LUMBERYARD IN A GYM FLOOR
At 0150 hours on January 5, 1992, the Providence (RI) Fire Department responded to a box alarm on the campus of Rhode Island College. What occurred over the next few hours tested the department’s ability to handle a deceptive fire that, in hindsight, clearly had the potential to take the lives of many firefighters. More than 100 firefighters were needed to control the four-alarm fire, which resulted in a S10 million loss for the college.
The alarm came in from Walsh Recreation Center, a large recreational facility and gymnasium complex that was home to the college’s athletic department and varsity teams. The structure, built in 1963, was—from all appearances—of unprotected steel frame construction with concrete block walls. The roof, eight inches thick, consisted of alternating layers of rubberized roof membrane material and foam insulation over its original tar and gravel metal deck. This was supported by a steel bar joist (parallel-chord truss) assembly. The building had no sprinklers, standpipes, or smoke detectors. It is presumed that heat detectors activated the alarm, sending a hill first-alarm response.
First-arriving units observed a fairly heavy smoke condition that smelled more like a wood-burning stove than a building fire. Upon entering, firefighters were puzzled by this smoke and the building type. Companies initially performed a search of office areas on the second-floor mezzanine, since there was a smoke condition there and burning office combustibles logically would be a source of the “wood smell.” Shortly thereafter, personnel on the first-floor (main gymnasium) level located fire behind some folded-up bleachers in the southwest corner of the building. A line was stretched to this location, but it soon was apparent that a considerable fire was burning below.
Handlines were stretched into the basement via three interior stairs, and a second alarm was transmitted. Truck company personnel began the arduous task of ventilating the builtup roof.
From this point forward, conditions began to deteriorate rapidly. Basement companies verified a large fire, apparently originating from the sauna area at approximately the center of the basement, against which handlines were having minimal effect. Members also reported seeing blue flames. Of even more concern, radio reports from companies operating in the basement were garbled or were not being received because the closest radio repeater station was several miles away. Propane cylinders feeding uniform dryers were located and shut off. The blue flames continued.
Basement companies were a considerable distance into the building, attacking the fire w ith 400-foot handlines, of which more than 300 feet were inside the building. Despite their efforts, the fire was increasing in intensity and appeared to be spreading internally through the building.
At approximately 0230 the first sign of structural problems began appearing. Companies reported that the plaster-on-wire-lath basement drop ceiling was cracking apart and falling off. On the outside, cracks began appearing on the brick exterior due to the elongation of steel structural members.
At 0233 Deputy Chief Paul Wentworth ordered the building evacuated, and withdrawal was safely completed by 0236. With all personnel accounted for, Wentworth switched to a defensive strategy. At 0243 fire broke through the gym floor, and within 10 minutes the fire was through the roof. The block walls on all four sides had cracked and buckled, and at 0301 the roof collapsed, causing a large section of the west wall to collapse along with it.
The fire went to four alarms, as inadequate water supply hampered master stream operations, I.ong-distance relay operations were established, and the fire was placed under control at 0432 hours. The building was a total loss. The looks of frustration on the faces of the first-in firefighters were telling.
AN UNUSUAL FLOOR
Most firefighters were discouraged to think that a noncombustible building with a relatively light fire load possibly could be damaged so severely by fire. Subsequent investigation revealed that the gym floor was the primary factor leading to the building’s destruction. It was a “special” design, intended to function as a shock absorber for the athletes who used it. On the surface it was a beautiful oak floor ( 1-inch by 3-inch boards). The surface was supported below by 1-inch by 4-inch boards laid flat, spaced approximately 1 ½ inches apart. Beneath this layer was another layer of 1-inch by 4-inch boards crisscrossed in the opposite direction, spaced 30 inches on center, forming a web. Below these was a third layer of l-inch by 4-inch boards spaced 1½ inches apart. This assembly then sat on 2-inch by 4-inch boards spaced 30 inches on center. The entire assembly rested on a steel beam grid, w ith each grid section six-feet by six-feet square. Wherever a two-by-four intersected the grid, it was bolted into a steel beam. This design was supposed to give the floor a “springiness” that would prevent injuries to basketball players.
These five layers of wood w ere in a void approximately four feet high, running the entire length of the building. The wooden floor was approximately 180 feet by 105 feet. The architect for the building said the college was emphatic about the gym having a “spring wood” floor, and that it was designed according to their exact specifications from wolmanizcd wood. Interestingly enough, after wood has been wolmanized (a pressure treatment), it burns with a blue flame.
Adapted from original drawings by David Varone
A suspended plaster ceiling was all that stood between the void and the basement. According to the Rhode Island state fire marshal, the Walsh Ciym fire was electrical in origin. It began in the men’s sauna room, located in the basement directly below the center of the gym floor. Once ignited, the fire had almost immediate access into the gym floor void space and the lumberyard within.
It is believed that the fire was burning in the gym floor void space for a considerable period of time prior to alarm activation. Conservative estimates place the amount of wood in the void at 175,000 board-foot. The spacing of the various wood members making up the floor provided nearperfect conditions for the fire to spread. The void had no draft-stopping or compartmentation. Thus, once the fire entered the void, it had access to the entire 180by 105-foot area.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Firefighters need a good understanding of building construction, together with confidence in their ability to assess a building’s structural stability during a fire. Yet, do not forget the saying, “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.” You must recognize that no matter howr much you learn about building construction, there are architects and builders who have created surprises waiting to be found.
Those w ho fought the fire at Walsh Gym agree that the Providence Fire Department is extremely fortunate that no lives were lost battling this blaze. At the time the evacuation signal was given, approximately 15 firefighters and three handlines were operating in the basement area. The “surprise” of Walsh Gym was learned without the need for funerals, expensive investigations, finger-pointing lawsuits, and guilt felt by all involved. However, that fact should not in any way detract from the magnitude of the lessons learned.
It is incumbent on command officers to be alert for the earliest signs that a building’s integrity has been compromised. Similarly, company officers, w ho are the eyes and ears of the incident commander, actively must search their surroundings for structural problems and report what they find to the appropriate sector or command officers. Assumptions made about a building’s construction or its fire load should not and cannot allow you to be oblivious to warning signs of structural problems, nor can they allows you to deny their existence.
You simply cannot predict what surprise some architect, builder, remodeler, handyman, or homeowner has prepared either in building a new building or remodeling an existing one. Your best chance for survival is to study building construction with a passion; conduct in-depth prefire inspections; establish an open channel of communication between the fire department and architects/builders/ engineers, reinforcing the importance of “fire safe” construction methods; and always look for the slightest sign of possible structural failure before, during, and after fires.
