 mph with gusts to 50 mph. Humidity was extremely low for Atlanta–26 percent.

THE INCIDENT

The fire began on the fifth floor of the five-story Cotton Mill known as Mill #1 in the complex. Built in the late 19th century, the 350- by 100-foot building was of heavy timber construction with masonry exterior walls. The building was under extensive renovation–being turned into condominiums–as part of the largest historic renovation project in the country. The mill had sat vacant since the early 1970s and had suffered significant structural damage from water over the years.

Construction workers installing a new roof noticed a small amount of smoke issuing from an opening in the roof. The tower crane operator also noticed the smoke and radioed to the roof crews that it looked as though they may have a fire. The construction crew immediately responded and found a small fire in a trash pile on the fifth floor. They attempted to extinguish the fire with as many as 10 fire extinguishers. As the wind gusted through the open structure, the fire quickly overran the construction crew, and they evacuated. At that time, the fire department was notified.

Fire crews arrived. Lieutenant Mark Greene`s initial size-up indicated moderate smoke showing from the top floor. Members of the construction crew reported that there was a pile of trash on fire on the fifth floor. Firefighters entered to investigate. On entering the fourth floor, members from Engines 10 and 6 and Squad 4 found a small amount of fire in a trash pile with little smoke accumulating at the ceiling. Lieutenant Todd Edwards from Engine 10 and his crew continued on to the top floor. Their investigation revealed a moderate fire on the open floor. Engine 10 reported it could handle the fifth-floor fire with two 134-inch handlines.

The interior crews were planning to use a truck company`s preplumbed waterway to supply their handlines because the standpipe in the building was the original standpipe that had been in the abandoned building for decades and was likely to be inoperable. Before the hose could be stretched in place, the wind violently swept through the building. This forced the crews back to the stairwell. In less than four minutes from their arrival on the fourth floor, the fire began to roll over the entire fourth-floor ceiling and fifth-floor roof, and sections of the roof began to collapse. Lieutenant Edwards and his crew returned to the fourth floor and told firefighters there to evacuate. Sections of the fourth-floor ceiling began to collapse at that time.

Firefighters heard several loud noises at this time. They abandoned their equipment and hastily retreated down the interior stairs. Chief Walker, aware of the serious fire conditions and weakened structure, ordered all crews to evacuate the mill. As firefighters reached the ground, intense, heavy smoke rolled out of window openings on the fourth and fifth floors. Seconds later, the entire fourth and fifth floors flashed over.

The sounds of the collapsing roof and floors rumbled over the scene, shaking the ground. Lieutenant Greene was reported unaccounted for. A call was put out over the radio. After a few tense minutes, he was located. Greene and his crew were some of the first out of the building; Greene was immediately requested by another firefighter to help move Truck 1 away from the fire building. The apparatus had already sustained heat damage, causing the tiller cab windows to melt. Both firefighters suffered second-degree burns on their hands from touching the hot steering wheel.

The operation on the mill was switched to defensive mode. The strong wind hampered the effectiveness of master streams set up around the building and the base of the 225-foot tower crane in which the operator was trapped. The radiant heat exposed nearby structures, which quickly burst into flames. The initial exposure was a three-story converted apartment house. Minutes later, reports of structure fires blocks away began coming into Fire Communications. Additional alarms were sounded to respond to exposure fires in Cabbagetown.

Residents reported many fires to firefighters who were already committed to other operations. Hot embers began dropping all over the community, sparking numerous grass fires and raining over firefighters and civilians. Other burning embers landed on rooftops, igniting the asphalt shingles. Citizens began hosing down their roofs and extinguishing grass fires with personal garden hoses and shovels.

THE EXPOSURE PROBLEM

Realizing that the wood-frame construction and close spacing of the houses represented the potential for a major conflagration, Assistant Chief Tolbert had requested additional resources including the Georgia Mutual Aid Group. Crews were quickly exhausting their air supplies in interior fire attacks on six separate structures. There were no relief crews, nor were there enough units on-scene to establish rehab sectors. Each of the separate exposure fires basically operated with one four-member engine crew (officer plus three) and one three-member truck crew (officer plus two). A member of each brand patrol unit ran from house to house with a 212-gallon water extinguisher.

The winds continued to carry burning embers away from the mill and into the community. The most remote fire sparked by mill embers was more than one-half mile away and across an interstate highway–a flying ember ignited a grass fire that spread into a structure.

Firefighters continued interior attacks on the Cabbage-town exposures, even though they had run out of air and were exhausted. They were able to extinguish or knock down the majority of the fires; there was very little exposure damage to the structures adjacent to them. In general, water supply was adequate; at one point in the incident, when such a great demand was placed on the water system, units in Cabbagetown experienced slightly lower pressures than what they normally could expect.

In the end, the interior of Mill #1 was completely destroyed, six houses had sustained major damage, and 12 houses had sustained minor damage. The offices of the nearby Intermodal Railyard complex, which housed its operations center for all tracking of truck and rail shipments, were severely damaged by the fire. Estimated property loss to the mill and the railyard operations center is estimated at $5 million.

Two firefighters were treated for second-degree burns to the hands, and two were treated for exhaustion. There were no civilian injuries.

Eighty-four existing loft apartments were evacuated because the structural stability of the 225-tower cane was in question. The crane was dismantled three days after the fire, and the evacuees were allowed to return. Other residents who were displaced are staying at temporary locations until reconstruction of their homes is complete.

Fire crews remained on the scene until 1349 hours on April 20, conducting fire watch and extinguishing hot spots in the mill.

The mill fire began an operation that required seven alarms that included 70 Atlanta Fire Department units and 185 personnel.

The cause of the fire is still under investigation, but it is suspected that a spark from a power tool dropped into a trash can on the fifth floor and started the fire.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

Initially, this fire seemed to be quite manageable–one that could be easily handled with one or two handlines. Do not underestimate your enemy. No fire response is ever routine until you are taking up.

The mill fire extended extremely rapidly. Several possibilities exist for this occurrence. The obvious factor is the very high winds that gusted through the open building, creating a blow torch effect. Second, the mill was used for nearly 80 years to process cotton; the heavy timber and wood flooring were saturated with cotton and machine oils. Furthermore, the weather had been very dry for weeks. The wood building components contained little or no moisture. The dry weather also contributed to the many exposure and grass fires that started from the fall-out of embers from the building of origin. Weather and building conditions are important parts of the size-up and tactical decision-making processes. Plan escape routes even for the “routine” fires. As much as possible, operate from a position by which rapid egress is achievable.

Investigate construction sites, and educate construction personnel on the importance of notifying the fire department immediately on discovering fire of any size. The delay in notification at this incident had a heavy price.

The incident showed the importance of a strong incident command system. The AFD implements the ICS at every response and expands it as needed.

Strong mutual-aid alliances are critical in dealing with large incidents. The AFD is a member of the Georgia Mutual Aid Group, currently consisting of fire departments from 12 metro counties. With one call the incident commander implements the system. One individual from the Group is automatically assigned to marshal the needed resources from the metro counties. This smooth acquisition of resources was of great benefit at this incident.

The incident commander managed 15 sectors from the command post. Placing another management level (at the command post) between him and the individual sector commanders would have been advantageous.

Relief crews and rehab resources must figure prominently in any large-scale or long-duration incident.

After a large incident, evaluate the mental and physical condition of your personnel. Firefighters were exhausted after this incident yet finished out their shifts. Some companies had several fires after this one. Consider a personnel call-back policy as an element to your firefighter health and safety program.

As a result of this incident, the AFD is placing additional spare SCBA cylinders on every apparatus. Two spare cylinders per apparatus are not enough. We are also considering placing a second air supply apparatus into service. Air needs at this large incident were not sufficient because the geographical area of operations was so extensive.

Sufficient cell phone capabilities are necessary for commanding a large-scale incident, to reduce radio traffic.

Consider the effectiveness of your personnel accountability system. Accountability was an issue at this incident. The AFD currently is reviewing its current roster card system. However, remember that the “hardware” aspect of any accountability system is secondary to what is needed for any such system to work: buy-in from all line personnel that`s actively supported by all on-scene officers. It`s our members who make the accountability system succeed or fail.

As is the case with many fire departments around the country, AFD company staffing levels have been reduced over the past 10 years. Scores of spot fires in Cabbagetown necessitated splitting alarm assignments. In particular, an officer and two firefighters is not an acceptable staffing level to safely and effectively handle the multiple tasks expected of a truck company.

Officers in staff positions and support services should stay involved in incident command training so they can easily reintegrate into the ICS when they`re needed in the field.

Establish and maintain the collapse zone around fully involved structures. Operate aerial master streams from corner-safe areas.

Interior collapse of large, nonfireproof buildings will rain flying brands over nearby areas. Fire spread to exposures will increase as to the building`s size, fire load, and wind conditions. Radiant heat will threaten all nearby structures. Anticipate the implementation of brand patrols. Call for help early and often.

In incidents with a conflagration potential, firefighters from brand patrols will be beseiged with calls for assistance from the public. Company officers will have to perform “fire triage” on neighborhood homes for the most judicious expenditure of firefighting resources.

Have an alternate plan for supplying water to upper floors of buildings in which the condition of the standpipe system is in doubt. n

(Above) Fourth-floor fire condition on arrival–a small fire in a trash pile. Fire dropped down from the fifth floor through pokethroughs and holes from water damage. Within minutes, a sleepy fire would become an inferno. (Photos by Ed Hill.) (Right) Just seconds after interior crews evacuated–just a few minutes after arrival–fire ran the open floors, and the roof and floors collapsed.

(Above) An aerial master stream in operation on the fire. The severe winds rendered this stream ineffective. (Photos by author.) (Right) A typical Cabbagetown house, two blocks from the mill. Flying brands ignited property as far as one-half mile from the original fire building. Note the narrow alley between this house and the one to its left.

Close to the end. Firefighters were on scene for more than a week. (Photo by author.)

n J. DAVID RHODES, a 13-year veteran of the fire service and lieutenant in the Atlanta (GA) Fire Department, is also a lead instructor in confined space rescue and firefighter rescue and survival with ESE Training Associates in Dalton, Georgia. Previously, he was a member of the Conyers-Rockdale County Fire Department, where he was the fire prevention and life safety coordinator. He has extensive training in advanced structural fire control, high angle rescue, and confined space and technical rescue operations and is also a Hands-On Training (H.O.T) instructor for the FDIC and president of the Atlanta Professional Fire Fighters.

n MATT MOSELEY, a member of the fire service for eight years, has served for the past two years as a firefighter in the Atlanta (GA) Fire Department, assigned to Squad 4. Previously, he was training advisor for Fayette County. He is an instructor at the Georgia State Fire Academy and a state-certified paramedic. He is also a lead instructor in haz mat and confined space rescue with ESE Training Associates in Dalton, Georgia, and a Hands-On Training (H.O.T.) instructor for the FDIC. He is working toward a bachelor`s degree in public safety administration.