UNDER CONTROL
BY JOHN A. REARDON
Your fire department responds to a working fire in the rear of a dwelling and initiates an interior attack. A line is stretched through the front door as another crew starts ventilation. As this is occurring, the chief arrives, confers with the officer in charge, and radios dispatch:
Dispatch: Chief 1 on the scene assuming Maple Street Command.
As this rather typical fire proceeds, the dispatchers, who have handled several emergency medical calls in the meantime, receive the following transmission:
Dispatch: Maple Street Command reporting the fire under control.
Whose control?
This radio message signifies a very important moment during that fire or any other emergency.
INCIDENT PRIORITIES
The National Fire Academy teaches three key scene priorities in its “Incident Command Course”: life safety, stabilization, and property conservation.
These priorities are key to the operations we might use on the fireground and have a relationship to operational priorities developed by Lloyd Layman in the 1950s (referred to as “RECEO”), as taught in the NFA course “Managing Company Tactical Operations: Decision Making: rescue, exposure protection, confinement, extinguishment, and overhaul.
This relationship is illustrated in the matrix below.
It can easily be seen that certain operations are directly related to incident priorities. Rescue relates to life safety and overhaul to property conservation. The matrix does not dictate the order of operations. For instance, a fire in a hospital may dictate that the fire be extinguished first, to remove the threat. Nevertheless, there is a general relationship between the operations.
Not as obvious, but within the matrix, is a relationship to the radio message “Fire under control.” Obviously, prior to that message, the fire was not “under control.” In fact, the fire was in control.
A fire starts and is detected. Dispatch is notified and alerts the fire department. Once alerted, the fire department reacts: Personnel jump up, don PPE, mount apparatus, start apparatus, drive to the scene, size up the incident, select and stretch hoselines, secure a water supply, provide for search and rescue, treat the injured, ladder the building, vent the building, attack the fire, and so on. We are not in control but are reacting to the incident. The fire is controlling us.
If our operations are successful, we will achieve knockdown, stabilize the incident, and reverse the control the fire has on us. It is at that point that we have control and can be truly proactive.
Regardless of how “proactive-minded” we are in our attack, the fact remains that we are reacting to the situation and cannot be truly proactive. In essence, we should move from Phase 1 planning to Phase 2 planning as we move from reaction to proaction.
Firefighter injuries should never be taken for granted, yet if an injury did occur during the heat of the battle, prior to stabilization, we can often rationalize (even if we can`t justify) it. But what about an injury after stabilization? After we have control!
Prior to stabilization, we have time against us. After stabilization, we control time, and it is on our side.
A question each of us should ask is, Can we decrease the amount of time it takes to reach the point of stabilization?
The above graphs illustrate this time shift, assuming the same amount of time is spent on the scene. The difference is that, for the same amount of time, we spend less time being reactive and more being proactive. More time is spent with the incident under our control.
ACHIEVING EARLY STABILIZATION
To achieve an earlier stabilization time, which will enable you to shift from being reactive to proactive at the fire scene, necessitates proactive management. A proactive management approach entails a long list of items that begins with hiring practices. Yet, even working with what we now have, we can do several things that will expedite stabilizing the fire.
Preincident planning helps to identify the types and construction of buildings, along with their occupancies. With this information, we can evaluate different attack methods and consider various factors.
Company and multicompany training sessions can be held with the intent of improving coordination between companies.
Apparatus practices can be studied to ensure a quick fire attack and sustained water flow. Just studying how apparatus is positioned will reveal when equipment is not being used to its maximum potential.
EFFECTS OF STAFFING
We should take a critical look at response times and the number of personnel responding. Raymond M. Hill, former chief engineer of the Los Angeles (CA) Fire Department, cites seven principles for fire attack.1 He identifies one as the “principle of mass action,” which he explains as follows: “A superior force (mass action) must be concentrated at the critical time and place in order to obtain results. The force used must be greater than that which is `just adequate.` ”
Carl von Clauswitz`s On War, still a great seller and available in most bookstores, discusses combat in military operations. He explains: “In such an aspect we grant that the superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the result of a combat, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other cooperating circumstances. The direct result of this is that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point.”2
Regardless of all the preparations we make through preincident planning, training, and so on, the major contributory factor in achieving a quick knockdown and stabilization is having an adequate force on the scene to initiate and support an effective attack.
RAPID INTERVENTION
Our offensive, aggressive attack should not be without risk/benefit analysis or adequate backup. Hill identifies also the “Principle of Security,” which relates to personnel safety: “Security is essential to the safety of fire combat personnel and the preservation of combat power. Security results from the establishment and maintenance of measures that protect the fire companies and their personnel from undue risk.”
Continues von Clauswitz: “From the subject of the foregoing chapter [from which his previous quote was taken] the general endeavour to attain a relative superiority, there follows another endeavour which must consequently be just as general in its nature: this is the surprise of the enemy.”
Fire, as our enemy, too often provides us with a surprise: that rapid buildup of heat, flashovers, and building collapses. Therefore, we should provide, as part of our mass action, the necessary reserve for a surprise. Our problem exists in how we respond. During the Gulf War, personnel, equipment, and supplies were amassed before taking action. We are not generally afforded that opportunity and must look again at the issue of having adequate personnel arrive in a timely manner.
While many management tools may be used to enhance fire department operations and may help achieve early stabilization, the fact is that they are useless if a sufficient and properly coordinated force is not at the fire scene at the critical time of initial attack.
Again quoting Hill: “It should be kept in mind that risk is common to both action and inaction.” The notion that we must simply await additional personnel or mutual-aid assistance before taking offensive actions means we are delaying stabilization and subjecting the building to increased damage, even to the point of instability. If we refer back to the graphs, we find ourselves pushing the point of stabilization down the time scale, and the results can be easily seen: We increase the time period in which we remain reactive. Until we reach the point where the fire becomes defensive, we increase the chance of injury and death to firefighters and possibly to the public.
Using the concept of incident priorities for management assessment and analysis, our effort is to move the point of stabilization closer to our arrival time than to the time when we pick up. Early stabilization results in less damage to the structure. More importantly, it allows us to dictate what happens on the scene. We become the controllers, and we can be truly proactive. During the attempts to gain control, an injury may be rationalized, and it will be. But once we have control, we can also control our injury rates. n
Endnotes
1. Hill, Raymond M., “Fire Combat!” Fire Command, August 1974; based on a presentation given at the National Fire Protection Association First European Fire Conference in 1973.
2. von Clauswitz, Carl. On War, Penguin Books, 1832; reprinted 1988.
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The general relationship between incident priorities and tactical objectives at a fire incident.
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A shifting of the point of stabilization on a time line, thus accomplishing earlier control or knockdown of a fire and a reduced reaction period.
JOHN A. REARDON is a retired lieutenant from the Detroit (MI) Fire Department. He currently heads a safety training company in Commerce Township, Michigan, and is president of the Michigan Fire Service Instructors Association.
