TESTING CODES BY FIRE

BY JAMES M. FOLEY

In 1984, New Jersey enacted the Fire Safety Act, which established a statewide Fire Prevention Code. An important aspect of this was the retrofit fire code provision that required upgrades to improve the level of fire safety in older existing buildings. The code’s provisions were far-reaching, affecting almost all existing buildings to some extent. The code required upgrades to active and passive fire protection systems, including stair enclosures, interior finish treatments, fire doors, exit signs, emergency lighting, means of egress, fire alarm systems, and automatic sprinkler systems.


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(1) Front of 3 South Iowa Avenue; fire started on the third-floor balcony. (Photos by author.)

The Atlantic City (NJ) Fire Department (ACFD) Fire Prevention Division has spent many years enforcing the retrofit code and upgrading the older building stock in the city. Over the years, the problem that we have faced is measuring the effectiveness and value of the code provisions compared to the monies expended by owners to provide the required upgrades. As any fire prevention officer can tell you, the business community constantly questions the value of fire code retrofit provisions because these systems are only beneficial when and if a fire occurs. Most building owners do not believe fire will happen to them. Fire code officials have to market this value in real terms for the money expended for retrofitting existing structures to comply with the fire code requirements. We must also deal with the political pressure that occurs when building owners approach elected officials to intercede on their behalf because of their perception of unfairness in compelling them to upgrade their older buildings.


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(2) Point of fire origin in PVC drain pipe (arrow).

In fire prevention, we often ask, “How can we effectively measure the success of implementing fire code provisions through enforcement, engineering, and education?” After all, it is not easy to measure the impact of events that did not happen. In Atlantic City, we have found that investigating the performance or lack thereof through fire experience is effective. The ACFD’s fire investigators examine not only fire scenes for cause and origin but also the building systems to identify positive outcomes from the enforcement of fire code retrofit provisions. As a case in point, the ACFD recently responded to a serious fire in a large apartment building that demonstrated the effectiveness of fire code enforcement as well as building material hazards.

The night shift had just begun on May 24, 2004, when an alarm was dispatched at 1858 hours; the fire was reported on the third floor of the Lennox Apartments at 3 South Iowa Avenue. Battalion 2, commanded by Chief Charlie Ritzel; Engine 4; and Ladder 3-all located a block away at California and Atlantic Avenues-immediately responded. In his initial observations, the chief located the fire on the third-floor balcony. Engine 6 arrived and established a water supply. The ladder company conducted initial search and rescue operations and assisted in evacuating the building’s 60 occupants. In a short time, the fire autoextended up the front of the building to the fourth and fifth floors and was entering the ornate roof cornice (photo 1).


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(3) Drain pipe (arrows) as seen from below, showing point of ignition; pipe was removed for evidence.

A deputy chief soon arrived; additional alarms were struck, bringing two additional engine and two additional ladder companies to the scene. The building occupants evacuated were sheltered in a nearby church. The fire entered the roof and extended to the cockloft, which resulted in a long firefight that continued into the nighttime hours. The deputy chief called fire investigators to the scene.

As chief fire marshal, I responded with Atlantic City Police Department detectives. Our investigation uncovered some interesting items related to fire prevention standards.


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(4) Char left by PVC synthetic grass carpeting on decks. (5) Unburned PVC synthetic grass carpet on second floor.

The point of ignition was on the third-floor open-porch deck over the building’s main entrance. The porches had no furniture, and the fire prevention code prohibited cooking on them. The point of origin appeared to be in the 90-degree elbow of a PVC plastic floor drain that drained rainwater from the porch deck (photos 2, 3). The ignition source was believed to be discarded smoking materials. Once open flaming occurred, the fire melted the PVC pipe and ignited floor joists and PVC synthetic grass carpeting (secured with mastic glue) on the floor deck (photos 4, 5). The plastics provided a significant fuel load and shattered the glass separation doors on the deck.


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(6) This fire door, a retrofit requirement, protected the interior stairway. (7) The closed fire door maintained a safe path of egress during the fire. (8) Retrofit protection requiring sealing of door transoms and self-closing apartment doors kept fire out of the apartments.

The fire entered the building but was halted by the stair enclosure, the upgraded apartment doors, and the sealed transoms; all required under the retrofit code (photos 6, 7, 8). The fire alarm system immediately activated and alerted all occupants of the fire. The implemented retrofit requirements provided adequate protection to allow all of the building occupants, including those in the path of the fire, to escape by primary interior exits and secondary fire escape exits. The fire spread to the fourth and fifth floors by autoexposure, igniting the wooden floor decking and PVC synthetic grass carpeting until it reached the roof cornices and entered the roof. Throughout the course of the fire, only one apartment was damaged by fire extension, and that resulted from radiant heat exposure through an open exterior window off the porch. The fire cause was deemed accidental by investigators, caused by careless disposal of smoking materials.

The significance of this fire was the impact PVC waste pipe and synthetic grass carpeting played in spreading this fire. A captain from Engine 6 told fire investigators that the fire was relatively small on the third floor at first but then accelerated rapidly up the face of the building. This fire demonstrated the value of code enforcement and the dangers of exposed nonregulated building materials.

LESSONS LEARNED

• Fire prevention code enforcement is a critical part of the community fire protection system. In this case, good code enforcement protected the 60 occupants of the building who would have been in serious jeopardy if the codes had not been enforced.

• Fire code retrofit requirements permit invaluable upgrades that protect occupants and reduce overall property damage during fires.

• Fire officials need to review building materials used in construction continually and recommend appropriate code changes. In this fire, the combination of combustible decking, mastic glue, PVC pipe, and carpeting provided an extraordinary fuel load.

• Fire investigators, firefighters, and fire inspectors need to be involved and communicate with each other on the investigation and identification of fire spread and travel factors. This is necessary so that more effective code provisions can be proposed.

JAMES M. FOLEY, a 34-year veteran of the fire service, is a deputy chief fire official in the Atlantic City (NJ) Fire Department, a leader of the New Jersey Task Force 1 urban search and rescue team, and a certified fire instructor II. He teaches in the fire code programs at Rutgers University and Camden County College. He has a bachelor of science degree in fire protection technology and fire administration from the University of Maryland and a bachelor of arts degree in biological science and chemistry from Rowen University.

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