By Gerard J. Naylis
On a cool but not bitterly cold December night in 2001, the Bergenfield (NJ) Fire Department was dispatched to a reported “fire of some type” at the Halfway House of the Knickerbocker Country Club at approximately 11 p.m. As I responded to this call, a number of thoughts crossed my mind. First was that access to the golf course was limited and, in fact, most of the responding firefighters would not know where the Halfway House was located. Having played on the course several times I was aware of where the Halfway House was situated on the course. The second big issue was water supply.
The narrow driveway that served as the entrance was flanked by brick-covered pillars on either side. I went through the gate and down the driveway past the Pro Shop. As I passed between the Pro Shop and the golf cart barn, I looked to the left and could see that the Halfway House was fully involved. I followed the cart path around and reached the Halfway House in short order. Indeed, the building was so involved that at that moment anyone could make a determination that there was little to save.
There was no known life hazard and there was virtually nothing left to save of the building, so there was no point in launching an aggressive interior attack. The old adage of risking nothing to save nothing resounded in my mind. Clearly, the course of action here was to minimize the damage already done and protect the exposures.
As I did a quick 360 around the entire building, I came to the conclusion that the greatest damage that might result would not come from the fire itself but rather from fire apparatus driving over the golf course. The value of a single hole on a particular golf course could range anywhere from $175,000 to $250,000. The Halfway House was situated where four separate holes converged. I quickly summarized that the greatest possible damage would most likely result if the fire apparatus drove over the golf holes, especially if we laid a supply line from the closest hydrant to the point of the fire. Can you imagine the headline? “Fire destroys $25,000 Halfway House. Fire department does $250,000 damage to golf course in putting fire out.”
The decision was quickly made to bring the first engine onto the golf course without laying a supply line. All apparatus was ordered to use the cart paths and to stay off the fairways, greens, and tee boxes. A water shuttle was employed using the fire department’s other three engines to provide water to the attack engine. As assignments were given by the operations officer to the individual crews, company officers were advised that there was no need to take any particular risks in extinguishing the fire as we had essentially determined that the structure itself was already a total loss.
The fire was ultimately extinguished using the approximately 3,000 gallons of water. There were no injuries.
This fire reinforced a number of important points. The first was the need to perform a comprehensive size-up before issuing orders to arriving units. The second point was the need to share the fire attack plan, particularly because it deviated from the normal accepted practice of laying a supply line for a structure fire. In this case it was far more important to protect the exposures (the golf holes) than to try and save a building that was 100 percent destroyed on arrival. The third point was the need to reinforce to all involved in the fire attack that we will risk a lot to save a lot; risk a little to save a little; and, where appropriate (like here), risk nothing to save nothing!
Gerard J. Naylis is an account engineer with Factory Mutual Insurance Company, dealing with loss prevention and control engineering. He is also the training officer for the Bergenfield (NJ) Fire Department. Currently, he is serving as the first vice-president of the International Association of Arson Investigators, Inc. and is a member of the New Jersey State Fire Safety Commission.
