FIRE IN THE HOLD SHIPBOARD DRILL

FIRE IN THE HOLD SHIPBOARD DRILL

A shipboard fire presents a significant challenge to land-based firefighters who, realistically, cannot have intimate knowledge of every vessel visiting their jurisdiction. The Metro-Dade County (FI.) Fire Department has responsibility for marine fire protection at the Port of Miami and a large portion of the Miami River. Miami’s proximity to the Caribbean has made the Port of Miami the largest cruise ship port in the world; no fewer than 17 cruise ships begin their voyages from Miami. Cargo ships use the Port of Miami and the Miami River as the gateway to Latin America and the Caribbean. Our department is fortunate to receive excellent cooperation and technical consultation from the United States Coast Cuard and local cruise and shipping lines.

We recently participated in a firefighting drill aboard one of the largest cruise ships berthed at the Port of Miami. The ship is 1 ,035 feet long and accommodates 2,200 passengers and a crew of 800. A fire in a forward storage space on a deck below the water line was simulated for three purposes:

• It tested the crew members’ abilities to evaluate their performances in accordance with the ship’s emergency plans. Each crew member has an important role during a fire emergen-
• cy. The duties, as specified, depend on a crew member’s regular function and position. For example, stewards usually have responsibility for evacuating passengers, while members of the engineering department start firepumps and secure ventilation to the involved space. Select crew members are organized into firefighting squads, equipped with protective clothing and SCBA. The fire squads of this particular ship are trained and directed by European firefighters on leave from the fire service in their country.

It provided our personnel with the opportunity to operate under realistic shipboard conditions.

It fostered a professional relationship and exchange of knowledge between our firefighters and those on the ship.

SIMULATION/SPECIAL EFFECTS

Eire and smoke conditions were simulated by several smoke generators and small flashing lights. Three decks in the bow of the ship were smoked to almost zero visibility. Crew members, posing as unconscious victims, had to be located and removed. Although few details were explained to participants before the drill, a firedeep in a ship would be a worst-case scenario: Firefighters would have to descend into an area of small crew cabins, workshops, and storage spaces that is very difficult to ventilate. The fire was to originate on a deck below the water line and extend to crew accommodations above by heat conducted through the steel deck.

This exercise, however realistic, necessarily was limited in terms of how much it could disrupt the in-port operations of a working cruise ship. The ship arriving in port has less than eight hours to transfer thousands of passengers; conduct maintenance; and load several tons of luggage, food, and fuel for another seven-day voyage to the Caribbean. This schedule leaves a small window within which to conduct training and limits the number of companies participating to just a few. An actual fire of this magnitude certainly would require a multiple company response with the appropriatelevels of command and logistical support.

FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS

Engine 39, stationed at the port, was the first unit on the scene, arriving dockside. Lieutenant Karl Oltz established command and ordered responding units to stage Level 1 (units standing by a block away awaiting further orders). Lt. Oltz was met at the crew (lower) gangway by the chief of the ship’s fire squad with a copy of the fire control plans.

Fire control plans are required for each ship to provide land-based firefighters with information that will assist them in reaching, confining, and extinguishing a fire on a vessel with which they generally are unfamiliar. (Very few passenger or cargo vessels operating out of Miami are registered in the United States. Foreign flag vessels operating in the United States must comply with regulations promulgated by the International Conventions for Safety of Life at Sea, or SOLAS. SOLAS is a treaty concerned with fire and life safety of vessels. Compliance with SOLAS requirements is verified by the United States Coast Guard through periodic inspections.) Fire plans detail the layout of each deck, the features of fire suppression systems, the emergency fuel and ventilation controls, and the locations of fire resistant bulkheads that divide a ship into separate fire zones.

Referencing the ship’s fire plan, Lt. Oltz had to consider the following factors as part of his initial size-up:

• Location of the fire.
• Areas the fire would spread to by convection and heat conducted through steel decks and bulkheads.
• Progression of passenger and crew evacuation.
• Actions taken by the crew prior to the arrival of the fire department, their appropriateness, and their effectiveness.
• Routes to the fire.

STRATEGY

Shortly after the Metro-Dade County Fire Department’s Battalion 5 arrived. Lt. Oltz briefed Chief W. H. Stephens on conditions, and Chief Stephens assumed command. His initial strategy was to confine the fire while his companies got in position to support a direct attack. The chief used the ship’s construction to confine the fire temporarily and reduce its intensity. (See sidebar “Vessel Construction, Ventilation, and Fire Systems” on page 46.) He considered how the ship’s compartmentation could limit the supply of oxygen into the fire area. Stephens made sure that the following steps were taken to support his holding action:

• Ventilation fans and dampers to the involved zone secured.
• Doors, hatches, and openings to the fire area closed.
• One-hour fire rated bulkheads identified to establish boundaries around the fire.

Isolating the fire would allow the time necessary to formulate a plan and communicate its details to companies operating in separate but interdependent, functional sectors. When companies were in position, the following plan was implemented:

• Engine 39, whose members have 60-minute breathing apparatus, was positioned at the seat of the fire in the deepest part of the ship.
• Companies would proceed to the involved deck for a direct attack on the fire.
• At the same time, the deck above the fire would be examined and cooled, if necessary, to prevent extension by conduction.
• A primary search would be extended on two decks above the fire.

Since six sides must be considered in establishing boundaries against conducted heat, the external hull plating of the bow forming the outside walls of the fire area would have required cooling from shoreside and Coast Guard fire monitors. The deck below tlie fire contained sewage tanks but required examination as personnel became available.

FIREGROUND ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND LOGISTICS

The command post (CP) remained at the gangway throughout the scenario; relocating it to the bridge was considered. The bridge can be an excellent location for a CP. Controls for alarm, detection, ventilation, communication, and watertight/fire door systems are centrally located on the bridge. It was decided to keep the CP at the gangway because the bridge was in the same vertical zone as the fire and would have required another level of command.

The ship’s fire chief remained at the CP throughout the drill to provide information, to develop strategy jointly with the battalion chief, and to relay radio messages from his personnel. Although no water actually was flowed inside the ship, command conferred with the ship’s officers on the effect that runoff water would have on buoyancy and stability.

Wherever possible, members of the ship’s crew were pressed into service to carry spare SCBA cylinders and equipment to a forward staging area (a watertight doorway immediately outside the affected vertical zone) so that personnel would be accessible but still tenable. Relieving firefighters of their burden reduces exertion prior to engaging in actual firefighting and increases their duration with SCBA.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Members of the ship’s fire squad led companies into the fire area, where they connected their hose packs to the fire main with adapters and initiated a direct attack on the fire. Firefighters—as a result of their search subsequent to knocking down the fire — located members of the ship’s crew on the fire deck and the deck above. The “victims” were dragged to clear air in an adjacent vertical zone.

Firefighters on the deck above the fire connected their hoseline to an outlet outside a watertight door to the fire zone. When ready, the line was advanced through the doorway to cool the upper boundary. (Our department augments the pressure and volume of the ship’s fire main system with our pumpers, using fire department—not the ship’s—hose.)

A search team secured the free end of its rope bag outside the fire zone and extended the rope as a guide as the team conducted a primary search of the two decks above the fire. After searching the starboard side, the team regrouped in clear air, assessed the air supply and each member’s physical condition, and then completed its search on the port side. Several “victims,” including one locked in the brig, were located and removed.

The operation had been completed in dense smoke before the difficult process of removing the smoke, using the ship’s gasoline-powered positivepressure blowers, was begun.

PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS

Problem: It is difficult to communicate by radio aboard ship, especially on lower decks, which are surrounded by steel and water.

Solution: Our department is exploring the use of portable repeaters and special frequencies to improve radio communications. In the interim, our hand-held radios are operated in the simplex —instead of the duplex (signal retransmitted by a repeater) — mode, allowing a direct radio-to-radio signal.

Problem: It was very difficult to ventilate the lower decks, especially below the water line. Removing smoke and heat from the lower decks is always difficult due to a lack of natural ventilation openings to the outside. Our problems were more pronounced on this particular ship because it lacked a continuous stair shaft from the lire area to an outside opening. The absence of a direct ventilation route necessitated the contamination of hallways—some in unaffected zones—to channel the smoke to stair shafts that lead to an outside opening.

Solution: Ventilation operations aboard ship require the utmost planning, coordination, and timing. Routes established to remove smoke and heat must be identified, evacuated, monitored, and protected.

Problem: Civilian observers questioned why search and rescue was delayed in favor of fire suppression.

Solution: Delaying search and rescue to implement fire suppression tactics is a frequently misunderstood strategic decision. A quick, direct attack on a fire may be the most effective use of limited first-arriving forces to prevent loss of life. Stopping the fire and thereby limiting its effects is consistent with our first tactical priority-rescue (life safety). A fire allowed to spread unchecked while personnel are involved in rescue can increase the hazard to life.

LESSONS LEARNED/REINFORCED

• Assigning a radio-equipped member of the ship’s crew to each of our crews proved to be more than a luxury —it was a necessity: They served as guides to our personnel, whose lack of familiarity with a ship is compounded by smoke and darkness.
• and their radios could have relayed messages to our CP had our radios proved ineffective.
• Most ships assign a number to each watertight door (WTD). This number is painted on or near the door and is detailed in the ship’s plans. The command post can track the progress and position of crews if they report the nearest WTD.
• The hydraulically powered sliding watertight doors did not present a problem because they were closed locally at each door. Had the WTDs been closed remotely from the bridge, they would have reclosed automatically as soon as the open lever at the door was released, possibly crushing personnel or hoselines. The ship’s firefighters have designed a steel plate that can hold a watertight door open against the closing force of its powerful hydraulic ram.
• The ship’s ventilation system can be used to remove smoke, but the consequence of circulating smoke into uninvolved areas of the same HVAC zone must be understood.
• The extended duration of our 60minute breathing apparatus is well worth the additional weight. Thirtyminute SCBA may be inadequate for the physical demands of and long approaches to a fire aboard a ship. Company officers constantly must monitor crew members’ physical and mental condition as well as air supply. Allowing 100 psi of air pressure for one minute of duration is a conservative rule of thumb that can guide an officer in ensuring that the crew will have sufficient air to withdraw to a safe area—and a reserve for contingencies You cannot rely on the lowair alarm; five minutes is not enough time to escape the smoky maze of a ship’s lower decks.
• It became apparent early in the drill how difficult and time-consuming evacuation of passengers would be. especially if the primary means of disembarkation —the main gangway—was in the involved vertical zone. Ideally, passengers would be moved to an upwind, outside deck area and evacuated by a means that would not conflict with fire depart-

• ment movement and operations.
• Firefighters operating aboard ship tire quickly and require early and frequent rotation of crews, rest, and rehabilitation.
• Frequent realistic drills aboard ship sharpen the skills necessary to handle a major marine incident. Previous ship fires that began at sea had escalated to major proportions by the time the ships reached port. Although this drill necessarily was limited in time and participants, it gave us a good indication of how quickly a ship fire can tax department resources.