horror in a haunted Castle
The Fire
How did the fire in the Haunted Castle start? Why were eight teenagers unable to reach safety? How could fire protection and early warning systems have helped to avert this disaster? Presented here is the incident itself, the strategy and tactics used to fight this fire, what the preliminary investigations uncovered, and recommendations to prevent a recurrence of such an event.
Friday, May 11, 1984, was the day of the tragic holocaust that claimed the lives of eight teenagers and injured a dozen others at the Six Flags’ Great Adventure amusement park in Jackson Township, NJ. This was also a day of disgrace for fire protection code enforcement officials everywhere.
The Haunted Castle, a ghastly spook house filled with flammable exhibits and actors dressed as ghouls, was constructed of seventeen 8 X 40-foot linked truck trailers with a false facade made to look like a castle with archways and a moat.
The complex of truck trailers was arranged in an “H” pattern, eight trailers on each side and a control trailer in the center. Only one eight-trailer section was in use at the time due to a light attendance at the park. The floors, walls, and ceilings were lined with plywood. Some of the trailers were partitioned with 2 X 4-inch wood studding covered with plywood paneling to form the maze. Exhibits were constructed of wood and covered with foam rubber. Some of the walls were covered with a foam cellular plastic to add realism to the exhibits and to protect people from injury. Each trailer was air conditioned with an exterior three-ton unit equipped with large circulating air fans.
Fire department operations
The fire was discovered by an employee assigned inside the maze. He smelled smoke, but thought it was from a cigarette. Checking further, he saw smoke coming from the phantom exhibit. He immediately went to the control center trailer where he called in the alarm to the security office. In about four minutes, flame was showing at the top and rear of the trailer.
The Great Adventure fire brigade was dispatched at 6:35 p.m. and responded with two pieces of fire apparatus manned by two men. With the help of other employees, the brigade was able to stretch four H/j-inch handlines. Employees were instrumental in assisting several patrons from the Haunted Castle.
The facility’s fire alarm was supervised and automatically transmitted to the local fire department. The Jackson Township Fire Department received the alarm at 6:41 p.m. Jackson Mills and Cassville Fire Departments also responded.
While enroute to the incident, Chief John Kebeck of the Cassville Fire Department tried to get a progress report via radio. However, heavy traffic on the fire radio prevented him from getting through. Being resourceful, he used his work band radio to call home and had his wife telephone the police dispatcher. Mrs. Kebeck relayed the information that the fire was in the Haunted Castle.
On April 1, 1984, the Cassville Fire Department conducted a drill at the Haunted Castle. Among the many pre-fire plans formulated at this drill, it was determined that if a fire did occur at the Haunted Castle, it would require a four fire department response.
Chief Kebeck ordered this pre-fire plan to be activated,! thereby increasing the respond-* ing units to eight pumpers and two tankers (one 8,500 gallons and one 5,000 gallons).
The Free Wood Acre Fire Department responded with a tanker and was assigned the responsibility of water control and supply. There were no water problems on the fireground. Two hydrants were used, and ample tankers were available.
On his arrival at the fire, Chief Kebeck received a report that all occupants had been evacuated. Disregarding this, search operations were continued. Initial size up indicated’ that the fire was being force fed from the rear of’ the row of trailers. It was^ later reported that four of the attraction’s air circulating fans were operating at the rear of the trailers and contributing to the velocity of the fire.
An interior offensive attack was the initial strategy, but the amount of fire combined with the collapse of flooring near the entrance forced all units to an outside defensive operation. Eight 2 1/2-inch and eight 1 Vi-inch lines were employed. A fence to the rear of the trailers was removed, allowing tor a four-sided attack.
The Tragedy/The Investigation
The fire quickly involved the entire complex. Several holes were cut in the sides of the trailers in order to place lines directly on the fire. Most of the fire was through the roof, subsequently consuming the trailers involved.
When conditions permitted, a thorough secondary search was conducted. The bodies of the eight trapped victims were located at that time. They were found in a loop section of the maze. The teenagers didn’t have much of a chance to escape the fast toxic buildup of copious amounts of heated black smoke followed by a fast flame spread from both the rear and the front due to the loop in the maze.
This fire should never have happened. In fact, the Haunted Castle should never have been built. It was constructed without a building permit and a certificate of occupancy was never issued. The structure was subject to the state’s uniform construction code that, among other things, requires smoke detectors and a review by the state and a professional plan reviewer.
The use of truck trailers linked together to form the Haunted Castle and the placement of large loads of flammable materials in them was a major factor contributing to the fast fire spread. Polyurethane foams, under the proper conditions, are capable of propagating flames at a very high rate because they have a high heat release rate due to having a low thermal inertia. These foamed plastics have the propensity to generate large amounts of black smoke and toxic gases, including carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene and nitrous oxides.
The small size of the truck trailers, made smaller by the addition of partitions to form a maze, set up conditions for a flashover. The plywood wall, ceiling, and floor covering, along with the sprayed-on foam would reach flashover point rapidly due to the pyrolysis of the combustibles and the sensitivity of the radiate thermal feedback in the confined space.
Another major factor contributing to rapid flame spread was the four large air circulating fans.
At press time, a grand jury investigation, called by Prosecutor Edward ]. Turnbach of Ocean City, NJ, was underway. Senator Frank X. Graves, Jr., chairman of the Senate Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee, called for statewide meetings to be conducted by the New Jersey State Fire Safety Commission. These meetings are analyzing all existing state agency requirements pertaining to the uniform construction code, and making needed revisions for new legislation that would prevent the recurrence of the Haunted Castle fire or similar tragedies.
Safety Feature Recommendations
Proper safety code enforcement, especially in an amusement park attraction filled with “phantoms” and optical illusions, is mandatory for preventing a recurrence of New Jersey’s Haunted House tragedy.
The Building Official and Code Administration (BOCA) Basic Building Code, the BOCA Basic Fire Prevention Code, and the National Fire Protection Association’s Life Safety Code all prescribe construction, protection, and occupancy features to minimize danger to life from fire, smoke, fumes, or panic during a fire incident. The following features, as well as a study of people activities, should be incorporated into a building designed for such an occupancy as the Haunted Castle:
- Smoke detectors.
- Sprinkler system equipped with a central station signaling system.
- Emergency lighting to conform to the national electrical code.
- Exit signs with supplemental directional signs designating the direction of egress.
- Interior finish and furnishings in all means of egress should be Class A (flame spread 0 to 25).
- Employees and attendants should be schooled in their duties in case of fire, smoke, panic, or other emergencies in order to expedite the evacuation of all occupants.
- Fire brigades must be adequately manned. Two or three men do not make a fire company. An improperly manned and ill-trained fire brigade responding first due to an incident will only add to the delay of the fire attack and cause unnecessary confusion.
- The number of exits must be adequate and maintained in a safe condition at all times for a speedy flow of all occupants to safety.
- Manual shutoff for all air conditioning or ventilating systems. The shutoff must be easily identified and located where it is readily accessible for fire department use, perhaps in the same locations as recommended for smoke detectors.
- Automatic smoke vents in the roof.
- Eliminate loops in corridors that create dead end areas where fire could seal off means of egress at both ends of a loop.
- Remove rubber tires from trailers that are occupied by people. These tires are difficult to extinguish when on fire, and produce large volumes of smoke.
- Use of cellular plastic foam, even when treated with a fire retardant, should not be used as an interior finish in buildings classified as places of assembly.
- Truck trailers or similar type containers that would set up a vault-like atmosphere when subjected to fire, smoke, or toxic fumes should not be used for public assembly areas.
- Plywood should not be used as interior finishes on walls, floors, and ceilings without an approved thermal barrier such as gypsum wallboard. (Some plywoods are extremely flammable and easily subjected to breaks and tears are exposed surface areas, making for a more readily ignitable material.)
