TRAIN DISASTERS TEST THE FIRE SERVICE

TRAIN DISASTERS TEST THE FIRE SERVICE

TRAGEDY ON THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

BY ED ST. LOUIS AND STEVE WILDER

On Monday, March 15, 1999, on a set of tracks owned by the Illinois Central Railroad, Amtrak #59, the famed City of New Orleans, reportedly traveling at 79 miles per hours slammed into a flatbed semitrailer. The accident occurred in an area of houses, farms, and fields in unincorporated Bourbonnais Township, Illinois, about three miles north of Kankakee, which is some 50 miles south of Chicago.

The Kankakee County Sheriff`s Department received the first calls reporting the accident at 2147 hours. Workers at the nearby Birmingham Steel plant, who had heard the crash and called 911, rushed outside to investigate. At the same time, telephone consoles in dispatch centers at the nearby Bourbonnais and Bradley Police Departments began lighting up with calls reporting the accident. Initial reports were sketchy. It was only after the first police officers arrived that the magnitude of the incident would begin to unfold. By the end of the night, more than 60 fire and EMS agencies would combine forces to bring 338 personnel and 106 pieces of equipment to the scene. Eventually, 11 people would be confirmed dead and another 122 injured, including one firefighter.

When the first call for the accident was received by the Bourbonnais Fire Protection District (a paid on-call department with 44 firefighters and an ambulance staffed 16 hours a day, seven days a week), several personnel were already in quarters, since the ambulance had previously been dispatched to an unrelated incident. Fire Chief Mike Harshbarger was returning to the station from that incident when his department was dispatched for a semi vs. train accident at Birmingham Steel. Since initial reports were not clear about what was unfolding, Harshbarger had no way of knowing what to anticipate.

FIRST ON-SCENE REPORTS

At the same time, Bourbonnais and Bradley police officers were beginning to arrive at the scene and quickly started to realize the enormity of the situation. One of the first police officers to arrive at the scene, Dave Verkler of the Bourbonnais Police Department, radioed dispatch to “advise fire they will need an ambulance box.” Based on that transmission, Harshbarger ordered that “ambulance box” #60-900 be pulled, bringing in advanced life support (ALS) ambulances from the neighboring communities of Bradley, Manteno, and Limestone Township, as well as from Provena St. Mary`s Hospital and Riverside Medical Center, both located in nearby Kankakee.

Almost immediately after calling the ambulance box, Harshbarger received a Bourbonnais Police radio call in which he was advised that police officers on the scene recommended that the ambulance box be upgraded to a fifth alarm, noting “… may need to start calling in ambulances from up north (nearer to the Chicago area) as well .U Our officers on the scene advise there are bodies everywhere …. Amtrak personnel on the train are advising that they have between 200 and 400 people onboard.” This was Harshbarger`s first indication that an Amtrak was involved.

Based on this information, Harshbarger elevated ambulance box 60-900 to a fifth alarm, bringing in nearly all ambulances in Kankakee County, as well as additional ambulances from neighboring Will County.

SIZE-UP

Seconds later, as Harshbarger arrived on the scene, flames began to erupt from the train`s second engine, which was lying on its side. As he reached the west side of the accident scene, he saw the tragic situation firsthand. A major fire involving the derailed cars was starting to develop.

Five or six cars were off the track; some appeared to be stacked on top of each other.

The second engine of the 16-car train had plowed into two parked railcars owned by the steel plant and parked on side tracks used by the plant. One parked railcar contained steel stock; the other contained furnace ash, a by-product of the facility.

After the train engine struck these parked railcars, the remaining Amtrak cars slammed into the engine, creating what could be described as an “accordion effect.”

Knowing that people were trapped, and with the fire impinging on several cars, Harshbarger immediately called for an automatic fifth alarm on “engine box” #60-100, bringing in engines from 12 surrounding communities.

Since the incident was in an unincorporated area, Harshbarger recognized that he might have to supplement the water supply and called for a fifth alarm on “tanker box” #60-800, bringing an estimated 16 tankers to the staging area.

Harshbarger then addressed the most immediate concerns of fire suppression and supplemental rescue operations. By this time, the fire had intensified, having been fed by 2,200 to 2,300 gallons of diesel fuel leaking from the overturned engine. The tanks had been filled in Chicago, and since the train had only traveled some 50 miles before the accident, the tanks were nearly full. Diesel fuel was spilling into a ditch adjacent to the tracks; the second locomotive was lying in the ditch on its side. A small fire inside the locomotive caused the diesel fuel to ignite. The fire quickly spread into the ditch and over the ground cover.

As Harshbarger continued to size up the incident, police officers, as well as dozens of workers from the nearby Birmingham Steel plant, were assisting the “walking wounded” to safety. They were escorted to Birmingham Steel office trailers.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications was the weakest link. Several times, the companies inside the dining car, where four passengers were pinned, had attempted to call for a hoseline, only to have their radio messages stepped on by other companies. Command, engine companies, tankers, search companies, rescue companies, sector leaders, and ambulances all jammed the county mutual-aid frequency. In addition, pages and dispatch tones would frequently interrupt or step over radio communications at the scene.

ESTABLISHING COMMAND SITES

The wreckage of the train created a dual aspect to the scene. As companies arrived, police advised them of the victims` locations. It quickly became obvious that victims were being cared for on both sides of the tracks and that the high number of victims made attempts to move everyone to one location impractical. In addition, access from one side of the tracks to the other was nearly impossible because of the distance across the tracks, the presence of ditches on both sides, the burning diesel fuel, the immense amount of damage, and the debris present. As a result, coordination sites were set up on both sides, as were triage, treatment, transportation, suppression, and rehab sectors.

ESTABLISHING WATER SUPPLY

The first-arriving Bourbonnais engine (E-61) was assigned to the west side of the railroad tracks and ordered to make a five-inch forward lay from a hydrant on Larry Power Road into the scene. The engine dropped 2,000 feet of five-inch hose, and Aroma E-54 came in behind it to drop another 300 feet before reaching the accident scene. Aroma`s engine was then sent to the hydrant to set up a relay operation.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

At the same time, Bourbonnais Squad 62, a medium-class rescue, had arrived on the west side and began search and rescue operations. Initially, Amtrak`s information concerning passengers aboard was limited. Passenger lists were inaccessible because of the damage to the locomotives. Uninjured Amtrak employees gave varying numbers, ranging from 175 to 400 passengers. In addition, firefighters were being told by Amtrak that since the train was not full when it left Chicago, “empty seat” passes had been sold, meaning that there could have been more passengers on the train than were listed on the roster. Local hospitals worked by telephone with Amtrak officials to determine an actual number of listed patients. Because of the conditions of the injured and the physical trauma to the fatally injured, all passengers were not accounted for until several days later.

Knowing that numerous victims were trapped inside the derailed cars, Harshbarger began deploying personnel from arriving engine companies and squads to perform manual searches. Thermal imaging cameras were also used to aid in the search. Four passengers were found trapped in the dining car.

After all victims had been located and rescued, relief teams were brought in to perform secondary searches. When these searches were completed, search teams spray-painted the word “EMPTY” on the outside of each car searched.

Workers from the Birmingham Steel plant had provided “extra hands” to assist in the rescue. Ignoring their own safety, they climbed into the train to help victims out before emergency workers arrived (see sidebar on page 64). As Harshbarger later related, there were “so many heroic rescues made that night; we will never know all of the stories of what went on to save these victims.”

TRIAGE AND TREATMENT

On the east side of the scene, employees from a nearby Farm and Fleet store, doing late-night inventory, opened the store to allow victims to be brought in and treated, escaping the 207F weather outside. Ambulances staged in the store parking lot were able to transport directly from the storefront.

On the west side, triage was set up in a parking area. Patients classified as “red” or “yellow” were taken into a large construction trailer for treatment. Walking wounded were taken into the steel plant, where they were sheltered until transport to the hospitals.

Medical teams of physicians and nurses responded from the trauma centers of both Kankakee hospitals. Also responding were the Lifestar medical helicopter from the Loyola University Medical Center in Maywood, the University of Chicago Aeromedical Network (UCAN) helicopter, and a helicopter from the Illinois State Police. Within 50 minutes, all but four of the 121 victims had been transported to hospitals.

EXTRICATION

The accordion effect caused by the cars` slamming into each other had caused a considerable amount of damage to the front end of the dining car, where four passengers were trapped. It took prolonged extrication to free them.

The four included an elderly couple who were sitting in a dining booth at the time of the accident. Both were still in the booth–the male sitting on the aisle side, the female against the wall. Firefighters quickly freed the male. He didn`t show any physical signs of injury but was complaining of thoracic pain, leading firefighters to suspect that he may have sustained rib fractures. The female could not yet be freed.

The next victim to be removed was a 48-year-old female, who was on the floor of the dining car. On initial assessment, firefighters quickly identified an open compound fracture of her right fibula/tibia. She also complained of pain in her pelvic area, possibly indicating a pelvic fracture. Rescuers immobilized her as best they could in the car and removed her.

The third victim to be removed was the 14-year-old daughter of the 48-year-old female who had just been removed. The girl, who also suffered from Downs Syndrome, complained of pain in her back and was partially trapped under debris. In addition, she was in an area where flames were pushing in on her and firefighters through the shattered window. Before rescue attempts could be made, the first two victims had to be removed to gain a path of accessibility. Because of the radiant heat to which she was exposed, firefighters used a set of turnout gear to cover her and protect her until a hoseline could be brought in. Once firefighters were able to access her, she was immobilized and removed. On her arrival at the hospital, it was learned that she had a broken back and would subsequently require surgical intervention.

The final victim removed was the elderly female still sitting in the dining booth. While not seriously injured, she was pinned under the dining table, which had collapsed on impact. In addition, her arm and leg were pressing up against the outer wall of the dining car, and she was beginning to complain of burns being caused by the flame impingement on the outside of the car. Firefighters had to raise the table and attempted to cut away a part of the tracking on the side wall of the dining car to which the table was attached. Because of the extent of the damage to the car, firefighters were unable to get a cutting tool in to access the track, despite numerous attempts. Flame impingement on the outside of the car precluded any consideration of cutting through the train shell to release the table from the tracking. Finally, as one team of rescuers lifted the table, a second team quickly assessed the victim and then physically lifted her out from under the table and into an awaiting stokes basket.

FIRE SUPPRESSION

Fire suppression proved to be one of the biggest challenges. The spilled diesel fuel ran underneath the wreckage and fed the fire. As foam operations were set up, a special mutual-aid call was placed to the Mobil Oil Refinery and to Stepan Chemical, both located in Elwood, Illinois, approximately 45 miles from the accident scene. Both facilities sent 3,000-gpm foam trucks to the scene to assist with the spill and vapor containment. The diesel fuel fires burned for several hours. Some 7,000 gallons of foam solution were used in the incident.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

Preparedness. A community risk assessment is critical in identifying the vulnerabilities that exist. The issue of disaster preparedness can`t be limited to urban areas. The small communities that responded initially performed in an exemplary manner. All of the rescues made were accomplished because previous risk assessments identified the possibility of such an incident and allowed the communities the foresight to prepare for such a situation. These efforts and the state of readiness that was obvious at the incident brought accolades from representatives of the National Transportation Safety Board.

Each year, the 23 member departments of the Kankakee Valley Firemen`s Association–in conjunction with area hospitals, law enforcement agencies, and county organizations–conduct a communitywide disaster drill designed to test preparedness and identify opportunities for improvement. There was no doubt that these drills, including a simulated train accident in 1997, helped to prepare the agencies involved in this incident for such an event.

Communications. The most critical factor in the incident was communications. Local departments crowded the county mutual-aid frequency, often stepping on each other and blocking out critical calls. In the future, different functions will be assigned to different channels, and the mutual-aid frequency will be used for command.

Dispatch. No incident should be taken lightly. The first calls received pertaining to this accident led telecommunication operators to believe they had a car struck by a freight train. The magnitude of the incident wasn`t realized until police arrived on the scene; that information was conveyed to command personnel while they were en route.

Resources. Mutual-aid companies responded from as far away as Danville, Illinois, which is 90 miles southeast of the incident site. Those companies not needed at the incident provided “change of quarters” coverage to communities at the scene. One radio call to the Illinois State Police freed fire dispatchers from having to worry about finding coverage; the state police willingly took over the matter of procuring coverage from remote communities.

Medical supplies were stripped from first-arriving ambulances for use in treatment areas. IV supplies and oxygen bottles were in demand initially. After additional ambulances started arriving, supplies were well covered. In addition, the county disaster relief trailer responded quickly, making disaster care supplies readily available.

Many departments lost varying amounts of expensive equipment during the mitigation process. A detailed inventory was maintained, allowing departments to submit claims for replacements to the involved insurance companies. This included the turnout gear damaged by the diesel fuel.

Beyond the incident: post-trauma. At the time of the incident, firefighters, police, paramedics, and community members did whatever was necessary and showed little personal effects. After the “rush” was over, many showed signs of post-traumatic stress. Realizing that this might happen, officials had critical incident stress debriefing teams mobilized within the first hour of the incident–a move that proved beneficial as the prolonged incident continued.

The Amtrak crash was indeed very tragic. Eleven lives were lost, and scores of people were seriously injured. The number of fatalities and injuries could have been much greater had it not been for the quick and skillful response of the multitude of agencies involved. As one hospital emergency room physician who was at the scene noted, “The fact that the only fatalities were those that occurred at the scene is a testimony to the preparedness of the agencies involved.” All of the 121 victims treated at the scene and area hospitals survived.

At a critique session held a week after the incident, Harshbarger told those in attendance that “this community was ready to deal with the incident because of one thing–training. Everyone who responded hit the ground moving, took their assignments, knew what they were to do, and did it. I couldn`t be more proud to be a part of the fire service in this community.” n

All 11 fatalities were from the same sleeper car. [Photos courtesy of Ryland Gagnon, Bradley (IL) Fire Department. Used with permission.]

This is the scene that greeted first-arriving companies. The photographer took this shot as he arrived behind the first-in engine on the west side.

Four people were pinned beneath the twisted metal of this dining car. All survived and suffered varying degrees of injuries including a broken back and compound fractures.

(Top) Firefighters fight flames of burning diesel fuel as they protect other companies performing search operations in a passenger car. (Bottom) As diesel fuel ignites, it quickly engulfs a passenger car.

n ED ST. LOUIS is a 21-year veteran of and a captain in the Bourbonnais (IL) Fire Protection District, where he serves as the department administrative officer.

n STEVE WILDER is a 22-year veteran of and a captain in the Bradley (IL) Fire Department, where he serves as director of training and safety. He is a frequent contributor to Fire Engineering and the author of Risk Manage-ment in the Fire Service (Fire Engineering, 1997).